Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century

by Mark Mazower

An unflinching and intelligent alternative history of the twentieth century that provides a provocative vision of Europe's past, present, and future.

"[A] splendid book." — The New York Times Book Review

Dark Continent provides an alternative history of the twentieth century, one in which the triumph of democracy was anything but a forgone conclusion and fascism and communism provided rival political solutions that battled and sometimes triumphed in an effort to determine the course the continent would take.

Mark Mazower strips away myths that have comforted us since World War II, revealing Europe as an entity constantly engaged in a bloody project of self-invention.  Here is a history not of inevitable victories and forward marches, but of narrow squeaks and unexpected twists, where townships boast a bronze of Mussolini on horseback one moment, only to melt it down and recast it as a pair of noble partisans the next.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, European History, Politics, 20th Century, War, World History

512 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1998

About the author

Mark Mazower is a historian and writer, specializing in modern Greece, twentieth-century Europe, and international history. His books include Salonica City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950, winner of the Duff Cooper Prize; Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe, winner of the 2008 Los Angeles Times Book Prize for History; and Governing the World: The History of an Idea. He is currently the Ira D. Wallach Professor of History at Columbia University, and his articles and reviews on history and current affairs appear regularly in the Financial Times, the Guardian, London Review of Books, The Nation, and New Republic.

Reviews

[Helen · Rating 4 out of 5]

I thought this was a tremendously well-written historical journey through the tragic history of Europe in the 20th Century by an eminent historian. This is not a heavy historical account - instead it is suffused with clarity, wisdom, and insight. It is also a book you look forward to reading, as if you are listening to a vastly knowledgeable, erudite, yet friendly historical guide. It does take a commitment of time and intellectual effort but is well worth it. I would recommend it to anyone interested in learning more about the unfortunate combination of circumstances in 20th C Europe that led to the largest human slaughter in both World Wars, as well as how the continent finally learned to live in peace during the second half of the century. The differences between Eastern and Western European development are set forth in illuminating detail, as is the gradual and inevitable disintegration of communism in Eastern Europe. Reading this book will increase the reader's understanding of the many factors - political and economic - that play into today's European economic crisis, although, as this books was written almost at the end of the 20th C (in 1998) the economic crisis that began in 2008 was still 10 years away.

[Nikos Tsentemeidis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Εκπληκτικό βιβλίο ιστορίας. Όλη η ιστορία της Ευρώπης του 20ου αιώνα απλά και κατανοητά από μια διαφορετική σκοπιά. Εστιάζει πιο πολυ στην εξέλιξη της κοινωνίας, των ιδεολογιών και των οικονομικών δεδομένων στη διάρκεια ενός αιώνα γεμάτο από πολέμους που άλλαξαν σημαντικά την Ευρώπη. Σπουδαίος ιστορικός ο Mazower, γνωστός από τα πολλά του έργα που σχετίζονται με την Ελλάδα. Στις θετικές κριτικές στο οπισθόφυλλο του βιβλίου υπάρχει και αυτή του Eric Hobsbawm. Από τα βιβλία που είναι χρήσιμα σε όλους.

[Tim · Rating 5 out of 5]

Dark Continent is not an easy read, but it is a good one with numerous insights to the time between 1919 and the 1990s. Mazower describes the rise of Hitler amid a Europe fascinated by nationality and race and tired of democracy and capitalism. He offers no apologies for the Nazi movement, but describes a European context alive with racism and fear that makes Hitler an extreme example and not an otherworldly demonic force. The chapters on the haphazard operations of the Nazi conquerors and the slow creation of the Eastern block during the Cold War add the horror of alternative histories to the real horrors he relays. He recounts forced migration after the war (12 million Germans expelled from Eastern Europe), ethnic cleansing that combining with Nazi horrors left Eastern European countries far more ethnically homogenous than before the conflict. In both Western and Eastern Europe a drive for consumer goods in the 60s and 70s replaced heroic post-war rebuilding efforts. He is not fond of Thatcher or that postive about the EU, but is happy that post-war Europe has settled peacefully (even complacently) into its smaller world role. Great examples, thoughtful and contrary arguments, incredibly enlightening.

[Max Nemtsov · Rating 5 out of 5]

Самое время читать наконец социально-политическую историю Европы как "темного континента": Мэзауэр доказывает, что фашизм для европейской цивилизации роднее, понятно, коммунизма, поэтому был не просто не случаен, а прямо-таки закономерен. На этом фоне книги, написанной в конце 90х годов прошлого века, становится понятно и как в этом веке фашизм мог возродиться в бывшей социалистической стране, которая тоже, как ни верти, часть Европы. Вернее он никуда, в общем не девался, а всегда был отрыжкой империализма. Настоящая же демократия, по мысли автора, как это ни парадоксально, наблюдалась только в начале века в национальных монархиях.

И любой отход от условной "либеральной демократии" неизбежно приводит к уничтожению конституции и фашизму, как его ни называй - тоталитарным строем, русской неомонархией, православным капитализмом или корпоративным государством. Это все рыла фашизма. Риторика и действия нынешнего кремлевского режима - настолько точная копия риторики и действий нацистов, разбиравшихся с наследием Веймарской республики, что даже смешно (эти упыри ничего своего придумать не в состоянии, включая мечты о Крыме как о "германской Ривьере", до которой можно добраться по автобану... обмолвился, должно быть, российской, конечно): от религиозных скреп и "особого" национального мировоззрения и пути развития, до "фюрерпринципа" и постановки "дегенеративных" элементов не только вне общества, но и вне "закона". Насаждение семейных ценностей и норм ГТО, поощрение рождаемости и демонизация альтернативной сексуальности - все это те кальварии фашизма, по которым неуклонно движется сейчас россия. Скоро они начнут принудительную стерилизацию, а затем и истребление умалишенных и недееспособных. Контрацепция станет уголовно наказуемой, а за аборты будут расстреливать. Другого логического исхода у этого идеологического элефантиаза, сопровождаемого флатуленцией, быть не может.

Неизбежность конца русского фашизма тоже становится ясна, будучи поставлена в контекст европейской истории ХХ века. Прежде, чем одолеть германский фашизм, либеральные демократии тоже сделали шаг назад на десяток лет. Но понятно и то, что фашистские режимы стабильны в смысле поодержки их т.н. "народом": что в нацгермании, что в совроссии или нынешней кремлегадости. Т.е. сейчас нас ждут, конечно, темные времена, но они - чисто по исторической необходимости - довольно скоро закончатся, что несколько утешает. Но затем начнется послевоенье, и тут нам остается только интерполировать с поправками на нынешний ветер, но мало что хорошего будет и там, хотя обойдемся без спойлеров, все и так всё понимают.

Ошибка Мэзауэра при оценке совецких дел (которую, впрочем, многие совершают) в том, что и партию Ленина, и партию Сталина он называет "большевиками": в то время как  "сталинским соколам" следовало бы дать какое-то другое название ("стервятники", что ли... трупоеды, в общем), потому что "большевиков" per se они успешно уничтожили. Потеря для истории невелика, конечно, но это были два разных биовида, как жабы и гадюки. У революции начало-то было, как в песне, а вот конца, сука, нет до сих пор.

...Да и список увлеченных фашизмом деятелей, конечно, впечатляет: от Чорана и Элиаде до Музиля и Уэллза (а вы Навальному простить заигрываний с национализмом простить не можете, ха).

...Ну а общим эпиграфом к книге могла бы, конечно стать песня Дольского "Прощай, ХХ век", не будь она написана в свое время с ламерских позиций идеалиста-шестидесятника.

[Nikola Jankovic · Rating 5 out of 5]

Istorijska knjiga ovog stručnjaka za 20. vek, Balkan (pre svega Grčku) i ideološki kontekst moderne istorije, sa podnaslovom 'Evropa u dvadesetom veku' je među boljim stvarima koje sam pročitao poslednjih godinu-dve. Odlagao sam početak čitanja, prolazio pored nje tamo na polici, nekako mi se činilo "20. vek, zar nije već sve rečeno?"

Bio sam nepravedan. Ovo je briljantna istorijsko-sociološko-ekonomske studija. Teško bi bilo udubiti se u nju sa nekim osnovnim znanjem istorije 20. veka, nema ovde standardne hronologije, prepričanih najbitnijih događaja i velikih ličnosti. Za to valjda imamo udžbenike, ali i druge sjajne knjige o ovom veku. Mazover pokriva vreme od 1919. do 1995., i ne beži od istorijskih uvida, ali se više bavi nekakvim sociološkim pregledom evropskog društva i uticaju istorije na evropska shvatanja, kvalitet života, reakcije Evropljana na velike događaje (znajući naravno, da Evropa nije monolitni kontinent, ponekad su se te stvari prilično razlikovale). Na primer, kako je i zbog čega demokratija doživela udarac nakon Velikog rata. Da li bi se uopšte oporavila da nije došlo do novog rata? Zašto je desnica bila toliko privlačna, i zbog čega je ekonomski uspeh komunizma u Sovjetskom savezu bio magnet za mase na zapadu? Šta se dešavalo sa manjinama u vremenu između rata, kako je na njih pokušalo da utiče Društvo naroda, i šta su drugačije (ako išta) uradili Ujedinjeni narodi. To su, recimo, pitanja kojima se ova knjiga bavi na koncizan i jasan način.

Ne možemo naravno mimo Drugog svetskog rata, ali je i on pokriven drugačije. Ovde imamo autorov pogled na nacističku ideju "udružene Evrope" (i zbog čega je naziva Hitlerovom propuštenom prilikom), kao i na međunarodni poredak i promene tokom rata, kako je došlo do holokausta i genocida.

Ako pogled na Drugi svetski rat možda nije najbolji deo knjige, zato je toliko bolji pregled Hladnog rata - a pre njega godina tokom kojih deluje da nije bilo konkretnog plana, ni sa istočne ni sa zapadne strane. Sovjeti su bili zadovoljni postignutim u ratu, jednostavno trebalo se oporaviti od 20 miliona žrtava. Tako im je uspostavljanje Poljske kao bafer-zone između Nemačke i Sovjetskog Saveza bilo donekle ispunjenje želja. Ideja svetske revolucije odavno je napuštena, tako da su razmišljali o tome kako da potpuno iscrpe Nemačku, (mada je čudno da podela Nemačke nije bila ideja nijedne velike sile, sem Francuske). Rusi nisu imali u to vreme planove za uspostavljanje Gvozdene zavese, tražili su se i u tome kako da organizuju vlast u istočnom bloku. Brzo su osnovane i organizovane komunističke partije i odmah na leto 1945. jeste krenulo da se deluje na terenu, ali izgleda mi da je ideja bila da se prelazak u socijalizam izvede kroz pobede na izborim. Tek kasnije, a mora se priznati delom i zbog uticaja anti-komunizma sa zapada, počeo je da se zauzima čvršći stav.

Narodne demokratije su se razlikovale među sobom - nije bilo isto da li si živeo u Poljskoj, Istočnoj Nemačkoj, Čehoslovaćkoj ili u Rumuniji. Mazover je ovde objektivan; nisu bile te države u svemu toliko loše koliko nova istorija želi da nam ih predstavi, ali je jasno da je bilo mnogo propusta i grešaka. Početni ekonomski rast nije bio dovoljan, došlo se do trenutka kad je fokus sa teške industrije trebalo prebaciti na podizanje životnog standarda ljudi, pa je tako ključni trenutak u putu ka slabljenju komunizma bio negde sedamdesetih, kad su ubeđeni socijalisti uvideli da su izgubili ekonomsku trku sa zapadom.

Na zapadu, tu je pogled pogled na ekonomsko čudo podstaknuto Maršalovim planom. Ne bavi se Mazover samo politikom, tu su i njegovi zaista dobri eseji na temu individualizacije društva i (preterane, priznaje i on, kao i većina Francuza i Britanaca u prve dve decenije posle rata) amerikanziacije Evrope. Zašto nema više pobune na nejednakost, šta je ostalo od 1968. i da li je to buđenje bio poslednji protest mladih u okviru ovog društvu stalnog rasta, zbog čega je levica u problemu u kom jeste, kao i šta nas čeka posle "kraja istorije", koji ipak nikako da dođe?

Knjiga je napisana 1999., tako da propušta poslednje godine veka - završava se ratom u Bosni, pa smo uskraćena na njegovo mišljenje o bombardovanju Jugoslavije. Za mene, to bi bio primeren zaključak knjige o "mračnom kontinentu", ali plašim se da mi se taj zaključak ispod pera Mazovera ne bi dopao. Prilično je objektivan i širokih pogleda, ali nisam se složio sa nekim od njegovih komentara na evropski socijalizam (ideološki je više ka centru od mojih uverenja), a nisam se složio ni njegovim komentarima rata na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije. Čovek jeste stručnjak za Balkan, ali su neke stvari ovde prokomentarisano prilično površno. Nisam siguran da je to samo zarad male vremenske distance (4 godine), čini mi se da je generalno tom delu evropske istorije dao manje mesta nego što je bila njegova važnost. Ili ga samo mi vidimo takvim?

Ipak, 1999. nisam pominjao samo zbog toga, hteo sam da kažem da je knjiga napisana pre 25 godina, ali je u sociološkom pogledu na evropski individualizam, liberalni kapitalizam, manjak otpora, veoma aktuelna. Kad bismo samo mogli nekako u tu analizu da uglavimo mobilne telefone, društvene mreže i veštačku inteligenciju, mislim da ne bi trebalo toliko menjati, pa da se ovaj pregled produži do 2019.

[Jenny · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was suggested by a friend at uni. It's on this year's list of essential reads. It's well worth reading and gives a great insight.

[Alexander Theofanidis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Σε ένα βιβλίο που «τρέχει» την ιστορία της Ευρώπης του 20ού αιώνα (με συμπιεσμένα για να χωρέσουν τα σημαντικότερα γεγονότα της εποχής), ο Μαζάουερ τα πάει αρκετά καλά, κάνει εξαιρετικό καταμερισμό του διαθέσιμου χώρου του βιβλίου και όπως πάντα χωρίς συμπάθειες, εμπάθειες και υπερβολές δίνει μια καλή αποτίμηση του χώρου στον χρόνο υπό εξέταση.

Αν χάνει ένα αστεράκι, οφείλεται περισσότερο στις προβλέψεις στο τέλος, που θα μπορούσαν να λείπουν, καθώς ειδικά στο ζήτημα της Ρωσίας που την έβλεπε παραπαίουσα και έτοιμη για διάλυση, η πολυπληθέστερη ευρωπαϊκή χώρα δεν τον δικαίωσε και συνέχισε να παραμένει ένα δυναμικό πρόβλημα για ικανούς λύτες στη διεθνή πολιτική σκηνή (με βασική ευθύνη του χλωμού μπακαλιάρου που είναι στην εξουσία τις τελευταίες δεκαετίες -λίγο πολώνιο στο τσάι μου, παρακαλώ και φοράω τσιμέντο νούμερο 44, για να μην ψάχνεστε).

Σίγουρα αξίζει να διαβαστεί, οι ιστορικοί δεν είναι Νοστράδαμοι και η ακριβής πρόβλεψη του μέλλοντος ανήκει στην επιστημονική φαντασία και τη σειρά Foundation του Asimov, οπότε αρκεστείτε στην ανάλυση των ήδη διαδραματισθέντων, όπου ο Μαρκ τα πάει πολύ καλά.

[Eren Buğlalılar · Rating 3 out of 5]

"Unlike capitalism, whose view of the world was essentially harmo­nious and benign, communism saw itself as embattled and belea­guered." (p. 124)

Lol. Capitalists transported enslaved people between the continents, invented racism, built concentration camps, established official and unofficial apartheid regimes, committed mass murders in their colonies, plotted coups to overthrow revolutionary regimes and assassinated revolutionary leaders. But Mazower thinks their "view of the world was essentially harmonious and benign", whereas communists imagined conspiracies and saboteurs everywhere. Is it a sort of anti-communist gaslighting?

Written only 8 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Dark Continent hits all the sweet spots of the glossary of the triumphant liberal historiography: "twin extremes of communism and fascism" (p. 13), "Soviet/Russian empire", "fascism was more than just another form of capitalism." Even as he mentions the "Communist Achievement" (the Soviet rapid industrialisation effort of the 1930s), he does not drop the hostile tone against the communists: Industrialisation effort was wasteful, disorganised. Yes, it created full employment and big cities, but workers came to the cities "to escape the new collective farms."

Mazower does not want to credit the Soviets about anything. When I read his sentence "the Bolsheviks had opened up breathtaking vistas in relations between the sexes, swiftly emancipating Russian women to an extent unparalleled anywhere else in Europe", I automatically assumed that he now had to "correct" this praise with a negative remark. And correct he did, because he quickly adds: "All of this—in the anti-Bolshevik climate of the 1920s—hardly helped the cause of female emancipation in the rest of Europe." Besides, because of the Bolsheviks "splits opened up within the women’s movement" (p. 80). Seems like the whole book is an effort to whack-the-communist-moles in the European history.

Dark Continent is a well-researched, well-written book that does not only rely on the political history of the Europe but describes the ideological structures, social policies and general trends within the 20th century European societies to give the reader a sense of how it was like to live at that period. I can imagine a liberal reader going through its pages self-righteously and with a sense of accomplishment. But as a communist, I found Mazower's take very much biased.

[Andrea Giovana Pesenti · Rating 5 out of 5]

O que significa e onde se situa a Europa? Essa palavrinha plurissignificativa é corriqueiramente desgastada por muitos de nós para designar um lugar idílico, no qual finalmente reina a paz e o bem estar-social após longos séculos de aprendizados através de intenso conflito e de inúmeras guerras. Mas será mesmo que a Europa é una e indivisível, quiçá uma sociedade coesa e integrada?

Mark Mazonwer, numa linguagem clara mas não acrítica, tenta "desmistificar" este pedacinho de terra que tanto atiça nossa imaginação. Separando o livro por "partes" o autor descreve o que a Europa era no pós Primeira Guerra e o que ela se tornou no pós Segunda Guerra, passando por numerosos atritos internos até ir se transformando, paulatinamente, no que ela é hoje. Esmiuçando os contornos do território europeu, separa-o em oeste, leste e centro, mostrando que, ao invés de coesão, esses blocos estavam em constante atrito ideológico até a metade do século XX, quando acalmaram-se gradualmente com a chegada de uma "paz brutal", também conhecida como guerra fria.

Rejeitando ideais os quais consideramos inerentes à Europa - "berço da civilização ocidental" - e ostentando em seu lugar ideologias de extrema direita, avessas à liberdade e à integração social, a Europa do entre guerras era solo fértil para o desenvolvimento do fascismo e do nazismo; Mazonwer não deixa de apontar, contudo, os supostos porquês da aversão à razão e à fé no capitalismo e na democracia, demonstrando como a Crise de 1930 abalou o pensamento da época. Aponta também que muitos desses ideais ainda (infelizmente) vigoram no pensamento político europeu ocidental do século XXI, através de suas leis para imigrantes, ciganos e outras minorias indesejáveis.

O autor ressalta também a bifurcação territorial do pós Segunda Guerra, e como se deu a reestruturação deste continente destroçado, que fora dividido e abocanhado, de um lado pelo capitalismo americano e de outro pelo julgo soviético, sendo uma excelente referência para se entender o que é a Europa atual, e qual o seu papel neste intrincado mundo globalizado.

[Ami · Rating 5 out of 5]

If we search for Europe not as a geographical expression, but as what Federico Chabod called 'an historical and moral individuality', we find that for much of the century it did not exist.

This book is absolutely brilliant. Mazower analyses all aspects of European history in the 20th century - political, social, economic - to draw a simple but elegant argument: democratic Europe was not a guaranteed outcome, and not because the 'bad guys' might have won the armed struggles that occured in C20, but because the seeds of democracy in Europe are a lot more fragile than most of us assume (or are taught to believe). Mazower demonstrates with ease how nazism and communism were as much part of the continent's heritage and natural political evolution as the democratic project; he demonstrates how these alternating visions of Europe, by co-existing, communicated with and informed one another (economic planning in the USSR informed economic policy in the rest of Europe following the crisis of capitalism in the 30s, for example; the Nazi experiment rushed the creation of the European welfare states; European imperialism fed Nazi, and later, albeit perhaps less glaringly, Soviet, ambitions in Eastern Europe etc). One does not need to agree with all of Mazower's arguments (for example his emphasis on ideological differences when looking at nazism/communism, as opposed to the more popular theory which emphasises the inherent similarities of totalitarian regimes goes against the mainstream, or the mainstream as I knew it) to say that this is an amazingly well-written, well-argued, momentous book. Reading it in 2021, twenty-three years after its publication, makes it seem almost prophetic at times. I'd add that it really is to Mazower's credit that he produced a work so solid but so eminently readable. It was actually catchy!

I enclose more quotes below:

On Europe as the traditional bastion of freedom: The intellectual tradition which identifies Europe with the cause of liberty and freedom goes back many centuries. But if we face the fact that liberal democracy failed between the wars, and if we admit that communism and fascism also formed part of the continent's political heritage, then it is hard to deny that what has shaped Europe in this century is not a gradual convergence of thought and feeling, but on the contrary a series of violent clashes between antagonistic New Orders.

On Hitler's ideological roots: A self-belief rooted in Christianity, capitalism, Enlightenment and massive technological superiority encouraged Europeans to see themselves over a long period as a civilizational model for the globe. Their trust in Europe's world mission was already evident in the 17th and 18th centuries and reached its apogee in the era of imperialism. Hitler was in many ways its culminating figure and through the Nazi New Order came closer to its realization than anyone else.

On race & nazism: Some white Americans were increasingly uncomfortable at the hypocrisies involved in fighting Hitler with a segragated army. Black Americans commented upon 'this strange and curious picture, this spectacle of America at war to preserve the ideal of government by free men, while clinging to the social vestiges of the slave system'. 'The fight is not to save democracy,' wrote Ralph Bunche, summing up what was probably the dominant view among African-Americans, 'for that which does not exist cannot be saved. But the fight is to maintain those conditions under which people may continue to strive for realization of the democratic ideals. This is the inexorable logic of the nation's position as dictated by the world anti-democratic revolution and Hitler's projected new world order.'

On empire & nazism: Most European seemed scarcely aware that any inconsistency was involved in defending human liberties at home while acquiescing in imperial rule overseas. (...) Europeans (and white Americans) remained largely unmoved by the drama of their own racial problems. So long as colonial subjects were willing to fight on their behalf, they had little incentive to alter the structure of power in a radical fashion. But here too, in ways largely invisible to British, French, Belgian and Dutch eyes, the war itself was the catalyst of change: Ho Chi Minh continued the struggle he had begun against the Japanese - against the French; Asian, African and Caribbean servicemen - Kenyatta and Nkrumah among them - returned home from fighting in Europe prepared to continue the struggle which had been started against Hitler.

On the waxing and waning of European attitudes to the Nazi 'new world order': As Luciolli observed, many Europeans were ready by the end of the 1930s to leave behind the liberal, democratic order created after 1918 by Britain, France and the United States for a more authoritarian future. What they did not bargain for was the brutal reality of Nazi imperialism, the reintroduction of slavery into Europe and the denial of all national aspirations apart from the German one.

On the EU: Perhaps the European Union can most fruitfully be seen as the West European nation-state's concession to capitalism. (...) This is why the EU remains most important as an economic entity; it is part of the attempt to adapt European capitalism to the needs of an increasingly global era. (...) The Italian Luciolli criticized the Nazi New Order for assuming that material goods were enough to create a feeling of belonging among diverse European nationals, but his accusation could more fairly be levelled at the European Union with its disquieting 'democratic deficit'. The fact is that capitalism does not create feelings of belonging capable of rivalling the sense of allegiance felt by most to the state in which they live.

[Lauren Albert · Rating 4 out of 5]

It took me a long time to get through this but it was worth it. I learned a lot from it. It's not so much factual (though it is loaded with facts) as "causal"--why things happened the way they did, how those things caused other things, etc. For example, he doesn't just tell you that politics changed in Europe after the Nazi defeat (and how) but why they changed the way they did and how those changes effected things later. It gives one a terrific sense of the connectedness of history. When I have time to upload my quotes to my notes page, you'll have the whole book almost in outline form since I marked so many passages. 6/09

[Johnny(My Realm Of Books) · Rating 5 out of 5]

Εξαιρετικό!!!

[Robert Morris · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a great book, but I don't think it does what it says it does. Dark Continent is billed as, or at least the reviews printed in this edition claim it is, a take down of the positive spin on Europe's 20th century history. The author places himself in opposition to the comfortable "whig history" narrative that Europe naturally chose a peaceful and democratic reaction to the 20th century's horrors, and that things have been improving since. In my opinion, the book supports that narrative quite well rather than discrediting it. It is a great book, and provides a quick and comprehensive history of Europe's last century. It is just not as revisionist as the author and its reviewers seem to think it is.

It is a fantastic piece of historical writing though. By telling the entire history of the century, the author avoids falling into the easy periodization that most other histories follow. Before this book, my understanding was the common one: Europe's golden 19th century ended with two cataclysmic wars, followed by a glorious reconstruction in a new peaceful system. Nothing important happened in the "low, dishonest decades" in between, and if you want to know about the wars check out some History Channel documentaries. Mazower provides a valuable service by examining the decades before WWII, and WWII itself from a different perspective. His focus on the failed attempts at liberal democracy between the wars, and Hitler's surprisingly long-lasting attempts at setting up a European system is invaluable. He successfully makes the case that you need to understand these periods to understand modern Europe. His interpretation of what these decades say about Europe is not entirely convincing, but the story is enlightening.

[Jasper Van Der Schaaf · Rating 4 out of 5]

De omineuze cover van deze in 2000 verschenen moderne geschiedenis klassieker kijkt mij al jaren uit de boekenkast aan. 23 jaar na publicatie ter hand genomen. Wat een eruditie en wat een soepele pen heeft deze man. Mazower springt met evenveel gemak door de politiek-dogmatische verschillen in de jaren '20 tussen de sociaal-democratie en het communisme als door de opkomende vreemdelingenhaat op ons "donkere" continent in de jaren '80. Een aantal van zijn illustrere (en linkse) Britse voorgangers komen voorbij, Eric Hobsbawn (The age of extremes), E.H. Carr (The 20-years crisis). Aan die eerste ontleent Mazower zijn periodisering: De korte 20e eeuw laat hij duren van 1914-1991. Het einde van de geschiedenis voorspelt hij de gelukkig niet, maar wel de wijze woorden dat West- en Oost-Europa tot elkaar veroordeeld zullen blijven. Mazower zegt het zo: The Western excess of realpolitik is counterbalances by excessive east European myopia (p. 4010).

Het boek is ambitieus van opzet, maar slaagt er toch in om in ruim 400 pagina's een duidelijk en coherent verhaal neer te zetten. De eerste 200 pagina's beslaan de periode tot en met WO2 (Mazower laat die doorlopen tot 1947) en die zijn magistraal. Hij maakt heel goed invoelbaar dat de democratie in 1933 in vrijwel geen enkel land als levensvatbaar werd gezien en als een mislukte staatsvorm werd beschouwd door de vele wisselingen in regeringen. De Weimar-republiek werd eigenlijk al per decreet geregeerd in 31-32 en Hitler zette die trend gewoon voort. De verwijzing naar een aantal belangrijke maar vaak vergeten juristen die het (internationaal) recht hebben gevormd zoals Hans Kelsen (fel tegen Hitler) en Carl Schmitt (Hitlers hofjurist), is een zeldzaamheid in een historisch boek. Ook de economische analyse van de autarikisch-nationalistisch-kartel economie en het moderne karakter daarvan destijds zijn zeer interessant. Soms vliegt hij uit de bocht. Als het gaat over een "what if" scenario waarin Hitler de Wannsee principes niet in de praktijk zou hebben gebracht memoreert Mazower dat dan de Polen of de Russen de joden wel zouden hebben vermoord. Mazowers vader is een "Bund" jood die is gevlucht uit de buurt van Vilnius en dat trauma laat zich dan even zien. Dat maakt nieuwsgierig naar zijn meest recente boek over zijn vader (Wat je niet vertelde, Atlas, 2017).

Bij de laatste 200 bladzijden bekroop mij het gevoel alsof de titel van dit boek en de omineuze voorzijde nog wel juist waren. Vanaf de jaren '50 is Europa hoofdzakelijk een groot succesverhaal, zowel economisch, democratisch, als sociaal-cultureel. Natuurlijk is er geen steun gekomen uit het Westen voor de Hongaarse en Praagse opstanden. En natuurlijk stelde het Warschau pact weinig voor, maar heeft de NAVO daar jaren over vergaderd. En natuurlijk heeft niemand, maar dan ook niemand de het ineenzijgen van de Sovjet-Unie voorspeld. En ja, die kwam van binnenuit, zoals schrijver Imre Kertesz na het mislukken van de Hongaarse opstand als eens ironisch schijnt te hebben gezegd. En daarmee is dit boek toch weer angstwekkend actueel. Want wie in godsnaam gaat onze agressieve Russische oosterbuur op dit moment stoppen? Weer staat het westen met de handen op de rug. De gesprekken over Nordstream 2, Wandel durch Handel en het weigeren van wapenleveranties door Duitsland aan Oekraïne lijken daarmee in een andere eeuw te behoren. Ik zou erg benieuwd zijn wat Mazower over de laatste 20 jaar te zeggen zou hebben. Zou de 20e eeuw misschien toch pas net zijn afgelopen, met de inval in Oekraïne? Oost en west zijn onherroepelijk tot elkaar veroordeeld. Slava Ukraina!

[Bryn Hammond · Rating 4 out of 5]

Riveting up to and including World War Two; after that a much more ordinary history, and its epilogue on Europe today – in 1998 – reads sadly now. An absolute five stars for the first half of the century, presented as a struggle between three ideologies: liberal democracy, fascism, communism – without the sense of ‘inevitable victory’ for the first. He wants to get away from liberal democracy’s complacency about its natural place in Europe. I could have read nothing better to come to terms with the fact that fascism is again popular, and liberal democracy, not for the first time, shaky.

[Alexandra · Rating 3 out of 5]

Minus one star for no mention of Eurovision

[Swarthout · Rating 4 out of 5]

covering 20th century europe centers around wwii, of course. the build up to it or the attempts at settlement after the great war. how there really wasnt any resolution due to managing needs of ethnic minorities found in many countries. outlines the motivations behind germanys insane racial pseudo science attempt to resolve issues surrounding their dealing with minoritys (just kill them).

after the war the issues of rebuilding and how hitlers insane policies led to peoples heavy legal framework to work in opposition of these policies (respect for human rights). he claims it wasnt successful, and looking currently whats happening in the western workd confirms this, even though the book was written in the 90s. optimism about living together in harmony has now been replaced with a relative competitive drive to fall in line with your group (white people), driven by elite extremism and capitalististic malaise, along with a strange fear of demographic "replacement" by immigrants. sound familiar ? gulp. heres to hoping 2032 is better. lol.

[Christopher Saunders · Rating 5 out of 5]

Engrossing analytical history of Europe's 100 year political turmoil, from World War I through the fall of Communism. Mazower (Hitler's Empire) takes a macro view focusing on ideologies and socioeconomic developments rather than specific events. He's particularly good highlighting the development and failure of particular ideologies: the distinctions between Nazism and "Old Right" fascist movements, Thatcherism's disastrous overreach (and its discrediting of European neoliberalism), the USSR's status as Europe's last traditional empire. An excellent, insightful read.

[dantelk · Rating 4 out of 5]

İlk yarısı çok ilginçti, soğuk savaş ile birlikte kitap biraz gemi azıya aldı. Mazower biraz daha hedefe yönelik yazabilirmiş son kısımda. Yine de iyi bir okuma. Basım yılının eskiliği, bu eserin her sene daha demoda olmasına sebep oluyor yazık ki...

Kendime notlar
-> Demokrasi, ww2 öncesi sallandıkça sallanıyor; milletleri birleştirmek yerine bölüyordu. Parlemento, ayrılıkları çözmek yerine daha da büyütüyordu. Faşizm ve komünizm, bu tıkanıkları açmak için ilaç olarak görülüyorlardı ve heyecanla karşılandılar.
-> Eski imparatorluklar demokrasi yerine monarşi ile yönetiliyorlardı; bu karma ülkeler için daha uygun. Osmanlı diplomatları Yunan olabiliyorlardı.
-> Osmnalı-> Türk. Çarlık -> Rusya. Habsburg'dan Macarlar çıktı. Osmanlılar da aynı taktikle, bir Bulgar kilisesi kurarak, Yunan'larla Bulgarları ayırdılar. İngilizlre ve Fransızlar bunu sevdiler; bu ülkeleri idare etmek daha kolay, ve Almanya ve Rusya'ya karşı da güvenlik sağlıyorlar.
-> İts unique culture rather than patrolled borders guarantees a nation independent existence.
-> Polonya'da bir yayın: Tüm polonyalılar eşittir. Sadece yahudiler, Polonya'ya asimile olamadıklarından dolayı hariç tutulmaktadırlar. Bu Fransa'da falan da gözlenen bir bakış açısı; ulus-devlet'in öğesisin, ya da düşman!
-> Ermeni katliamlarında/soykırımında Avrupa ağzı açık izlerken, bu ulus devlet fikrini verenin ve ortalığın karışmasına sebep olanların kendileri olduğunu unutuyorlardı
-> Mübadele, ulus devletçiler tarafından heyecanla karşılanıyor.
-> İtalyanlar Etiyopya'yı "modernleştirirken", Almanlardan farklarının, modernleştirme/köleleştirme opeasyonunu kıta Avrupa'sında değil Afrika'da uyguladıkları analşılıyor.
-> British nationalism is based more on culture; not race.
-> O dönemde ırk devamlılığı çok kritik görünüyor; özellikle küçük ve yeni ulus devletlerde üreme kampanyaları var. Anneler günü böyle ortaya çıkıyor hahahhaha!
-> Yunanlar, krizde vergi toplamak için paraları ortadan ikiye kesiyorlar.
-> Londra'da Gants hill istasyonu Sovyet mimarisine göz kırpıyor; herkes esinleniyor.
-> Komünizme şimdi tü kaka diyorlar; 1930'larda hiç öyle değildi: Köylü çarlığı, müthiş bir sanayi devletine dönüşmüş bir başarı hikayesiydi.
-> İtalya Mussolini: Active state takes place of free market. Liberal selfish individual is succeeded by disciplined collectivity.
-> Fransa'nın düşüşü, Avrupa'ya daha katı, ama en azından iş olan bir düzen gelmesi ümidi yarattı. İnsanlar bunu felaket olarak görmediler. Paris'te Almanca dersi alan öğrenci sayısı 1939'da roketledi, İngilizce dersi alan sayısı azaldı.
-> Himmler: düşük ırk için okullar olmalı; basit matematik (500'e kadar saymayı bilseler kafi), ismini yazmayı bilmek, okumayı öğrenmeye gerek yok... Doğu'daki okullar bunlar olmalı...
-> Danish'ler neredeyse tüm yahudileri güvenli yerleere kaçırmayı becerebildiler.
-> Nazi'lerin ırkçılığı diğer tüm Avrupa toplumlarında da var olan bir özellik; sadece diğerleri, bunu Avrupa'daki komşularına uygulamamışlardı.
-> Demokrasi tam olarak çözüm olmuyor; oy verme hakkı güzel ama çalışma hakkı ve yaşama hakkı daha kritik. Burjuva demokrasisi değil "sosyal" demokrasi....
-> Savaşla birlikte sosyal devlet fikri gittikçe belirginleşmeye başladı. Komünist düzenin başarısı, bunun batı'da nasıl harmanlanacağını Londra'daki politikacılara bile düşündürdü.
-> Commonwealth is linked together with the loyalty to one king.
-> ABD, özgür dünya fikirlerini yaymaya çalışırken, kendisi eşitsizliğin en yüksek olduğu gelişmiş ülke idi. Diğer "gelişmiş" ülkeler de öyle.
-> Savaş dönemi tüm ahlak kurallarını tersine çevirdi; insanlar paranoyağa döndüler. İnsanlar konuşmayı unuttular; ya bağıranlar ya da fısıldayanlardan oluşan bir toplum...
-> Toplama kampı videolarını pek çok alman "propaganda" olarak görüyor. Kimse etkilenmiyor bile.
-> O anki bakış açısı ile, Soviet takeover, daha çok olumlu bir devrim olarak görünüyor, ve doğu Avrupa'nın gelişimi için bir ümit olarak değerlendiriliyor. Demokrasi bir boka yaramamış o güne dek.
-> Moskova, batı sınırındaki devletlerin hepsine aleyhlerine sınır kararları alarak havuç tutuyor.
-> Demir Perde ülkelerinde propaganda arttıkça, gençlerin bunlara mukavemet gücü de arttı.
-> Batı Avrupa'da gelir adaletini sağlamak için vergiler alındıysa da devletler pasiftiler, İsveç'te ise devlet olaya aktif olarak el attı.
-> Labour, siyasi arenada mücadele için söylemini değiştirdi, çünkü işçilerin konusu hayat mücadelerinden tüketime kaymaya başladı. Kapitalizm ile sınıf meselesi tamamen tedavülden kalktı. WW2 sonrası İnsanlar apolitikleştiler.
-> Franca Viola isyan edene kadar tecavüzcü ile evlendirilme İtalya'da çok yaygın
-> 1970'e kadar İsviçre'den kadınların oy verme hakkı, Fransa'da banka hesabı açma hakları yok.
-> 1950-72 arası tarım nüfusu, AB'de 30'dan 8.4 milyona düştü. Konuyla ilgili koruma tedbirleri, ticariden ziyade kültürel korumaya yönelikti.
-> Göçmenlik konusu, ırk, vatandaşlık ve milli kültür konusunda dünya kadar tartışmaya yol açtı. Yeni gelenlerin çoğu genç erkeklerdi.
-> Savaş sonrası ırkçılık, önceki kadar beterdi, yeni gelen göçmenler bolca tokat yediler.
-> 1990 yılında İngiltere, bölgenin en eşitsiz ülkesi (gelir dağılımı olarak)
-> İngiliz çocuk kitabı yayıncıları, Fransa'ya kitap gönderirken "mozaik toplum" görsellerini kaldırıyorlar.
-> Muhafazakar partilerin yoğun olduğu yerlerde, anti-imigrant partiler pek kolay yükselemiyorlar (Türkiye bu konuda AB'ye göre tam bir tezat; bizde "sol cephe" göçmen karşı politikalara oynuyor)
-> Citizenship is at the hearth of immigration debate. Yukarı tükürsen bıyık aşağı tükürsen sakal. Kimi ülkeler gerilimleri azaltmak için vatandaşlık sürecini kolaylaştırıyorlar
-> British nationalism is a hybrid and does not fetish purity.
-> 1977 BATI Almanya: kadınlar kocalarından izin almadan çalışma hakkı elde ediyorlar
-> Astroloji, reiki vs hep insanların yeni kapitalist dünyanın güvensilikleri yüzünden ortaya çıkmışlar.
-> There is no future here (Polish worker), you have to wait 10 years for an apartment.
-> "Anyone with visions needs to see a doctor". (Vranitsky) Düzen bozulmasın
-> Avrupalılar demokrasiye inanıyorlar çünkü politika ile ilgilenmiyorlar.
-> 1989'un asıl fatihi demokrasi değil kapitalizm.

[MassiveMichael · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great account on how democracy became a deserted temple and had a comeback in the postwar period. The book further delivers new insights on a time period one thinks has already heard a lot about. I especially liked the parts in which Mazower covers how certain developments impacted the life of the ordinary people. Highly recommend it!

[Gabriela · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wow, this was a great one! If you're looking for an honest and brutal systesis of the XX century, this book might be the right choice.

[laure · Rating 5 out of 5]

somehow it feels like i need to re-read half of this already

[Lasse Christensen · Rating 5 out of 5]

So I have been asking myself, why is Dark Continent such a superb work? I just finished my second reading and it far surpasses any other general history of twentieth century Europe. Why is hardly self-explanatory, when you consider a few of its oddities: it leaves little to no space to pre-1914-developments, almost sweeps over the First World War, leaves the majority of the book to deal with the Nazi New Order, and does not experiment particularly neither thematically nor in terms of chapter structure in its interpretation of the post-45 years, jumping back and forth between the Eastern Bloc and Western Europe, resulting in two fairly separate narratives. With the narrow focus on ‘European history’, international events are sidelined or completely ignored: most American presidents are not even mentioned, nor monumental events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. According to one distinguished reviewer, Dark Continent is an ‘essential work’ for any undergraduate, but Mazower omits chronology and narrative of even the most important events, so that an extremely solid comprehension of Europe’s twentieth century is needed to engage with the book on more than a superficial level.
These are, however, minor peculiarities, and Dark Continent is overall a masterly work of historical enquiry. It is a timely read as well, with pundits once again perpetuating the liberal illusion that authoritarianism follows hierarchically from an alien tyrant. Mazower’s interpretation, which he bases on an impressive range of contemporary commentators and scholars, sees fascism as a direct product of a failed liberal order. We are also terribly wrong to assume that there was anything self-destructive about the new European order as it emerged in the late 1930s: things could have turned out very differently, a point that Mazower explores in more depth in his book on Nazi Germany’s imperial policies, Hitler’s Empire. Had the Speers and the Rosenbergs of the Third Reich gained the upper hand in the Nazi bureaucracy, had the rest of the Axis been allowed a greater say in the construction of a new European order, then a Europe fed up with liberalism and capitalism might have acquiesced. The failure to articulate the aspirations of those frustrated and disillusioned with liberal democracy was therefore, for the Nazis, Fascists and Authoritarians of our world, a ‘missed opportunity’.
And far from the Second World War illustrating the need for liberal democracy in Europe, it led to the most fundamental revamping of liberal democracy in its history. In exile, Charles de Gaulle interpreted the widespread anti-democratic sentiment as a product of an inaccurate conflation of democracy with excessive parliamentarism. H. G. Wells commented that we had forgotten to create ‘democracies that can work’, rather than democracies ‘that can vote’. The democratic systems engineered after the First World War were not simply corrupted by the unfortunate structures they worked under - the international economic crisis, territorial revisionism -, they were inherently inadequate. The New Europe that emerged from the ashes of the German Catastrophe - that being the one of the People’s Democracies, or Schuman’s Europe, - strengthened their executives, and allowed for a new understanding of the meaning of ‘democracy’, including economic and social rights in their constitutions, as exemplified in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Social and economic concerns were to be prioritised over financial capitalism, full employment policies should be the norm and democracies would have to cooperate for mutual gains. What then, if anything went wrong? Mazower's analysis of neoliberalism and Thatcherism is chilling and sheds light on what is still haunting us today - despite Dark Continent being a book of the previous century.

Read this book if you want to understand Europe as it came to be - and more importantly: how it could have turned out.

[Will · Rating 5 out of 5]

All Europeans should read this book, to challenge the safe assumptions that we hold about our recent past.

One point of criticism is that Mazower's arguments are at their best pre-1948, and at their shakiest 1989 onward: for example, the prediction that Russia would no longer to intervene in the affairs of its neighbours has not aged well.

[David · Rating 2 out of 5]

Flawed but interesting—Mazower pretends to be writing ideological history instead of economic but is of course forced at every turn to include the economic course of history that he so despises. A liberal understanding of fascism and Marxism, but with more legitimacy in terms of considering them as extant alternatives than regular liberal teleologists. An unfortunate lack of any real analysis of Europe's imperialist relationship with the rest of the world and how this affected the course of the 20th century (or the Eastern Bloc's lack thereof, which leads to some absurd economic conclusions regarding socialism). Serviceable for a general history but needs to be read critically aware of alternative, more radical perspectives.

[Stefan · Rating 5 out of 5]

A profound work on European 20th century history which gives a lot of useful insights. Mazower is very versatile in his analysis of economic, cultural, political and military factors, and is able to grasp them all equally well. He shows the history of Europe in the 20th century as a struggle that could have gone a different way multiple times in its history, rather than a black-and-white story of progress towards "end of history" liberal democracies. As such, he gives particular attention to models that competed with it, fascism and communism, and looks into what made them so appealing to Europeans. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in modern European history.

[Yannis · Rating 3 out of 5]

I had bought this book as a gift with some newspaper. Much cheaper than the price at the book shops. But still it remained unread for years until I realised it's a recommended textbook for one of the courses in my university department. So what the hell, I decided to read it. Most of the events described are kinda known, 20th century and all. But the insight Mazower gives about social, political and economical issues is great. At some times even prophetic!
Though I have to point out that I prefer ancient history or at least modern military history so I can't say I loved it...

[Meg]

Read this as part on an Open University course A327. Mostly readable, though some parts are a bit dense. The author has a lot of facts and anecdotes about the twentieth century, but something was missing. Maybe I'd prefer a more personal, human narrative. It'll be going to the charity shop when I've finished my course. Not a keeper!

[Miltiadis Michalopoulos · Rating 5 out of 5]

Η ιστορία της Ευρώπης του 20ου αιώνα, όχι σαν παράθεση γεγονότων αλλά με συνθετικό, δημιουργικό και διδακτικό τρόπο. Ο Μαζάουερ διαλύει ορισμένες πλάνες με τρόπο διεξοδικό και πειστικό. Μια πρώτη πλάνη είναι η συχνά διατυπωμένη αντίληψη ότι η Δημοκρατία υπήρξε το "φυσικό" πολίτευμα της Ευρώπης, που παρά την σύντομη αμφισβήτησή του κυριάρχησε νομοτελειακά. Όμως στις αρχές του 20ου αιώνα, η Δημοκρατία ήταν το πολίτευμα λίγων μόνο κρατών της Ευρώπης και μόνο η Αγγλία και η Γαλλία την είχαν σε πλήρη και ολοκληρωμένη μορφή όπως την εννοούμε σήμερα. Η Ευρώπη κυριαρχείτο από μεγάλους κρατικούς σχηματισμούς και αυτοκρατορίες όπως η Αυστρουγγρική και η Ρωσική. Σε αυτές συμβιούσαν ποικίλες εθνοτικές ομάδες, οι οποίες συχνά ήσαν εχθρικές μεταξύ τους και δεν είχαν δεσμούς με τις αυτοκρατορίες στις οποίες τυπικά ανήκαν. Το τέλος του Α΄Παγκοσμίου πολέμου επέφερε μεταξύ άλλων και μαζικές μετακινήσεις πληθυσμών, καθώς νέα κράτη δημιουργήθηκαν στη θέση των παλιών. Από τον μεσοπόλεμο και μετά η Δημοκρατία αμφισβητήθηκε σοβαρά τόσο από τα δεξιά όσο και από τα αριστερά. Στους πολέμιούς της δεν περιλαμβάνονταν μόνο δημαγωγοί και λαϊκιστές πολιτικοί, αλλά και ένα μεγάλο μέρος της διανόησης. Τόσο ο Μπολσεβικισμός όσο και ο Φασισμός-Εθνικοσοσιαλισμός πρότασσαν την έννοια του Κράτους έναντι του ατόμου και υποβάθμιζαν την σημασία της ατομικής ελευθερίας. Στα τέλη της δεκαετίας του '30 οι περισσότερες ευρωπαϊκές χώρες είχαν επιλέξει να διακυβερνηθούν από αντιδημοκρατικά και ανελεύθερα καθεστώτα. Και ενώ γενικά ο ναζισμός θεωρείται ως το πλεον ανελεύθερο καθεστώς, στην πραγματικότητα είχε ευρεία λαϊκή υποστήριξη. Αντίθετα, όπως πολύ εύστοχα παρατηρεί ο συγγραφέας, ο κομμουνισμός κατέλ��βε την εξουσία πραξικοπηματικά, επικράτησε μετά από εμφύλιο πόλεμο και προκειμένου να διατηρηθεί, φυλάκισε στα γκουλάγκ εκατομμύρια ανθρώπους.
Οι παλαιότερες θεωρίες περί ναζισμού, σύμφωνα με τις οποίες "μια μικρή ελίτ καταπίεζε έναν τεράστιο πληθυσμό με όπλο την απροσχημάτιστη τρομοκρατία, μοιάζουν όλο και περισσότερο με μια βολική αυταπάτη". Γιατί μπορεί όντως η πλειοψηφία του γερμανικού λαού να μην ψήφισε τον Χίτλερ, όμως ούτε και του αντιστάθηκε. Αποδέχτηκε την νέα κατάσταση και μάλιστα την υπερασπίστηκε. Και ενώ ο Στάλιν ανησυχούσε πάντα για τη θέση του και προέβη σε μαζικές εκκαθαρίσεις στο κόμμα και στον κρατικό μηχανισμό, ο Χίτλερ με εξαίρεση την Νύχτα των Μεγάλων Μαχαιριών δεν ένιωσε ποτέ την ανάγκη να κάνει κάτι αντίστοιχο.
Πολλά από τα προβλήματα που βασάνισαν την Ευρώπη έχουν τις ρίζες τους στη Συνθήκη των Βερσαλιών. Οι Βερσαλίες είχαν δώσει σε 60.000.000 ανθρώπους το δικό τους κράτος αλλά είχαν επίσης μετατρέψει άλλα 25.000.000 σε μειονότητες. Σε αυτές συγκαταλέγονταν όχι μόνο Εβραίοι, τσιγγάνοι, Ουκρανοί και Μακεδόνες, αλλά επίσης πρώην άρχουσες ομάδες όπως οι Γερμανοί, οι Ούγγροι και οι μουσουλμάνοι. Άρχισε έτσι η προσπάθεια επίλυσης αυτού του ζητήματος των μειονοτήτων με τρόπους συχνά ανεδαφικούς ή ανορθόδοξους.
Στο κεφάλαιο "υγιή σώματα, άρρωστα σώματα" ο Μαζάουερ εξετάζει τις δημοφιλείς στη δεκαετία του '20 και '30 απόψεις περί ευγονικής, όπου εξαιρετικά εύστοχα υπογραμμίζει το γεγονός ότι αποτελούσαν σχεδόν τον κανόνα στις επισημονικές κοινότητες. Επρόκειτο στην ουσία για μια αντίληψη ευρύτατα διαδεδομένη στην μεσοπολεμική Ευρώπη, την οποία βεβαίως ο Ναζισμός οδήγησε σε πρωτοφανή άκρα.
Με τον ίδιο διεισδυτικό τρόπο ο Μαζάουερ περιγράφει την κρίση και την αμφισβήτηση του καπιταλισμού και του φιλελευθερισμού καθώς και την άνοδο και την πτώση της αυτοκρατορίας του Χίτλερ. Με το τέλος του Β΄παγκοσμίου πολέμου τα προβλήματα της υποχρεωτικής μετατόπισης πληθυσμών, και των εθνοτικών ομάδων οξύνθηκαν πολύ περισσότερο απ΄ότι ήσαν στις αρχές του αιώνα. Όμως η φρίκη του πολέμου και η προοπτική ενός πυρηνικού ολοκαυτώματος κατέστησαν αδιανόητη μια μη ειρηνική επίλυσή τους. Η εν συνεχεία κατάρρευση της σοβιετικής αυτοκρατορίας δημιούργησε νέα προβλήματα και σήμανε τον τελικό θρίαμβο του καπιταλισμού. Η σύγχρονη Ευρώπη έχει περισσότερα έθνη-κράτη από οποιαδήποτε άλλη περίοδο στην ιστορία της. Όμως οι λαοί της προσπαθούν να βρουν το δρόμο τους ειρηνικά μέσα από τις κοινοβουλευτικές τους δημοκρατίες. Οι Ευρωπαίοι έχουν αποδεχτεί την Δημοκρατία επειδή δεν πιστεύουν πια στην πολιτική. Οι περισσότερες αξίες του παρελθόντος έχουν σήμερα ανατραπεί. Η μείωση του πληθυσμού που άλλοτε θα θεωρούνταν ως υπονόμευση της εθνικής ακεραιότητας, αξιολογείται σήμερα αποκλειστικά με βάση τις οικονομικές επιπτώσεις της στους πολίτες κάθε χώρας. Οι Ευρωπαίοι ηγέτες έχουν μικρύνει σε σχέση με το παρελθόν. Και ίσως αυτό να είναι καλό, αν σκεφτεί κανείς πού οδήγησαν τις χώρες τους οι ηγέτες με τα μεγάλα οράματα. Όπως είχε πει ένας σύγχρονος ευρωπαίος πολιτικός "αυτός που έχει οράματα πρέπει να πάει στον γιατρό". Ο σαρκασμός αυτός αναδεικνύει μια πικρή αλήθεια, με την οποία κλείνει αυτό το εξαιρετικό βιβλίο: μόνον εαν οι Ευρωπαίοι μπορέσουν να αποδεχτούν μια πιο σεμνή θέση μέσα στον κόσμο, ίσως καταφέρουν να επιλύσουν τις διαφορές τους και να προχωρήσουν σε ένα καλύτερο μέλλον.

[Peter Crofts · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's only 400 odd pages long, but it's a dense, fact heavy, read. I read it twice, since there's so much to absorb. For anyone educated in the Anglo-American triumphalist view of Europe, where capitalism and liberal democracy are now prevalent since that's simply how things were going to work out anyway, I would humbly suggest this is a necessary read, to get beyond a simplistic and, as this book underlines, dangerous manner of thinking.

It was published in 2000, and as I write this review parts of Europe are again experiencing what can only be described as a full on assault against the strictures of liberal democratic good governance, particularly minority rights and an executive constrained by constitutionally enshrined rule of law. While the neoliberal technocrats whine and cajole restive populations for rejecting that particular political tradition the ground beneath our feet is moving. If you read this book you may begin to understand why.