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Two prominent Israeli liberals argue that for the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians to end with peace, Palestinians must come to terms with the fact that there will be no "right of return."
In 1948, seven hundred thousand Palestinians were forced out of their homes by the first Arab-Israeli War. More than seventy years later, most of their houses are long gone, but millions of their descendants are still registered as refugees, with many living in refugee camps. This group—unlike countless others that were displaced in the aftermath of World War II and other conflicts—has remained unsettled, demanding to settle in the state of Israel. Their belief in a "right of return" is one of the largest obstacles to successful diplomacy and lasting peace in the region.
In The War of Return, Adi Schwartz and Einat Wilf—both liberal Israelis supportive of a two-state solution—reveal the origins of the idea of a right of return, and explain how UNRWA - the very agency charged with finding a solution for the refugees - gave in to Palestinian, Arab and international political pressure to create a permanent “refugee” problem. They argue that this Palestinian demand for a “right of return” has no legal or moral basis and make an impassioned plea for the US, the UN, and the EU to recognize this fact, for the good of Israelis and Palestinians alike.
A runaway bestseller in Israel, the first English translation of The War of Return is certain to spark lively debate throughout America and abroad.
304 pages, Kindle Edition
Published April 28, 2020
The Jews, I find, are very, very selfish. They care not how many Estonians, Latvians, Finns, Poles, Yugoslavs or Greeks get murdered or mistreated as Displaced Persons as long as the Jews get special treatment. Yet when they have power, physical, financial or political neither Hitler nor Stalin has anything on them for cruelty or mistreatment to the underdog.
For 2,000 years [the Jews] have claimed that might conveys no right…Driven from country to country as refugees, they have suffered everywhere from the persecution of military powers, and have everywhere denounced their persecutors and looked forward to an age when justice will replace armed power. But now, placed for the first time in a position to persecute others, they suddenly announce that military conquest is the true basis for settlement between nations.
Other statements by Yishuv leaders also show that when the Israeli leadership accepted partition, it had no advance plans to expel the Arabs from Israel, and that were it not for the Arab rejection of partition and the war they waged to prevent it, they could all have remained in their homes. The Palestinians would later argue that Zionism was by its nature a movement geared toward population transfer and that it could not have achieved its objectives without expelling the Arabs from Palestine. In this thesis, the war was just an excuse: the expulsion would have happened anyway.
"So here is where the intent is key. Zionism - and you can blame the early Zionists for being naive - but Zionism was never about dispossessing another people. As much as the Palestinians want to establish this claim, they cannot, because it's very clear: until the Palestinians chose to wage war against partition, no one was dispossessed; if anything, quite the contrary. Zionism meant to build, meant to construct, and in the worldview certainly of Herzl and others, there was room for everyone … Zionism was never about dispossessing the Arabs of the land."
Despite public rhetoric to the contrary, the idea of expelling (or, in the accepted euphemism, "transferring") the indigenous Palestinian population was an integral part of the Zionist effort to found a Jewish national state in Palestine. Historian Tom Segev writes:The idea of transfer had accompanied the Zionist movement from its very beginnings, first appearing in Theodore Herzl's diary. In practice, the Zionists began executing a mini-transfer from the time they began purchasing the land and evacuating the Arab tenants… "Disappearing" the Arabs lay at the heart of the Zionist dream, and was also a necessary condition of its existence… With few exceptions, none of the Zionists disputed the desirability of forced transfer — or its morality.
However, Segev continues, the Zionist leaders learned not to publicly proclaim their plan of mass expulsion because "this would cause the Zionists to lose the world's sympathy."[4]
The key was to find an opportune time to initiate the expulsion so it would not incur the world's condemnation. In the late 1930s, David Ben-Gurion wrote: "What is inconceivable in normal times is possible in revolutionary times; and if at this time the opportunity is missed and what is possible in such great hours is not carried out — a whole world is lost."[5]
The "revolutionary times" would come with the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, when the Zionists were able to expel 750,000 Palestinians (more than 80 percent of the indigenous population), and thus achieve an overwhelmingly Jewish state, though its area did not include the entirety of Palestine, or the "Land of Israel," which Zionist leaders thought necessary for a viable state.
For "a national home for the Jewish people" [as written in the Balfour Declaration] is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.
Already at the time of the Balfour Declaration, apprehensions concerning the fate of the "non-Jewish communities" had been voiced in British establishment circles. Edwin Montagu, a Jewish cabinet minister at the India Office, had expressed in 1917 his belief that the Zionist drive to create a Jewish state in Palestine would end by "driving out the present inhabitants." Even the enthusiastically pro-Zionist Winston Churchill had written in his review of Palestinian affairs dated 25 October 1919 that "there are the Jews, whom we are pledged to introduce into Palestine, and who take it for granted that the local population will be cleared out to suit their convenience."
At the end of April 1922, a few days after Weizmann's visit, Barlassina arrived in Rome. The Osservatore Romano published excerpts from the lecture he delivered there:
Having entered a truly active phase following the well-known Balfour Declaration, Zionism intends, in fact, gradually to expel the present inhabitants of Palestine, in order to seize the entire country and to erect on it the Zionist kingdom.
De Salis sent a report about Barlassina's lecture to Foreign Secretary Curzon and attached a clipping from L'Italie that stated that for an hour and a quarter Barlassina explained, complete with facts and figures, the acts of dispossession, the wrecking of morality, and the de-Catholicization being carried out by the Zionists in Palestine. The newspaper reported Barlassina as saying:
The avowed aim of Zionism is the resettlement of the Jewish people on the land of its forefathers and the expulsion of all other nationalities. Under the pretext of establishing a Jewish national home, Zionism is actually seeking to take the conquest of Palestine. With the help of the British authorities—Sir Herbert Samuel, the high commissioner, and almost all the high officials are active Zionists—the Zionist leaders are in effect the lords of Palestine … The Zionists intend to gradually dislodge the Arabs and the Christians and to settle in their place.
Allenby had a new Chief Political Officer, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, appointed in July 1919. He had been with the British Delegation in Paris, and had served in the office of the Director of Military Intelligence. Weizmann described him as "an ardent Zionist … And that not merely in words. Whenever he can perform a service for the Jews or Palestine he will go out of his way to do so".
Meinertzhagen reported on the situation in Palestine to Curzon, who was now Foreign Secretary, on 31 March 1920:
[…]I should like here to point out, that during a prolonged tour I recently made in Palestine, I was convinced that only one motive prompts anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine…The knowledge that the eventual dispossession of Arabs by Jews in Palestine is inevitable during the course of time, and that Jewish immigration spells an eventual Jewish state not only in Palestine but in Syria, very naturally frightens the Arab. I cannot conceal from myself that Arab fears regarding Zionism are not groundless - though Zionism at present contemplates nothing more than being allowed to found a National Home for Jews in Palestine. The very factors which constitute that Home and the methods which H.M.G. will be compelled to grant for its successful establishment, can only lead to predominant Jewish influence and possession in Palestine if not throughout the Near East.
The mark of disorder perpetrated by the Jews is all over the place, the "persecuted" turned persecutor, and lest this should be charged to the general wildness of the people in Palestine let it be said that the rioters were only expressing in deeds what cultivated American and English Jews have expressed in words—namely, that the lawful inhabitants of the land ought to be driven out, in spite of governmental promises to the contrary
The harsh truth is that Zionist forces had to expel large numbers of Palestinians in order to create a Jewish-majority state. The prewar Palestinian population was simply too large. In November 1947, when the United Nations voted to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab countries, Jews were only one-third of the population. Thus, even the state earmarked for Jews—which would have encompassed 55 percent of Mandatory Palestine—would have been almost half Palestinian. Since Jews lived largely in urban areas, Palestinians also owned 80 percent of the Jewish state's arable land. Zionist leaders knew that a country in which Palestinians were almost half the population and possessed most of the territory wouldn't constitute a genuine Jewish state. Jews would not rule. A month after the UN vote, Ben-Gurion told members of his political party, "Only a state with at least 80 percent Jews is a viable and stable state." So, while Ben-Gurion and the Zionist leadership—unlike their Palestinian and Arab counterparts—accepted the UN partition plan, they also began expelling Palestinians because that was the only way to create a large Jewish majority that occupied most of the land.
On this point, Benny Morris, the Israeli historian who gained fame for his research into the Palestinian exodus, has been unusually frank. "Ben-Gurion was a transferist," Morris told the Israeli journalist Ari Shavit in a 2004 interview. "He understood that there could be no Jewish state with a large and hostile Arab minority in its midst." Perhaps taken aback by Morris's directness, Shavit observed, "I don't hear you condemning him." Indeed, Morris was not. "Ben-Gurion was right," Morris continued. "If he had not done what he did, a state would not have come into being. That has to be clear. It is impossible to evade."
The [Shatila] camp was filled with children of refugees just like him, who twenty years after the war still claimed that they came from Acre, Haifa, or Tiberias, even though they were born in Lebanon.
[…]
Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO's political department, said of the Reagan Plan in the early 1980s: "It restricts the refugees' right of return to the West Bank and Gaza and not their original homes of Jaffa, Haifa, and Safed. Our right applies beyond the West Bank." Arafat himself announced clearly in 1980: "When we speak of the Palestinians's return, we want to say: Acre before Gaza, Beersheba before Hebron. We recognize one thing, namely that the Palestinian flag will fly over Jaffa."
[…]
Palestinians would probably continue dreaming of having Jaffa and Haifa, just as Jews would continue dreaming of having Hebron and Judea—but both these dreams would remain precisely that.
"I heard [the Spanish foreign minister] say you can't do this to people whose homeland is Gaza. For 75% of Gaza's population, it's not their homeland. Do you know what their homeland is? Haifa, Tiberias, Acre, Jaffa. This is a refugee population that has been there since 1948."