As many have noted, de Gaulle was an exceptionally complex man. Julian Jackson’s biography goes far toward explaining him, and is much more readable than other biographies (LaCouture, Fenby). A few things are worth pointing out about de Gaulle at the outset: he did not care about money and lived quite simply; he loved literature and learning (as President he read two or three books a week); he was intensely private, one might even say shy, which made him stiff and formal; he had a photographic memory, he was a devout Catholic, and he was a man of complete physical courage. The last bit was demonstrated first in WW1; he was wounded leading his company in a charge in 1914, and again at Verdun, where he was bayoneted and taken prisoner by the Germans. His soldiers commented on his complete disregard for enemy fire, and this was seemingly part and parcel of his moral courage; no other French leader said “No” to the armistice in 1940 as early or as clearly as de Gaulle. As a consequence he was sentenced to death in absentia by Vichy.
Jackson brings all this out in chapter after chapter of clear, expository prose; Jackson is so much clearer to English-speaking readers than LaCouture, whose great three volume biography assumes a lot of a priori knowledge on the part of the reader about French politics and history. But in my view Jackson lacks the passion of LaCouture, and also, Jackson leaves out many telling anecdotes about de Gaulle that in LaCouture’s account give the reader a better understanding of de Gaulle as a man. LaCouture dwells at length on the humanizing effect that de Gaulle’s daughter Anne, born with Downs syndrome, had on the General; for example, LaCouture’s account of de Gaulle’s comment to his wife at Anne’s death makes you grieve with him. de Gaulle spent years trying to gain admittance for Anne to normal schools, rather than the "institutions" to which children like Anne were consigned at the time, and he was told over and over, "But Colonel, she is not like the others, you know". As they left the funeral service for Anne, de Gaulle said to his wife, "Maintenant, elle est comme les autres". LaCouture gives many examples of de Gaulle’s humor, which tended to be very obscure, but his jokes and repartee revealed an extremely quick wit. Sadly, Jackson leaves out much of that, but where Jackson excels is in clearly, lucidly describing de Gaulle’s path to leadership of the Free French and then to his role as President in 1946 and again from 1958-1969.
De Gaulle is often remembered for being uncannily prescient about the future. After his first day of combat in WW1, he wrote a letter which clearly recognized that French strategy and tactics were completely wrong – brave bayonet charges were pointless in the age of machine guns and massed artillery. The Allied high command never really did learn this lesson, right through to the end of the war; de Gaulle apprehended it in one day of fighting in 1914. His 18 June 1940 speech was exactly right about how the war would turn out, and he was clear-eyed about many, many other issues. De Gaulle saw immediately, as the Battle of France turned to debacle, that the right path for France in 1940 was to evacuate its Army and Air Force to Algeria and continue the fight against Germany from there – Algeria was at the time a province of France. But the government was taken over by Petain, and then all that was left for de Gaulle was to deny the legitimacy of Petain, rightly so, and of the armistice he signed.
For a soldier, de Gaulle was a remarkably adroit politician, and he honed his skills in the fights for recognition of the Free French by the US and British as France’s legitimate government; part of why he felt he had to demand France’s rights so stridently was that the Vichy regime and the Nazis repeatedly tried to paint him as a lap dog of the British and Americans. But it was also personal, because he felt keenly the disgrace of France, and he was almost physically disgusted by his dependence on the Allies for all support: material, political, military. Roosevelt foolishly and pointlessly made an enemy of de Gaulle by opposing him and trying to unseat him as leader of the Free French. When the Americans tried to replace de Gaulle, not once but twice, with someone more pliable, de Gaulle developed a lifelong distrust of the Americans, and to an almost equal degree, of the British. Fortunately, Eisenhower understood the situation well enough to know he needed de Gaulle to organize the Resistance and to rally the French when D-Day came, and more to the point, he understood that de Gaulle was the legitimate leader – the Allies couldn’t just pick someone else and expect the French to support him, as they attempted with Giraud. Incidentally, by the end of WW2 the Free French forces under de Gaulle had fielded 14 Army divisions, a not inconsiderable contribution – by way of comparison, the US Army had about 70 divisions in Europe by war's end.
De Gaulle’s great achievement in 1958 in his return to power was the writing of a new constitution that made the French government more stable by virtue of having an elected president, as in the US, rather than a parliamentary system in which governments could (and did) fall frequently. His ruthlessness in extracting France from Algeria was exactly what was needed; de Gaulle had already concluded that colonialism was dead, so he made it his policy that only those overseas territories which freely chose to remain part of France would do so. De Gaulle tried to establish a bilateral “European Union” with Germany, but this was undone by the exit of Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor after his defeat in 1963. His development of the independent French nuclear force was privately acknowledged by Eisenhower as a sensible move, and in some ways helpful to NATO. The book is a bit light on details as to how de Gaulle influenced the Trente Glorieuses economic revival in France; there is only one reference to Airbus, a perfunctory nod to the Citroen DS, none to nuclear power, and none to the Concorde project. Much is said about de Gaulle's deliberate obscurity, and though this came naturally to him, it was also a tactic to give him room to maneuver politically. Nowhere was it more useful than in using the Army to help him gain power in 1958, and then crushing the Army’s power to intimidate the government and establishing, permanently, the principle of civilian control of the military.
Ultimately, the book is fair to de Gaulle, I think. He was a brilliant man and a great man, and he was what France needed in 1940 and in 1958. His ego was colossal, but so was his accomplishment in “making France present at the victory” over Germany, and in bringing stable government and a sense of pride to the French in the period of his presidency. He was a conservative who was nonetheless very suspicious of capitalism, and he was an Army officer who distrusted the Army and crushed the “putsch” of the four generals. In return, he was hated by many in the Army, and disaffected army officers mounted over twenty assassination attempts against him, two of which nearly succeeded. He could be scathing and he was prone to terrifying tirades, and yet he loved literature and history and he was endlessly tolerant of criticism from real geniuses like Sartre because, as he said, “One does not arrest Voltaire”. He was pragmatic, and he could be Machiavellian in achieving his goals, but at the end of the day, everything he did was to further the interests of the country he loved. He was incorruptible, and he did not tolerate corruption. This very complicated man believed in France, he salvaged the honor of France in WW2, and he made France great and relevant in the 1960’s.
I would like to give the book five stars, and maybe I should, but I missed the anecdotes and the bon mots recited by LaCouture. If Jackson's book had those it would be a five star, and unquestionably the best biography of de Gaulle.