Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon

by B.H. Liddell Hart

Scipio Africanus (236-183 B.C.) was one of the most exciting and dynamic leaders in history. As commander he never lost a battle. Yet it is his adversary, Hannibal, who has lived on in the public memory, due mostly to his daring march through the Alps with his elephants. At the Battle of the Ticinus, Hannibal's initial encounter with Roman arms, young Scipio first tasted warfare, rescuing his dangerously wounded, encircled father, who was also the Roman commander. By nineteen Scipio was the equivalent of a staff colonel and in 210 B.C. he was placed in supreme command. In three years he destroyed Carthaginian power in Spain and, after being made consul, took his forces to Africa, where he conquered Carthage's great ally, Syphax. Two years later he clashed with Hannibal himself, annihilating his army in the decisive Battle of Zama. For this triumph and his other exploits in the Punic Wars, Scipio was awarded the title Africanus.In his fascinating portrait of this extraordinary commander, B. H. Liddell Hart writes, "The age of generalship does not age, and it is because Scipio's battles are richer in stratagems and ruses -- many still feasible today -- than those of any other commander in history that they are an unfailing object lesson." Not only military enthusiasts and historians but all those interested in outstanding men will find this magnificent study absorbing and gripping.

Genres: History, Biography, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Ancient History, War, Military History

312 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1926

About the author

British military authority Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart early advocated tank and air warfare.

Usually known as captain before his knighthood, this English soldier and historian led theorists.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._H._L...

Reviews

[Steve]

Publius Cornelius Scipio (236–183 BC)


Publius Cornelius Scipio, better known to history as Scipio Africanus (the Elder), was very likely the greatest general the Roman Empire ever had, entering the written record at the age of seventeen when he led a cavalry charge that saved his father's life (the commander of the Roman forces) at the battle of Ticinus, the initial encounter of Hannibal's forces with the Roman army on Italian soil. The Romans lost that battle and almost all of the subsequent battles until Scipio was elected commander of the Roman forces in Spain at the age of twenty-four. Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon (1926) is an account of Scipio's life with an interesting twist.

Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895–1970) was a soldier and military theorist and historian who in the 1920's and 30's urged upon the British military establishment a reliance on the air force and navy that relegated to the army a secondary role in which the armored branch was pivotal. In ground actions he argued against direct attacks on well-made defensive positions, preferring what he called the Indirect Approach.

What gives Liddell Hart's Scipio Africanus additional interest above and beyond his careful use and extensive quotation of the Roman sources(*) is that he uses Scipio's strategies and tactics to illustrate his idea of the Indirect Approach, which may be suggested briefly with "Those who exalt the main armed forces of the enemy as the primary objective are apt to lose sight of the fact that the destruction of these is only a means to the end, which is the subjugation of the hostile will." He does not do so overbearingly, for the text is certainly focused on Scipio's career, but again and again he points up what he views as lessons for (then) modern warfare.(**)

As an illustration of this Indirect Approach, consider what Scipio did when he took command of the Roman forces in Spain shortly after both his father and uncle - the previous commanders - had been defeated and killed. The Carthaginian forces were split and active in three different places, and instead of attacking them directly one at a time,(***) Scipio (after carefully collecting information from all kinds of sources and then making thorough preparations) decided to attack Carthago Nova (now Cartagena), which was the Carthaginians' primary port linking to Africa and contained most of their provisions and operating funds. Cartagena fell quickly, along with the goods, ships, treasury and hostages, both Celto-Iberian and Roman, within its walls. By releasing the hostages and treating them well, he soon had the Iberian tribes back on his side. And now the Carthaginian armies were effectively cut off from Carthage.

After grinding up the Carthaginians and their remaining allies in Spain, instead of turning against Hannibal in Italy, whose primary source of reinforcement he had blocked, he chose to attack the Carthaginian homeland, but not without a great deal of resistance from the Roman Senate led by Fabius Cunctator and his pendant, Marcus Porcius Cato (the future Censor and foe of the "degenerate" Hellenization of Roman culture, not to mention the embodiment of conservative self-righteousness who sold his old and sick slaves so they would not be a burden on him and regarded his wife as little better than a servant - see Carl Christoph Burckhardt's Cato der Censor: Ein akademischer Vortrag).

Leading only volunteers he had carefully trained and outfitted and two legions disgraced at Cannae, he wrought enough havoc in North Africa to make the Carthaginians sue for peace. But they were split into those who truly wanted peace and the rest for whom the peace was, once again, to be a time of preparation for war. They drew their forces out of Italy and Gaul and had already violated the peace treaty as it was being ratified in Rome. Now at an even greater disadvantage, after clever maneuvering (both military and psychological) Scipio faced Hannibal at Zama. Hannibal had the numerical advantage and eighty war elephants - more than he had had in any previous engagement. Fortunately, this part of Polybius' history has survived, and we have many details of the action which are given to us by Liddell Hart with great relish. Suffice it to say here that in this meeting of invincible generals, Scipio triumphed.

Once again his peace terms were generous, but there were many in the Roman Senate who wanted more vindictive terms or who envied the young man's successes. They had no choice but to ratify the treaty, but Scipio had subsequently a contingent of powerful enemies in the Senate. Unlike later famous Roman generals, when the Roman people offered to make Scipio perpetual consul and dictator, he declined.

Scipio's later career is complicated, but I'll mention that he played a crucial role in Rome's domination of the Greek speaking world, where once again he exercised his far-seeing moderation and generosity after victory. But this was too much for the Senate faction led by Cato, and they went after his family and then him with apparently trumped up charges of corruption and abuse of power. He was acquitted but was so disgusted that he never returned to Rome, soon dying in voluntary exile on his country estate.

Not satisfied with this, his accusers went after his brother again, and though they managed to damage him, when they confiscated the Scipios' estates they found no money. This caused a revulsion in the public feeling, and, as Livy put it, "the public hatred which had been directed against the Scipios recoiled on the praetor, his advisers and the accusers." Cato was far from being finished, however, but that is another story...


(*) The most useful is Polybius' history of the Second Punic War, written almost contemporaneously with the events. Polybius personally visited the sites of the major battles with witnesses and was friend to Gaius Laelius, Scipio's right hand man.

(**) Noteworthy is Liddell Hart's emphasis on Scipio's generous peace terms after his victories, for the British author contrasted Scipio's wisdom in that regard with the onerous burden placed upon the German speaking world by the Treaty of Versailles. Liddell Hart understood as early as 1926 that such a peace could not last.

(***) Actually, each of those three contingents was numerically superior to the manpower Scipio had at his disposal, at least at the outset.

Rating

http://leopard.booklikes.com/post/119...

[Larry (LPosse1) · Rating 5 out of 5]

Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon by B.H. Liddell Hart – 5 Stars

What a great book—one of my favorite Roman history reads. Liddell Hart was clearly a fanboy of Scipio, and so am I. In my opinion, Scipio blows Hannibal away. His genius on the battlefield is still studied by generals today, and the author makes fascinating comparisons to other great commanders in history. Well researched, compelling, and incredibly informative—an outstanding portrait of an outstanding general.

[Brian Miracle · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good character study of Scipio Africanus, the Roman general who defeated Hannibal, the scourge of Rome. B.H. Liddell Hart, one of the more respected military historians of the twentieth century, examines Scipio’s rise to power, his defeat of Carthaginian forces in Spain, his move into Africa, and his ultimate defeat of Hannibal at Zama. The book then shows how Scipio negotiated peace with Antiochus in later life. Finally, Liddell Hart closes by comparing Scipio to the other great military commanders, such as Hannibal, Caesar, Alexander, and Napoleon. As the book’s title indicates, Liddell Hart is a fan of Scipio. However, the book objectively looks at Scipio’s many successes and his few failures.

['Aussie Rick' · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book; Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon, by Liddell Hart was first published in 1926 and the years have not condemned it to the forgotten back shelves of a library. This is a great history, although I take exception to the subtitle - Greater than Napoleon being an ardent fan of that great General! This is a story well told, with verve and passion and it is hard to put down.

I loved this book when I first read it in 1992 upon its first re-release and its been reprinted numerous times since. You might not agree with the author in some of the cases he makes for Scipio Africanus, I still think that Hannibal was the better commander but I still enjoyed this book. I would happily recommend it to anyone who loves a good tale of great commanders and leaders in the times of the Legions.

A recent title covering the same subject was Scipio Africanus: Rome’s Greatest General by Richard A. Gabriel (ISBN 9781597972055). Although the research is obviously more up to date I still found Liddell Hart’s account the better story, you decide!

[Ivan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Di Basil Liddell Hart avevo già un paio di libri di storia militare sulla prima e seconda guerra mondiale. Era infatti uno studioso di tattica e strategia militare. Partecipò alla battaglia della Somme nel 1916 e rimase pure intossicato dai gas. Ebbe poi l’occasione di poter intervistare subito dopo la guerra i generali di Hitler, ricavandone un volumotto dal titolo “Storia di una sconfitta”. Beh, quando comprai su una bancarella a metà prezzo la biografia di Scipione, pensavo che sarebbe stata non dico un pippone sulla guerra annibalica, che d’altronde non mi sarebbe dispiaciuto, ma certamente uno spiegone dedicato alla tattica e alla strategia del generale romano. Che in effetti sono trattate in misura preponderante, ma con un taglio tutt’altro che pedante. Anzi, direi quasi brioso, con continui riferimenti a Cesare, Napoleone, Federico di Prussia, Wellington e via dicendo. Quello che mi ha piacevolmente sorpreso nella lettura, invece è stata la ricerca continua e appassionata dell’uomo Scipione. Un grande, sì, dal punto di vista militare, ma soprattutto un uomo, un politico e diplomatico che svetta come pochi. Un uomo onesto con gli altri e con se stesso, educato nei sani principi repubblicani coniugati però con quelli umani. L’amicizia, la generosità, la lealtà, il rispetto, la mitezza e la moderazione, rivolte non solo ad amici e concittadini, ma anche agli altri: gli alleati, i vinti, i nemici da non umiliare e ridurre alla disperazione e al rancore.
Tutti questi aspetti contraddistinsero Scipione, insieme ad una grande capacità psicologica, abilità nel capire e giudicare le persone ed intessere relazioni, . Quanto diverso dagli altri romani, Cesare in primis, continuamente usato da Liddell Hart come pietra di paragone per Scipione! Tanto quello bramoso di potere, smodatamente cinico ed immorale, quanto questo semplice, onesto, morigerato, amabile. Gli uomini più in vista del suo tempo, Catone e Fabio Massimo per fare un esempio, fanno una ben misera figura: meschini, avidi, taccagni, invidiosi e rancorosi, odiosi. Scipione svetta invece per affabilità, intelligenza, leggerezza ed umanità. Sì, Scipione, per come ce lo presenta Liddell Hart, eccelle in umanità nel senso più ampio e più bello del termine.
Per Sir Basil nel paragone con i grandi generali del passato e del futuro Scipione resta insuperato per abilità, audacia, intuizione, inventiva, fantasia, psicologia.
Anche un altro “grande” del suo tempo fu dello stesso parere di Sir Basil. In missione diplomatica ad Efeso - secondo Acilio - Scipione volle incontrare Annibale che se stava in esilio presso re Antioco. Venuti infine a colloquio, Scipione gli chiese chi stimasse di più tra i grandi condottieri. Annibale rispose che reputava il più grande Alessandro, e poi Pirro. Avendogli chiesto chi fosse invece il terzo, Annibale rispose: ‘Me stesso’. “Africano sorrise, ed aggiunse: ‘E che diresti se tu mi avessi vinto?’ ‘Oh allora’ rispose ‘avrei posto me prima di Alessandro, prima di Pirro, prima di qualunque altro!’ Rimase sconcertato Scipione da quella risposta rigirata con malizia cartaginese e da quell’inaspettata forma di adulazione che lo segregava dalla schiera dei condottieri, al di sopra di ogni paragone”.
Come tutte le persone veramente grandi sotto il punto di vista umano, anche Scipione non sfuggì all’invidia e alla cattiveria dei mediocri. Gli fu intentato un processo con accuse inventate di appropriazione indebita e signorilmente preferì l’esilio. Non rimise più piede a Roma e morì a Literno nel 183. Aveva 52 anni.
Nello stesso anno morì Annibale, in esilio, a 64 anni, anche lui rovinato dall’invidia e dal rancore dei mediocri.

[Will · Rating 4 out of 5]

I don't think a man can have a more British name than Sir B(asil) H(enry) Liddell Hart. I went into this book on one of my favorite Romans, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, ready to experience an old style, biased, painfully and wonderfully British biography, and I got exactly what I wanted.

Liddell Hart loves Scipio more than any other general in history, maybe even more than his own mother, and I think that means something coming from a man who advised the British government on security in the Interwar period and wrote a book simply called Strategy, a classic to this day. Scipio is a towering figure of Roman history, who conquered Carthaginian Spain and the great tactician-general Hannibal Barca with foresight and conviction. Liddell Hart is enamored with his subject, but Scipio really was a better grand strategist than Hannibal. He knew when to stop and when to give chase. Unlike Hannibal, he wasn't afraid of a good siege.

In a few short years, Scipio transformed Rome from a dying Republic led by an ineffectual Senate whose lands only incorporated parts of Italy (due to those unfortunate Italian allies who were forced to defect to Hannibal), Sicily, and Sardinia into a major power on three continents that still bear their Latin names. And he achieved this success through moderation, innovative flanking maneuvers, and lifelong just treatment of critical allies, like Masinissa of the Numidians, whose cavalry I would argue were just as seminal to Scipio's victories in Africa as his own intellect and vision. And Scipio did all of this with little support from the Senate (especially from that eternal sourpuss Cato) because of senators' jealousy of his young age, his rapid success, and his popularity with the plebeians. In his later life, Scipio went into voluntary exile because of the hostility of some senators, who brought trumped up, personal charges against him and his brother Lucius.

As Liddell Hart repeatedly stated (I paraphrase): peace is always the desired outcome of war and grand strategy, and Scipio was an expert at compromise at Cartagena, against Antiochus in Asia Minor, and especially in the aftermath of Zama. The battle of Zama in 202 BC took place at Carthage's doormat and scared them stiff, their city forever sullied by the scuffing boots (fortunately not little ones, Caligula) of a Roman conqueror. Scipio could have laid siege to proud Carthage, but realized that a measured peace that neutered Carthage would have the same effect with less damage. Unfortunately for Rome's moral standing and Scipio's legacy, Carthage was obliterated in 146 BC because of the raging of a dead and spiteful Cato, who wanted nothing more than the total ruin of Scipio's reputation and legacy.

Liddell Hart praises Scipio's strategy of reinforcing and expanding allied border states (Numidia, Macedon, etc.) and claims that if Rome had kept client states strong as buffers from other empires, it would have survived the Barbarian onslaught, and the so-called Dark Ages wouldn't have been so dark. As we now know, calling the early middle ages the "Dark Ages" is a complete misnomer, but at its core his buffer states idea is intriguing, and I'll have to look more into it in both Roman and more recent times.

This history is surely outdated with many references to "Asiatic hordes" and unfavorable comments about democracy, but Liddell Hart's writing has its share of narrative charms and a truckload of wit. And even though I'm a perennial Carthage lover, Liddell Hart convinced me to root for Rome, if only for Scipio's sake.

[Massimo Pigliucci · Rating 4 out of 5]

Scipio Africanus was one of the best military commanders and statesmen of the ancient world, arguably of all time. However, it isn’t easy to find a lot of accessible material about him, which led me to read this book by British military authority Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, an early advocate of tank and air warfare at the beginning of the 20th century. Hart wrote “Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon” back in 1926, a century ago, in between the two World Wars of the 20th century. Despite some shortcomings, it is certainly very readable still today, and it provides insights into ancient warfare, its relevance to modern military campaigns, and the nature of the epic rivalry between Rome and Carthage for the control of the Mediterranean. While Hart is a bit too partisan about Scipio (see the subtitle, for instance), his analysis is interesting and reasonably based on the available historical sources. Scipio’s great rival was the equally legendary Hannibal, who had terrorized the Roman legions by the introduction of a new weapon: elephants. But Scipio was able to re-establish Roman control over Spain by defeating four Carthaginian generals and their respective armies, and finally confronted Hannibal directly on African soil. The decisive battle took place at Zama, near modern Siliana in Tunisia, and Scipio outmaneuvered and utterly defeated Hannibal. It was the beginning of the end for Carthage as an international power. Hart also gets into the rivalries among Roman statesmen, describing (perhaps in a bit of a one-sided way) the relationship between Fabius Cuntactor and Scipio, as well between the latter and Cato the Elder. Eventually, Scipio decided to retire outside of Rome, in self-imposed exile, wanting to end what he saw as petty squabbles motivated by jealousy that could undermine Roman resolve and therefore her dominance of the Mediterranean. It is also worth noting, though Hart doesn’t devote quite as much space to this, that Scipio created a flourishing cultural circle around himself, which included the famous poet Ennius, who was later much praised by Cicero. All in all, and despite some obvious limitations, Hart’s book makes for a very enjoyable reading.

[Justin Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

I picked up Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon because I wanted a change from business books and to get back in touch with Roman history.

Hart provides an informative text on one of the greatest and most overlooked figures in history. By following Scipio's life and achievements I was reminded of why I love Roman history so much. The politics, action, drama, war, and people are so fascinating. Upon completion I feel much more knowledgeable about Scipio, not only as a general, but as a person.

I would recommend this book to anyone who wants a quick and informative read on one of the greatest generals and statesmen to walk the earth.

Extra points as General Mattis highlights this as one of his favorite books.

[David Lopez · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent and interesting biography. The book is well written and makes for an enjoyable read (or listen if you’re like me and get the audiobook). Unlike many biographies, especially on ancient figures, this one did not drag and kept up a good pace throughout.

It’s worth noting that I was quickly sold on this book since right at the beginning the author brings up a point I have often noticed when studying history but until now have not seen anyone else call out. That point is our odd tendency to glorify the losers when looking at history. As the author notes, you can find an abundance of fiction and nonfiction on famous individuals like Hannibal Barca, Napoleon, and Robert E Lee, but there is an odd lack when it comes to those who defeated these men - Scipio, Wellington, and Grant. It is immensely satisfying to come across a work that not only acknowledges this but also seeks to fill the gap.

[T.R. Preston · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of history's greatest leaders that no one ever talks about.

[Michael Beck · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good older history book written when people wanted to learn lessons from historical men and events.

[Stephen Morrissey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hannibal, Alexander, Caesar - these are the names that echo down through history, Shakespearian dramas, and cultural markers attesting to their military genius and vast conquests. Scipio Africanus, a name only mentioned in tandem with Hannibal as the Roman general that bested, in the end, the man who traipsed the Alps and nearly overran Rome itself, is but a whisper. B.H. Liddell Hart offers a well-reasoned rebuke to Scipio's lost place in the annals of great warlords of history, for both his tactical genius and strategic endeavors that, unlike Hannibal, won the war and set Rome on the pathway to its Mediterranean Empire.

Hart tracks the military career of Scipio during the Second Punic War, with the young general's entry on the scene in Spain, where Roman armies best Carthaginian forces through the envelopment and cavalry-led flank maneuvers made famous, ironically, by Hannibal at Cannae. Despite a lack of support from the Senate and political leaders, Scipio then assembles a crack invasion force on Sicily, then launching an ambitious invasion of Carthaginian North Africa. Scipio not only lures Hannibal back to North Africa from Italy, but also wisely bids Hannibal to meet him far away from Carthaginian bases and on the plains of Zama ideally suited for cavalry-led envelopment.

Hannibal, like Robert E. Lee, shines with his daring battle plans, but falls at the feet of grand strategy. Carthage loses the war, and despite easy peace terms delivered by Scipio, becomes fodder for Roman politicians and is eventually ground into dust. Scipio was indeed a brilliant tactical leader, but more importantly kept his sights trained on the broader picture: encouraging armies to take reckless actions (as with Hasdrubal's army in Spain after Ilipa), or luring enemies towards favorable ground (as at Zama). Unlike Alexander and Caesar, Scipio's conquests are of more solid duration, lasting hundreds of years and moving Rome towards ascension and domination in the Ancient World.

Battles make legends; but strategy makes long-lasting success. No military leader proves that better than Scipio Africanus.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Scipio Africanus (236–183 B.C.) was one of the most exciting and dynamic leaders in history. As commander he never lost a battle. Yet it is his adversary, Hannibal, who has lived on in the public memory, due mostly to his daring march through the Alps with his elephants. At the Battle of the Ticinus, Hannibal's initial encounter with Roman arms, young Scipio first tasted warfare, rescuing his dangerously wounded, encircled father, who was also the Roman commander. By nineteen Scipio was the equivalent of a staff colonel and in 210 B.C. he was placed in supreme command. In three years he destroyed Carthaginian power in Spain and, after being made consul, took his forces to Africa, where he conquered Carthage's great ally, Syphax. Two years later he clashed with Hannibal himself, annihilating his army in the decisive Battle of Zama. For this triumph and his other exploits in the Punic Wars, Scipio was awarded the title Africanus.In his fascinating portrait of this extraordinary commander, B. H. Liddell Hart writes, ”The age of generalship does not age, and it is because Scipio's battles are richer in stratagems and ruses—many still feasible today—than those of any other commander in history that they are an unfailing object lesson.” Not only military enthusiasts and historians but all those interested in outstanding men will find this magnificent study absorbing and gripping.” I was inspired to read this after reading Secretary Mattis’ book, Call Sign Chaos, where he says he read through this book on the eve of battles he led in Iraq!

[Kevin · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not going to argue with a book written in 1926 too much. It doesn't feel nearly as dated as I might have expected, but there are certainly moments that jar you out of the flow. Liddell Hart's core premise, that Scipio Africanus was "greater than Napoleon" does not hold water with me, and his arguments that Alexander and Julius Caesar's defeats of "Asiatic hordes and "unorganized tribes" makes it very hard to take his assessments seriously. Liddell Hart is also one of the major reasons the "clean Wehrmacht" myth was perpetuated, so he can fuck off.

[Scipio Africanus · Rating 5 out of 5]

Entertaining and expertly written book about the greatest general in the ancient world. He goes into great detail about the tactics and ways the various battles played out as well as an in depth look at the character of each of the great players in this story.

Cant recommend enough. One of the best books of military history ive read

[Eileen · Rating 5 out of 5]

4.5 stars

[Oleg Demidov · Rating 4 out of 5]

The only minus that this book is totally biased and looks like ode of love.
On the bright side, a lot of ideas still valid after 2000 years since.

[Нестор · Rating 5 out of 5]

Очень интересная биография полузабытого ныне человека.

Прочитал с огромным интересом и однозначно прочитаю ещё нескол��ко книг о Сципионе, так как такие люди рождаются не очень часто, а пробиваются к вершинам власти и остаются в памяти народной и того реже...

И тем не менее, у этого человека есть чему поучиться как с точки зрения стратегии, тактики и воинского искусства, так и со стороны дипломатии и искусства жить (хотя о последнем можно судить только по некоторым небольшим и отрывочным данным).

Очень впечатлили история переговоров с Ганнибалом, которые вёл Сципион и тактика боя со слонами. Да и многое другое из сделанного и не сделанного (!) несмотря на сумасшедшее давление со стороны Сената и современников Сципиона впечатляет. Иногда даже казалось, что он себя вёл как пришелец из другой эпохи, причём даже не нашей, а какого-нибудь 22 или 24 века...

[Robert P · Rating 5 out of 5]

OK, I have already commented- responding to those who thought that Napoleon or Hannibal were greater than Scipio. The book praises Scipio as the greatest of generals in great historical and military detail, so it is ok to test that analysis by saying Napoleon or Hannibal were greater as these commenters have done, so I am responding. Napoleon lost 7 battles. He also seemed to lack an overall strategic grasp--even though he was a world leader, not just a battle planner. Accordingly, he needed to apprehend the futility of invading Russia--to see the overall cost of that loss on his country. He also needed to plan for the retention of the Louisiana Territory at all costs. Nothing he was doing would help France as much over the long term. He lost Spain in a war, and lost at Waterloo due to many causes that he was unable to juggle or overcome. All of these things Scipio would have been able to manage. Why? Because Scipio always had the larger picture firmly in view. Attack Spain, not Hannibal directly- punch the body and the head dies. Peel away allies of Hannibal through negotiation. Show Rome to be honorable and a worthy ally. Build morale that was at a low ebb. Bring the war to the Carthaginian homeland- make the enemy suffer the ravages of war. Most of all, if the Numidian cavalry is the reason Rome is losing battles to Hannibal, get Massinissa to switch sides. How did he do that? Massinissa's nephew was captured in Spain. The kid was only 15 or so, but a prince. Scipio gave him a crown, a scepter, a horse, a cape, a curule chair and an escort back to the front lines. When Massinissa next felt disgruntled, that Hannibal failed to acknowledge his very significant role in the victories of Carthage, he switched sides and became the cavalry arm for Rome. Would this have happened if the kindness of Scipio had not paved the way? Who knows. The point is that Scipio was playing 3 dimensional chess, not just fighting battles. The book, though flowery in the form of 90 years ago makes its case very well.

[Paul Slife · Rating 5 out of 5]

Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon boldly defends Scipio as one of the greatest grand strategists in history. Approaching this work, Liddell Hart's controversial reputation as a 20th century military thinker preceded him, and I was concerned there may be embellishment in his own views. Nonetheless, I found Hart's biography to be truly enjoyable. This book was not merely a study of strategy, but an enjoyable discussion of the tragic distaste Scipio's own country held for him. This is the best short-length biography I've read recently.

[Lauren Albert · Rating 2 out of 5]

Military hagiography. Don't read unless you like sitting around a campfire comparing the military strategies of Caesar and Napoleon and Patton.

[Fearless Leader · Rating 3 out of 5]

A bit of a fluff piece

[R · Rating 3 out of 5]

“Read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugène, and Frederick; take them for your model, that is the only way of becoming a great captain, to obtain the secrets of the art of war.”
- Napoleon

In this book, Captain B.H. Liddell Hart states his case for why Scipio Africanus is not only greater than all these men listed by Napoleon, but, titularly, better than the man doing the listing.

Reputation - 3/5
B.H. Liddell Hart was a British captain in the First World War. After retiring from active service, he was an advisor in his country’s armed services and a writer of books on military theory and history. Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon is his first published book, and remains his most popular biographical study.


Point - 3/5
Publius Cornelius Scipio was born in 235 B.C. By the time he was a teenager, Rome was in a lot of trouble. Hannibal was in control of Southern Italy and his brothers, Hasdrubal Barca and Mago had taken over Spain and were using it as a Carthaginian base and training ground. In 211 B.C. Scipio’s father and uncle were killed in Spain, facing Hasdrubal’s army. Then only 24, Scipio took the job of continuing the war in Spain (a position the senate gave him willingly, considering it a death sentence), and raised a small army to go against Hasdrubal and Mago. Rather than facing these armies directly, Scipio made an ingenious siege of Carthage’s base of operations in modern day Cartagena. He took the base, and through far-sighted political maneuvers, chased Hasdrubal and Mago out of Spain into Gaul. Here Scipio sowed the first seeds of alliance with the Numidian neighbors of Carthage.
The senate recalled Scipio to Rome and suggested he carry on the war with Hannibal in Southern Italy, but Scipio had a bigger strategy in mind. Through much convincing, he received a rag-tag bunch of disgraced soldiers to train on Sicily. Sicily was then considered an army colony for outcasts and many of these men had served with Scipio’s father and uncle in Spain, and thus had personal attachment to Scipio and the urge for redemption after their previous failures against Carthaginian armies.
With this army and his alliances with the Numidians (whose calvary was legendary), Scipio invaded Africa, knowing that Hannibal would be forced to quit Italy to follow him. In 202 B.C. Scipio faced Hannibal at the Battle of Zama and routed him. With Carthage neutralized and Hannibal exiled, Scipio returned to Rome with greater honors than any Roman before him. He refused many public titles, but took the agnomen “Africanus,” designating him as conqueror of Africa.
In the span of 10 years, Scipio had taken Rome from the brink of destruction to the position of unchallenged and unchallengeable power in the Western Mediterranean that she was to hold for another 600 years. Naturally the older generations of Romans were jealous of this 35-year-old who had scaled heights that had never been equaled. Their personal prejudices evidently greatly bothered Scipio Africanus, and so he retired to his estates, avoiding public life except in the few cases in which he campaigned on behalf of his half-brother.

Scipio Africanus was an undeniably great man and general. But was he the greatest? Liddell Hart’s argues the following: not only does Scipio Africanus exceed all the ancient commanders (Alexander, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar), but he also eclipses Napoleon, the greatest of all moderns.
Scipio learned tactics from Hannibal (universally regarded as the father of tactics), and then used the same methods to defeat him, head on, in Africa, at the Battle of Zama. Hart cites Zama as the only example in history when two supremely great commanders met in a decisive battle. The strategy (distinct from tactics, encompassing political and psychological planning) leading up to the battle also favored Scipio. Scipio had stolen part of the Numidian alliance from the Carthaginians, played the Numidians against each other, taking the strongest to his side, and then drew Hannibal into battle on a site where the Numidian calvary would be most advantageous. Hart argues that this is most perfect example of strategy against the most formidable opponent in all of history.
To here, Hart makes a very good case for Scipio’s supremacy over Hannibal and over ancient commanders generally. Where his argument falls apart is in the final chapter, when he begins a disorganized and illogical comparison between Scipio and basically every other great man ever. He backs this up with his idea of “Grand Strategy,” in which he defines the object of war as the establishment of a more perfect peace.

Here, we arrive the extraordinary and calamitous irony of Hart’s judgement. Writing in 1926, between the World Wars, Hart never once points out the factors that led to the Second Punic War (218 – 202 B.C.). He never once mentions the Roman annexation of Sicily, the heavy war reparations demanded from Carthage, the collapse of Carthage’s economy after the First Punic War. Sound familiar? 23 years elapsed between the end of the First Punic War and Hannibal crossing the alps to begin the Second. 21 years elapsed between the Treaty of Versailles and another infamous, H-named conqueror, rallying his people behind the redemption of his nation’s honor, crossed into Poland to begin a Second war. B.H. Liddell Hart was writing this book during those 21 years. And while, yes, the book is about Scipio Africanus, the absence of any historical awareness in the form of thoughtful parallels completely disqualifies Hart from comparing Scipio to anyone other than Hannibal directly. Thus, the subtitle and the entire last chapter can be dismissed as overreaching the book’s aim and harming the author’s credibility.

[Aside]
Hart later wrote a book called “Why Don’t We Learn From History?” His writings are an appropriate answer to this question.

Recommendation - 3/5
Still, this is the only biography of Scipio Africanus that I know of, and a very fine example of military theory. The military theory is at times rather dense, and a major drawback on this book is the lack of useful maps and illustrations. Thankfully, most of this can be found pretty easily online (usually animated).
As for Scipio, he’s an outstandingly interesting and great figure. There are many reasons he is not just the subject for historians, and Hart does an admirable job of asserting the value of studying Scipio’s life for its military and moral lessons.

Enjoyment - 4/5
This was my first encounter with the work of Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, and I came away impressed. He is an above-average writer with an encyclopedic grasp of military history. The faults that I find with him are in his logical thinking and his estimations. I have no room to argue with him on his prescriptions for what is best in military strategy in the same way that I cannot argue with Keynes about Economics. The military science is not exact, and as Napoleon said and demonstrated countless times on the battlefield, “in war it is not men but the man who counts.” To Hart’s credit, he gives us reasons beyond tactics and strategy as to the moral qualities of why Napoleon’s maxim is true of Scipio.
Unfortunately, the book ends giving us the feeling that we are learning much more about Liddell Hart than about Scipio Africanus. Perhaps not much more about Scipio can be known, and we are now left only to reflect on what we do know. In this, at least, Hart has given us a good start.

[Mark · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is Liddell Hart's paean to the military leadership of Scipio, the man who defeated Hannibal but has also been overshadowed by him in reputation and fame. Hart argues that Scipio's success was so compelling and enduring that he seems one of many, while the failures of Carthage make Hannibal stand out.

I certainly didn't grasp Scipio's full career. I knew he defeated the Carthaginians at Zama, but his story starts when the Romans were at their nadir: after the defeat of their armies in Spain and the loss of Italian forces at Cannae, the 25 year old Scipio volunteered for the apparently hopeless command of the remaining Roman forces there. On arrival he didn't stabilize the situation so much as upend it: a quick march and well planned seizure of the local capital at Cartagena (209 BC) upended their plans and at the start of the next campaign year he routed one of their three armies at Baecula, knocking it out of the war for two years. This essentially equalized the remaining forces and let him start peeling away Spanish allies; in 206 BC he crushed the remaining armies. The African campaign that ended Carthage followed the same mix of careful planning, calculated boldness, and diplomacy. All of this, until the very end, took place when Hannibal was still in Italy and reinforcements and supplies were limited. If Scipio reaped the fruits of Carthaginian exhaustion at Zama, it was he who caused it.

I did some scouting online and at least at a glance crediting him with this chain of unbroken successes does seem in line with modern assessments. I felt the need to check because this book is almost comically admiring of Scipio though; Hart essentially says Scipio's main fault was that he was too good and pure to realize the pettiness of Fabian and Cato as they tried to undermine him. The last chapter, arguing Scipio was greater than Caesar, Hannibal, Alexander or Napoleon makes a decent case but also felt a bit too partisan, like arguing over weather Batman could defeat Spiderman.

Still: The history is short and more than worth reading. The military accounts are captivating and it includes accounts of the statecraft and diplomacy he undertook to neutralize Carthage's allies and ultimately end the war.

[Relstuart · Rating 3 out of 5]

Recommended by James Mattis.

It was refreshing after reading a very academic book to read something written in the older history book style with an enjoyable narrative.

The author made a strong argument that Scipio was one of the all time great strategists and the war between him and Hannibal/Carthage was one of the few times such brilliant thinkers in charge of opposing armies faced off against each other.

Scipio was on a different level than many other victors. As Polybius stated, "Those who have won victories are far more numberous than those that have used them to advantage." Scipio knew how to win in both war and in diplomacy which is one of the factors that elevated his ability to win above his peers.

A quote I marked in the book: "It was said of one of the finest British commanders in the war of 1914-1918 that if he had a personal dislike or distrust of a subordinate he invariably gave the latter more rope than others, knowing that if his distrust was justified the man would assuredly use this rope to hang himself."

"A military victory is not in itself equivalent to success in war."

Scipio could have been king after his victory. All he had to do was to say yes to being given that power much like George Washington after winning the war of American succession from England. But, he did not believe it was good for the country and refused to accept what could have been his.

[Christopher Cerone · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a tour de force of the great Roman general and statesman, Publius Cornelius Scipio, later known as Scipio and ultimately Scipio Africanus after his decisive victory over the Carthaginians on their home turf in the Second Punic War. B.H. Liddell Hart dissects Scipio’s masterful victories in Spain and in Carthage, thus saving Rome from defeat at the hands of the daring Hannibal. Liddell expertly highlights Scipio’s mastery of military strategy and tactics, intelligence gathering and logistics throughout his military successes on behalf of Rome, a budding empire then led by many politicians who were highly skeptical of Scipio’s approach and plans during the war. Liddell convincingly shows how Scipio’s foresight, patience (witness his time in Sicily to build his force and bide his time between his victories in Spain and Carthage), and moral compass (as evidenced by his “economy of force” and desire to minimize unnecessary death, as well as his aversion to beating his opponents to death) inspired his men, contributed to his many military successes, and resulted in a stronger and larger Roman Empire. The author may be at his finest while efficiently outlining how Scipio stacks up against the greatest of generals,
including Napoleon, Caesar and Alexander. He, in effect, proclaims Scipio the best all-around general of all time based on deployment of strategy, tactics, logistics, morality and lasting impact of accomplishments. This is fascinating read for military historians and non-military historians alike. One quibble is the notable omission of General George Washington, who exhibited many of Scipio’s noteworthy military and moral qualities, was also extolled by his troops for his lofty yet principled convictions, and, like Scipio, left behind an indelible mark on history and an exemplary record worthy of replication.

[Robert Fisher · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was one of the best biographies I ever read of Antiquity's forgotten commanders. Scipio Africanus is one of my favorite commanders in history and B.H. Liddell Hart's book strengthens my admiration for his strategic abilities. It is concise, so anyone not interested in everything in the book, will find this a relatively quick and painless read. However, it is also well written so as to offer Ancient Rome enthusiasts new perspectives and new appreciation for Scipio Africanus.

[Paladin · Rating 4 out of 5]

I enjoyed learning about Scipio and his exploits 2200 years ago. I also enjoyed the opinions of a respected military historian. I do not, however, understand the subtitle "Greater than Napolean". The author compares Scipio to many ancient generals, e.g., Alexander, Pyrrhus, Hannibal, Caesar, etc. Napolean is mentioned a few times, but the largest part of the book is about the head-to-head battle with Hannibal. There is not much comparison of Scipio and Napolean.

If my grandson had to write an essay on the Roman Empire, I'd suggest he make Scipio his subject, due specifically to Scipio's benevolent handling of the people and armies he conquered. To my knowledge, only U.S. Grant was so magnanimous a victor.

[Walker Greene · Rating 5 out of 5]

okay, I'm on board

[Bobby Daugherty · Rating 3 out of 5]

Basically a biography of a great Roman general who has been ignored in favor of Hannibal.