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De russische klus: De geheime Amerikaanse reddingsoperatie bij de Russische hongersnood
Meesterverteller Douglas Smith onthult een verborgen gehouden geschiedenis
Het is bijna niet meer voor te stellen na een eeuw vol vijandigheid, maar in 1921 hebben de Verenigde Staten een grootscheepse reddingsactie uitgevoerd om Rusland te behoeden voor een van de grootste hongersnoden uit haar geschiedenis.
Na jaren van oorlog en revolutie stond de zojuist opgerichte Sovjet-Unie op instorten. In zeer grote delen van het gigantische land stond er een ramp te gebeuren: de honger was extreem en er waren al vormen van kannibalisme ontstaan uit pure wanhoop. Lenin was radeloos: het laatste wat hij wilde, was de hulp inroepen van de kapitalistische vijand, maar hij kon niet anders. De VS grepen in, met succes.
Vrijwel direct na de succesvolle reddingsactie wilden beide partijen er echter weinig meer van weten. Ze werden elkaars vijand en de gebroederlijke samenwerking werd aan beide kanten vakkundig onder het tapijt geveegd. Totdat de meesterlijke pen van Douglas Smith dit vergeten stuk geschiedenis weer opdiepte.
Het is bijna niet meer voor te stellen na een eeuw vol vijandigheid, maar in 1921 hebben de Verenigde Staten een grootscheepse reddingsactie uitgevoerd om Rusland te behoeden voor een van de grootste hongersnoden uit haar geschiedenis.
Na jaren van oorlog en revolutie stond de zojuist opgerichte Sovjet-Unie op instorten. In zeer grote delen van het gigantische land stond er een ramp te gebeuren: de honger was extreem en er waren al vormen van kannibalisme ontstaan uit pure wanhoop. Lenin was radeloos: het laatste wat hij wilde, was de hulp inroepen van de kapitalistische vijand, maar hij kon niet anders. De VS grepen in, met succes.
Vrijwel direct na de succesvolle reddingsactie wilden beide partijen er echter weinig meer van weten. Ze werden elkaars vijand en de gebroederlijke samenwerking werd aan beide kanten vakkundig onder het tapijt geveegd. Totdat de meesterlijke pen van Douglas Smith dit vergeten stuk geschiedenis weer opdiepte.
328 pages, Hardcover
First published November 5, 2019
About the author
Douglas Smith
8 books129 followersDouglas Smith is an awarding-winning historian and translator and the author of four books on Russia. He studied German and Russian at the University of Vermont and has a doctorate in history from UCLA.
Over the past twenty-five years Smith has made many trips to Russia. In the 1980s, he was a Russian-speaking guide on the U. S. State Department’s exhibition “Information USA” that traveled throughout the USSR. He has worked as a Soviet affairs analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich, Germany specializing in Russian nationalism and served as an interpreter for late President Reagan.
Smith has taught and lectured widely in the United States, Britain, and Europe and has appeared in documentaries for A&E and National Geographic. He is the recipient of numerous awards and distinctions, including a Fulbright scholarship and a residency at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Study Center.
His latest book, Former People: The Final Days of the Russian Aristocracy, was published in 2012 with Farrar, Straus and Giroux in the U.S. and Macmillan in the U.K. Read an interview with Douglas Smith about Former People and listen to his interview on KUOW Radio.
Douglas Smith is currently writing a biography of Grigory Rasputin to be published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux in 2016.
Over the past twenty-five years Smith has made many trips to Russia. In the 1980s, he was a Russian-speaking guide on the U. S. State Department’s exhibition “Information USA” that traveled throughout the USSR. He has worked as a Soviet affairs analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich, Germany specializing in Russian nationalism and served as an interpreter for late President Reagan.
Smith has taught and lectured widely in the United States, Britain, and Europe and has appeared in documentaries for A&E and National Geographic. He is the recipient of numerous awards and distinctions, including a Fulbright scholarship and a residency at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Study Center.
His latest book, Former People: The Final Days of the Russian Aristocracy, was published in 2012 with Farrar, Straus and Giroux in the U.S. and Macmillan in the U.K. Read an interview with Douglas Smith about Former People and listen to his interview on KUOW Radio.
Douglas Smith is currently writing a biography of Grigory Rasputin to be published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux in 2016.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 55 reviews
November 28, 2022
Douglas Smith exceptionally fine historian and chronicler of aspects of imperial/revolutionary Russian history have attracted masses of attention in terms chronicling in anecdotal ways but never the searching glare of historian determined to look beyond 'legend' into hard archival investigation. His biography of Rasputin has superseded all previous ones. His books on the Russian aristocracy at its extravagant, glittering apex under Catherine II and it's demise after Nicholas II are unique and essential reading for anyone interested pre and immediate post revolutionary Russian history. He has now tackled one of the more incredible stories from the immediate post civil war period in Russian history - the mammoth famine relief programme by the USA which saved millions of Russian lives and the new Soviet regime which was as close to death as any of the emaciated wraiths haunting the Volga.
The story of the famine relief programme carried out by the capitalist west between 1920-22 to save both human beings and the Soviet state has been told in a number of very fine histories, some very recently, but Smith's splendidly readable narrative history is as good as any of them and supported by recent research in the Russian archives. The way the story has fallen from recollection or commemoration in either the USA or Russia is not hard to understand because neither capitalists nor communist regimes wanted it remembered. The story does provide a insight onto why Hoover, when president, attracted such vilification for his handling of the 1929 economic crash and subsequent economic depression.
In 1914 Herbert Hoover was a very successful mining engineer and self made millionaire, not from playing the markets, but from creating and managing mining industries. His ability to get things done in practical terms was much admired and after the outbreak WWI for the number of large scale, complex relief programmes he largely initiated and managed. Amongst them was the repatriation of thousand US citizens caught in Europe after war began without access to money or transport and famine relief to Belgian citizens which necessitated complex negotiations with all the belligerent powers to ensure relief went to starving Belgians and not soldiers or the black market. He was seen as the only man who could do the same in Russia - making sure help went to the starving and politically 'approved' recipient's. That he did this earned him a reputation as businessman who understood how markets and business worked so as to be humanitarian on grand scale. Everyone presumed he would no how to fix the economy and provide relief to the millions of hungry and homeless.
That he failed to do so led to a reversal of reputation that is hard to comprehend. In 1925 as one of the most respected humanitarians in the world. By 1930 his name meant shanty towns (hoovervilles) and police on horseback massacring starving veterans of WWI on the streets of Washington DC.
But back to the 'Russian Job' - if you have read nothing on this fascinating episode in US/Russian relations then I urge to read this delightful narrative of a complex historical moment. It is stronger on personalities then the ins and outs of the political and administrative matters that underpinned the famine relief operation. But he does not ignore it, he provides an account of it within the whole narrative and gives plenty of archival references as well as up to date bibliographical information on not only books but scholarly articles that could be interest.
Finally I just want to praise again this books wonderful prose based as it is on first rate scholarship. Historians like Douglas Smith who write well and knowledgeably - on subjects that to often attract the monolingual amateurs who peddle the same unattributed stories from mediocre memoirs - is to be treasured and encouraged.
The story of the famine relief programme carried out by the capitalist west between 1920-22 to save both human beings and the Soviet state has been told in a number of very fine histories, some very recently, but Smith's splendidly readable narrative history is as good as any of them and supported by recent research in the Russian archives. The way the story has fallen from recollection or commemoration in either the USA or Russia is not hard to understand because neither capitalists nor communist regimes wanted it remembered. The story does provide a insight onto why Hoover, when president, attracted such vilification for his handling of the 1929 economic crash and subsequent economic depression.
In 1914 Herbert Hoover was a very successful mining engineer and self made millionaire, not from playing the markets, but from creating and managing mining industries. His ability to get things done in practical terms was much admired and after the outbreak WWI for the number of large scale, complex relief programmes he largely initiated and managed. Amongst them was the repatriation of thousand US citizens caught in Europe after war began without access to money or transport and famine relief to Belgian citizens which necessitated complex negotiations with all the belligerent powers to ensure relief went to starving Belgians and not soldiers or the black market. He was seen as the only man who could do the same in Russia - making sure help went to the starving and politically 'approved' recipient's. That he did this earned him a reputation as businessman who understood how markets and business worked so as to be humanitarian on grand scale. Everyone presumed he would no how to fix the economy and provide relief to the millions of hungry and homeless.
That he failed to do so led to a reversal of reputation that is hard to comprehend. In 1925 as one of the most respected humanitarians in the world. By 1930 his name meant shanty towns (hoovervilles) and police on horseback massacring starving veterans of WWI on the streets of Washington DC.
But back to the 'Russian Job' - if you have read nothing on this fascinating episode in US/Russian relations then I urge to read this delightful narrative of a complex historical moment. It is stronger on personalities then the ins and outs of the political and administrative matters that underpinned the famine relief operation. But he does not ignore it, he provides an account of it within the whole narrative and gives plenty of archival references as well as up to date bibliographical information on not only books but scholarly articles that could be interest.
Finally I just want to praise again this books wonderful prose based as it is on first rate scholarship. Historians like Douglas Smith who write well and knowledgeably - on subjects that to often attract the monolingual amateurs who peddle the same unattributed stories from mediocre memoirs - is to be treasured and encouraged.
December 19, 2023
Отличная книга о том, как Америка спасала Россию от голода в 20-х годах прошлого века. Взамен они получили подозрительность, ненависть и репрессии в отношение советских людей, работавших на американцев. За 100 лет ничего не поменялось: американцы спасают людей - а их за это ненавидят!
June 12, 2023
Не валяй дурака, Америка,
Вот те валенки, мерзнешь, небось.
Что Сибирь, что Аляска - два берега:
Баня, водка, гармонь и лосось.
Баня, водка, гармонь и лосось.
Так получилось, что пласт истории "до войны" (отечественной, пусть с нашей нынешней наверняка будет так же) начисто затёрся этим чудовищным бедствием. Даже военные события, где большевики проявили себя — Революция, Гражданская, Польский и Финский походы ушли из общественного сознания, что уж говорить о трагедии, за которую они несут прямую ответственность, и которая не закончилась крахом для России во многом благодаря иностранной помощи? Но это тоже наша история.
Книга суть повесть в лицах о том, как American Relief Administration, она же АРА, помогала Советской России в борьбе с голодом 21-23гг. О том, какие жуткие картины бандитизма, антропофагии и бесконечного унижения им пришлось наблюдать, о всепоглощающей подозрительности ЧК, о коллапсе медицины, транспортного соообщения, да и государственности вообще. И в то же время самопожертвования и работы на износ — у американцев, и несравненно большего числа их русских сотрудников.
О войне с советской бюрократией, с американским общественным мнением, о гуманизме наконец.
Удивительно, как русские умеют выбирать себе врагов. Янки спасли десять миллионов крестьян в 20х, и сколько еще жизней сохранил ленд-лиз в 40х. В начале девяностых, когда 70% населения страны недоедало, Ельцин получил 2млрд долларов продовольствием, угадайте от кого. При этом они наши злейшие враги.
А Сербы обе мировые войны дрались с нами, и они братья. Как это так?
Крестяне говорили Келли, сотруднику АРА, что вечно будут помнить то, как американцы спасли их детей от голодной смерти. И я тоже буду.
Вот те валенки, мерзнешь, небось.
Что Сибирь, что Аляска - два берега:
Баня, водка, гармонь и лосось.
Баня, водка, гармонь и лосось.
Так получилось, что пласт истории "до войны" (отечественной, пусть с нашей нынешней наверняка будет так же) начисто затёрся этим чудовищным бедствием. Даже военные события, где большевики проявили себя — Революция, Гражданская, Польский и Финский походы ушли из общественного сознания, что уж говорить о трагедии, за которую они несут прямую ответственность, и которая не закончилась крахом для России во многом благодаря иностранной помощи? Но это тоже наша история.
Книга суть повесть в лицах о том, как American Relief Administration, она же АРА, помогала Советской России в борьбе с голодом 21-23гг. О том, какие жуткие картины бандитизма, антропофагии и бесконечного унижения им пришлось наблюдать, о всепоглощающей подозрительности ЧК, о коллапсе медицины, транспортного соообщения, да и государственности вообще. И в то же время самопожертвования и работы на износ — у американцев, и несравненно большего числа их русских сотрудников.
О войне с советской бюрократией, с американским общественным мнением, о гуманизме наконец.
Удивительно, как русские умеют выбирать себе врагов. Янки спасли десять миллионов крестьян в 20х, и сколько еще жизней сохранил ленд-лиз в 40х. В начале девяностых, когда 70% населения страны недоедало, Ельцин получил 2млрд долларов продовольствием, угадайте от кого. При этом они наши злейшие враги.
А Сербы обе мировые войны дрались с нами, и они братья. Как это так?
Крестяне говорили Келли, сотруднику АРА, что вечно будут помнить то, как американцы спасли их детей от голодной смерти. И я тоже буду.
December 11, 2019
I began studying Russia two decades ago because I loved the beautiful things that came from Russia-- literature, music, art, ballet, and even science. But you can't study these things out of context, so I know more than I'd like to about war, corruption, poverty, and famine. I knew about the famines of 1921-22 as they affected political and cultural events in the early years of the USSR. I knew that from their earliest days in power, Lenin and Stalin used hunger as a weapon, strategically starving certain populations. I even knew the multiple words for cannibalism in Russian, which exist to make the moral distinction between eating a corpse and murdering someone for the purpose of eating them.
But I hadn't heard the American side of the aid story, which was quite amazing in itself. Starting during WWI, Herbert Hoover orchestrated massive operations to administer food and supplies, first to Belgium, then to other nations. Eventually, this organization was formalized as the ARA. When the writer Maxim Gorkiy sent out a plea for help, Hoover commissioned this small group of Americans to work with thousands of Soviet citizens, managing to bring large amounts of food, medicine, and clothing. As a narrative, the book is an excellent source of inspiration to put aside political or cultural differences to save lives in danger. As an academic source, though, the book does not offer full sources or many notes, so it won't be the greatest help to researchers (unless this can be added--I read a review galley).
Thank you to the publishers and NetGalley for the opportunity to read a digital ARC.
But I hadn't heard the American side of the aid story, which was quite amazing in itself. Starting during WWI, Herbert Hoover orchestrated massive operations to administer food and supplies, first to Belgium, then to other nations. Eventually, this organization was formalized as the ARA. When the writer Maxim Gorkiy sent out a plea for help, Hoover commissioned this small group of Americans to work with thousands of Soviet citizens, managing to bring large amounts of food, medicine, and clothing. As a narrative, the book is an excellent source of inspiration to put aside political or cultural differences to save lives in danger. As an academic source, though, the book does not offer full sources or many notes, so it won't be the greatest help to researchers (unless this can be added--I read a review galley).
Thank you to the publishers and NetGalley for the opportunity to read a digital ARC.
April 4, 2020
In 1921 when the Soviet Union was experiencing one of the worst famines in history, a Herbert Hoover-led entity, the American Relief Agency, came to Russia and spent two years providing much needed help. They fed some 11 million people. They distributed over 1.25 million food parcels. They restored 15,000 hospitals and inoculated 10 million people against epidemic diseases.
American politicians often challenged the program. Their contempt for communism and their opposition to the idea of American goods going anywhere but to Americans made them an ongoing obstacle. Hoover himself came to question how much could or should be done.
When the program ended, it faded into obscurity in America as other national concerns rose. In Russia, the program was discredited as the communist government was loath to seem reliant on capitalists. (Some of the Russians who had helped with the program were executed.)
This book relates the stories of those who worked for the ARA, the experiences they had, the frustrations they encountered as a needy but suspicious Soviet government helped/hindered them and how all of this changed their lives forever.
It is a very thought-provoking book and well worth reading.
Here’s one question that came to me as I read it:
Lenin was still in power at the time of the ARA efforts. ARA staff felt that he was aware of the need to ameliorate some of the inflexibility of communism. Would he have done so, had he lived longer and Joseph Stalin not risen to power? How would the history of the Soviet Union have been impacted?
And an idea that struck me.
Many of those whose lives were saved during the famine, grew to be the adults who fought the Nazis and served as allies to the British and Americans during WW2. Had the ARA not saved those lives, would the Soviet Union have been able to mount the formidable forces they did during WW2? Would the allies have been able to defeat the Nazis?
American politicians often challenged the program. Their contempt for communism and their opposition to the idea of American goods going anywhere but to Americans made them an ongoing obstacle. Hoover himself came to question how much could or should be done.
When the program ended, it faded into obscurity in America as other national concerns rose. In Russia, the program was discredited as the communist government was loath to seem reliant on capitalists. (Some of the Russians who had helped with the program were executed.)
This book relates the stories of those who worked for the ARA, the experiences they had, the frustrations they encountered as a needy but suspicious Soviet government helped/hindered them and how all of this changed their lives forever.
It is a very thought-provoking book and well worth reading.
Here’s one question that came to me as I read it:
Lenin was still in power at the time of the ARA efforts. ARA staff felt that he was aware of the need to ameliorate some of the inflexibility of communism. Would he have done so, had he lived longer and Joseph Stalin not risen to power? How would the history of the Soviet Union have been impacted?
And an idea that struck me.
Many of those whose lives were saved during the famine, grew to be the adults who fought the Nazis and served as allies to the British and Americans during WW2. Had the ARA not saved those lives, would the Soviet Union have been able to mount the formidable forces they did during WW2? Would the allies have been able to defeat the Nazis?
December 21, 2020
This was a solid history of a lesser known event. The author does a very good job of giving the details and illuminating the people involved. One area of weakness was that it presented the suspicion that the Russians had of Americans as being completely unwarranted. A few years previously, the US had invaded Russian as part of an international force and attempted to overthrow the Bolshevik's government. This would have give more depth to the book.
September 15, 2021
A really insightful look into the American Relief Administration, U.S’s massive, federally funded relief program organized in the wake of the Russian Revolution, Civil War, and subsequent famine. Douglas, as always, writes accessible nonfiction, with deep knowledge of Russia and her mentality and history.
February 19, 2020
Although I have read widely and studied Russian history for most of my adult life, I had never come across this somewhat forgotten interlude – and what a fascinating story it is, the story of how the American Relief Administration, under the auspices of the US Government, fed millions of starving Russians in the crisis facing the country after the Revolution and Civil War. Over 300 volunteers went to save as many lives as they could, sometimes sacrificing their own to do so. It’s a harrowing and heart-breaking tale of famine, death and devastation accompanied by some equally harrowing and heart-breaking photographs. A compelling narrative, excellently told and of absorbing interest.
May 26, 2022
Firmly in the "human story" camp as opposed to the politics and logistics surrounding the launch of "A-hra".
July 10, 2024
Amazing story i actually didn’t knew. Great read, 5 stars.
December 18, 2019
Hard to imagine such extreme famine. Very interesting read about how this famine was dealt with by Americans and an unfriendly communist government. Suffering is hard to read about, I can’t imagine what it was like to witness it. Certainly worth reading.
August 17, 2026
An updated and bittersweet narrative of one of the grandest, large-scale humanitarian aid operations in known history, carried out the American Relief Administration (ARA, under Herbert Hoover's direction and management). The moments of hopelessness, brutality, hunger, regret, frustration, depression and exhaustion that are experienced and felt for most of the book become palpable and hard-felt. However, this pessimistic outlook is offset by feelings of solidarity, humanity, hope, encouragement and gratitude towards the end. However, the pessimism is not fully offset by the good when the book ends. Those familiar with Soviet history will be aware that the food problem and famine were not resolved subsequent to the ARA's departure. Further, there is an interesting paradox that is presented after finishing the book, on this later.
The general outline of the book centers around the ARA's famine relief mission that was commenced close to the end of the fighting in relation to the Russian Civil War. Prolonged military conflicts, coupled with poorly thought-out agricultural expropriation protocols carried out under the Bolshevik's "War Communism" economic program and brutally frigid climates, largely resulted in a widespread famine at a scale far greater than the Bolsheviks and ARA had initially conceived. The Bolsheviks, unable to handle the existential conflict on its own, made a call for aid. This call was answered 90% by the US (an estimate of the proportion of aid provided by the U.S. according to Smith at the end of the book), with additional help from England, Italy, the Netherlands, and other European nations not directly impacted from the famine. Overall, it was a miraculous effort with remarkable results. It is no exaggeration to say that millions of lives were saved.
Smith's prose is comprehensible and accessible for readers not familiar with the expansive Soviet government and its seemingly endless laundry list of abbreviations and nicknames. Further, Smith's storytelling and nuance is one of the book's best strengths. The magnitude of suffering at hand made for emotionally taxing reading, even as someone who has read plenty about famines in the Soviet Union. The gravity of the hunger and the extent of death and misery are compounded through Smith's generous provision of pictures of the victims - ranging from unfortunate children looking like skeletons, to a pile of corpses in some locality that was ravaged by the famine. Consequently, the book is graphic from both a linguistic and visual perspective, and is not recommended for those who are faint of heart and/or stomach.
A project of this nature, carried out in a regime inherently distrusting of the capitalist West - a West that also intervened in the Russian Civil War, so such distrust wasn't entirely unmerited - was met with numerous challenges. Namely, intervention and at times outright sabotage by the Cheka became a recurring complaint and concern for ARA personnel. Aside from constant surveillance by Cheka agents, numerous members of the ARA and native volunteers were inspected, harassed, arrested, and generally inhibited by the Cheka's conduct. It is thus ironic that (Iron) Felix Dzerzhinsky proved to be a major force in getting urgent things done for the ARA when he needed to step in. Speaking of the Soviet government, its general incompetence, corruption, and inefficiency of the Bolshevik regime becomes apparent rather quickly, as travel, communication, housing, sanitation, etc., are beyond laggard. The devastation from WWI, the Civil War, and War Communism would be almost impossible to overestimate.
In spite of whatever ideological misgivings between the West and the Soviet Union, the ARA's project sought to be an apolitical venture: feed the hungry, and then leave once the famine is resolved. However, one notices Hoover's anti-Bolshevism when he implies or outright claims that the ARA project would prove Bolshevism's inadequacy and result in regime change brought out internally, or a seismic shift in political outlook to one more moderate and cooperative with the West at large. On top of this, one also notices the scope of the ARA's aid expanding so exceedingly far beyond the provision of food. Medicine and vaccination, infrastructure construction, Sanitation, education and literary initialives, consumer goods and clothing distribution, and managing private donations from individuals, companies and non-profits. In this sense, the ARA project had a far greater impact than resolving hunger: it managed to repair pervasive health and infrastructure issues in some localities as well, whose impacts are observable over years. It was extraordinary to read about how the ARA's aid was expanded further in scope of activity, while also being further expanded in geographic scale.
Beyond the actual activity of the ARA, the most important and influential figures of the relief organization are highlighted and discussed throughout. In particular, the stories of Joel Childs, Frank Golder, Hoobert Hoover, and Haskell are especially noteworthy for different reasons. For example, Childs's story is fascinating from the perspective of someone who was directly involved in the administration of aid, along with learning about the juxtaposition between his Soviet sympathies as a socialist and having to provide vital aid to an empire experimenting with the very socialism he supports (the degree to which the socialism was actually being implemented is, of course, a topic of endless debate). Meanwhile, Hoover's story is interesting as someone who was in constant communication with the American and Bolshevik governments, having to weigh in on important economic policies such as cooperation with the Bolsheviks and official diplomatic recognition. On this subject, the arguments for and against are a neat addition to the story and adds a layer of intrigue into the fundamental differences between the US and Russia from an ideological perspective.
When I mentioned feelings of frustration earlier in this review, I am not lying when I say there are numerous instances of utterly baffling and frustrating events and decisions that makes one's blood boil. One example is the Bolsheviks deciding to EXPORT tens of thousands of metric tons of grain in 1923, even though countless citizens were still starving and in need of food (p. 226-227, 247-248). Even Walter Duranty - a well-known Stalinist sympathizing crank - sensibly asked what the true famine situation actually is in that would justify such grain exports. Another example relates to the speculators who were greedily seeking to take advantage of the citizenry's desperation for food, when such food could have been provided for cheap (or free), instead of rotting on market/store shelves (p. 133-134). A further example relates to Paxton Hibben, a former diplomat in charge of the American Committee for Relief of Russian Children, engaging in Bolshevik d***-sucking by saying that the Soviet people "may criticize the government to their heart's contents" and saying that the failures of protecting those who perished rested centrally on the ARA, in blatant defense of the Bolshevik government. It is shocking that in both major Soviet famines (1921-1923 and 1932-1934), there was some absurd American crank who uncritically supported the Soviet's conduct, even if such conduct caused and/or exacerbated the effects of the famine. Other frustrating events relate to the Cheka's frequent interference and unlawful arrests, Hoover tarnishing his reputation during his presidency, Childs tarnishing his reputation after violating terms preventing ARA members from leaving with Russian valuables (of which he took many), and, most of all, the attempts by the Bolsheviks to wipe the ARA's aid our of public memory (p. 269-272).
In short, the ARA relief mission saved countless lives, possibly an entire generation of rural Soviet children. Smith estimates at least 10 million lives saved from the aid project and 6 million dead from the famine. One cannot help but inquire about the extent of further damage that would have occurred had the relief mission never taken place. The 6 million death toll would have likely been 10 figures, to say nothing of the demographic impact on future generations of Russian citizens. This is also to say nothing of additional revolts that would have likely taken place had the Bolshevik efforts to quell the famine proved inadequate, as they already had.
And this brings me to the previously-foreshadowed paradox that surfaces from reading this book.
On the one hand, the ARA mission saved countless lives and helped resolve the famine in the USSR. On the other hand, this very relief mission allowed the Bolsheviks to consolidate authority and solidify its single-party dictatorship that held for just under seven decades after the conclusion of the famine. Note that these are the same Bolsheviks who were fervently and vehemently disdainful towards the US and the liberal capitalist West at large, fundamentally yearning to subvert and overthrow their entire societal order in favor of Communism. In essence, the US saved from collapse a regime that was hellbent on destroying their political and economic systems through international class warfare.
On the basis of this, several questions can be raised regarding the "what could have been?" had the aid never come:
- What would have happened to the Bolsheviks had the ARA and other nations never provided the aid? Would the Bolsheviks have lost all legitimacy? If so, how would they have addressed the increasing public discontent and rebellions that would have likely taken place? Would they have suppressed them like with the Tambov peasants and the Kronstadt rebels? Would they have abdicated and let a new set of rulers take place? If the latter, what would the nature of their rule have been, and how would they have addressed the famine? Would it be adequate?
- What would have happened to Russia, and the world at large, had the Bolsheviks enterprise collapsed right then and there (assuming the aid never came)? Would there have never been a Stalinist famine in 1932-33? WWII? Cold War? Would the Marxist philosophy have faced an early and bitter fall from grace? Would the world have been better off or worse off?
- Conversely to the above, how would the globe have reacted if the West never came to the Soviet's aid in the first place? Would it have been seen as a bankruptcy of the liberal capitalist system to let such high-scale death take place, when they had the resources and capability to at least help as many people as reasonably possible? Would the negative publicity have reflected worse on the US and the ARA for not stepping in, or on the Bolsheviks for allowing such a catastrophe to reach such a monstrous scale? Would it have been expected for capitalist nations to have aided famine relief for a government that was openly belligerent to them?
- Ultimately, was it better for the aid to have been provided, even if this meant protecting the Bolshevik regime? Or, would it have been better for the aid to have never been provided, even if this meant a far more devastating famine and civil strife?
Thankfully, such questions do not need to be answered. For such questions are either impossible to answer from a counterfactual perspective, or are outright ridiculous. It would be incredibly uncomfortable to consider the notion that a group of nations would neglect providing aid to resolve a massive famine simply because the government ruling that country is hostile to their political and economic system. And for that, I am personally glad that the aid was provided in an act of cross-national humanity and solidarity that put aside political differences (or rather, at least made some effort to do so on the ARA's side). In spite of the Bolshevik consolidation of dictatorship, it can be resoundingly stated that many Soviet citizens were spared from an untimely demise.
The fact that such a story is re-told based on more up-to-date information makes this an incredibly worthwhile read. On top of not being overladen with meaningless detail, the illustrations provided do an amazing job in exhibiting the gravity of the famine and the aid provided. It also shortens the book by a fair bit. It is highly accessible, as well. For that, 4/5 stars feels appropriate. One star is taken away for a lack of footnotes, which would have helped trace where specific quotes and claims are supported. I was able to corroborate notable claims and statements to other works and general knowledge from a deep interest in the subject, which is luxury that other readers may not have. Hence, I was a tad disappointed with the documentation in the form of no footnotes.
Overall a great work on the famine and the ARA's mission. The story definitely raises a cogent counterpoint to the steady stream of claims that nations like the US were always actively seeking to coup, embargo, sanction, and/or destroy socialist nations. For the exact opposite occurred during the Soviet famine of 1921-1924, with a far higher significance in terms of impact on the 20th century Marxist movement itself.
The general outline of the book centers around the ARA's famine relief mission that was commenced close to the end of the fighting in relation to the Russian Civil War. Prolonged military conflicts, coupled with poorly thought-out agricultural expropriation protocols carried out under the Bolshevik's "War Communism" economic program and brutally frigid climates, largely resulted in a widespread famine at a scale far greater than the Bolsheviks and ARA had initially conceived. The Bolsheviks, unable to handle the existential conflict on its own, made a call for aid. This call was answered 90% by the US (an estimate of the proportion of aid provided by the U.S. according to Smith at the end of the book), with additional help from England, Italy, the Netherlands, and other European nations not directly impacted from the famine. Overall, it was a miraculous effort with remarkable results. It is no exaggeration to say that millions of lives were saved.
Smith's prose is comprehensible and accessible for readers not familiar with the expansive Soviet government and its seemingly endless laundry list of abbreviations and nicknames. Further, Smith's storytelling and nuance is one of the book's best strengths. The magnitude of suffering at hand made for emotionally taxing reading, even as someone who has read plenty about famines in the Soviet Union. The gravity of the hunger and the extent of death and misery are compounded through Smith's generous provision of pictures of the victims - ranging from unfortunate children looking like skeletons, to a pile of corpses in some locality that was ravaged by the famine. Consequently, the book is graphic from both a linguistic and visual perspective, and is not recommended for those who are faint of heart and/or stomach.
A project of this nature, carried out in a regime inherently distrusting of the capitalist West - a West that also intervened in the Russian Civil War, so such distrust wasn't entirely unmerited - was met with numerous challenges. Namely, intervention and at times outright sabotage by the Cheka became a recurring complaint and concern for ARA personnel. Aside from constant surveillance by Cheka agents, numerous members of the ARA and native volunteers were inspected, harassed, arrested, and generally inhibited by the Cheka's conduct. It is thus ironic that (Iron) Felix Dzerzhinsky proved to be a major force in getting urgent things done for the ARA when he needed to step in. Speaking of the Soviet government, its general incompetence, corruption, and inefficiency of the Bolshevik regime becomes apparent rather quickly, as travel, communication, housing, sanitation, etc., are beyond laggard. The devastation from WWI, the Civil War, and War Communism would be almost impossible to overestimate.
In spite of whatever ideological misgivings between the West and the Soviet Union, the ARA's project sought to be an apolitical venture: feed the hungry, and then leave once the famine is resolved. However, one notices Hoover's anti-Bolshevism when he implies or outright claims that the ARA project would prove Bolshevism's inadequacy and result in regime change brought out internally, or a seismic shift in political outlook to one more moderate and cooperative with the West at large. On top of this, one also notices the scope of the ARA's aid expanding so exceedingly far beyond the provision of food. Medicine and vaccination, infrastructure construction, Sanitation, education and literary initialives, consumer goods and clothing distribution, and managing private donations from individuals, companies and non-profits. In this sense, the ARA project had a far greater impact than resolving hunger: it managed to repair pervasive health and infrastructure issues in some localities as well, whose impacts are observable over years. It was extraordinary to read about how the ARA's aid was expanded further in scope of activity, while also being further expanded in geographic scale.
Beyond the actual activity of the ARA, the most important and influential figures of the relief organization are highlighted and discussed throughout. In particular, the stories of Joel Childs, Frank Golder, Hoobert Hoover, and Haskell are especially noteworthy for different reasons. For example, Childs's story is fascinating from the perspective of someone who was directly involved in the administration of aid, along with learning about the juxtaposition between his Soviet sympathies as a socialist and having to provide vital aid to an empire experimenting with the very socialism he supports (the degree to which the socialism was actually being implemented is, of course, a topic of endless debate). Meanwhile, Hoover's story is interesting as someone who was in constant communication with the American and Bolshevik governments, having to weigh in on important economic policies such as cooperation with the Bolsheviks and official diplomatic recognition. On this subject, the arguments for and against are a neat addition to the story and adds a layer of intrigue into the fundamental differences between the US and Russia from an ideological perspective.
When I mentioned feelings of frustration earlier in this review, I am not lying when I say there are numerous instances of utterly baffling and frustrating events and decisions that makes one's blood boil. One example is the Bolsheviks deciding to EXPORT tens of thousands of metric tons of grain in 1923, even though countless citizens were still starving and in need of food (p. 226-227, 247-248). Even Walter Duranty - a well-known Stalinist sympathizing crank - sensibly asked what the true famine situation actually is in that would justify such grain exports. Another example relates to the speculators who were greedily seeking to take advantage of the citizenry's desperation for food, when such food could have been provided for cheap (or free), instead of rotting on market/store shelves (p. 133-134). A further example relates to Paxton Hibben, a former diplomat in charge of the American Committee for Relief of Russian Children, engaging in Bolshevik d***-sucking by saying that the Soviet people "may criticize the government to their heart's contents" and saying that the failures of protecting those who perished rested centrally on the ARA, in blatant defense of the Bolshevik government. It is shocking that in both major Soviet famines (1921-1923 and 1932-1934), there was some absurd American crank who uncritically supported the Soviet's conduct, even if such conduct caused and/or exacerbated the effects of the famine. Other frustrating events relate to the Cheka's frequent interference and unlawful arrests, Hoover tarnishing his reputation during his presidency, Childs tarnishing his reputation after violating terms preventing ARA members from leaving with Russian valuables (of which he took many), and, most of all, the attempts by the Bolsheviks to wipe the ARA's aid our of public memory (p. 269-272).
In short, the ARA relief mission saved countless lives, possibly an entire generation of rural Soviet children. Smith estimates at least 10 million lives saved from the aid project and 6 million dead from the famine. One cannot help but inquire about the extent of further damage that would have occurred had the relief mission never taken place. The 6 million death toll would have likely been 10 figures, to say nothing of the demographic impact on future generations of Russian citizens. This is also to say nothing of additional revolts that would have likely taken place had the Bolshevik efforts to quell the famine proved inadequate, as they already had.
And this brings me to the previously-foreshadowed paradox that surfaces from reading this book.
On the one hand, the ARA mission saved countless lives and helped resolve the famine in the USSR. On the other hand, this very relief mission allowed the Bolsheviks to consolidate authority and solidify its single-party dictatorship that held for just under seven decades after the conclusion of the famine. Note that these are the same Bolsheviks who were fervently and vehemently disdainful towards the US and the liberal capitalist West at large, fundamentally yearning to subvert and overthrow their entire societal order in favor of Communism. In essence, the US saved from collapse a regime that was hellbent on destroying their political and economic systems through international class warfare.
On the basis of this, several questions can be raised regarding the "what could have been?" had the aid never come:
- What would have happened to the Bolsheviks had the ARA and other nations never provided the aid? Would the Bolsheviks have lost all legitimacy? If so, how would they have addressed the increasing public discontent and rebellions that would have likely taken place? Would they have suppressed them like with the Tambov peasants and the Kronstadt rebels? Would they have abdicated and let a new set of rulers take place? If the latter, what would the nature of their rule have been, and how would they have addressed the famine? Would it be adequate?
- What would have happened to Russia, and the world at large, had the Bolsheviks enterprise collapsed right then and there (assuming the aid never came)? Would there have never been a Stalinist famine in 1932-33? WWII? Cold War? Would the Marxist philosophy have faced an early and bitter fall from grace? Would the world have been better off or worse off?
- Conversely to the above, how would the globe have reacted if the West never came to the Soviet's aid in the first place? Would it have been seen as a bankruptcy of the liberal capitalist system to let such high-scale death take place, when they had the resources and capability to at least help as many people as reasonably possible? Would the negative publicity have reflected worse on the US and the ARA for not stepping in, or on the Bolsheviks for allowing such a catastrophe to reach such a monstrous scale? Would it have been expected for capitalist nations to have aided famine relief for a government that was openly belligerent to them?
- Ultimately, was it better for the aid to have been provided, even if this meant protecting the Bolshevik regime? Or, would it have been better for the aid to have never been provided, even if this meant a far more devastating famine and civil strife?
Thankfully, such questions do not need to be answered. For such questions are either impossible to answer from a counterfactual perspective, or are outright ridiculous. It would be incredibly uncomfortable to consider the notion that a group of nations would neglect providing aid to resolve a massive famine simply because the government ruling that country is hostile to their political and economic system. And for that, I am personally glad that the aid was provided in an act of cross-national humanity and solidarity that put aside political differences (or rather, at least made some effort to do so on the ARA's side). In spite of the Bolshevik consolidation of dictatorship, it can be resoundingly stated that many Soviet citizens were spared from an untimely demise.
The fact that such a story is re-told based on more up-to-date information makes this an incredibly worthwhile read. On top of not being overladen with meaningless detail, the illustrations provided do an amazing job in exhibiting the gravity of the famine and the aid provided. It also shortens the book by a fair bit. It is highly accessible, as well. For that, 4/5 stars feels appropriate. One star is taken away for a lack of footnotes, which would have helped trace where specific quotes and claims are supported. I was able to corroborate notable claims and statements to other works and general knowledge from a deep interest in the subject, which is luxury that other readers may not have. Hence, I was a tad disappointed with the documentation in the form of no footnotes.
Overall a great work on the famine and the ARA's mission. The story definitely raises a cogent counterpoint to the steady stream of claims that nations like the US were always actively seeking to coup, embargo, sanction, and/or destroy socialist nations. For the exact opposite occurred during the Soviet famine of 1921-1924, with a far higher significance in terms of impact on the 20th century Marxist movement itself.
February 13, 2020
This is a fascinating and intriguingly written account of the rescuing of millions of Russians from famine in 1921-23. The five star rating is boosted by the fact that I knew so little about this; the providing of background, context, and a follow up made the story easy to understand.
By 1921, following WWI, revolutions and civil war, the USSR could not feed itself. Reluctantly Lenin and the Communists had to beg for aid. In a war-ravaged world that could only come from the US. And we had not only food but the MAN - Herbert Hoover who had helped feed Belgium during the war. He pt together a team of eager volunteers (often young men who found the post war world boring) and started the ARA. Eventually they fed millions of people. As Smith points out, this relief was a seed for recovery. With food assured peasants did not eat seed grain (or each other).
Lenin and his clique were, of course, suspicious. There had to be ulterior motives. Hoover was very anti-Communist. But the workers tried to stay out of Politics. There were expressions of gratitude and even plaques, but these were later torn down. (As a side note, if you check newspaper reviews, there is a cheery Russian troll zipping around “proving” it was all an evil plot.)
Smith provides a lot of anecdotes, from letters and archives. To the members of the ARA it was a thrilling and often dangerous time. And, at least in retrospect, they loved it!
By 1921, following WWI, revolutions and civil war, the USSR could not feed itself. Reluctantly Lenin and the Communists had to beg for aid. In a war-ravaged world that could only come from the US. And we had not only food but the MAN - Herbert Hoover who had helped feed Belgium during the war. He pt together a team of eager volunteers (often young men who found the post war world boring) and started the ARA. Eventually they fed millions of people. As Smith points out, this relief was a seed for recovery. With food assured peasants did not eat seed grain (or each other).
Lenin and his clique were, of course, suspicious. There had to be ulterior motives. Hoover was very anti-Communist. But the workers tried to stay out of Politics. There were expressions of gratitude and even plaques, but these were later torn down. (As a side note, if you check newspaper reviews, there is a cheery Russian troll zipping around “proving” it was all an evil plot.)
Smith provides a lot of anecdotes, from letters and archives. To the members of the ARA it was a thrilling and often dangerous time. And, at least in retrospect, they loved it!
January 12, 2020
What a masterful story of America's aid to the Soviet Union in the 1920s. The relief effort is described through the lens of individual participants - both American and Russian, which makes it personal and easy to follow. In addition to the description of the humanitarian aid operation, Mr. Smith provides great insight into the formation and development of the US-USSR relations at the beginning of the Soviet era.
July 22, 2020
This book details a piece of American and Russian history that has largely gone unremembered. The politics involved in trying to save human lives was fascinating. The devastation detailed in the book, (along with some pictures) is horrifying. I found the book too interesting to put down, but it was somewhat depressing to read of some of the difficulties people faced with extreme famine. A must read for a picture of the years prior to the Great Depression.
September 16, 2021
This is an interesting part of history, but I'm not sure it justifies a full book-length treatment. I felt like there was a lot of repetitiveness and getting into details that I didn't necessarily need to know. I think for the sake of posterity it's good that Smith did enough research to fully flesh out the people involved and the incidents, but for my purposes I am not sure I needed quite so many biographical details of the primary actors here.
May 30, 2020
When Food from America Saved Millions in the Soviet Union from Starvation
The Russian Job is the story of an American relief effort under the leadership of Herbert Hoover to address extreme famine in the Soviet Union in 1921-1922. As the book’s subtitle suggests, this effort is little remembered in the United States and, because it was an embarrassment to the Bolsheviks, was effectively erased from official Soviet history. Those who administered the aid and those who benefitted at the time have now passed away.
The scale of the American Relief Administration (ARA) program was massive. A group of 300 young Americans mobilized 120,000 Russians to help administer the program, and fed 10 million starving people a day across a million square mile territory.
Many of the young administrators were idealists. They believed that Russia, once fed, would abandon its radical roots and could be brought back into the Western fold. American aid would make the Bolsheviks more responsible and respectable.
Hoover was a hard-headed realist and did not agree. His motivation is not fully explained, but the fame and honors he gained as an administrator of an earlier Belgian relief operation from 1914 to 1919 during World War I was likely a factor. This was an opportunity for him to duplicate his earlier effort and again achieve global acclaim. In the book, he comes across as a faceless, unemotionally involved bureaucrat. This seeming inability to inspire, despite skill in organizing private relief initiatives, later haunted him as president when the US entered the Great Depression fewer than ten years later.
The book’s description of Russian starvation, as Americans entered the countryside, is haunting. Poverty was extreme even before the war and Bolshevik depredations further stripped the countryside of food. The young men from the ARA encountered disease, starvation, and at times cannibalism among those with no other option to avoid death from starvation themselves.
There are charming profiles of many of the young Americans involved in the program, who often fell in love with Russia and with Russian women. Many of the women were attracted to the Americans because they were a source of food and money, but surprisingly few wanted to leave the Soviet Union even when given an opportunity to do so through marriage. One exception involved J. Rives Childs, who managed to marry and to help his wife and her mother, former members of the Russian aristocracy, to emigrate. Unfortunately for the reputation of the ARA, Childs also was found to be exporting Russian treasures, thereby fueling Soviet suspicions about the integrity of the organization, and he was forced to resign.
The ARA’s activities came under suspicion from all sides. The Soviets were paranoid about Western involvement. They believed that food distributed by the organization was used to thwart Bolsheviks in Hungary, a charge that was false. Henry Ford led attacks from the right, claiming that the ARA was controlled by Jews and Bolsheviks.
But it was Hoover who decided to wind down the organization after two years, when it became apparent that while America was sending food relief to Russia, the Bolsheviks were exporting their own grain to earn foreign currency so as to purchase industrial goods essential to the modernization of their economy. For Hoover, that was the last straw.
Author Douglas Smith does an effective job telling the story of this forgotten initiative. Moreover, through diaries and other contemporary accounts he captures personalities, as well as the extent of naiveté and prejudice as both sides encountered each other. There had been very little contact between the two countries before 1920, and later under Stalin’s dictatorship the Soviet Union became a closed society as never before. Indeed Stalin’s collectivization of the countryside in the 1930s again sacrificed peasants to starvation in the name of modernization and Communist ideology. Had they known the full extent of Stalin’s programs, the men of the ARA would have lamented the fact that their efforts were transitory and failed to permanently lift what one called, “the interminable sadness of Russian peasant life.”
The Russian Job is the story of an American relief effort under the leadership of Herbert Hoover to address extreme famine in the Soviet Union in 1921-1922. As the book’s subtitle suggests, this effort is little remembered in the United States and, because it was an embarrassment to the Bolsheviks, was effectively erased from official Soviet history. Those who administered the aid and those who benefitted at the time have now passed away.
The scale of the American Relief Administration (ARA) program was massive. A group of 300 young Americans mobilized 120,000 Russians to help administer the program, and fed 10 million starving people a day across a million square mile territory.
Many of the young administrators were idealists. They believed that Russia, once fed, would abandon its radical roots and could be brought back into the Western fold. American aid would make the Bolsheviks more responsible and respectable.
Hoover was a hard-headed realist and did not agree. His motivation is not fully explained, but the fame and honors he gained as an administrator of an earlier Belgian relief operation from 1914 to 1919 during World War I was likely a factor. This was an opportunity for him to duplicate his earlier effort and again achieve global acclaim. In the book, he comes across as a faceless, unemotionally involved bureaucrat. This seeming inability to inspire, despite skill in organizing private relief initiatives, later haunted him as president when the US entered the Great Depression fewer than ten years later.
The book’s description of Russian starvation, as Americans entered the countryside, is haunting. Poverty was extreme even before the war and Bolshevik depredations further stripped the countryside of food. The young men from the ARA encountered disease, starvation, and at times cannibalism among those with no other option to avoid death from starvation themselves.
There are charming profiles of many of the young Americans involved in the program, who often fell in love with Russia and with Russian women. Many of the women were attracted to the Americans because they were a source of food and money, but surprisingly few wanted to leave the Soviet Union even when given an opportunity to do so through marriage. One exception involved J. Rives Childs, who managed to marry and to help his wife and her mother, former members of the Russian aristocracy, to emigrate. Unfortunately for the reputation of the ARA, Childs also was found to be exporting Russian treasures, thereby fueling Soviet suspicions about the integrity of the organization, and he was forced to resign.
The ARA’s activities came under suspicion from all sides. The Soviets were paranoid about Western involvement. They believed that food distributed by the organization was used to thwart Bolsheviks in Hungary, a charge that was false. Henry Ford led attacks from the right, claiming that the ARA was controlled by Jews and Bolsheviks.
But it was Hoover who decided to wind down the organization after two years, when it became apparent that while America was sending food relief to Russia, the Bolsheviks were exporting their own grain to earn foreign currency so as to purchase industrial goods essential to the modernization of their economy. For Hoover, that was the last straw.
Author Douglas Smith does an effective job telling the story of this forgotten initiative. Moreover, through diaries and other contemporary accounts he captures personalities, as well as the extent of naiveté and prejudice as both sides encountered each other. There had been very little contact between the two countries before 1920, and later under Stalin’s dictatorship the Soviet Union became a closed society as never before. Indeed Stalin’s collectivization of the countryside in the 1930s again sacrificed peasants to starvation in the name of modernization and Communist ideology. Had they known the full extent of Stalin’s programs, the men of the ARA would have lamented the fact that their efforts were transitory and failed to permanently lift what one called, “the interminable sadness of Russian peasant life.”
May 30, 2020
This is a readable, well-written account of the story of American Relief Administration famine relief in Russia in 1921-1923. It seems based primarily on letters, photographs and memoirs of American ARA officials, so you see the story through their eyes. You see the doomed, starving people in the famine zones; the gruesome instances of cannibalism; the non-functioning government and transportation systems (unless the Cheka steps in); the grateful aid recipients once ARA food starts arriving. The ARA men have adventures and love affairs, get sick or demoralized or invigorated, get in and out of trouble. They do a world of good — saving perhaps 10 million lives — and then leave, even more quickly than they arrived. Smith asks but can’t answer the question of why such a consequential event was so quickly and thoroughly forgotten. My guess is that it was forgotten because it doesn’t make a good story. There are some of the elements of a good story: the ARA good guys facing off against the famine, with Soviet incompetence, resistance and assistance keeping things interesting until the famine is ultimately defeated. But in a good story the participants end up someplace different for the experience, and that didn’t happen. The ARA men went home to a country that wasn’t terribly interested. The experience did not change the U.S. view of the Soviet Union, or the Soviet view of the U.S. The ones with most at stake in the drama — the residents of the famine zone — were not in a position to turn their personal gratitude for being saved into any real difference in their world. The bigger picture after the famine was the same as it was before: the Soviet Union wanted U.S. recognition and trade but had little to offer in exchange, the U.S. was suspicious and had no pressing interests in Russia. In hindsight it seems like a fluke — driven largely by Hoover’s force of personality — that the mission occurred at all. For a brief window of time it served the interests of Soviet officials, grain farmers in the U.S., and American politicians, but it wasn’t based on any durable foundation of support, and couldn’t be built upon into something larger or more permanent. It brings to mind George W. Bush’s PEPFAR: a powerful man takes a personal interest in a particular moral cause, money is found, millions of lives are saved, but the effort is overshadowed by more contentious world events, and soon nearly forgotten.
December 9, 2024
Insightful recap of a long-forgotten, century-old act of international goodwill that saved the fledgling USSR from collapse and its people from moral and physical disintegration. Though not as monumental as Parnaude's "The Big Show in Bololand," Smith's book does capture the idealism and horror, success and repercussions of the world's largest (and genuine) act of humanitarian intervention.
The American Relief Administration built on Herbert Hoover's successful famine-fighting in Europe. Off to a rocky start between a Soviet rock and anti-Bolshevik hard place, it nevertheless fulfilled its mandate of feeding millions of hungry children and adults in big cities and far-flung villages. The course was never smooth, the motives on both sides often ambiguous. The ever-paranoid Bolsheviks, even with Cheka chief Dzerzhinsky's help, were often obstructionist; the Americans were often less than Boy Scouts, behaving like swaggering, sexually-entitled colonialists bearing White Man's Privilege.
The saving and gratitude of the recipients was what mattered in the end. That it did not lead to a formal recognition between the two countries was to be expected; though, as a part of NEP, this opening did lead to widely-expanded trade and laid the foundation for WW II Lend Lease. Even a half-century later, in Brezhnev's time, the word "Ah-ra" could provoke a nostalgic outburst.
Hoover's legacy stood him in good stead in election as president; unfortunately, the Depression proved his match and liquidated this success as well as his larger legacy. This never really matched Luce's self-worshipping ideals of the "American Century." Smith acknowledges this fact, yet takes his case a little too far when he parallels the American aid and bailouts of the 1990s with the ARA. This was banking business, not charity. But his concluding sentence on p. 273 is spot-on: "May the story of the ARA inspire that same spirit of generosity today toward all humanity, abroad and at home." A far cry from our current state, which sees intervention only in brutal military terms.
The American Relief Administration built on Herbert Hoover's successful famine-fighting in Europe. Off to a rocky start between a Soviet rock and anti-Bolshevik hard place, it nevertheless fulfilled its mandate of feeding millions of hungry children and adults in big cities and far-flung villages. The course was never smooth, the motives on both sides often ambiguous. The ever-paranoid Bolsheviks, even with Cheka chief Dzerzhinsky's help, were often obstructionist; the Americans were often less than Boy Scouts, behaving like swaggering, sexually-entitled colonialists bearing White Man's Privilege.
The saving and gratitude of the recipients was what mattered in the end. That it did not lead to a formal recognition between the two countries was to be expected; though, as a part of NEP, this opening did lead to widely-expanded trade and laid the foundation for WW II Lend Lease. Even a half-century later, in Brezhnev's time, the word "Ah-ra" could provoke a nostalgic outburst.
Hoover's legacy stood him in good stead in election as president; unfortunately, the Depression proved his match and liquidated this success as well as his larger legacy. This never really matched Luce's self-worshipping ideals of the "American Century." Smith acknowledges this fact, yet takes his case a little too far when he parallels the American aid and bailouts of the 1990s with the ARA. This was banking business, not charity. But his concluding sentence on p. 273 is spot-on: "May the story of the ARA inspire that same spirit of generosity today toward all humanity, abroad and at home." A far cry from our current state, which sees intervention only in brutal military terms.
November 28, 2019
In the early 1920s, after the Bolsheviks defeated the White forces in a civil war, parts of southern European Russia, Ukraine, and the Urals suffered significant crop failures that were compounded by carryover problems from the civil war and the preceding revolution along with World War I. The American Relief Organization, a quasi government organization led by Herbert Hoover that had been active elsewhere in Europe was able to organize relief efforts in Russia that saved millions of Russians from dying.
It's a remarkable history that as the author suggests isn't well known. The focus is on particular American individuals who worked for ARA who documented their time in letters and other documents that the author found in archives and elsewhere. It is a mostly chronological presentation of what happened that moves from place to place in telling what happened.
Hoover is not as much a part of the telling of the story as I expected, which is fine. The larger story of the relationship between the United States and the USSR during this time is a reoccurring theme - the US did not recognize the USSR until 1933 and it is perhaps surprising that the aid program did not help with establishing diplomatic relations before that.
At the end the author draws attention to the lack of awareness among Russians and even Americans that this help was given. I'm not sure it is that surprising - how many Europeans are aware of the extent of the Marshall Plan assistance after World War II at this point? Perhaps it is more noteworthy that the almost complete lack of awareness now was in part the result of official Soviet policy to erase this from Soviet history.
https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374252960 includes a long excerpt from the book.
It's a remarkable history that as the author suggests isn't well known. The focus is on particular American individuals who worked for ARA who documented their time in letters and other documents that the author found in archives and elsewhere. It is a mostly chronological presentation of what happened that moves from place to place in telling what happened.
Hoover is not as much a part of the telling of the story as I expected, which is fine. The larger story of the relationship between the United States and the USSR during this time is a reoccurring theme - the US did not recognize the USSR until 1933 and it is perhaps surprising that the aid program did not help with establishing diplomatic relations before that.
At the end the author draws attention to the lack of awareness among Russians and even Americans that this help was given. I'm not sure it is that surprising - how many Europeans are aware of the extent of the Marshall Plan assistance after World War II at this point? Perhaps it is more noteworthy that the almost complete lack of awareness now was in part the result of official Soviet policy to erase this from Soviet history.
https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374252960 includes a long excerpt from the book.
February 5, 2025
The Holodomor of the 1930s is the more well-known of the Soviet famines, but the 1920s also experienced a famine, albeit one with a very different response. The aid given by the American Relief Administration between 1921 and 1923 helped alieviate the disaster in a way that was made impossible in the 1930s. Smith focuses on the personal here, following the men on the ground along the Volga as they struggled to get food and aid where it was needed most.
Divided by year, The Russian Job follows the story from Herbert Hoover's early relief efforts and the formation of the ARA to the Russian Civil War and its effects on the countryside. He lays out how the relief mission was formed and initiated, pausing to provide short biographies of the men involved.
Most of the focus stays personal, following the men in their district as they struggle to balance their own health, physical and mental, with the constant barrage of need. Smith doesn't pull any punches here - included are both long extracts from personal letters and pictures that reveal exactly how people - many of them children, the ARA's main focus - were effected by the lack of food.
Because Smith's focus is the personal, most of the political back and forth between the US and Soviet governments are only glanced at, as is the logistical efforts of moving that much food across the world. This book serves as either an introduction to the subject or a suppliment to more specific research.
Divided by year, The Russian Job follows the story from Herbert Hoover's early relief efforts and the formation of the ARA to the Russian Civil War and its effects on the countryside. He lays out how the relief mission was formed and initiated, pausing to provide short biographies of the men involved.
Most of the focus stays personal, following the men in their district as they struggle to balance their own health, physical and mental, with the constant barrage of need. Smith doesn't pull any punches here - included are both long extracts from personal letters and pictures that reveal exactly how people - many of them children, the ARA's main focus - were effected by the lack of food.
Because Smith's focus is the personal, most of the political back and forth between the US and Soviet governments are only glanced at, as is the logistical efforts of moving that much food across the world. This book serves as either an introduction to the subject or a suppliment to more specific research.
April 23, 2022
The tragedy I read about in "Stalin's Famine" was massive and horrendous, but this account of an earlier outbreak is bigger, and frankly more nightmarish. Whereas the previous book took a broader look at the politics driving the famine, this one about a famine in 1921 is different, looking at the horror of people starving, dying - and cannibalizing. Unlike 1932, this famine wasn't intentional and relief was given - and it still didn't stop the suffering.
Unlike they would do decade later, Russia acknowledged this crisis and put out a call for help, and the most effective relief came from the United States.
There was a political aspect to it - those who wanted or help but not endorse communism, those who wanted to crush the nation in its time of need. But the Americans, led by the hero of post-WWI European relief (and future president Herbert Hoover) did their best to keep politics out of it.
If the Americans had acted in 1921 like Stalin eventually did in 1932 - letting people starve to win a political victory - the Soviet Union would have died in the cradle. But the American Relief Administration would not let that happen.
The book covers the ARA, the Cheka secret police and the people caught in the middle. Through it all, the Americans fed 10 million men, women and children in a huge zone of the Soviet Union and rebuilt the communist nation's infrastructure.
Unlike they would do decade later, Russia acknowledged this crisis and put out a call for help, and the most effective relief came from the United States.
There was a political aspect to it - those who wanted or help but not endorse communism, those who wanted to crush the nation in its time of need. But the Americans, led by the hero of post-WWI European relief (and future president Herbert Hoover) did their best to keep politics out of it.
If the Americans had acted in 1921 like Stalin eventually did in 1932 - letting people starve to win a political victory - the Soviet Union would have died in the cradle. But the American Relief Administration would not let that happen.
The book covers the ARA, the Cheka secret police and the people caught in the middle. Through it all, the Americans fed 10 million men, women and children in a huge zone of the Soviet Union and rebuilt the communist nation's infrastructure.
June 5, 2022
4.25/5. Definitely worth reading if interested in Soviet history or American-Soviet relations. Note - First book I’ve read on Kindle in a long time in case that affects my views on it.
Covers the period of 1921-23 and American Relief Administration (led by Herbert Hoover but he wasn’t specifically in Russia itself) attempts to provide famine and medical relief after the Russian Civil War (where there had been American soldiers fighting the Bolsheviks in Siberia and the very north of Russia near Finland). You don’t need much background knowledge on the period as everything is well explained. It’s a dark and grim book as there is a lot of starvation and cannibalism described (some of the Americans got ‘famine shock’ like shell shock from the things they saw) but rather compelling to read as the book focuses on the human stories without getting bogged down in too many statistics. Some politics as well about the state of American-Soviet relations, mainly about whether the USA would formally recognise communist Russia but also the Bolshevik mistrust of the relief efforts as some sort of anti-communist plot (a bit of truth in the suspicion but the Bolsheviks took it too far)
Covers the period of 1921-23 and American Relief Administration (led by Herbert Hoover but he wasn’t specifically in Russia itself) attempts to provide famine and medical relief after the Russian Civil War (where there had been American soldiers fighting the Bolsheviks in Siberia and the very north of Russia near Finland). You don’t need much background knowledge on the period as everything is well explained. It’s a dark and grim book as there is a lot of starvation and cannibalism described (some of the Americans got ‘famine shock’ like shell shock from the things they saw) but rather compelling to read as the book focuses on the human stories without getting bogged down in too many statistics. Some politics as well about the state of American-Soviet relations, mainly about whether the USA would formally recognise communist Russia but also the Bolshevik mistrust of the relief efforts as some sort of anti-communist plot (a bit of truth in the suspicion but the Bolsheviks took it too far)
June 22, 2023
I initially found this book while looking for information on the lend lease to the Soviet Union during WWII. I have read quite a lot about both the Russian Revolution and the Civil War period and was very surprised by its contents as I had never heard of the American Relief Association or its work in the early Soviet Union. Although, I was aware of the famine during the period 1921-23 but not the extent of it and had heard of some of the other relief organisations. This book was enlightening, it charts the operation from beginning to end, covers much of the territory of the young USSR from Moscow to recently conquered states in the Caucuses, works with first hand accounts and provides additional context and rebuts the author's strange racial prejudices about Slavic peoples.
It was also a very interesting look at how the early Soviet state dealt with catastrophes, and sadly it paints a very bleak picture. Practically every chapter held some interesting information I had not encountered before. I highly recommend this work to any sovietologist or student of humanitarian efforts.
It was also a very interesting look at how the early Soviet state dealt with catastrophes, and sadly it paints a very bleak picture. Practically every chapter held some interesting information I had not encountered before. I highly recommend this work to any sovietologist or student of humanitarian efforts.
February 22, 2025
How America Saved the Soviet Union From Ruin
The subtitle is a fair statement of the book. After WWI, multiple civil wars, and the wreckage caused by trying to implement Marxism, the new Soviet Union was in trouble. Private Americans, the American Relief Administration, asked for help during a terrible famine, came through and saved millions. They were never trusted by the Soviet government, even though several key members were socialists. They insisted on having the freedom to feed all those in need as was agreed. But they had to fight to maintaining that freedom. Ultimately, they were incredibly successful. But the Soviets government did all it could to blackened their memory and deny their achievements. Here is to true example disinterested giving that is largely forgotten.
The subtitle is a fair statement of the book. After WWI, multiple civil wars, and the wreckage caused by trying to implement Marxism, the new Soviet Union was in trouble. Private Americans, the American Relief Administration, asked for help during a terrible famine, came through and saved millions. They were never trusted by the Soviet government, even though several key members were socialists. They insisted on having the freedom to feed all those in need as was agreed. But they had to fight to maintaining that freedom. Ultimately, they were incredibly successful. But the Soviets government did all it could to blackened their memory and deny their achievements. Here is to true example disinterested giving that is largely forgotten.
March 10, 2020
I had vague notions of mass starvation in early 20th century Russia, but the Russian Job puts into focus their first major incident of famine in the early 1920’s (not to be confused with the later actions a decade later centered mostly in Ukraine that is painstakingly detailed in Anne Applebaum’s Red Famine). What’s even less known is the US involvement in famine relief during the 20’s, which was largely led by Herbert Hoover prior to his presidential term later in the decade. It contains accounts of the Americans who went over to Russia and what they did and saw while there from the mundane (Yanks falling in love with Russian) to the heartbreaking (the accounts of the extent of the starvation).
May 27, 2023
In 1921 as the Russian Civil War wound down, the new Bolshevik government under Vladimir Lenin faced a catastrophic famine in the Volga River Valley and further east. Future American president Herbert Hoover, then head of the American Relief Agency (ARA--set up to help feed war victims in Europe after WWI), sent a team of intrepid young Americans to help distribute millions of tons of grain and food to millions of starving Russians in 1922-23. This happened when the two nations did not officially enjoy diplomatic relations. This book is a reminder that the U.S., when called upon, can do great things for other nations. Smith's book focuses on several ARA employees and their individual experiences in the Soviet Union.
January 29, 2020
I admit with some awkwardness that I knew nothing about this connection between the American Relief Administration and Russia in the 1920's. The story of the US providing millions of tons of food to feed millions of Russians is incredible with so many conflicts revealed on both sides as a giant humanitarian effort to feed starving children throughout Russia.
What puzzled me about the book is that there is a photo of one of the food caravans and the sleds appear to being pulled in winter conditions by either camels or llamas, yet there is no reference in the book to this unusual animal being used in this way. Anybody else know more about this?
What puzzled me about the book is that there is a photo of one of the food caravans and the sleds appear to being pulled in winter conditions by either camels or llamas, yet there is no reference in the book to this unusual animal being used in this way. Anybody else know more about this?
August 9, 2020
American Aid to Soviet Russia following their Civil War
This is an analysis of The ARA, American Relief Association which distributed American food and essential goods in the Volga region and Western Siberia during the Russian famine of 1920-23. Hubert Hoover was the leader who sent American NGOs to Russia to distribute humanitarian aid. Interesting story of a unknown relationship that would set an example of American values diplomacy. Smith is very critical of the Revolution and of the Communists. He feels that Americans do not get enough credit for their involvement in the USSR and that Russia owes Americans a lot of thanks, which was only expressed to a limited extent.
This is an analysis of The ARA, American Relief Association which distributed American food and essential goods in the Volga region and Western Siberia during the Russian famine of 1920-23. Hubert Hoover was the leader who sent American NGOs to Russia to distribute humanitarian aid. Interesting story of a unknown relationship that would set an example of American values diplomacy. Smith is very critical of the Revolution and of the Communists. He feels that Americans do not get enough credit for their involvement in the USSR and that Russia owes Americans a lot of thanks, which was only expressed to a limited extent.
October 5, 2020
A gruesome but riveting story about Hebert Hoover’s ARA (American Relief Administration) and its effort to save millions of Russians from starving to death in the early 1920’s. Smith tells what happened, but he also tells the stories of some individuals who were instrumental in making the relief effort a success. Before reading this book, I’d never heard of the ARA. Hoover may have been a terrible president but he did a lot of good as the leader of this great humanitarian effort. Even Lenin had to admit that Hoover and the ARA helped the Soviet Union. My main question is what became of those who were saved from starvation when Stalin came to power?
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