Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge

by Bimal Krishna Matilal

In classical India, the Nyaya-Vaisesika school upheld a form of realism, best known as Naive or Direct Realism. Professor Matilal here presents the Nyaya view and critically examines it against the opposing Buddhist version of phenomenalism and idealism. The dispute between the Buddhist and Nyaya schools of thought lasted a little over twelve centuries; and although the author's approach is largely historical, it is informed by the belief that the issues raised by this dispute have a significant contribution to make to modern philosophical concerns. His reconstruction of Nyaya arguments meets not only traditional Buddhist objections but also those of modern sense-data representationalists. One may understand the history of philosophy in a global sense. The dispute that lasted a little over twelve centuries between the Nyaya and the Buddhist over the nature of perception, the critique and criteria of knowledge, and the status of the external world, is undoubtedly an important chapter in the history of global philosophy. It is author is firm conviction that modern philosophical discussion stands to be enriched, and our insight deepened, by a proper analysis and critical study by philosophers today. The need for painstaking research in this field can hardly be over-emphasized.

Genres: Philosophy, Religion

450 pages, Hardcover

First published April 10, 1986

Reviews

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

Perception is an incredibly dense and closely-argues work of philosophical scholarship. This is both it’s strength and its weakness. On the one hand, Matital succeeds in demonstrating that the millennia-long debate between Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers is rich and inspiring philosophy. On the other hand, the argument is extremely intricate and frequently, for this read at least, quite boring.

Any Westerner who has grown up on the Byron-Schopenhauer-Beatles version of “the Orient” should consider reading Perception. Matilal was an Oxford don, and a thoroughgoing hard-nosed analytic philosopher in the British tradition. His version of Indian thought is not remotely mystical or psychedelic. He covers all the major topics in logic, personal identity, ontology and epistemology, showing how Indian thinkers anticipated most of the debates of contemporary analytic philosophy and have much of value to say on all of them. Despite his rather narrow interests when it comes to Western philosophy, Matilal is extraordinarily broad and open-minded when it comes to Indian thought. He freely admits that he inclined towards the Nyāya-Vaishesika school, but Perception is far from a Nyayayika apologia. He shows throughout the book how Buddhist sceptics pushed the philosophical debate in new and fruitful directions, and brings it Advaitins and other thinkers frequently where they present interesting challenges or alternatives.

This may not be the greatest work of literature in the philosophical tradition, but it is a magnificent edifice of scholarship and a fine introduction to Indian thought for a Western-educates reader.

[PKumar Sachin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perception is a rigorous systematization of over thousand years of Nyaya-Buddhist debate about epistemological concerns. Its language is crisp, explanations are through, and treatment of topics is comprehensive. What was especially remarkable was the extent to which Prof. Matilal has positioned the debate in relation to modern analytical philosophy (phenomenology vs naive realism).

A word of appreciation for Prof. Matilal. Because Indian philosophy's primordial problem is liberation from suffering, its analytical nature is often dismissed and its mystical aspect highlighted unnecessarily. No academic has done more tham Prof. Matilal to dispel this myth and show that Indian philosophy's problems are what would be properly classified as concerns for "proper philosophy."

[Vipul Vivek M-D · Rating 5 out of 5]

Rereading after about 15 years. I don't think I understood anything when I first picked it up during my undergrad in philosophy. Or at least I don't remember what I understood then.