Conscience: The Origins of Moral Intuition

by Patricia S. Churchland

“Illuminating, entertaining and wise.” ―Nicholas A. Christakis, Nature Conscience , a finalist for the PEN / E. O. Wilson Literary Science Writing Award, explores why all social groups have moral systems and how these systems are formed. Distinguished professor Patricia S. Churchland brings together an understanding of the influences of neuroscience, genetics, and physical environment to elucidate how our brains are configured to form bonds and care for children, while also investigating why amoral psychopaths can arise. Churchland then turns to philosophy to understand how morality is transmitted through generations, and why it has become a foundation of all societies. Conscience joins ideas rarely put into dialogue and brings light to a subject that speaks to the meaning of being human. 13 illustrations

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Nonfiction, Psychology, Neuroscience, Biology, Sociology

240 pages, Paperback

First published June 4, 2019

About the author

Patricia Smith Churchland (born July 16, 1943 in Oliver, British Columbia, Canada) is a Canadian-American philosopher working at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) since 1984. She is currently a professor at the UCSD Philosophy Department, an adjunct professor at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies, and an associate of the Computational Neuroscience Laboratory (Sejnowski Lab) at the Salk Institute. She won a MacArthur prize in 1991. Educated at the University of British Columbia, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Oxford (B.Phil.). She taught philosophy at the University of Manitoba from 1969 to 1984 and is the wife of philosopher Paul Churchland.

Churchland has focused on the interface between neuroscience and philosophy. According to her, philosophers are increasingly realizing that to understand the mind one must understand the brain. She is associated with a school of thought called eliminativism or eliminative materialism, which argues that folk psychology concepts such as belief, free will, and consciousness will likely need to be revised as science understands more about the nature of brain function. She is also called a naturalist, because she thinks scientific research is the best basis for understanding the nature of the mind. Her recent work focuses also on neuroethics, and attempts to understand choice, responsibility and the basis of moral norms in terms of brain function, brain evolution, and brain-culture interactions.

She was interviewed along with her husband Paul Churchland for the book Conversations on Consciousness by Susan Blackmore, 2006.

She attended and was a speaker at the Beyond Belief symposium on November 2006 and November 2007.

Patricia and her husband are noted for their attempts to apply their philosophical positions in their daily life. Emotions and feelings, for instance, are eschewed in favour of more precise formulations, such as the following which describes the state of Patricia after a hectic meeting:

"Paul, don't speak to me, my serotonin levels have hit bottom, my brain is awash in glucocorticoids, my blood vessels are full of adrenaline, and if it weren't for my endogenous opiates I'd have driven the car into a tree on the way home. My dopamine levels need lifting."

Reviews

[Rossdavidh · Rating 3 out of 5]

Patricia Churchland is, with Daniel Dennett and Josh Knobe, among my favorite living philosophers. She takes on a topic here, the nature of human conscience and morality, that is both important and accessible. She advocates a thesis which is both different than the orthodoxy, and with which I fundamentally agree. However, there is no kind way to put this, the book kind of limps home. It is 2/3 of a good book, and then there is the last third.

First off, she examines existing schools of thought regarding the question of what is moral, and how humanity is to know this. I appreciate that, while clearly not religious, she is less disdainful of traditional religion than some others. She can discuss the features and consequences of an Abrahamic religious approach to the question of what is moral and how are we to know, including the shortcomings, without sounding offensive to a reader from one of those religions, if they approach the text with good will. Her discussion of the relative differences between Buddhist thoughts on morality, and how the contrast with Abrahamic religions can inform our understanding of the topic, also showed that she had spent some time thinking about all of it.

She also spends some time looking at Kant, Hume, and the rest of classical philosophical thinking on morality. Broadly divisible into "use pure reason to find the truth about what is moral" vs. "do that which brings the greatest utility to the greatest number", she also does a pretty effective job of highlighting the shortcomings of either approach. To summarize greatly: both of them will either result in arriving at horrible conclusions (she gives several examples for each system), or else you will have to bolt on an extra "reject any conclusion that seems odious" exception, in which case what really was the point of the whole exercise?

And then, we are about 2/3 of the way through the book, and we are ready for her to say something like, "So, instead, we should..."

All momentum fails. She had warned, in advance, that we should not expect the neuroscience-informed philosophy which she advocates, to deliver judgements on what is moral. Fair enough; a brain scan is no substitute for a judge. If all she was intending to do with this book, was to warn us away from expecting philosophy to be of any help with this question, that would be worth something as well. There was a time when the best medical theory was based on balance between the four humours, and a scholar of the time who had nothing better to offer, would still have been correct to say, "this theory is balderdash, do not trust it to make judgements with".

However, Churchland does seem to be attempting, the last few chapters, to make some attempt at putting something in place of the systems of thought she had effectively demolished, but it isn't much more than "take everything into consideration". True enough, but that isn't really telling us much we didn't know before, and it surely didn't require several chapters to say. In what circumstances is a person best able to do that? How do we know that, is there any evidence? She suggests that talking to people wiser than yourself is a good idea; probably so, but do we have any evidence of this? Has it ever been tested? If not, why is she telling us something most people would do instinctively, and in any case how is a person to determine which among the people they know are wise? It all amounts to not much more than, 'moral questions are hard, find somebody else that knows the answer'.

She ends with more or less a statement that she doesn't much like Trump, and it's an oddly underpowered ending to a book by a thinker that has, generally speaking, so much intellectual firepower on offer. Nassim Taleb does a better job, when he attempts a similar task at demolishing established models of handling risk, at stressing that the very point is we cannot know some things (in his case, the degree of our own uncertainty and the likelihood of never-seen events). He also doesn't spend 1/3 of his book at the end muddling about after having made his main point. It causes me to wonder if the first 2/3 of the book wasn't originally the entire thing, and someone or something convinced her to add on some advice at the end about what to replace it all with.

Still and all, she is at least discussing important questions, and her analysis of the efforts of others is well worth reading. I will still look forward to getting her next book. But this one, while I didn't hate it, was not among my favorites, and I hope she finishes better next time.

[Ryan Boissonneault · Rating 4 out of 5]

When thinking about morality, people generally make two mistakes: 1) that moral certainty can be achieved by consulting some external, objective source, and 2) that if this is not the case, and moral certainty cannot be attained, then we all have license to do whatever we want and there’s nothing left to discuss.

As analytical philosopher Patricia Churchland explains in her latest book, Conscience: The Origin of Our Moral Intuitions, both ideas are false. Moral dilemmas always involve conflicting priorities, and the call for “objective morality” is nothing other than the desire to escape uncertainty and to have someone or something else do the thinking for you. As Churchland writes:

“I may long for certainty, but I have to live with doing the best I can. I may concoct a myth to explain that my certainty, unlike yours, taps into universal moral truths. Reality will soon dissolve that myth. Voltaire (1694-1778), a French philosopher of the Enlightenment, concisely summed up the state of affairs: ‘Uncertainty is an uncomfortable position, but certainty is an absurd one.’”

While moral certainty does not and cannot exist, that doesn’t mean we lack a strong foundation from which to build. Morality is equal parts emotion, rooted in biology, and reason, which allows us to leverage our “better angels” while suppressing or controlling our baser instincts. As Churchland states:

“The verdict of conscience is not solely cognitive...but has two interdependent elements: feelings that urge us in a general direction, and judgment that shapes the urge into a specific action.”

Humans, like most mammals, are social animals, wired for sympathy, empathy, attachment, bonding, and the desire for social approval. This social suite of emotions and behaviors, which allows for complex cooperative behavior, is the only reason humans, physically unimpressive as they are, did not go extinct over their 200,000+ year history.

It is worth reflecting on the fact that modern humans have been around for hundreds of thousands of years. This means that morality must have come from some other source than “ancient” religious or philosophical texts that were written a mere two to three thousand years ago. These texts cannot, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, possibly account for our collective longevity and social and moral inclinations. The roots lie deeper in our evolutionary past, encoded in our biology and uncovered by neuroscience.

To the authors credit, Churchland does not get lost in the scientism that this might suggest; she acknowledges that science cannot determine right and wrong actions. On the other hand, Churchland also correctly recognizes that science is highly relevant to moral decision making and that scientific facts impact what we consider to be moral actions. While conceding to David Hume that “is” does not imply “ought,” science can certainly influence our moral calculation, as, for example, when we stopped executing witches on account of the fact that they don’t exist.

So morality is grounded in our biology and our care for others, informed by science, and codified in community standards. Most of the time, and in most cases, moral decisions do not pose any special problems. But what about moral dilemmas with conflicting interests, as in debates regarding abortion, the death penalty, and political philosophy in general? How are we supposed to balance the competing priorities and conflicting ideals?

The history of moral philosophy is filled with attempts to escape the discomfort of uncertainty with rule-based systems that prescribe one course of action or the prioritization of one variable in all circumstances. As Chruchland explains, every such attempt is easily exposed as incomplete with counter-examples and exceptions. This shouldn’t be surprising, as every ethical dilemma is unique and involves competing priorities; therefore, the prioritization of the same principle all of the time leads to immoral behavior at least some of the time.

Humanity’s first attempts at solving ethical problems were the invocation of supernatural authority. Divine command theory states simply that God will tell you what to do, you just have to follow the commandments. The problem with this was first articulated by Plato in the dialogue Euthyphro. The “Euthyphro Dilemma” asks: do the gods love good action because it is good, or is good action good because it is loved by the gods? If the first, the goodness of an action is independent of god, rendering god unnecessary and subject to the same moral constraints as everyone else. If the second, then morality is not objective and entirely dependent on god’s whim.

Of course, even the religious don’t believe that all divine commands are moral, which is why there is so much disagreement among people with the same gods and the same religions and why people cherry pick the moral parts out of the Bible while ignoring the nastier parts (I’m thinking of pretty much anything out of Leviticus). If god, or the voice in your head, told you, like Isaac, to murder your own son, I would hope that your response would be different and that you wouldn’t march him up to an altar.

So divine command theory cannot be the answer; we simply can’t escape the evaluation of moral claims regardless of their source.

So what about grounding morality in reason alone? This too has been attempted and has largely failed for the same reasons.

Kant’s categorical imperative tells us to “act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.” This seems like a reasonable idea, but only if you overlook the fact that logical consistency does not imply morality. Two people may disagree on what they think should be willed as a universal law, and the categorical imperative does not in itself resolve the dispute. For example, is lying always wrong, and should this be cast as a universal rule? Kant said yes, but as Churchland wrote, “As even modestly clever undergraduates are quick to point out, no rule seems to be immune to fair-minded exceptions.” Would you lie to save your child’s life? I’m betting you would, despite the demands of the categorical imperative.

Utilitarianism tries a different approach. It regards moral decisions as those which produce the greatest good for the greatest number, but is apt to ignore basic human rights and the idea of not using human life as a means to an end. It also runs counter to our strong biological urge to prioritize the needs of our family over others.

Even the Golden Rule, commanding us to treat others the way we would wish to be treated, is only moral if the other person shares your values. Perhaps they wish to be treated differently than you, or deserve harsher treatment (as in the case of psychopaths and terrorists). Again, any rule-based system or moral proclamation will encounter examples it is not equipped to deal with.

All of this is not to endorse moral relativism; of course some actions are more moral than others according to the only standards that really count: our biological wiring that causes us to value pleasure over pain, peace over violence, and solidarity over solitude. We are justified in calling immoral the things that cause suffering and moral the things that cause human flourishing. But this does not mean that there are not difficult cases with conflicting priorities that simultaneously strain both our Kantian and utilitarian impulses.

The best we can hope for is to keep the dialogue going. The real enemy of morality is not uncertainty, but ideology, the dogmatic confidence in the moral superiority of one’s position. Whenever the claim that god or reason is on one side of the moral debate and one side alone, the result is almost always tragic.

[Jon Stout · Rating 4 out of 5]

Patricia and Paul Churchland seem to have invented neurophilosophy, the discipline which addresses philosophical questions, such as the nature of mind, by using the insights of neuroscience. I found Paul Churchland’s book, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul, quite exciting because it discussed massive parallel processing, an AI technique similar to the functioning of the brain, to illuminate the relationship between computing and thinking. At first I was disappointed by Patricia Churchland’s book, Conscience: The Origins of Moral Intuition, because it read like an introduction to evolutionary psychology, but it too became exciting when she brought it up against the classical positions of ethics based on reason.

The first three-quarters of the book discussed the functioning of various parts of the brain and the fact that from an early age we are conditioned to follow the urgings of our parents and the lessons of experience, so that given some choice to make, our brain processes give us positive or negative reinforcement. Such reinforcement might range from “Don’t touch the hot stove.” to “Tell the truth.” Churchland devotes considerable energy to describing the parts of the brain which perform particular roles in reinforcing (or inhibiting) us in these choices. Unfortunately, I usually get lost in discussions of areas of the brain, because, like discussing the geography of a far away place, I have no way to relate it to my own experience.

In the seventh chapter, Churchland considers classical conceptions of conscience, in the form of traditional ethical theories. Since most of these have been in the form of rules or principles, she considers three kinds of ethical rules. First is a religious position characteristic of much of the history of Christianity, but also of other religions, namely that what is right and good to do is what God commands us to do. For example, we ought to follow the ten commandments, because they are commanded by God. Leaving aside the validity of religious beliefs, Churchland rebuts such a position using the Socratic argument: Is an action good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? If the former, then we can ask whether God can command something that is bad. If the latter, then what is good has priority over what God commands.

Second and third, Churchland considers the two best-known ethical principles in the history of philosophy: Kant’s Categorical Imperative (Act only on that maxim which can be a rule for everyone) and Bentham’s Utilitarian Principle (Act so as to cause the greatest good for the greatest number). While each of these principles shows insight into the ethical dilemma, the literature is replete with seeming exceptions and problematic features of these rules, many of which Churchland discusses. She concludes that the situations in which one has to make ethical decisions are subject to many different constraints, such as the social context and social expectations, one’s own capabilities and interests, etc., so that the constraint of an all-encompassing rule is only one factor in the mix. She rejects such rules as the sole ground of conscience, or of moral choice, but interestingly enough, she thinks they are more important to legislators who are framing laws for a society, since then they can abstract from individual differences.

Churchland looks more favorably on another trend in contemporary philosophy, virtue ethics, which looks back to Aristotle and Hume in arguing that what is important in ethical choice is neither rules nor consequences, but rather “strong social habits, also known as the virtues: prudence, compassion, patience, honesty, courage, kindness, hard work and generosity.” Churchland argues that such an ethical viewpoint is far more compatible with a biological account of how choices are made than any ethical standpoint based on reason alone.

I find Churchland’s discussion quite enlightening, even though I am not quite so skeptical of using reason to frame ethical principles. The natural sciences are also in the business of framing general principles, and we know that the effort can be difficult, and that what seems ironclad in one age, such as Newton’s laws, can become problematical in a later age, such as Einstein’s era. It is part of human nature to try to come up with guiding principles, no matter how difficult the task may be. Nonetheless, Patricia Churchland’s use of neuroscience to keep the discussion real is absolutely necessary to our age.

[Chunyang Ding · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not a bad book, but also not a good one. The first half of the book seems misleading, as the premise is a neurological understanding of moral philosophy, yet the neurology present is fundamental evolutionary neurochemistry. It feels more like a neuroscience textbook, highlighting key experiments and whatnot. While this makes for good reading, it leaves me wanting more understanding into actual moral questions, rather than only dance around the issue by discussing mental illnesses and animal studies. The second half of the book is better, but still barely intertwines philosophy and neuroscience. Instead, the author gives a primer on key philosophical concepts, and makes the barest of connections to how our brain interprets them. There are few hard neuroscience experiments used in this section to argue why the author is correct, which is why I had wanted to read the book in the first place.

[Ishan Vashi · Rating 2 out of 5]

Love a lot of stuff patricia churchland has done and have a lot of respect for the "neurophilosophy" project she's pioneered, but there was nothing of much value in this book. For over 50% of it, it's not very clear how the text relates in any way to conscience or morality and comes off as more of a list of interesting recent-ish developments in neuroscience told in a pop-sciencey way. The last two chapters were pretty good (when she begins to bring things back to philosophy), but my main worry with this book is that it's tried to place itself into two fields (neuroscience and philosophy) and as a result has just done poorly within both.

[Gizem Kendik Önduygu · Rating 3 out of 5]

Müsade varsa şuraya bir özet bırakıyorum.
- Vicdanın biyolojik kökenleri
- Dini teoriler - çık
- Kant'ın kategorik imperatifi - yok 
- Utilitarianizm - olmaz
- Trump'a giydiriş ve kapanış
Ya bu yazarlar, bilim insanları arasında bizim bilmediğimiz gizli bir anlaşma mı var ya. Trump'a giydirmeyen kitap yok.

Ayrıca 34 yaşıma geldim hala bir ikiz araştırmasında yer alamadım. Etrafımda ikiz araştırmasında yer alan hiçbir ikiz yok. Kim bu araştırmadaki ikizler ya bizi de alın. 
Bu yorumlardan sonra evrimsel biyoloji alanında yerimin olmadığını kanıtlamış oldum. Alın beni buradan.  

[Bob · Rating 4 out of 5]

Summary: Exploring the neuroscience of our sense of right and wrong, integrating our knowledge of neurophysical causation, social factors, and philosophy, arguing that moral norms are based in our brain functions, interacting with our social world.

Conscience. Unless one is significantly cognitively impaired, there is this inner sense we have about what is morally right or wrong, or sometimes this place where we determine right or wrong. Where does this come from? Theists will claim a transcendent basis for this, something written on the heart. Yet, what is written on one heart often varies from another's. Often we experience uncertainty about these things in our own hearts. Furthermore, those "cognitive impairments" and advancing neuroscience are demonstrating that many aspects of human moral behavior from social bonding and care for others to where one may fall on the political spectrum with regard to moral issues is rooted in the neurophysiology of the brain. Are we conscious actors, or is our moral sense and moral behavior in some way determined by our brain chemistry?

Patricia S. Churchland is one of the pioneers in the field of neurophilosophy--exploring this intersection of neuroscience research and philosophical discussion of questions like ethics and free will. This work is an engaging introduction to her work that moves between discussions of neurotransmitters and a philosophical survey of theories of moral behavior and the question of free will.

She looks at the role of oxytocin in human attachment ("The Snuggle to Survive"), how we are wired for sociality, and how behavior is shaped by the reward system in our brains, and the physiology of empathy. We learn what the brain response to a person eating worms may indicate about political attitudes. Churchland explores the bewildering field of psychopathology--those whose anti-social behavior reflects a lack of moral compass, guilt or remorse--and thus far, our futile efforts to arrive at remedies.

The last two chapters of the book focus on the philosophical questions, and here is where it got really interesting for me. Churchland considers "rule based" moral behavior from the ten commandments to Kant's categorical imperative to utilitarian-based systems. The flaw, she argues, is that human behavior endlessly deviates from these rules, and there is even significant disagreement on the rules. She argues for a socio-biological basis for moral behavior in which the evolution of our neurophysiology is such that we are well-equipped to engage in social life and behavior that sustains the bonds between us. This leads her to a definition of morality as "the set of shared attitudes and practices that regulate individual behavior to facilitate cohesion and well-being among individuals in the group."  She seems sympathetic to forms of virtue ethics in which habits of behaving may be modified by particular case constraints.

The final chapter explores free will, and here, Churchland seems to be trying to navigate between those who would fully advocate for free will, and even argue moral certainties, and those who would argue that what we have learned about causation in neuroscience undermines free will, and exonerates criminals from guilt. She argues for the distinction between causes beyond our control and causes under our control, using the example of Bernie Madoff, who was under no compulsion, but knew exactly what he was doing.

Churchland's discussion in these two chapters also indicated to me some of the concerns that underlie this book. She is deeply concerned about those who tout moral certitudes and also authoritarian approaches that may lead to morally justified abuses of others. She believes that an understanding of how we are "wired" for morally decent behavior shaped by social norms to be superior to such approaches. 

As a Christian theist with a deep respect for scientists, and one who shares a sense of being humbled before the realities of our existence, I wonder whether there is a third way between a pure naturalism of "morally decent humans" and a rule-based authoritarianism, whether rooted in ideology or theology. Might we not allow for the possibility that we are indeed "wired" for moral behavior in social contexts that reflect transcendent concerns expressed in the great commands, which are really broad moral statements of principle, to love God and one's neighbor as oneself? It seems we often get caught in binary discussions of either science or the transcendent. Might there be an approach of both-and that both celebrates the wonderful mechanisms that bond parents and children, or larger social groups, the mechanisms by which we learn what it is to be moral, in all its societal variants; and recognizes the possibility that at least some communal norms might be grounded in transcendent realities that are not occasions for arrogance or authoritarianism, but humility and grace and empathy, and are consonant with the ways we are wired?

I could be wrong, but it was not evident that Churchland has engaged with neurotheologians like Andrew Newberg, (see my review of his book Neurotheology [https://bobonbooks.com/2018/05/10/rev...]) who covers similar ground. There are many others interested in a conversation rather than a war between science and religious belief, and see the possibility of a kind of consilience that mutes the voice of neither. When I consider Churchland's account, I find myself marveling anew at the marvels hidden within my own body and am grateful for her exposition of these. I hope going forward, there might be a growing appreciation on the part of neurophilosophers like Churchland, not merely of problematic aspects of rule-based ethics in philosophy or religious teaching (which I will admit exist, just as there are problematic questions in neuroscience), but also the ways religious frameworks of moral teachings have profoundly shaped many communities for good (for example Andre' Trocme' and his community of Le Chambon, which hid Jewish refugees during the Holocaust), and helped individuals lead morally worthy lives as people of conscience.

____________________________

Disclosure of Material Connection: I received a complimentary review e-galley of this book from the publisher via Edelweiss in exchange for an honest review. The opinions I have expressed are my own.

[Stephie Williams · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is Patricia Churchland's stab at how we create and use moral principles. It is a brain based approach. Not surprising from a materialist. She provides the relevant neuroscience behind our morality and in some case immorality, such as psychopaths. She also brings in relevant evolutionary psychology because if we did not evolve as we have our brains would not have the capacity to form moral feelings the driving force behind our moral behaviors. She is basically a Humean when it comes to focusing on moral feelings. The case is not closed on how we figure out what the right thing to do is - most of the time. Much, more work in neuroscience has to be done to understand what the brain is doing. Analyzing moral terms and how they are used, and hence how they are understood can only take us so far, and while it is important to do these things, knowing what the brain is up to can rule out bad philosophy, or in this context ethics. I like the approach Churchland takes this in her work. Philosophy of mind that ignores the findings of neuroscience does so at it's own peril.

The following our some comments based on my notes on this book. Numbers in brackets [] are page numbers for the Kindle pagination.

[12] "Of course, individual scientists, as humans with moral values, may well have opinions on what should be done. Thus, many scientists, upon learning that there is a strong causal link between human papillomavirus and cervical cancer, campaigned in favor of vaccinating females against the virus." It is now known that vaccinating boys can reduce cervical cancer in women as well.

[13] "But the point belongs again to Confucius: humility is the solid foundation for all the virtues." This is stated without any reason to support it, not even one, let alone all, which surprises me coming from such a fine philosopher as Churchland.

[51] "In one particular experiment relevant to empathy, one partner of a pair of prairie voles is exposed to a stressor (such as movement restriction), and then returned to the cage to re-join the mate. Immediately, the unstressed partner hurries to the stressed partner and engages in intense consolation behavior—grooming and licking." Humans may not groom and lick, but they are able to be concern over another's suffering and offer some sort of consolation in most cases. But, we must remember the experiment was on voles.

[52] "Estrogen, for example is to coexpressed with oxytocin, and the pair act together to reduce stress." Makes one wonders does the relaxation related by some transgender women on estrogen for feminization hormone treatment be a casual factor.

[65] "As for the blood-brain barrier, the unanswered question is whether some oxytocin may leak through the barrier into the brain. So far, research has not shown such a leaky path into the brain, or, more exactly, into regions of the brain where there are oxytocin receptors for the oxytocin to bind to. That matter urgently needs to be clarified, if the results from the intranasal method are to be trusted." I thought of the exact same thing as I read this part of the text.

[68] "This inner model enables us to recognize what others are feeling and intending, and to get along in the social world." Isn't this exactly the same folk psychology she argued against in Neurophilosophy. Let alone she is referring to animals. Where could any possible proof come from to support this.

[108] "In addition, you can be quite traditional with regard to some norms, and less so with regard to others." I dress in a particularly modest way, including weather depended. At the same time I break the norm by being a transgender woman, which should be considered as part of "normal."

[110] "Family dinners erupt in an uproar as kin heatedly disagree about a norm involving sexuality, such as polygamy or homosexuality or premarital sex." What about transgender and gender non-diverse people.

[132] "Hare and neuropsychologist Kent Kiehl concur that probably less than 1% of the population as a whole would score 30 or higher on the Hare Checklist. Greater estimates, such as 4%, are based on looser criteria and hence include disagreeable folks who, however, are not genuine psychopaths as measured by the Hare Checklist." How arbitrary are these numbers?

[146] "Not uncommonly, people now ask of a choice, “What would Jesus do?”—which is a reasonable way for Christians to follow Smith’s advice for certain dilemmas." Makes me want to puke. Perform miracles of course, or act immorally, or throw temper tantrums. Was Smith hallucinating?

[161] "The special significance of family and friends in many of our daily actions continues to challenge the principle of utility as a simple, universal rule to guide all morally significant decisions in our lives." I wrote a blog post on an old philosophy blog of mind (https://aquestionersjourney.wordpress...), which analyzes how are ethical concerns circle outward.

[168] "In other words, if you have a habit of being kind to everyone, you do not have to use time and energy figuring out what to do in a routine occasion." Sounds very Aristotelian.

[177] "That voice of conscience that we hear when we consider violating a norm is our reward system sending out a “negative value” signal. Our conviction that we are justified in a choice does not come from some hypothetical “pure reason” unconnected to the physical brain. It depends on what our brains have internalized as an appropriate norm—on what our reward system assigns value to, and which constraints dominate." Exactly, the brain rules.

I will first have to say I am disappointed with Patricia Churchland and her abandonment of eliminative martialism. Granted people move on. It would also be hard to discuss these topics without the use of folk psychologically.

Despite this qualm the book was well structured and the information needed at a least a moderate amount background. I like when she differentiated between what is better substantiated by science along with the (especially later in the book) presents clearly which could be supported with further research.

I would love to give her book 5 stars, but for the lack of any mention of eliminative materialism.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

This isn't a grand work, like Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. But it's a nice synthesis of recent science, philosophical musings, and relatable anecdotes. It doesn't feel finished, but that's perfectly appropriate - the field is nowhere near finished. Churchland is giving the non-expert audience a look at the current state of things, and giving a compelling argument for her approach to these issues as being far more fruitful than traditional philosophy.

I'm a scientist. We typically look down on philosophy as unproductive and unrelated to the real world. We love theorizing, but all the theorizing in the world wouldn't have produced quantum mechanics without the world poking us and saying we had to invent it.

Why I like Churchland more than any other philosopher is because she recognizes this. She incorporates the science, and realizes all the self-reflection in the world can't tell you what your brain is really doing. But she synthesizes the science and uses it to (begin to) answer the big questions of philosophy.

[Anastasia Bizyayeva · Rating 4 out of 5]

A pretty enjoyable read but it was different from what I expected - I've been swayed by a lot of argumentation from both Paul and Patricia Churchland (definitely favourite power couple material), and so I was excited to see that Patricia had a new book released a few weeks ago.

I love the Churchlands' philosophical argumentation, but this book was a little more in the pop science realm. It's a pretty easy read compared to their more technical works, and helpful to folks who don't have background in the evolutionary development of our neurology. It also has a nice introduction to intro ethics (deontology, utilitarianism, virtue ethics), but not super insightful or deep for someone who's done more than an intro philosophy course.

Overall, this is probably a good intro read for people who are interested in how our moral intuitions have developed and haven't looked into the origin of other intuitions or our brain's evolutionary development. Unfortunately I wasn't the right audience for this, but giving it a 4 star because I don't think there's anything off about the content!

[John Kaufmann · Rating 3 out of 5]

Like her earlier book Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Selves, I found this a very interesting read and learned a lot. But also like that previous book, I find her writing and arguments very subtle, such that I occasionally lost the thread. Part of it is me, I am sure -- this is difficult material, and I struggle with cognitive science. Also, part of it is that this is a developing field, and Churchland proceeds cautiously rather than making bold pronouncements.

[Jan Peregrine · Rating 4 out of 5]

Conscience: The Truth Will Set You Free......

“If I had one piece of advice to give to girls, I would say, 'Don't listen to my advice. Listen to the voice inside.' It's not important they know who I am; it's important they know who they are.” -Gloria Steinem, The Truth Will Set You Free, But First It'll Piss You Off: Thoughts on Life, Love, Rebellion



Despite Patricia Churchland's unfortunate last name, I chose to pick up her latest book called Conscience: The Origin of Moral Intuition. I was pleasantly surprised. She's a Socratically-minded neuroscientist who would heartily agree with Steinem's quote above. We should know ourselves, but not in the sense of self-absorption.

Conscience is about making decisions based on instinct, norms, values, social skills, and context-sensitive problem solving. In other words, from the evolved-brilliance of our 86 billion neurons. Yes, you read that correctly!

Churchland advocates a biological origin of our conscience and thoughtfully argues that it cannot be of pure, one-rule-fits-all origin as espoused by the church or many philosophers like Kant and Plato...or is it Aristotle? It cannot be developed through utilitarian means that simply tells us to do what makes the most people happy, forget the suffering of the rest. She didn't mention Ayn Rand here.

This makes perfect sense to me that our conscience is a culmination of our inner qualities responding to our different life experiences that have been influenced by family, society, and environment.

It took a couple of chapters to start being engaged by this deep book, but stick with it and you'll be rewarded as I was. I'll be checking out her other books. This world needs a lot more practical thinkers like her who aren't ideologically or politically driven, making us believe or decide as they want us to.

That is neither conscience nor moral intuition, but, in my words, a moral sacrifice. A negation of self.



“If everyone has a full circle of human qualities to complete, progress lies in the direction we haven't been. It's progress for men to develop so-called feminine qualities and for women to develop so-called masculine qualities. We are all becoming full human beings, -Gloria Steinem

“A quail is just a chicken with a press agent.” GS

[Alexandra · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is one of the authors I bookmarked after reading Philosophy Bites Again. It was one of my favorite conversations there.

Overall I liked the book and agreed with many of its statements. It looked at the idea of conscience holistically - from energy requirements to neural circuitry in the brain. The critique of the modern philosophy also resonated well with me, it was well formulated and gave me "I couldn't have said it better myself" kind of feeling.

On the negative side, the book felt a bit shallow. Both on the science and philosophy side.

On the science, some experiments were kind of far-fetched and there wasn't enough data for me to form my own opinion. The one about the images and political preferences felt especially weird to me. I am planning to find more info on that one - from the problem definition to blunt "the images were non-controversial" - there were a lot of things that didn't sound quite right.

On the philosophy side, I felt like the author stopped too early. She looked at others' definitions of conscience, looked at science and... kind of decided it's enough. Conscience is in the brain, that's it. It's not different from the feeling of balance or pain. I always felt like philosophy is not as much about answering questions, but asking the new ones after the old ones get answers. The introduction of the book was promising - "If I were a lizard, I wouldn't worry about that" statement was cool. So, if our conscience is a product of being warm-blooded and having a big brain, then can reptiles have a conscience? And how would it look like? What would be the possible similarities with human conscience? And if lizards can't have one, is there a link between conscience and energy requirements? I was waiting for questions like that and some ideas where to look for the answers. But sadly, that didn't happen.

Anyway, building the bridges between disparate areas of knowledge and making connections is never easy. I am planning to read more books that combine science and philosophy and I applaud the effort here.

[Dan Graser · Rating 4 out of 5]

UC Professor of Philosophy Patricia Churchland is at all times a masterful writer with important issues to discuss and the necessary linguistic and intellectual tools with which to discuss them. This latest work centers on the formation of what we know of as our conscience and how varying degrees of biology and environment come to play. The notion(s) that this is some sort of supernatural sense with which we are gifted, a purely biological process over which we have no control, and a mere collection of responsive to environmental norms are effectively discussed and dismissed.

Dealing with complex issues of scientific determinism as well as moral relativism, Churchland wisely avoids becoming a fundamentalist of either system and instead is very frank as to the areas of neuroscience that remain to be studied. However, her introduction to the concept and discussion of where we are currently in terms of understanding our moral intuitions on a scientific and philosophical level is one that makes for very enjoyable reading, free of easy-answers or stubborn ideology. This is a complicated issue and one which she must have known going in would not be resolved to any satisfactory degree upon completion, what she does provide is an effective roadmap to further study that will guide folks towards productive areas of discussion and away from some of the hopelessly dry semantic/philosophical arguments that frequently stagnate and stultify this subject.

[Ksenia · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very decent non-fiction read for anybody interested in ethics and neurobiology. Churchland does a great job combining cultural and historical elements with her knowledge of contemporary scientific research. The writing is solid and clear. As other reviewers have noticed, the book starts strongly and grows kind of meh closer to the end. While some of her arguments are well-presented, others are more based on personal attitude than logic, like the segment on free will debate. All in all, the first two thirds of the book are a delight, and the bibliography gives more ideas for further reading.

[minj · Rating 4 out of 5]

FINALLY finished this book omg it’s not even that long, I just didn’t have the motivation to finish it back in January :’) the idea of neurophilosophy is so so so cool & I don’t know much about neuroscience so I didn’t mind the first half being basically just an overview of evolutionary neuroscience. but I do wish Churchland spent more time connecting everything back to philosophy bc that was why I was interested in this book in the first place.. that last bit felt way too short & rushed
edit: also also I loved how she talked about our capacity to care!! we are wired to care for those around us.. I suppose we just weren’t wired to care for 7 billion other people

[Prooost Davis · Rating 5 out of 5]

The title would perhaps more precisely be "The Biological Origins of Moral Intuition," but maybe the actual title has more mystery to attract the buyer.

Patricia Churchland is a philosopher who got interested in, and studied, neurobiology. She was dissatisfied with the reigning philosophical theories on morality: mainly that there are absolute moral rules, applicable in all times, in all places, and in all cases, which can be discovered by reason. She became convinced that our morality is partially hard-wired in our genes at birth, partly imparted by our culture, and partly learned by our own individual experience.

She put together this book that tells a little about how our brains work in social situations, and explains that our human and mammalian needs as social animals have shaped our morality in different times and places.

[Steve · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very disappointing. I expected a lot more from a philosopher with a strong neuroscience background. As far as a I know the neuroscience part of the book was accurate but it wasn’t told engagingly. And for a philosophy professor, I think the philosophy part of the book was really weak. Her discussion of free will in the last chapter was an embarrassment.

[Roo Phillips · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting mixture of philosophy and neuroscience. Churchland takes a cautious dive into some of the latest research in neuroscience. She tries to connect the research to our understanding of moral values, where they come from, how they affect us in different situations, etc. While really understanding how the brain works is still a ways off, Churchland does a sound job of correlating mammalian biology and the importance/use/origin of morality. She doesn't really discuss other potential sources of moral value and behavior, but focuses on how we readily see it emerge from our own biological structures.

[Ioannis Apostolopoulos · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ένα βιβλίο Νευροφιλοσοφίας, της φιλοσοφίας που όσο θα μαθαίνουμε περισσότερα για τον εγκέφαλο και την λειτουργία του θα γίνεται επικρατούσα. Απολαυστικό και ειλικρινές τοποθετεί την Ηθική στα Νευροβιολογικά της θεμέλια, στο «αγκυροβόλιο» των Νευροεπιστημών και την αποδεσμεύει από τους μονολιθικούς και κάποτε μεταφυσικούς κανόνες της Θρησκείας, του Ορθολογισμού ή του Ωφελιμισμού.

[Sandra de Helen · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is not a Book Challenge read, but it should be. It is a non-fiction book by a woman scientist. I haven’t read a lot of those. “Conscience” is about the brain and how the mammalian brains developed such that we are social animals vs those who live a solitary life. Churchland goes into great detail about brains, the evolution of brain, and how it is that biology influences the development of morality. I read this book after reading an article about it, because I was curious to see whether she posits a theory of morality that encourages conservatism. I was happy to find that she does not. In the end, morality is a far bigger topic with many influences, biology being only one of them. Churchland herself is as liberal in her thinking as I could have hoped for. She is a scientist who looks at all the possible ways development of neurobiology might affect our lives in the future, including looking hard a psychopathy, sociopathy, those who are neurodiverse. Along the way, I learned more about anxiety (and possible aids), including the fact that psychopaths never feel anxiety. I found the book easy to read and endlessly fascinating.

[Tiago F · Rating 5 out of 5]

I've long been fascinated by morality, so seeing a book that tried to give a scientific account of conscience seriously captured my attention.

The scientific part of it was a bit underwhelming. It does provide some rationale for the intuition of conscience we have, but I expected a more in-depth and complete map of it, which was absent. Nevertheless, I think my expectations were unrealistic.

The core of the argument is that we are social beings, and thus are wired to act socially in a way that we can fit into the community. Just like physical pain evolve to protect one's body of harm and ensure propagation, this pain system got exapted in mammals so that pain is not only what threatens me, but also kin. There exist neurological pathways that deal with "emotional" pain, not requiring physical pain to occur to be activated.

This plays out not only in the activated avoidance of pain, such as protecting offspring, but positive feelings that come from social attachment. For example "affective touch", what most people call cuddling, makes us feel that we are safe. This downregulates stress hormones and makes us feel good.

A lot of morality is socially constructed, but it nevertheless builds upon this biological foundation. Societal norms get ingrained from our culture as they are rewarded by our peers. Conscience is supposedly the mechanism that regulates the norms so that we can adjust our behavior to the standards of our community, and that is reinforced with things like guilt and anxiety. They aren't just abstract notions but rather the social norms that become part of one's neural network based on the social reward experienced.

A big theme from the book was trying to argue that the foundations of morality are biological. This is a common argument for people in biology or psychology. Churchland gives a good example of how something as simple as the density of receptors for oxytocin can determine of a species is monogamous or not.

I had a similar view in the past, although now I think it is a little bit more complicated. While there is certainly a biological legacy that structures morality, I don't think it can simply be divorced from philosophy and biology will have all the answers. I had a hard time pin-point her views exactly. She doesn't seem to fall into the naturalistic fallacy and hoping that biology will answer our moral dilemmas but likewise thinks that it's misguided to look in philosophy for answers. I don't understand in what camp that makes her fall into, and Churchland seems to have the same problem as everyone else except to provide some scientific underpinnings of moral intuition, which while useful do not provide a full account and morality has a whole remains just as mysterious.

At best she made a case against viewing morality as completely independent from biology in a matter of pure reason and abstraction, but nowadays I don't think anyone holds that position regardless. At least if we are talking about moral intuitions and not 'objective morality', which is always a tricky duality that is hard to disentangle, a problem shown repeatedly through her book and even in this review.

One of the factors that I most liked about the book is that it was quite holistic in its writing. At first, I was a bit disappointed and I expected more neuroscience about conscience, but I learned how to enjoy her perspective on related topics and found it quite insightful.

For example, towards the end of the book, there was a fairly long section about ethics, particularly in detailing the problems of both deontology and utilitarianism, which are often seen as the two opposing views on ethics. Either an action is wrong in an objective sense and can never be morally justified, or action should be judged by its outcome (for example, the most happiness from all). Churchland rightfully points out the problems with both these approaches.

She claims that ethical rules are constraints in the decision-making process, and both are reductionist by trying to reduce all ethical dilemmas to a single constraint and making that a universal system. I'm not sure if that actually solves any of the problems. How should opposing constraints be managed then? But nevertheless, her exposition of both views was well done and very enjoyable to read.

Another example of going a bit off-topic in terms of the neuroscience foundations of moral intuition was her take on free will and how it connects to morality. I typically hate discussion about free will (from both sides), but I found her exposition particularly well done. She argues against the view that thinking free will does not exist means that people cannot be said to be guilty since one's brain is simply a 'casual device'. To be clear, it's not like Churchland solved the problem of free will, but offers an interesting perspective, especially regarding we should conceptualize crime and blame if we accept that our actions are outside our control in a cosmic sense.

There were many things that I wish were done differently, and I can't help but feel that the explanation wasn't anywhere near enough. Perhaps what I find the most confusing is in the cases where conscience seems to go against social norms, which are so emphasized in the book. Of course, you can explain those also in terms of biological systems that were tinkered by culture, but the question is if that truly exhausts its creation, and even if so, why does it differ from someone else who does not have such a conscience in the exact same culture?

When I finished the book and saw its reviews, I expected it to be better received. I thought it was well written, and a fantastic example of a good, scientifically-grounded non-fiction book. Yes, it's not the most exciting thing to read, but it deals exactly with the topic that it promises and explores what moral intuition is and where it comes from. If you're interested in ethics, either from a philosophical or psychological perspective, it's a solid read.

[Urstoff · Rating 2 out of 5]

TLDR: The neurobiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions is not yet a topic that is ready for a popular treatment.

Right from the start there is an ambiguity in the topic. On the one hand, we might want to know why we do what we do most of the time, and why we rarely deviate from what we consider right (you don't stomp on someone's flower garden as you walk by; it doesn't even occur to you to do that, as it would be mean and destructive). On the other hand, we might want to know the neurobiological basis of that aspect of our mental life we call "conscience": that feeling we have at rare choice points where we deliberate on whether an action is right or wrong, and the feelings of guilt or relief depending on which path we take (and why we might take the wrong path despite the guilt we know we will have). Churchland's book is really about neither of these; instead it's a bit of a grab bag of things that sort of relate to our feelings about others (which can include moral feelings) and a defense (or just proposal?) of the "biological approach" to morality, a topic which takes up the last third of this fairly short book.

Despite the unfocused topic, the first three chapters (excluding the unnecessarily discursive introduction) are the best and most interesting parts of the book. In Chapter 1, we are taken through a quick history of why humans have such large brains (in particular, a large cortex). Flexible social behavior is only seen in animals with significant cortexes (bees are social, for example, but their behavior is highly stereotyped and determined). So, as a result of various evolutionary pressures, humans ended up with big brains, and big brains, taking longer to mature than small brains, necessitated maternal care.

Chapter 2 describes how the neural machinery for maternal care was adapted and expanded to cover other members of the community (in particular, mating partners). Well, this chapter ostensibly explains this. What we get is a lot of interesting material on prarie voles and the density of oxytocin receptors in the nucleus accumbens, but the explanation for why a greater density of oxytocin receptors leads to caring about others is highly speculative. Oxytocin is associated with cannabanoid release, so maybe other people (or voles) give us nice feelings via the release of cannabanoids. Why the presence of other people triggers oxytocin release is not explained, just assumed as an evolutionary jump. Babies crying release oxytocin in nursing mothers to trigger lactation, so somehow (at some point) this circuit got highjacked to release oxytocin in the mere presence of others (first mates, then other people). Ultimately, what Churchland gives us beyond the hard facts of oxytocin receptor density is a hypothesis that needs much more evidence.

Because oxytocin activates brain regions that release cannabanoids, there is some sort of reward learning going on. Person makes me feel good, so I want to be around person more. Given this basis, Chapter 3 describes the dopamine reinforcement-learning circuit. This is interesting in itself (and described in much more detail in Read Montague's book), but it's connection to the oxytocin system is not clear. Perhaps these cannabanoids serve as positive reinforcers (the dopamine system just predicts whether such rewards will happen, it is not itself a reward). This is an outline of a skeleton of a basic hypothesis about human sociality, but it's hard to see how it connects it to everyday acts toward others, much less our anguished moments of moral deliberation.

The rest of the book doesn't shed much light on this connection. Chapter 4 is about social learning; no explicit connection here is made to the oxytocin or dopamine systems, although Churchland insists that the dopamine system "must" be behind some of the experimental results (the experiments were not neurobiological in nature). Chapter 5 is about how inherited personality characteristics are associated with particular broad characterizations (liberal or conservative), which have a moral component. Nothing connected to the oxytocin or dopamine systems. Chapter 6 is about psychopaths and people with OCD (seen as a sort of hyper-moral fastidiousness). How, if at all, the brains of these individuals are different than normal individuals is not known (Churchland says this explicitly).

Chapter 7 is where Churchland introduces and/or defends her biological approach to morality in opposition to the two major schools of moral philosophy, deontology and utilitarianism. Unfortunately, her sketch of these two positions is brief to the point of caricature, and no doubt the deontologists and utilitarians have heard the very basic objections that Churchland puts forth as definitively refuting the two doctrines. I myself doubt that either position is correct, but Churchland has certainly not done her due diligence in understanding and arguing against the positions (or she thought cartoon refutations of cartoon positions was good enough for a popular science book).

As mentioned earlier, this is a short book; there are less than 200 pages, and the spacing is pretty generous. Given the lack of connective tissue between the chapters, it seems clear that, if Churchland's representation of the current science is accurate, and there is no reason to think that it isn't, then there simply isn't enough research yet to form a theory broad and well-supported enough that explains what we're really talking about when we talk about conscience or moral intuitions. Maybe in 20 years a book on this topic could be written, but as it stands, Churchland's book is a set of scattered findings with no real theory that even attempts to explain "the origins of moral intuition."

[Nancy Garon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Amazing book! I love how she integrated a variety of research areas.

[szymborskalyte · Rating 2 out of 5]

Over-promises and under-delivers.

[Bahar]

Bu kitaptan dopamin, seratonin ve oksitosin üzerine çok şey öğrendim. Bir de akumbens çekirdeği üzerine yapılan çalışmalar hakkında bilgi sahibi oldum.

[Suzan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bu detaylar iç açıcı, yön verici ama detay yine de, çok soran biri için daha az uğramalı buralara.

[Love · Rating 3 out of 5]

Om det inte finns objektivt korrekta moraliska regler att följa, varför kan jag då inte göra exakt vad jag vill? Och varför känns det fel när jag handlar "fel"? Churchland menar att vi är sociala djur som har utvecklat samvete genom biologisk evolution. Våra handlingar är alltså en produkt av både genetik och uppväxt.

Det finns anledning till att vi tar hand om varandra och har relationer som sträcker sig hela livet. Vi hjälper oss själva om vi tar med föda till flocken. Vi vänjer oss från barnsben att reagera positivt eller negativt på olika saker. Slå dig inte i ansiktet ty det gör ont, eller ljug inte ty då blir mamma arg. Detta har med hjärnan och göra, men tyvärr förde jag inte tillräckligt bra anteckningar så är lite osäker på hur det fungerar.

Jag gillade delen av boken då Churchland kritiserade moralfilosofier. En vanlig uppfattning är att Gud har uppenbarat sitt vilja genom heliga texter, traditioner och andliga upplevelser. Dessa uppenbarelser anses ge vägledning för människor att förstå vad som är rätt och fel, både moraliskt och rationellt. Det innebär att Guds uppenbarelse kan ses som en vägledning för att navigera i olika situationer och fatta beslut som är förenliga med Guds vilja. Så om jag misstolkar den heliga texten och agerar dumt, har jag gjort fel? Som Sokrates sade, säger gudarna att något är gott för att det är gott, eller är något gott för att gudarna säger att det är gott?

Immanuel Kants påstod att en en handling kan endast vara genuint god om den görs för pliktens skull, inte för att uppnå njutning, glädje eller tillfredsställelse. En regel är moralisk riktig om, och endast om, den rationellt kan godtas som universellt giltig. Det innebär att regeln ska gälla för alla, hela tiden, utan undantag. Om jag ljuger nu och det blir en universell lag, då försvinner syftet med ett löfte ty ingen hade trott på någon. Alltså får man, enligt Kant, aldrig ljuga, även om det kan rädda liv eller elände.

Givetvis är det förståeligt att det är fult att ljuga när det enbart passar en själv, men när en lögn kan avstyra en tragedi eller en oförskämd kommentar, vad är då skadan? Även Kant förstod att den gyllene regeln inte fungerar då vi inte vet vad den andra personen har för värderingar. Man kanske inte ska följa moraliska regler blint, helt enkelt.

Utilitarism, filosofin som innebär, kort sagt, att handla så att största möjliga lycka åstadkoms för största möjliga antal individer. För att handla ordentligt med denna filosofi i bakhuvudet måste alla liv beräknas som lika viktiga, inklusive ens egen familj, påstår vissa. Det implicerar att din första plikt är att försörja 20 föräldralösa barn på andra sidan jordklotet över dina egna två barn, påstår Churchland. Detta är ett väldigt hårt sätt att se på det, men det tydliggör ändå att det inte finns någon moralfilosofi med alla de rätta svaren. Jag tycker att man måste ta den svenska approachen: blanda filosofier tills man hittar något lagom. Men även då kommer det att existera situationer som ingen har ett korrekt svar på. Vi får helt enkelt hoppas på att vi aldrig sitter i en sådan knivig situation.

De som talar om strikt opartiskhet vid moraliska dilemman kanske är lite ute och cyklar. Det vore bättre om vi levde så, påstår dem. Såklart har opartiskhet sitt berättigande i domstol och liknande, men alltid och överallt? Kärleken till dem i den egna familjen är ett neurobiologiskt faktum som ingen idélära kan göra sig kvitt. Det finns exempel på människor som är extremt troende att biologi inte spelar någon roll (det har jag skrivit om i någon tidigare recension, antagligen Burn?), men det är inte lätt.

"Fri vilja förutsätter att handlandet sker i ett vakuum fritt från orsaker. Ett i verklig mening fritt val kan alltså inte föranledas av en orsak. Hjärnan är en orsaksmaskin, skapad av gener, och allt vi gör är resultat av hjärnans verksamhet. Alla våra val och beslut orsakas av processer i hjärnan. Därför existerar inte någon fri vilja."

Ty ingen fri vilja existerar kan ingen ha ansvar för något. Straffrättssystemet borde avskaffas! Så kanske någon tramspelle säger, men ingen tror ärligt på att avveckla straffrättssystem, i alla fall inte alldeles för många, killgissar lilla jag utan källor.

Vanligtvis när man talar om fri vilja menar man att individen har kunskap, intention och självkontroll. Det saknas effektiva metoder för att behandla psykopater, ty de är födda annorlunda. Även om determinism är sann handlar vissa människor och andra inte. Vissa gör förbjudna saker och andra inte. Det kanske är säkrare om man låser in dem som hittar på busigheter.

[McKenzie Records · Rating 2 out of 5]

A lot of this was kind of obvious stuff. And it focused more on brain chemistry than anything else, which I didn't really find engaging or revolutionary. There was an entire chapter on brains that I honestly had no idea how it related to morality. The writing also didn't seem well-organized or succinct enough.

The author also didn't go into the morality of dissecting/harming animals capable of love and monogamy (the voles in one experiment that featured heavily throughout the book), which I felt was an oversight. If you use animals as a huge basis for studying morality or conscience, admit they have the same capability as humans, and then not go into the ethics of how they should be treated within the experiment, while showing cross sections of their brains, it seems like a glaring ommission. Not once was animal welfare discussed, except for a brief mention of Catholics feeling conflicted about eating meat on Fridays (presented as irrational), despite non-human animals featuring very heavily in the book.

I felt like some of it was interesting, especially early on when the author talks about mammals being reliant on mothers and the connection to unformed/malleable brains and the advantages that gives a species. But after that nothing really pushed beyond basics. Even the experiments were things like... Animals feel love and oxytocin can be manipulated to block/encourage feelings of love. Like ok? Most people know that and we don't need an entire 15 pages on it.

There was a section on psychopaths that didn't really seem to come to any firm conclusions, other than, again, basics like brains can be irreparably damaged in childhood from neglect, and sociopathy is partly genetic.

I highly distrust the entire chapter on predicting political values based on revulsion to pictures of worms. The most obvious way to disprove this is that political affiliation is heavily correlated to geography and economic status... So unlikely to be so genetic as to be hardwired in the brain enough to be able to predict your affiliation based on reactions to disgusting images. At this point I assumed there was a lot more questionable science throughout the rest of the book.

If I wasn't already annoyed by these things, I might have liked the sections on logical fallacies and philosophers such as Kant. As it was, I distrusted everything the author wrote and couldn't get behind it. I did however, appreciate how little she wrote of herself and own anecdotes (with some exceptions). I felt I could intuit what kind of person she was and what she personally believed, but it wasn't on the usual level of these kinds of psychology books, which I usually find to be self-absorbed, with anecdotes that are only interesting to the author and meant to show how smart or well-regarded they are. She did include a thing about the dalai lama, but one is a far cry better than usual.

[Thomas · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's an interesting book with enough in it to make you upgrade/refresh your approach to certain moral arguments. Strangely scathing portion on utilitarianism which, for me, spoilt the success of the text. For example, she suddenly asks, "How do utilitarians go from the premise that each of us seeks our own happiness to the moral directive that each of us should seek the happiness of everyone?" (the is/ought problem that Sam Harris attempted to answer, but more rigorously Singer and Lazari-Radek have addressed somewhat successfully). She goes on to half describe, half criticise : "“In particular, the impartiality requirement puts utilitarians in opposition with such moral convictions as “charity begins at home”/ It implies for example, that my duty to provide for twenty orphans on the other side of the planet is greater than my duty to provide for my own two children. It implies that my one aging mother should count much less than five homeless people… If I donate a kidney, impartiality requires that it must not be a young sister who desperately needs it; I must donate to the donor bank. ", and that she does "not know why my conscience simply would not let me neglect my own two children in order to care for twenty orphans. Love for one’s own family members is a neurobiological act mere ideology cannot wish away. "

Okay, sure, the objections are warranted, but she says her biological view on morality escapes these problems yet she doesn't offer a viable moral framework. Moreover, she denies that utilitarians are capable of recognising biological truth--strange. She also makes an appeal to moral value existing outside the domain of pleasure and pain, but it's a truly shallow proposition insofar that she doesn't explain what the values are (outside a certain type of familial (evolutionarily induced) ethic) and why we ought to follow her is--the starting point of her criticism of utilitarianism.

At this point it got a little off-putting because she implied with her succession of objections that she had previously provided the solutions to some of the questions utilitarians (and others) cannot answer, all whilst offering nothing.

If she were to include anything wanted when experienced as pleasurable, anything that satiates an organisms biological urges as pleasurable (as many progressive hedonistic utilitarians do) , then I suspect she would not be so scathing. Since she appears unwilling to, the burden is on her to explain how a moral value can exist if it does not avoid pain, and promote the pleasure of an entity. And the book just didnt seem to adequately satisfy that problem. If she didn't introduce the is/ought problem, this could have all been avoided and it would have remained a great read.