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فلسفة العلم الفيزيائي
حصريا من كتب العالم شاهد متجرنا لمزيد من الكتب العربية
278 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1939
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About the author
Arthur Stanley Eddington
56 books55 followersSir Arthur Stanley Eddington, OM, FRS was a British astrophysicist of the early 20th century. The Eddington limit, the natural limit to the luminosity of stars, or the radiation generated by accretion onto a compact object, is named in his honour.
He is famous for his work regarding the Theory of Relativity. Eddington wrote a number of articles which announced and explained Einstein's theory of general relativity to the English-speaking world. World War I severed many lines of scientific communication and new developments in German science were not well known in England. He also conducted an expedition to observe the Solar eclipse of May 29, 1919 that provided one of the earliest confirmations of relativity, and he became known for his popular expositions and interpretations of the theory.
He is famous for his work regarding the Theory of Relativity. Eddington wrote a number of articles which announced and explained Einstein's theory of general relativity to the English-speaking world. World War I severed many lines of scientific communication and new developments in German science were not well known in England. He also conducted an expedition to observe the Solar eclipse of May 29, 1919 that provided one of the earliest confirmations of relativity, and he became known for his popular expositions and interpretations of the theory.
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March 14, 2025
IS THE ‘PURELY OBJECTIVE WORLD’ THE ‘SPIRITUAL WORLD’?
English astronomer/physicist Arthur Eddington (1882-1944) wrote in the Preface of this 1939 book, “This book contains the substance of the course of lectures which I delivered … [at] Trinity College Cambridge in the Easter Term 1938. The lectures have afforded me an opportunity of developing more fully than in my earlier books the principles of philosophic thought associated with the modern advances of physical science. It is often said that there is no ‘philosophy of science,’ but only the philosophies of certain scientists. But … there is an ascertainable present-day philosophy of physical science. It is the philosophy to which those who follow the accepted practice of science stand committed by their PRACTICE. It is implicit in the methods by which they advance science, sometimes without fully understanding why they employ them, and in the procedure which they accept as giving assurance of truth, often without examining what kind of assurance it can give.
“There should be no conflict between the claim that a philosophy is scientifically grounded and the claim that it is, so far as it goes, a true philosophy. But in a specialized work of this kind the primary object must be to ascertain and discuss the philosophy which, whether true or not, is the present philosophy of physical science in the sense stated above. Those of us who believe that science, notwithstanding continual failures and readjustments, is slowly drawing nearer to the truth, are content that philosophic truth should be reached by the same method of progressive advance.”
He states in the first chapter, “we have to consider the knowledge acquired by the methods of physical science. For brevity I will call this ‘physical knowledge.’ … I define physical knowledge to be that which a right-thinking person would today accept as justified by physical science.” (Pg. 2) He continues, “Every item of physical knowledge must … be an assertion of what has been or would be the result of carrying out a specified observational procedure. I do not think that anyone… will disagree with the first axiom of scientific epistemology, namely that the knowledge obtained by the methods of physical science is limited to observational knowledge in the sense explained above.” (Pg. 10)
In the second chapter, he says, “Generalizations that can be reached epistemologically have a security which is denied to those that can only be reached empirically… some laws of nature may have an epistemological origin. These are compulsory; and when their epistemological origin is established, we have a right to our expectation that they will be obeyed invariably and universally.” (Pg. 19-20)
He argues, “It is clear that no coherent philosophy can be made out of a half-and-half recognition of the place of epistemology in science. What really concerns our inquiry is that the leaders of physics have so far committed themselves in accepting its aid and that its complete assimilation is only a question of time… I do not see how anyone who accepts the theory of relativity can dispute that there has been some replacement of physical hypotheses by epistemological principles; nor do I think that those who accept the theory with understanding will be inclined to dispute it. The more controversial question is, ‘How far can this replacement extend?'... I believe that the whole system of fundamental hypotheses can be replaced by epistemological principles… all laws of nature that are usually classed as fundamental can be foreseen wholly from epistemological considerations. They correspond to a priori knowledge, and are therefore WHOLLY SUBJECTIVE.” (Pg. 56-57)
He suggests, “It seems to me that the ‘enlarged’ physics which is to include the objective as well as the subjective is just SCIENCE; and the objective… is to be found in the non-physical part of science… The purely objective sources of the objective element in our observational knowledge have already been named; they are life, consciousness, spirit. We reach then the position of idealist, as opposed to materialist, philosophy. The purely objective world is the spiritual world; and the material world is subjective in the sense of selective subjectivism.” (Pg. 68-69)
He summarizes: “(1) Physical knowledge … includes only knowledge capable of observational test…(7) … the probability conception is incorporated in the fundamental definitions. It introduces an irreversible relation between observation and formulated observational knowledge.. (8) Certain quantities … in classical physics … are unobservables, e.g., absolute simultaneity at a distance… (10) The conclusions (4) to (9) are… refer[red] to … as epistemological or 'a priori' conclusions… (11) Although epistemological conclusions are of the nature of truisms, they have far-reaching consequences in physics… (12) … epistemological principles play a part which was formerly taken by physical hypotheses… (13) Current relativity theory and quantum theory … have not yet taken full advantage of the epistemological method… when the epistemological scrutiny of definitions is systematically applied, and … followed up mathematically, we are able to determine all the ‘fundamental’ laws of nature… (14) This means that the fundamental laws and constants of physics are wholly subjective… (15) It is not suggested that the physical universe is wholly subjective… (17) the characteristic form of the fundamental laws of physics is the stamp of subjectivity…(18) Epistemological laws … are compulsory, universal, and exact.” (Pg. 102-105)
He acknowledges, “The physical universe as described in this book may seem remote from the universe ordinarily contemplated because of the emphasis that has been laid on its subjectivity. But the suspicion that the term is being misused arises from a misunderstanding. It has been my special task in these lectures to study the subjective element in the physical universe so that the objective element has been kept out of the limelight; but… the objective element bulks largely in the unsystematized part of our knowledge which also forms part of the description of the physical universe.” (Pg. 161)
He explains, “I have no serious quarrel with the average physicist over his philosophical creed---except that he forgets all about it in practice. My puzzle is why a belief that physics is concerned with the correlation of experience and not with absolute truth about the external world should usually be accompanied by a steady refusal to treat theoretical physics as a description of correlations of experience of the contents of an absolute objective world. If I am in any way heterodox, it is because it seems to me a consequence of accepting the belief, that we shall get nearer to whatever truth is to be found in physics by seeking and employing conceptions suitable for the expression of correlations of experience instead of conceptions suitable for the description of an absolute world.” (Pg. 185)
He concludes, “In the age of reason, faith remains supreme; for reason is one of the articles of faith. The problem of knowledge is an outer shell underneath which lies another philosophical problem---the problem of VALUES. It cannot be pretended that the understanding and experience gained in the pursuit of scientific epistemology is of much avail here; but that is no reason for trying to persuade ourselves that the problem does not exist. A scientist should recognize in his philosophy---as he already recognizes in his propaganda---that for the ultimate justification of his activity it is necessary to look, away from the knowledge itself, to a striving in man’s nature, not to be justified of science or reason, for it is itself the justification of science, of reason, of art, of conduct. Of the relation of mysticism and science I have written elsewhere.” (Pg. 222)
Some perhaps surprising opinions, that may be more of interest to students of religion and idealist philosophy, than philosophers of science.
English astronomer/physicist Arthur Eddington (1882-1944) wrote in the Preface of this 1939 book, “This book contains the substance of the course of lectures which I delivered … [at] Trinity College Cambridge in the Easter Term 1938. The lectures have afforded me an opportunity of developing more fully than in my earlier books the principles of philosophic thought associated with the modern advances of physical science. It is often said that there is no ‘philosophy of science,’ but only the philosophies of certain scientists. But … there is an ascertainable present-day philosophy of physical science. It is the philosophy to which those who follow the accepted practice of science stand committed by their PRACTICE. It is implicit in the methods by which they advance science, sometimes without fully understanding why they employ them, and in the procedure which they accept as giving assurance of truth, often without examining what kind of assurance it can give.
“There should be no conflict between the claim that a philosophy is scientifically grounded and the claim that it is, so far as it goes, a true philosophy. But in a specialized work of this kind the primary object must be to ascertain and discuss the philosophy which, whether true or not, is the present philosophy of physical science in the sense stated above. Those of us who believe that science, notwithstanding continual failures and readjustments, is slowly drawing nearer to the truth, are content that philosophic truth should be reached by the same method of progressive advance.”
He states in the first chapter, “we have to consider the knowledge acquired by the methods of physical science. For brevity I will call this ‘physical knowledge.’ … I define physical knowledge to be that which a right-thinking person would today accept as justified by physical science.” (Pg. 2) He continues, “Every item of physical knowledge must … be an assertion of what has been or would be the result of carrying out a specified observational procedure. I do not think that anyone… will disagree with the first axiom of scientific epistemology, namely that the knowledge obtained by the methods of physical science is limited to observational knowledge in the sense explained above.” (Pg. 10)
In the second chapter, he says, “Generalizations that can be reached epistemologically have a security which is denied to those that can only be reached empirically… some laws of nature may have an epistemological origin. These are compulsory; and when their epistemological origin is established, we have a right to our expectation that they will be obeyed invariably and universally.” (Pg. 19-20)
He argues, “It is clear that no coherent philosophy can be made out of a half-and-half recognition of the place of epistemology in science. What really concerns our inquiry is that the leaders of physics have so far committed themselves in accepting its aid and that its complete assimilation is only a question of time… I do not see how anyone who accepts the theory of relativity can dispute that there has been some replacement of physical hypotheses by epistemological principles; nor do I think that those who accept the theory with understanding will be inclined to dispute it. The more controversial question is, ‘How far can this replacement extend?'... I believe that the whole system of fundamental hypotheses can be replaced by epistemological principles… all laws of nature that are usually classed as fundamental can be foreseen wholly from epistemological considerations. They correspond to a priori knowledge, and are therefore WHOLLY SUBJECTIVE.” (Pg. 56-57)
He suggests, “It seems to me that the ‘enlarged’ physics which is to include the objective as well as the subjective is just SCIENCE; and the objective… is to be found in the non-physical part of science… The purely objective sources of the objective element in our observational knowledge have already been named; they are life, consciousness, spirit. We reach then the position of idealist, as opposed to materialist, philosophy. The purely objective world is the spiritual world; and the material world is subjective in the sense of selective subjectivism.” (Pg. 68-69)
He summarizes: “(1) Physical knowledge … includes only knowledge capable of observational test…(7) … the probability conception is incorporated in the fundamental definitions. It introduces an irreversible relation between observation and formulated observational knowledge.. (8) Certain quantities … in classical physics … are unobservables, e.g., absolute simultaneity at a distance… (10) The conclusions (4) to (9) are… refer[red] to … as epistemological or 'a priori' conclusions… (11) Although epistemological conclusions are of the nature of truisms, they have far-reaching consequences in physics… (12) … epistemological principles play a part which was formerly taken by physical hypotheses… (13) Current relativity theory and quantum theory … have not yet taken full advantage of the epistemological method… when the epistemological scrutiny of definitions is systematically applied, and … followed up mathematically, we are able to determine all the ‘fundamental’ laws of nature… (14) This means that the fundamental laws and constants of physics are wholly subjective… (15) It is not suggested that the physical universe is wholly subjective… (17) the characteristic form of the fundamental laws of physics is the stamp of subjectivity…(18) Epistemological laws … are compulsory, universal, and exact.” (Pg. 102-105)
He acknowledges, “The physical universe as described in this book may seem remote from the universe ordinarily contemplated because of the emphasis that has been laid on its subjectivity. But the suspicion that the term is being misused arises from a misunderstanding. It has been my special task in these lectures to study the subjective element in the physical universe so that the objective element has been kept out of the limelight; but… the objective element bulks largely in the unsystematized part of our knowledge which also forms part of the description of the physical universe.” (Pg. 161)
He explains, “I have no serious quarrel with the average physicist over his philosophical creed---except that he forgets all about it in practice. My puzzle is why a belief that physics is concerned with the correlation of experience and not with absolute truth about the external world should usually be accompanied by a steady refusal to treat theoretical physics as a description of correlations of experience of the contents of an absolute objective world. If I am in any way heterodox, it is because it seems to me a consequence of accepting the belief, that we shall get nearer to whatever truth is to be found in physics by seeking and employing conceptions suitable for the expression of correlations of experience instead of conceptions suitable for the description of an absolute world.” (Pg. 185)
He concludes, “In the age of reason, faith remains supreme; for reason is one of the articles of faith. The problem of knowledge is an outer shell underneath which lies another philosophical problem---the problem of VALUES. It cannot be pretended that the understanding and experience gained in the pursuit of scientific epistemology is of much avail here; but that is no reason for trying to persuade ourselves that the problem does not exist. A scientist should recognize in his philosophy---as he already recognizes in his propaganda---that for the ultimate justification of his activity it is necessary to look, away from the knowledge itself, to a striving in man’s nature, not to be justified of science or reason, for it is itself the justification of science, of reason, of art, of conduct. Of the relation of mysticism and science I have written elsewhere.” (Pg. 222)
Some perhaps surprising opinions, that may be more of interest to students of religion and idealist philosophy, than philosophers of science.
July 11, 2022
The debate between pure math and physics is so much fun, spotlighting the question of protology of everything. Also, Eddington jab against philosophy, especially early existentialism and Bertrand Russell is fascinating considering the heat between the two disciplines back then (most of the scientific assumption in this book is of course dated, but it really shows the roots of analytic versus continental).
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