Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises

by Henry Kissinger

By drawing upon hitherto unpublished transcripts of his telephone conversations during the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the last days of the Vietnam War (1975), Henry Kissinger reveals what goes on behind the scenes at the highest levels in a diplomatic crisis.
The two major foreign policy crises in this book, one successfully negotiated, one that ended tragically, were unique in that they moved so fast that much of the work on them had to be handled by telephone.
The longer of the two sections deals in detail with the Yom Kippur War and is full of revelations, as well as great In Kissinger's conversations with Golda Meir, Israeli Prime Minister; Simcha Dinitz, Israeli ambassador to the U.S.; Mohamed el-Zayyat, the Egyptian Foreign Minister; Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.; Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary General of the U.N.; and a host of others, as well as with President Nixon, many of the main elements of the current problems in the Middle East can be seen.
The section on the end of the Vietnam War is a tragic drama, as Kissinger tries to help his president and a divided nation through the final moments of a lost war. It is full of astonishing material, such as Kissinger's trying to secure the evacuation of a Marine company which, at the very last minute, is discovered to still be in Saigon as the city is about to fall, and his exchanges with Ambassador Martin in Saigon, who is reluctant to leave his embassy.
This is a book that presents perhaps the best record of the inner workings of diplomacy at the superheated pace and tension of real crisis.

Genres: Politics, History, Nonfiction, International Relations, Historical, American History, Middle East

576 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2003

About the author

Henry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.

A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.

During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.

Reviews

[Natan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Would give 3.5 stars if I could.

This book was a real eye-opener for me, as far as how international diplomacy works behind the scenes. I guess whatever happens publicly at the UN has already been decided behind the scenes. Or maybe since it's no longer just kind of USA vs. USSR, things are different now?

Also, I learned how international relations really are determined by each country's own coldly calculated interests and nothing else. From now on, whenever I hear some American politician talking about the "special relationship" with Israel, I will roll my eyes and mentally tell him to shut up. While there is no doubt the USA was a huge help to Israel in the Yom Kippur War (and since), Kissinger makes it clear that he merely saw the survivial of the State of Israel as helpful to the USA only as part of the larger Cold War, not because there was some moral obligation to assist an ally, or to prevent a second Holocaust in the space of 3 decades. So, if Henry Kissinger, a European Jew who fled the Nazis, felt that way, surely we can't expect more from any other American politician.

By the way, speaking of American moral obligations to allies and previously signed treaties, ask the Ukrainians how the Budapest Treaty worked out for them. I can only hope (and doubt) our politicians learned that lesson.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 4 out of 5]

Amazone

Specific to Kissinger's section on Vietnam

Anyone who has read Kissinger extensively could predict what he would be saying in this book, and he did not disappoint. The same old story of the failure of the democrats, in the House and Senate, from 1973 until the Fall of Saigon, to provide the necessary resources, as Kissinger articulates them, primarily dollars, to support the South Vietnamese government and their American allies.

What Kissinger does not address, nor has he in the volumes that he has written about himself, is the fact that Kissinger, the CIA, many of the diplomats on the ground in Saigon, as well as key members of the administration knew that the context of the war, in 'the waning days' had dramatically changed.

Through ports in Hanoi and Haiphong, the Russians provided the North Vietnamese Army( NVA) with sufficient military resources to support a massive build-up - in the form of artillery and armor - to ensure an NVA military victory.

All the dollars Kissinger and the administration blamed the democrats for failing to appropriate, in order to shore up the Saigon government, would not have affected the war's outcome because the NVA had decided on a military victory and prepared for it.

How, then, would increased dollars, given the American mood and cyncism of the time, from the democratically controlled Congress, made any difference, given the NVA military initiative?

Kissinger reinforces his previously stated analyses, with more self-serving bias, as predicted.

Kissinger uses the method of transcribed telephone conversations to drive certain other points home, points to support a favorable image.

When one reads a response to a Kissinger question, from Ambassador Martin, for example, the reader cannot deduce what Ambassador Martin really was thinking about the Kissinger question or even the man. The "response" is not telling.

While admittedly, Kissinger and Ambassador Martin shared the same principles, for many reason, Martin was often sketpical of the arrogant, aloof Harvard professor.

Dennis W. Hallinan

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Disappointing

After reading this book, the question looms large as to why Dr. Kissinger bothered to "write" it. It is essentially a selected collection of phone logs between Dr. Kissinger and his cohorts during the Yom Kippur War and the last days of the Vietnam War.

If you are halfway interested in politics and history, there is nothing in this book that you don't already know, other than being able to glean through the actual words spoken by the policy makers of the time. what was 'behind the scenes' was not startlingly different than what was on the TV screen.

I am disappointed with this book, not least because I am much impressed by Dr. Kissinger's other work, especially his defining tome: Diplomacy.

I am thankful for the tip given by the previous reviewer from Amsterdam, pointing out where to get the declassified information from the NSA. He was right.

The account of the Yom Kippur War, from the declassified NSA documents was more succinct, balanced and overall more informative.

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Kissinger is great. 'Kissinger On China' is the equivalent of being trapped in a first class carriage traveling by rail from Paris to Istanbul and discovering that your companion is brilliant, immersed in his subject, and the most agreeable, articulate and comprehensible person you will meet.

'Crisis' is not quite as good but nearly so. The 1973 war, the Yom Kippor War set so many diplomatic strategies at one another, much like an atomic collider.

Kissinger recounts his efforts to rule in the quarks and neutrinos and emerge with a stabilized, longevous solution to the conflicting aspirations of the various sovereign states in the Middle East.

In doing so the narrative is very gripping. It is the transcriptions of his various phone calls made over that week.

In its background, Nixon is beleaguered by the Watergate crisis.

It provides an unusually clear insight into the complications facing diplomacy and national interests that are nearly invisible at the time.

The end of the Viet Nam war is the second crisis, with a much sadder and disorganized outcome.

Nixon is gone and Ford is struggling to effect diplomacy through Kissinger at a time when America, who used Viet Nam as an ally to contain Chinese expansion, ultimately abandons it.

One cannot help but see the parallels arising from Bush's intervention Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It can be a tad creepy, still worth it.

S. Waltzer

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[Alexander Stefanov · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book explores two complex foreign policy dynamics during crises (as per the book title).

What I found highly intriguing was the intricate diplomatic strategies between USA and Russia in navigating mostly Israel (but also a minor communication attempt in Vietnam).

Warfare is u predictable. We see Kissinger, Scowcroft, Brezhnev, Dobrinin, Graham Martin and more trying to strategize but they were often surprised.

For example, when the war between Israel and Egypt supposedly ended, we see Israel trying to more or less starve Egypt’s 3rd army as their show of power, trying to scare Egypt into never attacking again.

I am happy that that part ended with the first peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, but the next part of the book is a bit more emotional. It’s essentially a tragedy. USA is trying to evacuate as many people as possible (Vietnamese and American), without causing too much panic. Eventually, southern Vietnam falls and people are sent into “pre-qualification camps” and you probably understand the euphemism.

To conclude, I believe this book opened my eyes on diplomacy and warfare. We see highly sophisticated diplomatic planning.

On the ground realities often defy controlled expectations. Kissinger’s book is an evident portrayal of the nuanced and chaotic nature of international negotiations and military interventions.

[Ghis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent, instructive book. We're invited in the backstage...the places where geopolitics, international issues are discussed and dealt.
Every crisis bears its own collateral damages. Lots of concerns, domestic ones...from allies and from adversaries.

[Kiki · Rating 4 out of 5]

Explica muy bien la naturaleza del funcionamiento de la diplomacia estadounidense durante un conflicto de la magnitud en medio oriente

[Mohammed Kotb · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not as I have expected.
I was disappointed with how many blanks in the mainstream conversations.
However I must admit that this SOB kissinger was like a composer who was weaving a masterpiece. Very shrewd. While he was fully standing behind Israel, he was keen on preserving the Egyptian third army, and Egypt's ego as well. He realized that the alienation of Egypt will only make things worse for Israel in the future.

[CD]

I've moved this to the read shelf though I skipped around and read only portions of the last third or so of the book.

Planning on returning to this one later this fall and rereading most if not all of what I have read so far again because of the transcript nature of portions of the book.

[Mustafa Şen · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is an important in terms of to get USA's Middle East politics that involves Israel.