Very good book overall. With this, one can see that it's semi-realistic to draw a straight line from Andrew Jackson straight to Donald Trump. His animus against the Second Bank of the US aside, Jackson's favoritism for his "pet banks" was against, not for, the best interests of the enlarged Jacksonian voting class, authors show. Individual chapters are devoted to a variety of different such movements, starting with Bacon's Rebellion.
That said, the book isn't perfect, and it has leftist biases that in a couple of cases, this skeptical lefist rejects.
First, in 1942/43, I seriously doubt Roosevelt and Churchill deliberately decided to let Stalin rot. They had worried about Hitler knocking him out of the war a year earlier, and their fear was little less. The fact is that, even though better prepared than at the start of WWI, the US wasn't totally ready for war, and an Anglo-American invasion of Europe was simply unthinkable. And, it's simply not true that the North African effort faced only six Axis, or even six German, divisions after Torch. The fact that 275,000 combined Axis troops surrendered in May 1943, plus those captured in the six months before then, those killed, and those escaped to Sicily, simply puts the lie to that, therefore, the lie to the overarching idea that Stalin was being left to rot. (German commanders, including Rommel, who had no need to overplay these numbers, admit that 120-130K German troops alone were captured in the Tunisia campaign, which is far more than six divisions.)
Second, I reject most leftists blanket, unreasoned condemnation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There's plenty of evidence that Hirohito himself, through May if not June, hoped to hold on to everything Japan gained through the end of World War I, and that up to the date of Hiroshima, he hoped to hold on to, if not everything gained through 1905, at least everything gained through 1895. Yes, an imperial US wasn't going to allow that. But, the idea that Hirohito, let alone the Imperial War Cabinet, was even close to unconditional surrender on Aug. 6, 1945 is simply not true. (Nor is it true that the Russian invasion of Manchuria was more important than the Bomb in getting Japan to surrender. I wish non-skeptical leftists would just stop that one.)
With my last parenthetical comment on WWII in Africa added after the initial review, I almost bumped this back to four stars.