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Paramilitarism: Mass Violence in the Shadow of the State
From the deserts of Sudan to the jungles of Colombia, and from the streets of Belfast to the mountains of Kurdistan, paramilitaries have appeared in violent conflicts in very different settings. Paramilitaries are generally depicted as irregular armed organizations that carry out acts of violence against civilians on behalf of a state. In doing so, they undermine the state's monopoly of legitimate violence, while at the same time creating a breeding ground for criminal activities. Why do governments with functioning police forces and armies use paramilitary groups? This study tackles this question through the prism of the interpenetration of paramilitaries and the state.
The author interprets paramilitarism as the ability of the state to successfully outsource mass political violence against civilians that transforms and traumatizes societies. It analyses how paramilitarism can be understood in global context, and how paramilitarism is connected to transformations of warfare and state-society relations. By comparing a broad range of cases, it looks at how paramilitarism has made a profound impact in a large number of countries that were different, but nevertheless shared a history of pro-government militia activity. A thorough understanding of paramilitarism can clarify the direction and intensity of violence in wartime and peacetime. The volume examines the issues of international involvement, institutional support, organized crime, party politics, and personal ties.
The author interprets paramilitarism as the ability of the state to successfully outsource mass political violence against civilians that transforms and traumatizes societies. It analyses how paramilitarism can be understood in global context, and how paramilitarism is connected to transformations of warfare and state-society relations. By comparing a broad range of cases, it looks at how paramilitarism has made a profound impact in a large number of countries that were different, but nevertheless shared a history of pro-government militia activity. A thorough understanding of paramilitarism can clarify the direction and intensity of violence in wartime and peacetime. The volume examines the issues of international involvement, institutional support, organized crime, party politics, and personal ties.
208 pages, Hardcover
Published September 2, 2020
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January 11, 2024
Here, author tries to give some general information [framework if you like] in order to define the paramilitary organizations and their relations with state and society in general. Book does not try to give an answer and fully define the paramilitarism as a social structure (as author notes there are way too many definitions here, although I have to admit author purposefully narrowed down the definition and thus removed some very interesting developments from the discussion). Author tries to give general picture with a reading list for anyone interested to learn more (bibliography is truly excellent).
Of course starting point needs to be made and author's stance on paramilitaries is that they are defined as force structures used by the state to provide political leverage so that state can better control its citizens and keep itself afloat. In other words in order to get desired effect politically, state utilizes paramilitary structures in a variety of ways - as a form of state unification (political and/or ideological) and a terror tool set against the opposition (which culminates in what Germans called Nacht und Nebel during the WW2 Gestapo/SS horrors).
In other words author looks at paramilitaries as tools for strengthening and keeping the state [regime] alive. Author takes us on the road from Middle East (Syria), across Africa, southern parts of Europe and over to Asia. Additionally we are given some historical overview of the paramilitary forces and while presentation of 20th century is all right in my opinion, Renaissance and early [modern] state periods are something I have quite a problem with.
To say condottieri were one example of paramilitary forces is ridiculous. These captains and their troops were for all means and purposes military for hire. There is no equivalent today anywhere in the world, because these troops (together with Landsknechts, Swiss pikemen, Irish Wild Geese and Scottish Galloglass) were the professional military troops of their days. They worked for whomever payed them to fight; in times when city states (burgs) were fighting for independence from feudal lords and just could not afford big troops, in period when ordinary citizens were forbidden to be armed at all, condottieri and above mentioned German(ic) and Irish and Scottish freelancers were the only professional military available.
They were paid but their troops had to provide weapons, armor and transport - they had whole convoys of women and children following them (since Skype or Viber weren't the thing then - you had to have eye on your spouse and kids). In other words they weren't Sepoys, Askeri or even Gurkhas that were recruited, armed and fed by the state, or kings and princes. Condottieri were self-sufficient moving military bases that made very good business of messing up client states in order to get maximum profit out of their misery. They were never used in internal squabbles (city states, especially in Italy, had their own ways of dealing with that) but only for combat with external threats. Did their captains find the way to become persons of means in mentioned city-states? Of course, but usually once that would happen captain's band would dissolve and move on to next battlefield - nobody wanted reminders of very hard military life when they aim for the stars.
So in context of author's presentation condottieri [with Landsknechts/pikemen/Galloglass/Wild Geese] could never be treated as paramilitaries because they were external parties/forces used for fighting external parties/forces.
So this was first hiccup I came across.
Second was basically linked to the above said but in modern times. Again, you guess it - it is about mercenaries and operatives operating outside the state. Again if you take into account author's guidelines these are not paramilitaries in the strictest meaning of the word (since they are not add-on (para) to state's own military but tool to instigate chaos and destruction on opposition's (enemy state) grounds). They might not even be citizens of the state that uses them clandestinely (like was case with Chang Kai-shek's nationals or mountain people of Vietnam) and they definitely never play any role in the internal affairs of the sponsor state (although commanding cadre might come from there, they [commanders] again are not politically involved since field of their operations is outside of their home state).
Hey, if you look at it through this prism even Serbian irregulars from the bloody wars in former Yugoslavia, that did horrendous things against civilians, don't fall in author's definition of paramilitaries. Which is ridiculous to say the least.
Basically author decided to concentrate (and unfortunately not only him but it seems majority of academia related to the subject) on so called authoritarian states - where state utilizes services of unsavory people (if I may add, although author constantly mentions only men, there are quite a few women also participating) to stay afloat and manipulate the events to ensure state survival (as author states these are not weak states but shrew states). And this is OK for a majority of the book because author shows how in this gray security zone where shady characters manipulate events entire armies can be born to do terrible things (Indonesia was ...... horrendous, situation in Turkey, terrible indeed, India was eyes opening (especially related to current president)).
But then from time to time author either falls into trap of its own making (Russia the bad guy needs to be mentioned of course, but then Russian sponsored mercenaries that are active in Ukraine, again, do not fall into category of paramilitaries author sticks to, so you get the mention and then ..... nothing, because of course it is outside of the scope) or for some weird reason he decides either to skirt it (like US intelligence led paramilitary (?!? again, not by the author's definition) forces executing targeted strikes) or avoid in full (no mention of Mossad; Turkey's Grey Wolves organization is mentioned only through a scandal when one of the organization member was killed together with state officials - no mention of organization's actions in Turkey and especially in Azerbaijan (organization was mobilized through entire conflict with Armenia, from 1990's 'til now), nothing, zilch.....). There is no mention of most notorious paramilitary ever existing, South African apartheid Vlakplaas death squads - now these were false flag/internal mayhem paramilitaries that did terrible things and also operated in the outside world. What about operation Condor in South America - it does get mentioned as US intelligence project, but then ..... nothing.
Very, very weird choice to skip entire category of force structures (outside above mentioned comment on Russia of course, because before Russia nobody utilized this kind of forces since 2001 :) hahahahahha, yah... VOC anybody?No?.....). While I agree that internally used paramilitary organizations are truly devious things for citizens, over the border use of paramilitary forces is what is the most dangerous thing in the world. There is no word on using foreign "volunteers" in former Yugoslavia that wondrously found their way from battlefields of Afghanistan, Yemen, Middle East (yes, even Iranians) and Caucasus - what they just decided to take a walk in not-so-specific western direction? They were brought by external forces to fight on foreign ground and even dictate destination country's internal politics (again they weren't add-ons (para) to anything in the designated state, they very quickly became opposition) and it took a long, long time to get them neutralized. What about El Salvador and Nicaragua?
Also author mixes things up a bit when it comes to privateers. These were officially recognized seamen granted rights to pillage enemy transports on the open seas. Were they paramilitaries? Definitely. But again not from the author's perspective because they weren't linked to the internal affairs (!?!)
And then after whole spiel about the Turkey and deep state author discards any notion of Gladio, although starting from 1980's and early 1990s, Italy (host state for stay behind troops named Gladio, that gave its name to the whole setup) gave substantial evidence of collusion of state security and forces that formed the Gladio (same as in South America, radical anti-communist forces and surviving fascists from WW2) in order to control the internal politics of Italy. Apparently presence of a single book on the subject is not sufficient enough (although nobody asks why is there deficit of material on the subject - hmmm? Really why :)) so entire subject is dropped by the author as a speculation. Again although both Italy and Turkey (they call that structure deep state there without any pretensions) have confirmed through years everything mentioned monograph talked about.
It is equivalent of talking about tanks and deciding not to take into account WW2 Eastern front (!?)
As you can see it is a conflicting book, lots of decisions author took, for me do not make much sense.
But even with this big holes in the provided information (since author just cut them off in the beginning by agreeing on very limited definitions), what is given is very informative and quite a food for thought. This is why I cannot give it below 4 stars - I have not come across a book that would cover this subject in this way (again, huge huge holes in the subject, but what is covered is truly well done).
Definitely a book for anyone interested in irregular troops, special operations and shadowy world of state security.
Of course starting point needs to be made and author's stance on paramilitaries is that they are defined as force structures used by the state to provide political leverage so that state can better control its citizens and keep itself afloat. In other words in order to get desired effect politically, state utilizes paramilitary structures in a variety of ways - as a form of state unification (political and/or ideological) and a terror tool set against the opposition (which culminates in what Germans called Nacht und Nebel during the WW2 Gestapo/SS horrors).
In other words author looks at paramilitaries as tools for strengthening and keeping the state [regime] alive. Author takes us on the road from Middle East (Syria), across Africa, southern parts of Europe and over to Asia. Additionally we are given some historical overview of the paramilitary forces and while presentation of 20th century is all right in my opinion, Renaissance and early [modern] state periods are something I have quite a problem with.
To say condottieri were one example of paramilitary forces is ridiculous. These captains and their troops were for all means and purposes military for hire. There is no equivalent today anywhere in the world, because these troops (together with Landsknechts, Swiss pikemen, Irish Wild Geese and Scottish Galloglass) were the professional military troops of their days. They worked for whomever payed them to fight; in times when city states (burgs) were fighting for independence from feudal lords and just could not afford big troops, in period when ordinary citizens were forbidden to be armed at all, condottieri and above mentioned German(ic) and Irish and Scottish freelancers were the only professional military available.
They were paid but their troops had to provide weapons, armor and transport - they had whole convoys of women and children following them (since Skype or Viber weren't the thing then - you had to have eye on your spouse and kids). In other words they weren't Sepoys, Askeri or even Gurkhas that were recruited, armed and fed by the state, or kings and princes. Condottieri were self-sufficient moving military bases that made very good business of messing up client states in order to get maximum profit out of their misery. They were never used in internal squabbles (city states, especially in Italy, had their own ways of dealing with that) but only for combat with external threats. Did their captains find the way to become persons of means in mentioned city-states? Of course, but usually once that would happen captain's band would dissolve and move on to next battlefield - nobody wanted reminders of very hard military life when they aim for the stars.
So in context of author's presentation condottieri [with Landsknechts/pikemen/Galloglass/Wild Geese] could never be treated as paramilitaries because they were external parties/forces used for fighting external parties/forces.
So this was first hiccup I came across.
Second was basically linked to the above said but in modern times. Again, you guess it - it is about mercenaries and operatives operating outside the state. Again if you take into account author's guidelines these are not paramilitaries in the strictest meaning of the word (since they are not add-on (para) to state's own military but tool to instigate chaos and destruction on opposition's (enemy state) grounds). They might not even be citizens of the state that uses them clandestinely (like was case with Chang Kai-shek's nationals or mountain people of Vietnam) and they definitely never play any role in the internal affairs of the sponsor state (although commanding cadre might come from there, they [commanders] again are not politically involved since field of their operations is outside of their home state).
Hey, if you look at it through this prism even Serbian irregulars from the bloody wars in former Yugoslavia, that did horrendous things against civilians, don't fall in author's definition of paramilitaries. Which is ridiculous to say the least.
Basically author decided to concentrate (and unfortunately not only him but it seems majority of academia related to the subject) on so called authoritarian states - where state utilizes services of unsavory people (if I may add, although author constantly mentions only men, there are quite a few women also participating) to stay afloat and manipulate the events to ensure state survival (as author states these are not weak states but shrew states). And this is OK for a majority of the book because author shows how in this gray security zone where shady characters manipulate events entire armies can be born to do terrible things (Indonesia was ...... horrendous, situation in Turkey, terrible indeed, India was eyes opening (especially related to current president)).
But then from time to time author either falls into trap of its own making (Russia the bad guy needs to be mentioned of course, but then Russian sponsored mercenaries that are active in Ukraine, again, do not fall into category of paramilitaries author sticks to, so you get the mention and then ..... nothing, because of course it is outside of the scope) or for some weird reason he decides either to skirt it (like US intelligence led paramilitary (?!? again, not by the author's definition) forces executing targeted strikes) or avoid in full (no mention of Mossad; Turkey's Grey Wolves organization is mentioned only through a scandal when one of the organization member was killed together with state officials - no mention of organization's actions in Turkey and especially in Azerbaijan (organization was mobilized through entire conflict with Armenia, from 1990's 'til now), nothing, zilch.....). There is no mention of most notorious paramilitary ever existing, South African apartheid Vlakplaas death squads - now these were false flag/internal mayhem paramilitaries that did terrible things and also operated in the outside world. What about operation Condor in South America - it does get mentioned as US intelligence project, but then ..... nothing.
Very, very weird choice to skip entire category of force structures (outside above mentioned comment on Russia of course, because before Russia nobody utilized this kind of forces since 2001 :) hahahahahha, yah... VOC anybody?No?.....). While I agree that internally used paramilitary organizations are truly devious things for citizens, over the border use of paramilitary forces is what is the most dangerous thing in the world. There is no word on using foreign "volunteers" in former Yugoslavia that wondrously found their way from battlefields of Afghanistan, Yemen, Middle East (yes, even Iranians) and Caucasus - what they just decided to take a walk in not-so-specific western direction? They were brought by external forces to fight on foreign ground and even dictate destination country's internal politics (again they weren't add-ons (para) to anything in the designated state, they very quickly became opposition) and it took a long, long time to get them neutralized. What about El Salvador and Nicaragua?
Also author mixes things up a bit when it comes to privateers. These were officially recognized seamen granted rights to pillage enemy transports on the open seas. Were they paramilitaries? Definitely. But again not from the author's perspective because they weren't linked to the internal affairs (!?!)
And then after whole spiel about the Turkey and deep state author discards any notion of Gladio, although starting from 1980's and early 1990s, Italy (host state for stay behind troops named Gladio, that gave its name to the whole setup) gave substantial evidence of collusion of state security and forces that formed the Gladio (same as in South America, radical anti-communist forces and surviving fascists from WW2) in order to control the internal politics of Italy. Apparently presence of a single book on the subject is not sufficient enough (although nobody asks why is there deficit of material on the subject - hmmm? Really why :)) so entire subject is dropped by the author as a speculation. Again although both Italy and Turkey (they call that structure deep state there without any pretensions) have confirmed through years everything mentioned monograph talked about.
It is equivalent of talking about tanks and deciding not to take into account WW2 Eastern front (!?)
As you can see it is a conflicting book, lots of decisions author took, for me do not make much sense.
But even with this big holes in the provided information (since author just cut them off in the beginning by agreeing on very limited definitions), what is given is very informative and quite a food for thought. This is why I cannot give it below 4 stars - I have not come across a book that would cover this subject in this way (again, huge huge holes in the subject, but what is covered is truly well done).
Definitely a book for anyone interested in irregular troops, special operations and shadowy world of state security.
March 4, 2021
A compact synthetic history / sociology work on the phenomenon of paramilitarism. The sociological side of argument draws on Charles Tilly's 'state as an organised crime' paradigm, and the historian in the author is at the strongest in his area of expertise of the (post-)Ottoman world - the Balkans, Turkey, Syria. Many gory but picturesque details which are not merely illustrative but explanatory (like the Susurluk accident), and the scheme applies to some of the cases that I'm pondering.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews