Realism and the Aim of Science.

by Karl Popper

Hardcover in unclipped dust jacket. Jacket is worn and tanned at edges. Foxing to page block, light tanning to endpapers. Boards are faintly marked. Pages are clean and unmarked throughout. AD

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Nonfiction

Hardcover

First published February 15, 1985

About the author

Sir Karl Raimund Popper, FRS, rose from a modest background as an assistant cabinet maker and school teacher to become one of the most influential theorists and leading philosophers. Popper commanded international audiences and conversation with him was an intellectual adventure—even if a little rough—animated by a myriad of philosophical problems. He contributed to a field of thought encompassing (among others) political theory, quantum mechanics, logic, scientific method and evolutionary theory.

Popper challenged some of the ruling orthodoxies of philosophy: logical positivism, Marxism, determinism and linguistic philosophy. He argued that there are no subject matters but only problems and our desire to solve them. He said that scientific theories cannot be verified but only tentatively refuted, and that the best philosophy is about profound problems, not word meanings. Isaiah Berlin rightly said that Popper produced one of the most devastating refutations of Marxism. Through his ideas Popper promoted a critical ethos, a world in which the give and take of debate is highly esteemed in the precept that we are all infinitely ignorant, that we differ only in the little bits of knowledge that we do have, and that with some co-operative effort we may get nearer to the truth.

Nearly every first-year philosophy student knows that Popper regarded his solutions to the problems of induction and the demarcation of science from pseudo-science as his greatest contributions. He is less known for the problems of verisimilitude, of probability (a life-long love of his), and of the relationship between the mind and body.

Popper was a Fellow of the Royal Society, Fellow of the British Academy, and Membre de I'Institute de France. He was an Honorary member of the Harvard Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa, and an Honorary Fellow of the London School of Economics, King's College London, and of Darwin College Cambridge. He was awarded prizes and honours throughout the world, including the Austrian Grand Decoration of Honour in Gold, the Lippincott Award of the American Political Science Association, and the Sonning Prize for merit in work which had furthered European civilization.

Karl Popper was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1965 and invested by her with the Insignia of a Companion of Honour in 1982.

(edited from http://www.tkpw.net/intro_popper/intr...)

Reviews

[Justin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Pretty much has the germ for what pretty much everyone after him pretty much says.

[Apatheia · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant.

[Adrienne · Rating 4 out of 5]

Karl Popper questions the epistemology of science (including the Scientific Method and the empirical approach) as infallible paths to truth. Popper looks at the problem of hypotheses (the infinite number that can be manufactured at the inception of an investigation and ad hoc AND infallible relationship between open-ended hypothesis/theories with experience).

[Satya · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book, Realism and the Aim of Science, is the first volume of Sir Karl Popper's Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery.  Although it was written in about four decades ago, this book is very much germane today and busts the bullshit assault by vendors using “science” to sell products that many people, in their mind, confuse science and scientism.  Karl Popper distinctly writes that scientific theories remain uncertain, however 'successful' and well 'supported' by evidence and the result of discussion, and we may be unable to foresee what kind of change will become necessary. "It  is surprising that", Popper adds, "philosophers naively continue to discuss the problem of epistemology in terms of the origin of our knowledge in sense-data or perceptions, or in terms of the number of 'repetitions' of the 'observations' of a black ravan or White swan."  Popper, in his volumes of work, advocates the falsifiability, testability, and refutability of a theory. Furthemore, he emphatically says that scientific theories are guesses or conjectures which may or may not be true, and that we can never know of a theory that it is true, even if it is true. He presents an exegesis on subjective and objective theory of knowledge. He explicates the problem of induction in terms of corroboration, certainity, uncertainity and probability.  Popper conclusively debunks the problem of induction -- which clearly arises from the fact that inductive inferences are not valid: which is the same as saying that inductive conclusions do not follow deductively from the inductive premises. This book also expounds on the problem of demarcation -- demarcation between theories based on testability and falsifiability rather than distinguishing the theories as science and metaphysics. 

With this said, I conclude by saying that -- the science we have been witnessing today is the death of Popperian science and the new age of ignorance, thanks to "science journalism." Science is moving from fallibilism to councils of cardinals declaring what is right!

[Parker · Rating 3 out of 5]

I should have read Logic of Scientific Discovery first...

Part 1 is an elaboration on Popper's solution to the problem of whether induction (inductive logic) can lead to knowledge, and why induction is not how we make progress. The aim of science (and deductive logic) is to find more satisfactory explanations than we are currently given through correction. That we can explain and grow our explanations at all is practically miraculous. That there is something for us to discover, and that we can and do make progress, is reason enough to pursue this aim even though we will not ever achieve it with certainty. The aim of inductionists to become more and more certain (closer to a probability of 1.0) is not possible because theories are never confirmed or verified. They may be falsified and rejected, or tentatively accepted - if corroborated until falsified.

Part 2 is a very repetitive discussion of the foundation of probability theory and I couldn't keep track of the thread... was way over my head

[Jonathan Hockey · Rating 2 out of 5]

Pretty disappointed in this. Very dogmatic perspectives, with little argument to support them only a presumptuous arrogance. Did not remember Popper to be like this many years ago when I first read him, but this was very disappointing. He is not aware of any of the subtleties of the debates regarding realism and idealism. His views on induction are as fine as ever, but you can get this much better in the original, logic and scientific discovery or in Conjectures and refutations. It is like Popper is only able to apply one thinking effort to any topic and then he immediately settles down to a dogmatic position regarding it, and focuses on petty personal issues of interpretation with other thinkers like Kuhn and claiming some special privilege for his theories when it really amounts to little more than the common sense idea of trial and error and learning from your mistakes more than from your successes.

[Filos · Rating 4 out of 5]

Did not read Part 2 - But part 1 is a good development of Popper's philosophy of Science.

[Vincenzo Politi · Rating 4 out of 5]

First volume of the monumental three-volume Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discoveries. This is Popper at his most lucid and mature reflecting, analysing, conjecturing and refuting. Yet, a bit more editing would have been helpful.