This is my first time reading Freud. I was brought to him when I realized that my philosophical interests seem to align with phenomena that he focuses on. I've been interested in how it seems that we often imagine that the world stands in a certain way; the contents of such imaginings may often show up as factual, when in fact they fail to align with reality. We then need to correct ourselves and remember it is in fact make-believe. Or conversely, when we try to remind ourselves of reality, we will imagine how reality stands, and sometimes this fails to show up to us as indeed factual, even though we "know" in a certain sense that it is factual.
Freud does get at this topic in this book, but treats it only briefly. His focus, instead, is to explain what the id, ego, and superego are, to explain how they develop over an individual's psychological maturation, and to detail the relationships between them. Let me summarize some of his main claims, and my concerns about them. First, Freud claims that unconscious states, which belong primarily to the id, can have the same effects on our behavior, or generally occupy the same psychological functional role, as conscious states. For example, an unconscious desire can drive behavior in the same way a conscious desire can. He even implies that unconscious states are structured and have content in the exact same way as conscious states, but they are simply repressed (he does not explicitly claim this however, and so this might be a misreading on my part).
This seems suspicious to me. Of course there are many factors that are other than our conscious intentions that drive behavior. But I'd think the intuitive view would be that these factors are simply subpersonal or causal in nature (e.g., a purely physiological, affective state; a circumstance involving threat to the body that causes that state). Behavior can automatically follow from such causes due to our enculturation and conditioning. Why call these factors unconscious states, as if they were psychological in character in the sense of possessing intentional or semantic content, but which are simply not consciously accessible? I see no reason to construe these factors in this way, and Freud does not provide an argument for this.
It seems equally suspicious that unconscious states could share the same structure as conscious states but simply be unconscious. I've been sympathetic to R. G. Collingwood's expressionism and Bergson's metaphysics of mind, which share the claim that there is a realm of preconscious states of which we can become conscious but which in themselves are highly indeterminate. The process of becoming explicitly conscious of such states requires that we express them in conceptually determinate terms; this is because whenever we are explicitly conscious of something it needs to be determinate. There are many possible interpretations to give to any preconscious state. Freud does not theorize in this direction at all; he suggests unconscious states are as determinate as conscious ones, and psychoanalysis is just a matter of making the former conscious (rather than of our creating/enacting new states out from old materials). Freud provides no argument for this view, unlike Collingwood and Bergson for theirs.
Second, Freud claims that the superego (which is like the conscience) is formed due to this psychological process: as infants, we are sexually attracted to our mothers. But we realize we cannot have the mother in that way. We see that the father does get the mother in that way. So to cope we try to be more like the father. Freud claims we do this by internalizing the father's perspective; we have a sense of how the father sees the world and evaluates himself, and we try to see the world and evaluate ourselves in a similar way. He provides no argument for why this would be the case; if it is indeed true we try to create a surrogate situation to sexually attaining the mother (and I don't agree with this starting premise at all), it seems more likely we'd directly imagine what sort of person the mother would like, and so internalize her evaluative perspective, rather than the father's. Freud conflates our trying to become more like a certain person (and the evaluate perspective that would be discipline ourselves towards becoming that person) and our adapting the inner voice of a certain other person. These two are independent conditions; I could try to become more like my friend, for example, without adapting his evaluative perspective, especially if he is highly self-critical and tries to become someone other than himself. Freud wants to say that we adopt another person's evaluative perspective in order to become more like that person, when these are just separate conditions.
I do appreciate Freud's insight that we "internalize" other people's perspectives, however. We come to evaluate ourselves as other people with whom we've been close or whom we trust would evaluate us. Freud moreover admits that whatever perspective we've "internalized" can develop quite variably and fluidly in our own lives, so that it comes to not resemble the original person from whom we borrowed it in the first place. I'm curious about this process of "internalization". Maybe this word itself is misleading; I doubt that we can just take someone else's way of seeing us and see ourselves that way directly. There's probably a more non-linear, complex process here, and the outcome is also probably so as simple as borrowing or adopting someone else's perspective. For example, it seems that generally infants come to learn about the meanings and affordances of the world by example and testimony from their caretakers. Maybe coming to evaluate oneself in a certain way is just any ordinary instance of this general phenomenon of learning from others? If so, this learning process is not a matter of "internalizing" another's perspective, but it is a matter of taking another person as seeing an object in a certain way and attempting to treat the object similarly. Our own background and various cirucmstantial factors will influence how we take another person and the character of our attempt; this is no simple internalization.
Nonetheless I think Freud is onto something with his idea that when we "internalize" a parent's perspective, as aspect of the parent's relationship to us that is preserved in the resultant super-ego or conscience is that the voice of this perspective is authoritative. We related to our parents by trying to heed to them when we were children. Now, we have certain inner voices that also rile up our sense of urgency and necessity to obey. This sense can hold even if we "intellectually" know that whatever this inner voice says is irrational or ought not to be followed. I'd like to think more about this; it is not the particular content of another person's perspective that we internalize, but rather there are general qualities of types of relationship that might come to hold between our inner voices and our spontaneous experience to which those voices respond.
Freud also claims that the superego comes to occupy almost the same functional role of the id. Just as the id's impulses rile up the ego to heed it, the supergo does so as well. The main differences are the character of the content of whatever the id v. superego "says" (e.g., the id conveys wishful thinking and desires not grounded in reality; the superego is grounded in reality), and the ego endorses the superego while tries to reject the id. I wonder whether this commonality between the power for the id and the superego to dispose the ego towards certain actions is superficial, or whether the superego is developmentally continuous with the id in such a way that the power arises from the same underlying processes. It seems to me when I am tempted to do something reckless, it is a very different kind of propulsion towards action compared to when I remind myself of what I ought to do. But there is also a commonality; my emotions are evoked and alter which actions to which I am disposed in both cases.
A last, less theoretically substantial criticism of Freud; when he discusses the superego, he focuses solely on its role of chiding us and making us feel guilty. But I'd think the superego would have the more general role of reminding us what reality consists in, or of relaying to us our aspirations, related to long-term planning. Pursuing our aspirations and successfully acting in accordance with reality can be invigorating and delightful; it is not always a matter of chiding and guilt. Just as friends encourage us and we do not feel guilty, I'd imagine the superego or conscience can do so too.
As a whole, I can imagine how radical and important Freud was to posit the id, ego, and superego. I think this framework as a whole makes a lot of sense; we often have spontaneous impulses and desires, and we often have to check these by reminding ourselves of what is real and what we ought to do. I am highly doubtful that our mind consists of three distinct parts that map out this psychological dynamic, however; moreover, I doubt it is theoretically fruitful to think about it in terms of three distinct parts. That is oversimplifying. Given my background, I'm disposed to make sense of it rather in terms of there being spontaneous or automatic experiences, which are based upon past habit, experience, enculturation, etc; and then, there is our capacity to re-present an experience, imagine, and use language. These capacities can enable us to "present" to ourselves imagined situations or experiences, which have a sort of virtual presence in contrast to our immediate perceived situation, but which still have the functional role of changing our behavioral dispositions.
Is there anything gained with adopting Freud's picture of the id, ego, and superego? At least I can imagine that this more commonplace and detailed picture sketched above could be too detailed and based on assumptions that are false. If that were true, it could be useful to stick with Freud's terms insofar as they are more general and vague, and so clear way for creating new conceptual distinctions which differ from those presupposed in that commonplace picture. I'd like to keep an open mind about this all.