Остання імперія. Занепад і крах Радянського Союзу

by Serhii Plokhy, Сергій Плохій, Ярослав Лебеденко (перекладач)

Аналіз розсекречених документів та інтерв’ю з безпосередніми учасниками подій наштовхують на висновок: крах СРСР не був результатом діяльності спецслужб Сполучених Штатів, навпаки, американські лідери боялися раптового колапсу радянської держави, який міг затягти Євразію в політичний та економічний хаос. Називаючи розпад СРСР «роботою Америки», політичні діячі США переоцінили власний потенціал у знищенні та перебудові іноземних режимів. Автор упевнений: американська роль у розвалі Союзу була міфом, який роздували на догоду діячам американської зовнішньої політики та прихильникам імперського реваншу в Росії. Україна стала ключовим гравцем у драмі розвалу Союзу й не тільки здобула незалежність для себе, але й показала шлях до державності менш рішучим республікам, як-от Білорусь та Казахстан.

«Остання імперія» — це нова, смілива інтерпретація останніх місяців життя Радянського Союзу, свіжий погляд на причини та передумови смерті цього політичного організму без заангажованості та упередженості.

Genres: History, Russia, Nonfiction, Politics, Russian History, Ukraine, Soviet Union

512 pages, Hardcover

First published March 7, 2014

About the author

Serhii Plokhy is a Ukrainian and American historian. Plokhy is currently the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History and Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, where he was also named Walter Channing Cabot Fellow in 2013. A leading authority on Eastern Europe, he has lived and taught in Ukraine, Canada, and the United States. He has published extensively in English, Ukrainian, and Russian. For three successive years (2002-2005) his books won first prize of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies.

For his Ukrainian-language profile, please see: Сергій Плохій

Reviews

[Patrick Blackburn · Rating 5 out of 5]

Simply put, this is a stunning book. It's not every day an author is able to rewrite history, and do so credibly. When I read, on the inside cover, the following sentence: "...the collapse of the Soviet Union was anything but the handiwork of the United States," I feared that it was going to attempt to diminish the role the U.S. played. On the contrary. I have read about 20 books on the subject and this is one of the best accounts of US-Russia relations from 1980-present (Hoffman's "The Dead Hand" is another). After reading "The Last Empire," I have a greater appreciation of the actions George Bush (HW) took (and accomplished) during this time. The significant impact of Secretary of State George Schultz was revealing as well.

Plokhy takes you right into private meetings all over the world during a six-month period in 1991. From the unbelievably tense meetings between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, to meetings by leaders of former Soviet states (namely Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) about the nature of the role they will play in this new world, there is no shortage of intrigue in "The Last Empire".

This book is not only for those who are interested in the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. The timing, with what is currently happening in that part of the world this book, is perfect. The author is an expert on Ukranian affairs (he is director of the Ukranian Research Institute at Harvard University) and spends a lot of time discussing Ukraine's (significant) role in the breakup of the Soviet Union. He even spends time on Crimea, which makes this book as relevant today as it was 25 years ago, if not more so. After reading "The Last Empire," I feel like I have a much better understanding of what (Putin's) Russia is trying to do (which doesn't make it any less disturbing). Whether you are interested in 1991 Russia, 2014 Russia, or both, "The Last Empire" absolutely must be added to your library. You won't be sorry.

[Micah Cummins · Rating 4 out of 5]

Serhii Plokhy’s 2014 book, The Last Empire, examines in fine detail the collapse of the Soviet Union. Plokhy, the Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute, and Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University is a Ukrainian American historian who has written extensively on the subjects of Ukrainian, Russian, and Soviet history. Plokhy places himself along with others in his field who, “...argue that while the lost arms race, economic decline, democratic resurgence, and bankruptcy of communist ideals all contributed to the Soviet implosion, they did not predetermine the disintegration of the Soviet Union. That was caused by the imperial foundations, multiethnic composition, and pseudo federal structure of the Soviet state, features whose importance was fully recognized neither by American policymakers in Washington nor by Gorbachev’s advisers in Moscow.”

The Last Empire focuses on the last months of the Soviet Union, late July to December 1991. The Soviet Union, or the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), was a country in Eastern Europe which was made up of fifteen republics. Formed in 1922 in the wake of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, the city of Moscow served as the USSR’s capital until the Soviet Union was dissolved in December of 1991.

In The Last Empire, Plokhy dives straight into the subject in an authoritative manner, challenging a common western ideology of “the triumphalist interpretation of the Soviet collapse as an American victory in the Cold War.” Instead, Plokhy argues that the fall of the Soviet Empire was destined from the beginning, and indeed toppled from the inside. Using recently declassified documents, Plokhy relies heavily on letters, diaries, and phone records to fully immerse his reader into the drama of the subject.

We follow Mikhail Gorbachev, the President of the Soviet Union, as he struggles to keep the USSR from crumbling through his fingers. We are witness to two United States Presidents, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush, as they both work through their own negotiations and policy deals with Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. Many other prominent names grace the pages of the drama as well. The President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, the sworn enemy of Gorbachev, and the first democratically elected President of Russia, features as a key player as the drama unfolds. We are also given front-row seats to Ukraine’s long-lasting struggle down the path to Soviet, and Russian, independence. Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of Ukraine, plays a large part in the narrative of The Last Empire as he, and many other native Ukrainians, fought with the Soviet Union and tried to win the favor of the West.

The relationship between President Gorbachev and President Bush is given much attention, illuminating how both were forced between personal ideologies and their countries, and how far they were willing to go for what they believed in. The Yeltsin-Gorbachev conflict also provides another layer of drama to the story, as do their interactions with other Soviet and Western leaders.

The Last Empire as a whole is a comprehensive and well-presented book. Plokhy chose to include much of the true dialogue that was passed between members of the key figures of the story, giving the reader an even more detailed and intimate look into the interpersonal and political lives of the most powerful leaders of the late twentieth century. The Last Empire is at once both detailed, and accessible, making it a must-read for anyone looking to deepen their knowledge or simply learn about the subject for the first time.

[Igor Mogilnyak · Rating 5 out of 5]

5⭐️

Друга прочитана мною книга Плохія, і це знову топ!

Читати всім.

[Shabbeer Hassan · Rating 5 out of 5]

A rather well-written account on the last days of the Soviet Union, its relationship with US during those waning days of Cold War with a rather special focus on the machinations of Bush-Gorbachev-Yeltsin triumvirate. Much has been written about the collapse of Soviet Union (SU) and all too frequently, US ingenuity coupled with SU's ineptitude has been touted as one of the main reasons for the end of Cold War. This suited both US (bolstering its superpower status, Bush Sr.'s political career) and Russia (improving relations with US leading to better financial deals and more importantly, rise of jingoistic nationalism and the political fortunes of those depended on it)

Serhii Plokhy brings a fresh perspective into this by doing away with the above erroneous assumption and rather puts the spotlight on Gorbachev's out of touch idealism, Yeltsin's hunger for power and enmity towards Gorbachev, political ambitions of Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk as the main causes. Historically, as seen from Bush Sr.'s personal diaries, correspondences, and other recently declassified files, the role of US in the demise of SU was quite minimal. As long as treaties were signed regarding diplomatic, arms-control agreements and concessions, the US was more than happy with the outcome. Though the book also rightfully gives its due to Bush Sr. and James Baker's diplomacy in the earlier stages of the dissolution talks with Gorbachev.

It's an interesting book for many reasons as stated above but also chiefly for bringing a fresh pair of eyes on an old, tired historical narrative transforming it into a rather an important primer for understanding Putin's current political manoeuvres.

My Rating - 5/5

[Mike · Rating 3 out of 5]

“It wasn’t quite the fourth of July.”- John Stepanchuk, acting US consul in Kiev.

Plokhy’s stated goal here is to dispute the narrative, which according to him is generally accepted in the west, that the United States ‘won’ the Cold War, arguing that the primary causes were internal to the Soviet Union- the crumbling economy, Gorbachev’s democratic reforms, the hatred that existed between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, etc. Whether or not the ‘triumphal’ narrative is particularly strong, or particularly widely believed, an attempt at clarification is generally a good thing.

The irony of the aforementioned narrative, according to Plokhy, is that George H.W. Bush and most of those in his administration (with the exception, perhaps ominously, of Dick Cheney) were not unreservedly enthusiastic about the prospect of the Union’s collapse, one seemingly reasonable reason for this being the question of nuclear disarmament; there was also a general sense of hesitancy and caution about what would follow that collapse. Bush seems to have exercised this caution despite domestic pressure, for example from the Ukrainian diaspora in America (apparently large enough to be electorally significant), to act, to push Gorbachev to recognize Ukrainian independence. Plokhy, who is Ukrainian, refers in passing to H.W. Bush’s “Chicken Kiev” speech, in which he hedged on the issue of Ukrainian independence, as a “gaffe”- I’m not sure that it was, and I’m not sure that Plokhy’s book really supports the idea that it was, either.

The book is notable for its focus on Ukraine and the Ukrainian independence movement. One thing that jumped out at me immediately is the way in which the current problems in Ukraine seem to have been foreshadowed. Yeltsin, upon the Union’s having more or less ceded central power to Russia, warned that “if any republic breaks off Union relations with Russia, then Russia has the right to raise the question of territorial claims.” When Yeltsin’s press secretary was asked to be more specific about which republics Yeltsin was addressing, the secretary mentioned parts of northern Kazakhstan, Abkhazia in Georgia, and the Crimea and Donbass in Ukraine. Yeltsin continued to threaten Ukraine with partitioning until the Ukrainian referendum, the result of which, according to Plokhy, was 90.32% in favor of independence (David Remnick wrote that it was “a few votes shy of 90 percent”). In the Lugansk and Donetsk oblasts, now disputed territories, the results were 83% and 77%, in favor of independence. Even in Crimea, “more than 54% voted in favor.” Of course, this is not evidence that the ‘referendums’ that have been held in those areas during the past couple of years are illegitimate, even though they are. The Russian 'ark', as Plokhy says, was leaving the harbor, economically speaking, and one gets the sense that many Ukrainians, even in the east, saw their neighbor as a dead weight; but my (anecdotal, second-hand) understanding is that life in the 90s for the average Ukrainian was not any easier than for the average Russian, financially speaking.

The US seemed to influence events inadvertently. Bush, for example, threatened to withhold economic assistance from the Union, economic assistance that the Union needed, if Gorbachev sent Soviet troops to crush resistance movements in the Baltics. When the central government displayed a disinclination to use force, the Baltics knew they could break away. It seems that the Bush administration understood that things could happen that way. But one of the points that Plokhy makes quite clear is that it wasn’t necessarily an advantage for the United States to have to deal with a splintering superpower, a potential “Yugoslavia with nukes.” Better, really, to deal with a relative moderate rendered somewhat complaisant, who could still maintain a level of control over the whole.

There are a number of passages about Gorbachev ‘losing’ his struggle for power and relevancy with Yeltsin, and the indignities that Yeltsin later subjected Gorbachev to, that take on the tone of Greek tragedy. At one point Plokhy writes that “…he changed the world and his country for the better by his actions but failed to change himself.” I’m not really sure what that last part means, but Plokhy also summarizes Gorbachev’s achievements: “the end of the Cold War, the dismantling of the totalitarian system, the democratization of Soviet politics, and the opening of the country to the world.” Not damn bad, I would say.

The writing in this book is kind of dry, and the dryness includes the occasional ‘hooks’ that seem out of place in a history book. One chapter, for example, begins with the sentence ‘He knew he was being followed.’ There are some grammar mistakes, and Plokhy repeatedly confuses the words ‘former’ and ‘latter.’ Plokhy is Ukrainian, and I found myself wondering throughout the book whether or not it was translated; there is no indication on the cover or the title page that it is. Then, in the acknowledgments section, I noticed that he thanks an editor for “Englishing” his prose. Grammar mistakes from a non-native speaker are entirely understandable, but it makes it seem like the book hasn’t been edited very thoroughly, and that perhaps it was rushed to publication in order to capitalize on the fact that Russia is back in the news. There is also a kind of awkward coda where Plokhy circles back to discrediting the narrative of American triumphalism, forgotten for hundreds of pages, and criticizing H.W. Bush for employing rhetoric to that effect as he began his re-election campaign in 1992. I think it’s kind of difficult to condemn Bush for simply taking rhetorical advantage of the situation (Bush allegedly even told Gorbachev, in private, “not to pay any attention to what he would say during the presidential campaign”), never mind that he lost the election anyway. Plokhy then links this triumphal narrative to a growing false sense that America needed to provide ‘moral clarity’ in and police other parts of the world, and therefore, to Bush II’s disastrous invasion of Iraq. That seems like a bit of a stretch to me.

Of course, there is always this song by Kino, “Changes”, which according to a member of the Russian Duma was written by the CIA to encourage dissatisfaction among the people:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5xQf...

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A clear, well-researched, and well-written history of the fall of the Soviet Union. While the idea that the US caused the Soviet Union’s collapse has been discredited, this myth has suited both the Americans (who have used it for political gain) and the Russians (who have used it to dodge blame and accusations of incompetence) Despite these, Plokhy stresses the role played by pure chance.

In a lively, readable narrative Plokhy covers all of the private negotiations within the Soviet government and between the leaders of the foreign states. He also emphasizes the often-forgotten desire of President Bush (both a an ally and personal friend of Gorbachev) and US policymakers to prevent a Soviet collapse, a prospect they compared to a “Yugoslavia with nukes.” Plokhy covers Gorbachev’s policies and how they led to the Soviet Union’s ultimate breakup, all the while stressing the contingency of events and especially the interaction between Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and the opportunistic Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk. Plokhy discusses how Kravchuk’s decision to declare Ukraine’s independence led Yeltsin to do the same, and how the the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union led to the collapse of Gorbachev’s political career. Plokhy’s rendition of the August coup is particularly dramatic. Gorbachev comes off as idealistic and out of touch, Yeltsin as boorish and erratic.

Plokhy credits the efforts of these republics with the Soviet Union’s collapse, and convincingly argues that the US was a bit player. Again, although frequently overlooked, US policy was to preserve the USSR’s integrity, since the US viewed Gorbachev as an ally and because of fears that a breakup could result in a regional war, and potentially a nuclear one. There was concern that a breakup could damage the nuclear agreements between the US and the USSR, and the immediate goal of the US was to extract as many Soviet diplomatic and arms-control concessions as possible before the Soviet Union collapsed. The ultimate breakup of the Soviet Union was not the result of US foreign policy, and Plokhy covers the often overlooked effect that Soviet electoral politics, the Gorbachev-Yeltsin rivalry, and Russian-Ukrainian relations had on the USSR’s fate. The Russians valued their alliance with the US since it gave them legitimacy. While not able to exercise much influence over events, Plokhy argues that the diplomacy of Bush and Baker was sensible and realistic. “In the final analysis,” Plokhy concludes, “George Bush’s policies contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union, but they often did so irrespective of the desires of his administration, or even contrary to them.”

A few parts are a bit plodding and tedious, but Plokhy succeeds in telling a nuanced, insightful and human story.

[Wick Welker · Rating 5 out of 5]

A republic dissolves with a bang and a whimper.

I am not knowledgeable about the fall of USSR or even the creation of USSR and want to be and that's why I did this audiobook. I found this to be very detailed (too much for what I was interested in) going into such lengths as to very specific phone calls between Bush and Yeltsin and Gorbachev ect. Now that's my fault, not the author's fault. I did get from this book what I wanted but it took a while. You'll learn everything about why the fall happened and everything that lead up to it including the Ukraine's involvement with the collapse of the USSR and its impact of the wounded psyche of Russia are still ongoing today. Anyway, I wish I were smarter and more informed to write a better review for this excellent work.

[Bas · Rating 4 out of 5]

4,5/5 stars

This is my second book by Plokhy and he is quickly starting to become one of my favourite historians. He is combining great research with a strong understanding of the subject and very enjoyable writing. The main thesis of the book is quite simple: contrary to popular and mostly American belief the fall of the Soviet Union wasn't caused by the USA but by internal Soviet causes and most importantly by the decisions of the 2 most important republics : Ukraine and Russia. Russia didn't want to carry the burdens of empire any more and Ukraine wanted full independence.
I really enjoyed this book for a couple of reasons:
Plokhy really succeeded in putting the historical characters at the center and make come alive in all their complexities : Bush senior, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Kravchuk are being shown in all their glory and despair and Plokhy is able to make you understand their way of thinking and acting.
An other reason is the very relevance of this book to current events. It was published in 2014 when it was already super relevant and the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war has only made it more relevant. The way the book deals with tensions between Russia and Ukraine present in 1991 is very interesting to read.
To conclude I would say that I certainly recommend the book to anyone who is interested in Eastern-European history.

[Ryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

News flash : Americans like to take credit for things they actually had much less to do with than they'd like to think. More at 11.

A great read as usual from Plokhy, and despite being written before Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, actually gives some pretty compelling backstory about why Putin just can't seem to square his brain with the idea that Ukraine exists independently of Russia.

[Richard · Rating 5 out of 5]

This details the undoing of the Soviet Union, basically between July and December, 1991, in very clear and readable prose. I came to this book because, despite its being one of the great historic moments of the twentieth century (at least), I knew next to nothing about it or its major players.

Gorbachev who had ended the Cold War in 1989 had unloosed the democratic demon, leading to elected parliaments in the republics that formed the Soviet Union. While he tried to maintain the central role of the Union and his own presidency, Yeltsin in Russia, and the Ukrainian and Belarus leaders, chosen by those freely elected parliaments, moved toward independence for their republics. In August, hard-liners had attempted to turn back the democratic movements and to re-establish Union control at the center, isolating Gorbachev, but, due in large part to Yeltsin, they failed.

The US concerned itself with the nuclear issue as weaponry was placed in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; in order to avoid upsetting the status quo, the Bush (41) administration attempted to keep Gorbachev and the USSR in existence and succeeded longer than they might have otherwise.

The Union was undone on 8 Dec 1991 when Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus opted for independence, later signing with the Islamic republics--all of them save the Baltics who had been given their independence from the USSR earlier and Georgia (which sent a representative) were signatories, and the Union was done. Gorbachev would give his resignation speech on 25 December and was treated shabbily by Yeltsin in the aftermath. The book offers much more in the way of specifics, interplay, and evolution of the stance of the republics.

Plokhy rejects the US claim of "victory" as campaign rhetoric introduced by Bush in his comments after Gorbachev's resignation. The pope is never mentioned as an influence.

What was/is very interesting is the role of Ukraine and its first president, Leonid Kravchuk. There was fear that the various republics would see ethnic strife as the Union lost power, and Ukraine has a large ethnic Russian population, but they voted in a majority for independence. Russia could not do without Ukraine, but Kravchuk was every bit Yeltsin's match, managing to get his way on a variety of issues. Reading this, however, one can understand Putin's desire to regain Russia's dominance in Ukraine but also in the other republics, perhaps recreating a Russian union in the image of the Czarist and Communist empires. A turn to the West, as Ukraine has done, can only be viewed from the Kremlin as intolerable.

Besides Kravchuk, Secretary of State James Baker comes off very well.

[Matt · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Last Empire, by Serhii Plokhy, is a comprehensive and detailed account of the last few months of the Soviet Union. It starts with the August Coup and ends with Gorbachev's resignation in December. The book focuses on the Bush, Kravchuk, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin perspectives.

This is a must read for those studying Soviet/Russian history and is an excellent start to studying both the fall of the USSR and Gorbachev's reign.

[Suzannah Rowntree · Rating 4 out of 5]

December 1991. Russian president Boris Yeltsin goes to Belarus to help save the Soviet Union, where he is greeted warmly by the Belarusian Speaker of Parliament, Stanislau Shushkevich:

Shushkevich did his best to smooth over the jarring effect of Yeltsin's "goodwill gift" presented to the Belarusian parliament earlier that day. It was a seventeenth-century tsarist charter to the Belarusian city of Orsha, taking it under Russian protection. What Yeltsin and his advisors regarded as an instance of Russo-Belarusian friendship to be emulated in the future was perceived by the democratic opposition in the Belarusian parliament as a symbol of Russian imperialism. Yeltsin's gift was met with shouts of "Shame!"

This is just one of the many telling historical details in Ukrainian academic Serhii Plokhy's study of the dissolution of the USSR between August and December 1991, which he pitches justly as the dissolution (I would say the partial dissolution) of the last classical European empire. When I realised the book dealt with such a limited time period, I was a little worried I might not have the context to understand what was going on. In 1991 I was alive, but only just. I certainly had no understanding of geopolitics. Happily, my worries were baseless. Plokhy gets you up to speed in the first few chapters and then follows a tight cast of characters - Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Bush I and Kravchuk - through the tumultuous events of those months, telling a story that at times reads like a thriller.

Plokhy's thesis - which is surely more well-founded, and less self-absorbed than the American boast to have "won the Cold War" is that the independence declaration of Ukraine was the decisive blow that caused the USSR to disintegrate.

Yeltsin and his advisers felt much more affinity with the Union than is usually allowed for in commentary about them. Not even the most radical of Yeltsin's advisers had the dissolution of the USSR on their original agenda... Neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin imagined a viable Union without Ukraine. It was the second Soviet republic after Russia in population and economic contribution to the Union coffers. The Russian leadership, which was already skeptical about bearing the costs of empire, could be persuaded to do so only together with Ukraine. Besides, as Yeltsin told George Bush on more than one occasion, without the Slavic Ukraine, Russia would be outnumbered and outvoted by the Central Asian republics, most of which, with the notable exception of Kazakhstan, relied on massive subsidies from the Union centre.

One particularly horrifying detail that ought to give us a good deal of perspective on current 2022 events is how Yeltsin himself - a far better democrat than Vladimir Putin ever has been, although that admittedly does not require a very high bar - responded to the prospect of the USSR's dissolution:

Many of Yeltsin's advisers regarded the Commonwealth [of Independent States, the body created to link the republics when the USSR was dissolved] not as an instrument of divorce but rather as a means of Russian control over the post-Soviet space. They believed that Russia needed to free itself from the burden of supporting a traditional empire, but in twenty years, once it recovered from its systematic and political problems, the republics would come back to Russia of their own free will.

But this was obviously wishful thinking, of the same sort that could contribute to the massive depopulation of Belarus in WWII and the poisoning of one-fifth of its agricultural land in 1986 and then have the nerve to present its parliament with a memento of their imperialist subjection. Some of the republics did return - notably Belarus, once it became a dictatorship. Others would need to be forced back to the fold, like Georgia. And then, of course, Ukraine, first and boldest, would demand special treatment...

Vladimir Putin referred to the dissolution of the Soviet Union as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century," and this book makes it perfectly clear why he might blame Ukraine above all the other former Soviet republics for that event. But of course it isn't a catastrophe: it's a eucatastrophe. As I've dug into recent Russian history this year, the one event I keep coming back to in sheer wonder is the fall of the USSR. The century, and the region, that saw one brutal regime after another; the slaughter of millions by hunger, bullets, and war; the deportation or enslavement of whole populations; also experienced one staggering, improbable, largely bloodless moment of freedom and hope.

Things have gotten bad again since. Amidst the former communist states, Russia, Belarus, Hungary, and Azerbaijan are once again ruled by dictators. Ukrainians are fighting for their lives and Armenians face a dark future. But the USSR will never rise again, and it fell in the most unlikely way imaginable. And the fact that Providence intervened in this way should give all of us hope.

[Simonas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Pildau Naujausios istorijos žinojimo spragas: 450 puslapių apie tai, kas vyko šalia, bet mūsų fokusas buvo visai nebeten - paskutiniai CCCP gyvavimo metai, 1991-ieji. Lietuva ir Baltijos šalys paminėtos tik atsitiktinai - mes jau ten nebedalyvavome, praktiškai visi CCCP ir Rusijos vadovai irgi jau buvo nurašę, jog Baltijos šalys jau išėjusios. Bet politiniai dalykai buvo įdomūs, kaip šitas sovietinis monstras subyrėjo - pučas, Jelcinas, Bušas ir kas ten tik nedalyvavo. Labai patiko - "Gates of Europe" autorius ukrainietis turi parašęs visą šitą istoriją iš atsiminimų ir paviešintų dokumentų.

[Віта · Rating 5 out of 5]

Напевно, в історії розпаду срср, як її бачить Сергій Плохій, найбільше вразило розігрування Горбачовим в останні дні при владі етнічної карти. Єльцин навіть про око не вдавав, що його обходить становище росіян, які могли опинитися з розпадом союзу за кордоном. Для успішних політичних ігор йому не потрібні етнічні росіяни Прибалтики, бо мав підтримку тамтешніх націонал-демократів. А от завдяки передсмертним політичним метанням Горбачова стало зрозуміло, звідки ростуть ноги у путінських маніпуляцій етнічними питаннями і його ставок на міжетнічні конфлікти.
Доля росіян за кордоном - у випадку проголошення радянськими республіками незалежності - була останнім аргументом Горбі для збереження срср.

"Він уважав, що югославська трагедія зблідне порівняно з тим, що може статися в Радянському Союзі, якщо численні етнічні меншини проведуть нові державні кордони. Його аргумент базувався на долі росіян - колишніх господарів імперії - та дискримінації, перед якою вони могли постати в нових незалежних державах.
- Сімдесят п'ять мільйонів людей живуть за межами своєї малої батьківщини, - стверджував Горбачов, посилаючись на місця проживання радянських національностей та змішане населення Союзу. -  То що, всі вони стануть громадянами другого сорту? І хай нас не заколисують, що все буде гарантоване у двосторонніх договорах, які підписують республіки. Не вірте, що це розв'яже проблему. Має бути збережено державу, яка забезпечить правовий захист кожній людині.
Далі Горбачов посилався на російськомовних мешканців регіонів, які, не знаючи місцевих мов, не зможуть повноцінно брати участь в політичному процесі.
- Самохіть чи ні, а виходить, що деяких громадян - мешканців прибалтійських республік зараховують наче до другого сорту".

Чи це лише мені здається, чи російському політику навіть на думку не спадало, що можна вивчити мову республіки, в якій живеш?

Путін застосовує цей підхід до ведення зовнішньої політики.

"Те, що тепер вважають винаходом Володимира Путіна, - агресивна політика інтеграції колишніх радянських республік до спільних інституцій та протидія членству України та Грузії в НАТО і структурах Європейського Союзу, - також походить від подій 1991-го. (...) Російсько-український конфлікт за Крим та спровокована і підтримувана Росією війна на Донбасі сягають корінням планів радянської еліти 1991 року та сподівань російських політиків відносно російського домінування в регіоні того періоду. Тривала війна, яка вже рахує вбитими та поранентми десятки тисяч громадян України та Росії і принесла руйнацію цілого регіону, може перетворитися на ще більш руйнівний конфлікт. Розпад Радянського Союзу далеко не закінчився. Остання імперія продовжує свої конвульсії".

Так писав Сергій Плохій у 2015 році і як у воду дивився, передбачаючи теперішнє повномасштабне вторгнення.

[Brandy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Read this for a grad class.

This book is just incredible. I can't wait for a second edition so that Plokhy can write an afterward or something to comment on the recent/current Ukrainian crisis. Just fascinating. Plokhy gives a blow by blow of the last four months of the Soviet Union, with a focus on Gorby, Yeltsin, Bush 1, and the maybe less obvious but massively important Kravchuk. My only issue was that I had to keep writing the date at the top of the page haha.
Will absolutely keep this on my shelf for reference and will recommend to anyone who wants to understand what happened in 1991. So good.

[Sajith Kumar · Rating 4 out of 5]

The forces of communism and western liberalism joined hands briefly for a while to take on the might of the Axis powers during World War II. Burying the differences and bridging the yawning chasm that divided their own ideologies, this united force admirably eliminated the threat of a Nazi takeover of the world. After the victory, however, it became evident that the natural instincts of the two camps could not be concealed any longer. The Cold War began shortly, as the USA and USSR played with their pawns and puppets at various theatres of war in the world. They fought with each other – killing, maiming and destroying resources – but without firing a shot directly at each other. The balance was so precarious that the world was scary at the thought of a sudden nuclear holocaust triggered as a result of a false move by any one of the opponents. In 1985, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev took the reins of power in the Soviet Union through the regular route – as the General Secretary of the Communist party. Gorbachev thought and acted differently, as he recognised the ideological bankruptcy of communism which had given the Soviet people nothing but misery and turmoil. He wanted to emulate the west to obtain its level of material prosperity. This came as an interlinked package with democracy. Gorbachev slowly opened up the political space for pluralism. The Soviet people, who were eagerly awaiting liberation from the communist yoke, rushed out of the union in a stampede before anyone could figure out what was happening. This book tells the story of the decimation of the Soviet Union in just five months from August to December of 1991 when the Communist party was dissolved and the nation crumbled to dust. Serhii Plokhy is a Ukrainian-American historian and author specialising in the history of Ukraine, Eastern Europe and Cold War studies.

Plokhy terms the Soviet Union as the ‘last’ empire. This is not in the sense that there will be no more empires in the future, but because it was the last state that carried on the legacy of the ‘classical’ European and Eurasian empires of the modern era such as the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, British or French. Anti-imperialism was a pet slogan of the communist rhetoric, but the irony of the very political state through which it was being manifested was itself an instrument of imperialism is sure to come as a realization for the naive among the communists. The hallmarks of an imperial centre were visible in Russia, the largest constituent of the union that led all the other republics. The member states were de jure free to secede at will, but this option always remained in the realm of imagination. Russia controlled the political, economic, cultural and social webs that linked many nationalities and ethnic groups. But there were differences as well. The metropolis – Russia – commanded huge energy resources on which the other republics eagerly counted on. This dependence had become a millstone around Russia's neck by the time of Gorbachev. This has also contributed to the metropolis’ desire to dissolve the empire.

Plokhy argues that the fate of the Soviet Union was decided in the last few months of its existence, between the coup that began on August 19 and the meeting of the leaders of the Soviet republics in Almaty on December 21, 1991. The reluctance of the political elite of Russia and Ukraine to find a modus vivendi within one state structure drove the final nail in the coffin of the union. The road to disintegration was ready in the early Gorbachev years. His attempts to reform Stalin’s centralised system of economic management had accelerated the speed of its collapse. Perestroika’s economic reforms failed, with increasing shortages of goods and growing scope for criticism of party policies. The Communist party lost its race with its opponents. The author identifies one more factor for the unwillingness of the non-Russian republics to prop up the Soviet structure. The coup, though organised by the KGB, was unprofessional which simply fizzled out when it encountered the first signs of resistance among the crowds that surrounded Yeltsin and his Parliament building in Moscow. Yeltsin’s stature grew immensely overnight. He could exert his control over the armed forces. It looked as if he liberated Gorbachev from the coup leaders’ captivity in Crimea. Yeltsin and his Russian cronies tried to exploit this bargaining chip to step into the shoes of Gorbachev and assume control of the central organisation that still held the union afloat. The other republics immediately got wind of this operation which indirectly helped catalyse their decision to depart. Most of these units were under the Tsarist regime before the Bolsheviks took over and they wanted no trek with a new Russian hegemony under Yeltsin. Ukraine was steadfast in asserting independence as shown by the sweeping majority for secession in a referendum held on December 1.

This book somewhat captures the plight of the common people during the last days of the communist state. But this does not attract the required attention from the author who continues with a blinkered version of the political narrative. Soviet Union desperately wanted food aid from the west to tide over the winter of 1991 in the form of eggs, powdered milk and mashed potato mix. They appealed to the Americans to release the material stored by US army which would be thrown out after its expiry period of three years, implying that their shelf life of three years would be acceptable to the Russians. Plokhy then dishes out an old comment made by Nikita Khruzhchev in which he threatened to bury the West. The stark contrast between the times of Khruzhchev and Gorbachev is visible here.

The author also tracks the crucial influence exerted by George H W Bush, the US President. All the factions which strove for power in the Soviet republics obliged Bush with interviews and factual reports in return for economic and food assistances and diplomatic recognition. The US was mainly concerned with the safety and unified control of the nuclear arms stored in four republics – Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Luckily for the US and the rest of the world, all states except Russia expressed their desire to let go of the nuclear capability. Russia collected weapons from the other states and assumed control of them. They also agreed to abide by the arms-control treaties signed by the Soviet Union earlier. This appropriation was timely, as radical Islam was beginning to tighten its hold on the central Asian and Caucasian regions. Plokhy argues that Bush tried to save the union from collapse, but once it had become certain that it was unavoidable, entered into a pragmatic arrangement with the successor states.

That leaves us with the image of Gorbachev, who is treated with respect by the author, but not unduly so. He won the Peace Nobel and is glorified across the world as the man who brought in a crucial change for the better in world politics by destroying communism. The west considers Gorbachev to have ended the Cold War and responsible for dismantling of the totalitarian system, democratization of Soviet politics and the opening of the country to the world. Even with all these achievements, Plokhy assert that Gorbachev was not the ‘blue-eyed boy’ made out by the west as far as native Russians were concerned. The reason for this is purely economic. When Gorbachev allowed the fundamentals of political freedom to percolate in Russian society, it accelerated the demise of the old structures that ensured at least some amount of succour for the common man. Even basic foodstuffs went off store shelves when the first whiff of political freedom touched the mercantile community. The people arraigned Gorbachev responsible for this state of things. The author claims that the Russian people were irritated even to hear Gorbachev's broadcasts over the radio.

This book is written with a superior bias to American interests and politicians. We read of Russian leaders, including Gorbachev and Yeltsin politely presenting status reports to the American president in person or through phone. They are also portrayed as bending to American pressure. While there may be some truth in this, the overall picture painted in the book is quite embarrassing to Soviet interests and sovereignty. Another incident narrated is that of the Russian foreign minister Kozyrev inquiring about the differences in meaning of the terms ‘federation’, ‘association’ and ‘commonwealth’ with an American scholar on the eve of a crucial meeting of the Soviet republics convened to decide on the most suitable form of political organisation for them. The book also includes a good collection of monochrome plates of the major actors and events of the era.

The book is strongly recommended.

[Skut333 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Вже стало звичкою чекати нових перекладів книг Сергія Плохія і ця не була винятком. Напевне для мене вона є еталонним історичним чтивом, щоб так захопливо і водночас скурпульозно зробити виклад потрібно дійсно мати талант. Та крім того автор береться зовсі не за легку справу розслідувати останні дні кончини СРСР. Як маститий детектив він береться пролити світло хто ж дійсно ввігна останній кіл.
Водночас це чудова книга для дипломатів, оскільки є неперевершеною ілюстрацією відносин з усіма тонкощами двох противоборчих країн та систем.
Дуже раджу!!!!

[Socraticgadfly · Rating 5 out of 5]

Plokhy writes a very worth successor to his Yalta book, which I've also read.

With a bit more time separation, unlike Gorbachev and other "principals" who have already written away, and academic detachment, but with the connection of Ukranian heritage and being born in the USSR, Plokhy is well-positioned for a book like this.

And he doesn't disappoint.

Much of his focus is on neither Gorbachev but Boris Yeltsin, but on Ukraine's Leonid Kravchuk, as he pivots from being a Ukrainian Communist apparatchik to its leading politician, and pushing for the full break-up of the USSR.

Plokhy also explains the nearly 40 years of Russian-Ukrainian dynamics within higher Soviet ranks, from the start of Khrushchev on. He then ties in Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev as the other key player, after the failure of the August 1991 coup, in the drama.

Without this being an actual biography, one gets good snapshots of Yeltsin, Gorbachev and Kravchuk. My only regret is that there's not a bit more about the Central Asian dynamics, or maybe the Caucasian ones.

On the American side, Plokhy spends somewhat less time. He could have gone another 40-50 pages with some dynamics, but he does note that US attitudes toward keeping the USSR alive were divided within the Bush administration, with Defense Secretary Dick Cheney being most hawkish about a breakup.

With the recent Russian-Ukranian tensions, Plokhy also has ironically good timing, per what I have noted above. For more on Soviet ethnic dynamics, especially in western Ukraine, his Yalta book may be of some additional help.

[Anatoly Bezrukov · Rating 4 out of 5]

Отличная книга, показывающая последние пять месяцев существования СССР: от саммита СССР-США в конце июля до нового года 1992 г.
Читается практически как "Игра престолов": несколько политических сил, у каждой свои интересы и ограничения, и всё это сплетается в очень сложный клубок.
США, например, не особо были заинтересованы в полном распаде СССР, т.к. опасались за судьбу ядерного оружия; СССР был важен как гарант относительной стабильности на Ближнем Востоке и в Средней Азии и т.п. В то же время эта общая позиция не распространялась на Прибалтику, поскольку её подконтрольность СССР Америка не признавала изначально, с 40-х годов. А вот на Украину Штаты изначально смотрели как на неотъемлемую часть СССР, хотя, как и Прибалтика, Западная Украина была присоединена к Союзу в тот же период по тому же пакту Молотова-Риббентропа. Но в то же время в США была довольно большая украинская диаспора, традиционно поддерживавшая республиканцев, поэтому совсем не учитывать их интересов Буш, которому предстояли выборы, тоже не мог.
В общем, всё очень сложно. И очень интересно.
Из минусов: Плохий делает упор на политические и национальные факторы, но мало пишет про экономику, а это все-таки тоже был весьма значимый фактор (особенно если судить по "Гибели империи" Гайдара). Также довольно мало про Чернобыли и почти совсем ничего про Афганистан, хотя это, кажется, тоже были значимые факторы распада.
Но даже без этого довольно интересно.

[Vadim · Rating 4 out of 5]

Сергей Плохий, вовлекая в научный оборот рассекреченные архивы президента США Джорджа Буша-старшего, дает ответ на вопрос, кто погубил Советский Союз. Детальная реконструкция событий июля-декабря 1991 года показывает, что это не Ельцин, надеявшийся при возможности получить союзную корону, не Буш, положивший почти все яйца в корзину поддержки Горбачева и сохранения его во главе Союза, а растущее национальное движение, олицетворением которого можно считать Кравчука.

Книга хороша не только общей картиной, но и деталями. В решающие моменты сначала у ГКЧП, а потом у Горбачева не оказывается ни одного верного полка, которые захотели бы им помочь. Иногда демократия работает очень окольными путями.

[Tomas Repka · Rating 5 out of 5]

Although the main thrust of the book is the outwardly paradoxical foreign policy stance of the United States to keep the Soviet Union alive. The key chapters are those on the mutual relations between Russia and Ukraine, which not only led to the break-up but in which the roots of the future military conflict can be traced. If Yugoslavia was a case of immediate escalation of unresolved issues, the Ukraine-Russia conflict hibernated for several years. It will take all the longer to resolve it, which is far from settled.

I highly recommend this book.

[Marv · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union answered a lot of my questions about the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Especially the role of the Bush Presidencies involvement in the future of Russia and the other countries of the Soviet Union.

[Andrewh · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book starts off by stating that the idea that the US/West ‘won’ the cold war, by defeating the Soviet Union, is a total myth – in fact, the Soviet Union was intact at the end of the ‘conflict’ and not militarily defeated. As the author also explains, President George HW Bush was in fact very keen to keep the reformist Gorbachev in power and to avoid a break up of the USSR – the US were worried about a nuclear-armed Yugoslavia-type breakup of the Union, with several potentially unstable nuclear states resulting.

The author is an expert on Ukraine and much of the 500 pp history is devoted to detailing the machinations between the central power of the Communist Party, led by the reformist (but locally unpopular) Mikhail Gorbachev, and the leaders of the key Soviet republics, Boris Yeltsin [Russia] and Leonid Kravchuk [Ukraine] in particular. The most exciting and in some ways most interesting section of the book is the August coup against Gorbachev by members of the KGB and the military, who effectively took him prisoner in his dacha and tried to take over the state, in order to prevent further reforms and a new union treaty. Gorbachev refused to sign over power to the plotters and when army units moved on Moscow, Boris Yeltsin made himself into a national(ist) hero by standing with the crowds against the tanks that were closing in on the White House. The coup failed, but Gorbachev’s fate as Soviet leader was effectively sealed and Yeltsin then began to challenge him, as president of the largest state in the Union, which no longer had any wish to be ruled from the centre.

There then follow many detailed and well-referenced, if slightly dull, chapters outlining the complex negotiations between the aspiring states, Russia and Ukraine in particular, and the Party in the Centre, who still had power over the Soviet armed forces and over foreign policy, if nothing else in effect. Ukraine held a referendum on independence in December 1991, which voted overwhelmingly in favour of leaving the Union [90%], which effectively forced Russian’s hand – they could not envisage the Union without Ukraine. Yeltsin favoured a confederation of Slavic states, comprising Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (all being nuclear states), which would eventually become the Commonwealth of Independent States, the successor body to the Soviet Union in effect. This body was agreed to at the fairly informal Belavehza Accords (at which the various leaders wrote things down themselves in pen and ink). The US position seemed to be pivoting toward support for the free-market aspirations of Yeltsin’s young reformers.

The formal discussions on the transition of power from the Union to the CIS took place in mid-December 1991 at Almaty – the central Asian leaders also supported this pan-Slavic body, to Gorbachev’s surprise (he had hoped to keep them in a new Union), on condition that they be considered as founder members, with equal rights (it would now include 11, not 3 republics) – a new declaration was signed for the Commonwealth, which essentially replicated the USSR without the Baltics. It also abolished all Soviet ministries on all territories and allowed Russia to be the legal successor to the Union and to take the USSR’s seat at the UN, with only the Russian president being given authority to launch nuclear weapons, while other presidents would be consulted. Gorbachev formally resigned on 25 December and the Soviet flag was simply replaced with the Russian imperial flag (even though the CIS capital was supposedly Minsk). Yeltsin had completed his ‘coup’ in the author’s words, and the Soviet Union was over, without ever having been subject to any vote in all the member republics on its own future.

After Gorbachev’s resignation speech, President Bush made a televised speech announcing it as a victory for ‘democracy and freedom’. This was a volte-face aimed to prop up Bush’s presidency and to appease the hawks in his party. In the Epilogue the author notes that it was the introduction of democratic elections within the USSR that led to its downfall – directly, in fact, as a result of the December 1991 Referendum in Ukraine. Neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin could envisage a USSR without Ukraine, and that was the catalyst for the CIS agreement. The author also adds a coda that describes Putin’s aggressive policy in the near abroad as harking back to 1991, as the CIS was devised by Yeltsin as a means to control the post-Soviet space in essence. (He also traces the hubristic US neo-con policy of the post-911 era to this great 'moral victory' over the USSR, making 1991 a crucial event in international relations in many ways.)

This is a very readable book but I would probably have enjoyed it more with a more edited down middle section, but the author's authority on the topic seems undoubted and he paints vivid pictures of the main actors, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Bush Sr.

[Oleksandr Golovatyi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Лучшие цитаты:

"Недовольство партийной элиты начало назревать после аварии на Чернобыльской АЭС (апрель 1986 года). Электростанция подчинялась Москве, но ликвидация последствий аварии, как и эвакуация людей из зоны бедствия, легла на плечи украинских властей. Кроме того, Москва настаивала на проведении первомайской демонстрации – в то самое время, когда Киев накрыло радиоактивное облако."

"Но если Горбачев и Ельцин были руководителями, в чьем ведении находились крупные регионы, то Кравчук представлял собой типичного аппаратчика, бюрократа от партии."

"Помощник Горбачева Анатолий Черняев, сопровождавший генсека во время встречи с канцлером Германии Гельмутом Колем, проходившей в Киеве в начале июля, записал в дневнике: “Ощущение, будто в каком-то большом западноевропейском, скорее немецком, городе: XIX век, улицы, зелень, прибрано, чисто, ухожено… И, в общем, […] сытно… по сравнению с Москвой!”"

"Никсона 1972 года, когда за обедом, данным в его честь украинскими официальными лицами, Никсон назвал Киев “матерью городов русских”"

"Ельцин возглавлял сопротивление заговорщикам, якобы намеревающимся спасти Советский Союз. Россия восстала против собственной империи"

"К шести часам утра танки Таманской дивизии окружили Останкино; еще час спустя в город начали входить остальные подразделения Таманской и Кантемировской дивизий, хорошо знакомые москвичам по парадам на Красной площади. Всего в город были направлены около 4 тысяч человек личного состава, более 350 танков, около 300 бронетранспортеров и 420 грузовиков."

"Буш действительно хотел уберечь Союз от распада: его тревожила сохранность ядерного оружия. Еще до встречи с Кравчуком Чейни и эксперты Министерства обороны подготовили проект меморандума о ядерном разоружении. Текст получили союзники США в Западной Европе, а также Горбачев."

"Чечню возглавил сорокасемилетний генерал-майор авиации Джохар Дудаев. Месяцем ранее он ушел в отставку с должности командира дивизии стратегических бомбардировщиков, дислоцированной в Эстонии. Дудаев был свидетелем борьбы прибалтов за независимость и желал того же для Чечни. Народ Дудаева немногим уступал эстонцам в численности: согласно переписи, в Эстонии проживало около миллиона эстонцев, а в Чечне – около 750 тысяч чеченцев. В обеих республиках русские и представители других славянских народов составляли от четверти до трети населения. Однако между Эстонией и Чечней имелось существенное различие. Первая имела статус союзной республики, а ее право на независимость признавали и Буш, и Ельцин."

"После официальной беседы американец предложил министру разговор наедине. Морозов согласился, хотя и недоумевал: он не владеет английским, а Бжезинский – русским. Но Бжезинский, поляк по происхождению, перешел на родной язык – а Морозов отвечал по-украински. Они вполне понимали друг друга."

"Геннадий Бурбулис, правая рука Ельцина, именно Киеву приписывал последний гвоздь в гроб СССР. “Действительно, самым настойчивым, самым упорным в отрицании Союза был Кравчук, – рассказывал Бурбулис в интервью."

[Mihkel · Rating 5 out of 5]

Siinse looduskaitseala juhataja Sergei Baljuk, kes elas üsna Viskuli lähedal Belovežje ürmetsa servas asuvas Kamenjuki külas, saabus koju hilja õhtul ja äratas oma naise, teatades talle vapustava uudise: "Nõukogude Liit on lagunenud". Kuuldu ei jõudnud naisele kohe pärale. "Olin poolärkvel ega saanud aru, mis on juhtunud või mida peab nüüd tegema," on meenutanud Nadežda Baljuk. "Aga tema oli nii ärritatud ja närvis ja kordas kogu aeg: "Nõukogude Liitu ei ole enam, ei ole.""

Plohhi meistritöö on köitvalt kirjutet ja rikkaliku sisuga ajalooteos, mille tähelepanelikes pintsitõmmetes joonistuvad selgelt välja nii laiemaid motiivid kui erinevaid pisidetailid (Ukraina parteiaparatšikute eemaldamine liidu tippvõimu juurest Perestroika raames kui yks Ukraina separatismi põhjuseid). Nende kaudu saab lugeja hõlpsalt haarata tervikprotsessist hargnevate arvukate niidiotsade olemust nii iseseisvalt kui laiemasse konteksti asetatuna, st mis täpsemalt viis mingi sündmuseni ja millist mõju omas see tulevikus. Rohkesti on kasutatud tykke võtmetegelaste omavahelistest vestlustest, telefonikõnedest, päevikutest jne, mis lisavad tekstile yksjagu elulisust.

Samuti leiab tykati ajalooliselt mõnevõrra vähetähtsaid, kuid pigem inimlikul tasemel huvitavaid stseene (nt Augustiputši toetanud marssal Ahromejevi enesetapukiri Gorbatšovile, millele lisas viiekümnerublase, et tasuda ta võlg Kremli selvekohvikule).

[Kolya Terletskyi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Досі не можу усвідомити як відносно легко розпався Союз, скільки жертв принесли його створення та становлення, і потім він спокійно (знову ж таки відносно) за 70 років припиняє своє існування.

Автор легко та докладно виклав матеріал, даючи можливість самому визначати що найбільше спричинило до розвалу: реформи Горбачова, незалежність прибалтійських країн, економічна криза, референдум в Україні, вплив США. Скорше за все це були окремі цвяхи в одну домовину СРСР.

В ті часи надіялись на демократію в Росії, після краху Союзу та партії, після звільнення від тоталітарного режиму, проте зараз ми з вами бачимо, що все повернулося. І Путін, який називає ці події найбільшим геополітичним провалом, хоче повернути російський вплив назад.

В любому випадку, денонсація створення СРСР мала величезний вплив на світ, від комуністичного Китаю та демократичних Штатів та Західної Європи, але найбільше на пострадянські республіки, які нарешті стали незалежними і могли обирати і турувати свій подальший шлях, поряд з росіянами чи повз них.
Україна продовжує свою боротьбу за незалежність, Білорусь обрала варіант підпорядкування, Азейбарджан дружить із Туреччиною, вірмени після поразки в Карабаху нарешті побачили зміст усієї російської підтримки.

Окремо відзначу стиль викладеного матеріалу, дуже легко, доступно і захопливо читається, бо чомусь мав враження, що книга буде сухо інформативною.

[Luke Drysdale · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really interesting day by day account of the final months of the USSR. Goes against the general western understanding of why the Soviet Union ended and also shows how key a role Ukraine and other Republics played.

Also goes a long way in describing American actions in the 2000s and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

5/5

[Jillian Powell · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great deep dive into the political climate of Russia in the early 1990s. Highly recomend this if you are interested in the subject.

[Anthony Nelson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Incredibly relevant given current events. A fascinating explanation of how the collapse of the Soviet Union was not inevitable.

[Oliver · Rating 5 out of 5]

My first time reading a narrative history set in the twentieth century! This is written so clearly and engagingly. The final days of the Soviet Union are absolutely fascinating. This book is really useful for understanding the Russian invasion of Ukraine.