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Osprey Duel #15
Russian Battleship vs Japanese Battleship: Yellow Sea 1904–05
The first major clash between a European and Asian state in the modern era signalled the beginning of Japan's rise as a major power on the world stage. Watched by the rest of the world's superpowers, this incredibly violent war was disastrous for the Russians who, despite their superior numbers, were defeated by the Japanese underdogs in a spectacular fashion.
Here, military expert Dr. Robert Forczyk covers the key technical elements of firepower, protection, maneuverability and communications for each side in detail. Accompanied by first-hand accounts and specially commissioned artwork, this compact volume explains and illustrates this historically significant duel...
Here, military expert Dr. Robert Forczyk covers the key technical elements of firepower, protection, maneuverability and communications for each side in detail. Accompanied by first-hand accounts and specially commissioned artwork, this compact volume explains and illustrates this historically significant duel...
80 pages, Paperback
First published February 10, 2009
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About the author
Robert Forczyk
59 books74 followersRobert Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
July 21, 2022
This is an excellent, easy-to-read, and well-illustrated book about the sea battle that led to the Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. Although I had heard about the sea battle, or battles, I had no idea the outcome was so utterly disastrous for the Russian Empire. This book explains in detail why the Russian fleet was entirely either destroyed or captured (with one ship managing to escape to Chinese port, where it was interned). Russian naval power in the Pacific was destroyed and Japan emerged as the rising power in the Far East, after the decisive war, which meant it could go ahead and expand in Korea, Manchuria, and later, China.
The reasons for the defeat in the climactic battle of Tsushima strait were poor leadership, especially that of Zinovy Rozhestvensky, the Tsar´s pet gunnery expert whom he had foolishly rapidly promoted to Vice Admiral, unprepared and unfit to lead the effort vs. Japan in the sea battle and the fact that some Russian sailors were conscripts who had been rushed into shipboard duty after only brief training and they more or less panicked, stopped functioning as a team once their ship was hit. Moreover, the social situation in Russia was mirrored on the Russian ships, with the caste system in effect - rather that team cohesiveness - so that morale was low. In addition, sailors were poorly paid and fed, and sometimes subject to cruelty by martinet-type commanders. Russian Orthodox priests on each Russian ship were supposed to boost morale by leading daily prayers but this may have simply played into the Russian inclination toward fatalism. Japanese leadership instead built morale by promoting patriotism, love of country and the Emperor. The Japanese learned a great deal by sending naval attaches to European capitals, buying ships, armor, up-to-date technical systems made in England and other Western ship-building countries (the Russians also bought battleships made in the USA, England, etc.)
The Japanese realized, after the battle of Port Arthur in 1904, that their shells could not penetrate the well-armored Russian battleships´ hulls, and so instead in 1905 sent a hail of regular shells, as well as smaller-caliber rounds, onto the decks and aimed for the bridge, creating confusion and essentially disabling a ship even if it was still operational. The Russian sailors weren't always well-trained, so they were less apt to work as team under attack and instead might panic or give up in emergency situations, such as fires, etc. The Japanese had assimilated the lessons learned from the earlier battle of Port Arthur, knew that their shells usually could not penetrate the Russian armored hulls. They were canny and bold in modifying their strategy accordingly so that they approached the Russian fleet within striking distance of the slower-firing Russian guns in order to land any and all caliber shells on the decks, aiming for the gun turrets, canvas, bridge, or anything that might ignite on the ships´ cluttered decks. The Russian guns could be fired less frequently than Japanese guns so the Japanese took advantage of this difference, yet also were restrained so as not to expend their entire supply of ammunition all at once, which the Russians tended to do (although since the battle was lost early on it would have hardly made a difference). The Japanese were also vicious in hunting down disabled ships and sinking them. Most of the Russian fleet was sunk by the Japanese - some ships were deliberately scuttled by Russian commanders rather than allow their ships to fall into the hands of the enemy. A number of Russian ships went down with all hands. The total number of Russian dead were 2,600, and the entire fleet, as stated above, was lost.
This battle in Russia naturally led to disgust and fury against the Tsar, and the revolution which had been brewing since 1904 intensified after the defeat of 1905. In response, the Tsar allowed the formation of a Duma, or Parliament, but this didn´t really change anything since the Duma was ineffectual and the system of a ruling class of hereditary nobles, oligarchs etc., remained in place. Russia did not become a constitutional monarchy because the Tsar and the nobles still retained power, and refused to accept any of the recommended reforms - for them the constitution was merely a piece of paper to be ignored at will. The dissatisfaction of the naval forces, in the aftermath of the disaster of the Russo-Japanese War which can be mostly blamed on the social system under the monarchy, was decisive in the later Russian Revolution, and it is easy to see why the sailors would have wanted to overthrow the naval/aristocratic leadership in favor of a more democratic, less-hierarchical system - and perhaps prove they were not passive, mute sufferers under the unjust system, but had some agency of their own, that they too were men and not mice.
Unfortunately, there was no strong leader advocating for a democratic solution to Russia´s problems rather than a popular socialist or communist revolution which is what Lenin proposed and which, perhaps predictably, mesmerized the public, given how generally downtrodden the public was. At the time of Russian communist Revolution, around 80% of the Russian public was illiterate and so it is hard to know what the people understood about what they were supporting (communism). Certainly, the peasants who wanted land reform in the countryside, were often unpleasantly surprised when the farms they had seized from the estates of the nobles even before the revolution were seized by communist commissars after the revolution and made part of collective farms owned by the state. Perhaps it was enough for the pro-communist Russians that the system - hidebound, with hierarchical and hereditary castes, lack of social mobility, no social safety net, and extreme income inequality - would be overturned and the people would finally get some property (or so they thought) or at least some dignity and self-respect. Maybe that´s what they understood a communist revolution to represent, the downfall of the rich and the redistribution of their property among the poor masses - rather than the state owning everything, more or less a new state ¨monarchy¨ with the all-powerful state headed up by an strongman or dictator replacing the all-powerful monarch. There was probably no compelling voice, at least no voice that could rival that of the socialists, calling for the reform yet basic retention of the economic system because unless there was serious reform/redistribution, the system, if retained, would have simply prolonged the existence of the vast gulf in wealth between the many poor and the few rich (had the wealthy been allowed to keep their property and power). Sadly, the tendency for wealth and power to concentrate in the hands of the few, who then go on to take advantage of their favored situation, and further increase income inequality, leading to the worsening economic plight of the many, seems to be built in to capitalist democracies- which undergo regular economic ¨revolutions¨ of a sort when busts or depressions occur - wiping out the wealth of many of the rich, but unfortunately also taking down the fortunes of entire classes of society with them through mass unemployment, inflation, etc.
This is an interesting book - contains excellent illustrations, charts, and so forth - that will give the reader a great deal of information into this key pre-WWI sea battle, which was also a cause of the Russian Revolution, around 14 years later: Although the Tsar was no longer in power, the Provisional Government, which was composed of members of the ruling and political class, could not win a war - against the Germans this time - and the people realized that to stop their endless slaughter, they needed to remove the Provisional Government from power and end the war by signing a peace treaty with Germany, which is what Lenin had promised the cheering crowds he´d do and which he did do once the Bolshevik military forces overthrew the Provisional Government and seized control of the government. The ruling class had been seen as ineffectual and sclerotic, and although Lenin signed a peace treaty with Germany ceding thousands of square miles of Russian Empire territory to Germany, it was still seen by most as a plus since it ended the war, turned over a new leaf of Russian history, and hopefully leading to a better future under a new system. Sadly, many disagreed with this viewpoint and the country was wracked by civil war for five years with millions of Russians lost fighting each other. However, the long reign of the hereditary system of nobility and monarchy was finally gone forever - for better or worse, a new system was in effect, and the next chapter of Russian history was about to begin. Anyone interested in finding out more about one of the causes of the Russian Revolution - why Russia lost the Russo-Japanese War, basically the same basic reason it also lost the war against Germany in WWI, which led directly to the Russian Revolution - will find much of interest in this book.
Here are the paraphrased quotes:
¨[Only by 1893 did]...Japan [still a poor country, have the funds] ...to [purchase] ...its first modern battleships, the ¨Fuji¨ and the ¨Yashima,¨ from Britain.¨ [Sadly, Japan, similar to Western Imperialist powers at that time, thought that then backward countries like Korea, Manchuria, and China, did not deserve to be independent countries since they had not modernized, and thought Japan therefore had a right to invade and turn these countries into colonies.] [Naval warfare did not progress much for centuries until it]...underwent a radical transformation in the mid-19th century...[when] In 1860, France commissioned the ¨Gloire,¨ the first steam-powered ironclad warship, followed [in 1861] ...by Britain's ¨Warrior.¨ ¨By 1873, Britain had built HMS ¨Devastation,¨ the first sea-going turret ship...¨
¨[Several decades of development followed] ... before modern big-gun, ocean-going battleships became a practical reality in 1889-92.¨ ¨Naval artillery was revolutionized in 1885, when Britain [developed] ... the breech-loading 12-in/25-cal gun with improved muzzle velocity, and France introduced ¨Holtzer¨ steel projectiles that could [pierce] ... compound steel armor.¨ ¨[Battleship armament was complicated] ...by the emergence of the torpedo threat. In 1870, ...British engineer Robert Whitehead perfected a compressed-air powered torpedo...¨ ¨Russia [began] .... developing a major warship construction center at St. Petersburg in 1704....by the 1880s, it [could build] ...its own battleships.¨ ¨Russia [built] ...its own ironclads in the 1860s and by 1876 it [had built] ...its first battleship, the ¨Petr Veliki.¨ ¨... Russian-built turrets and engine-room equipment [weighed more] ....than the French built versions...[so] ...the Borodino-class [battleships designed by Dmitri V. Skvortsov of St. Petersburg´s New Admiralty yard] ...increase in their displacement had a major impact on their combat-effectiveness.¨ ¨The [Imperial Japanese Navy] IJN ordered its first [iron-clad]... warship from Britain in 1875.¨ ¨...Japan could not begin constructing battleships in its own yards until May 1905...¨ ¨The ...mobility of IJN battleships was... inhibited by a ...shortage of high-grade coal. Japanese domestic coal was poor quality and the IJN [had to import] ...coal from Britain.¨ ¨Until [the close of the 19th century] ... battleships had [used] ...signal flags for inter-ship communications and [under] ...good visibility conditions, signal flags could be read out to 7 km. [After nightfall] ...flashing lights could ...be used to send messages, but these were slow. Wireless radio communications became feasible in 1895 and four years later the Russian battleship ¨Tri Sviatitelia¨ ...became the fist warship in the world equipped with radio, although the Popov set initially only [would work at] ... a range of 5-10 km.¨ ¨Early radio sets were extremely heavy - up to 6 tons - and even by 1905 ...only capable of intermittent contact out to a maximum of 60 km.¨ ¨...unlike the Japanese the Russians made little effort to build team spirit. ...battleship crews were split into a rigid hierarchy between ranks that reflected the class-consciousness of Tsarist Russia.¨ ¨...rations for the enlisted were inadequate, and poor-quality food was the immediate cause of the mutiny on the battleship ¨Potemkin¨ in the Black Sea in May 1905.¨ ¨This ...dysfunctional relationship [between officers and crew] ---although not universal - was common enough to destroy any respect Russian sailors had for their officers, and it would contribute... to defeat, then revolution.¨ ¨...[IJN] sailors were discouraged from reading newspapers that might contain socialist or radical viewpoints; the IJN wanted to [make sure] ...their sailors were not distracted from their duty by a swirl of competing ideas.¨ ¨Rozhestvensky´s...Squadron was not able to depart Libau in Latvia until October 15, 1904, [because of]...the difficulty in arranging for at-sea coaling. After a seven-month accident-filled voyage Rozhestvensky´s fleet finally reached Cam Ranh Bay on May 9...¨ ¨Tsushima ... less a battle than an execution of an untrained mob.¨ ¨...the Russian Navy [had focused on building] ...a fleet of very powerful battleships for sea control, but neglected to develop lighter units to supplement the battle fleet.¨
The reasons for the defeat in the climactic battle of Tsushima strait were poor leadership, especially that of Zinovy Rozhestvensky, the Tsar´s pet gunnery expert whom he had foolishly rapidly promoted to Vice Admiral, unprepared and unfit to lead the effort vs. Japan in the sea battle and the fact that some Russian sailors were conscripts who had been rushed into shipboard duty after only brief training and they more or less panicked, stopped functioning as a team once their ship was hit. Moreover, the social situation in Russia was mirrored on the Russian ships, with the caste system in effect - rather that team cohesiveness - so that morale was low. In addition, sailors were poorly paid and fed, and sometimes subject to cruelty by martinet-type commanders. Russian Orthodox priests on each Russian ship were supposed to boost morale by leading daily prayers but this may have simply played into the Russian inclination toward fatalism. Japanese leadership instead built morale by promoting patriotism, love of country and the Emperor. The Japanese learned a great deal by sending naval attaches to European capitals, buying ships, armor, up-to-date technical systems made in England and other Western ship-building countries (the Russians also bought battleships made in the USA, England, etc.)
The Japanese realized, after the battle of Port Arthur in 1904, that their shells could not penetrate the well-armored Russian battleships´ hulls, and so instead in 1905 sent a hail of regular shells, as well as smaller-caliber rounds, onto the decks and aimed for the bridge, creating confusion and essentially disabling a ship even if it was still operational. The Russian sailors weren't always well-trained, so they were less apt to work as team under attack and instead might panic or give up in emergency situations, such as fires, etc. The Japanese had assimilated the lessons learned from the earlier battle of Port Arthur, knew that their shells usually could not penetrate the Russian armored hulls. They were canny and bold in modifying their strategy accordingly so that they approached the Russian fleet within striking distance of the slower-firing Russian guns in order to land any and all caliber shells on the decks, aiming for the gun turrets, canvas, bridge, or anything that might ignite on the ships´ cluttered decks. The Russian guns could be fired less frequently than Japanese guns so the Japanese took advantage of this difference, yet also were restrained so as not to expend their entire supply of ammunition all at once, which the Russians tended to do (although since the battle was lost early on it would have hardly made a difference). The Japanese were also vicious in hunting down disabled ships and sinking them. Most of the Russian fleet was sunk by the Japanese - some ships were deliberately scuttled by Russian commanders rather than allow their ships to fall into the hands of the enemy. A number of Russian ships went down with all hands. The total number of Russian dead were 2,600, and the entire fleet, as stated above, was lost.
This battle in Russia naturally led to disgust and fury against the Tsar, and the revolution which had been brewing since 1904 intensified after the defeat of 1905. In response, the Tsar allowed the formation of a Duma, or Parliament, but this didn´t really change anything since the Duma was ineffectual and the system of a ruling class of hereditary nobles, oligarchs etc., remained in place. Russia did not become a constitutional monarchy because the Tsar and the nobles still retained power, and refused to accept any of the recommended reforms - for them the constitution was merely a piece of paper to be ignored at will. The dissatisfaction of the naval forces, in the aftermath of the disaster of the Russo-Japanese War which can be mostly blamed on the social system under the monarchy, was decisive in the later Russian Revolution, and it is easy to see why the sailors would have wanted to overthrow the naval/aristocratic leadership in favor of a more democratic, less-hierarchical system - and perhaps prove they were not passive, mute sufferers under the unjust system, but had some agency of their own, that they too were men and not mice.
Unfortunately, there was no strong leader advocating for a democratic solution to Russia´s problems rather than a popular socialist or communist revolution which is what Lenin proposed and which, perhaps predictably, mesmerized the public, given how generally downtrodden the public was. At the time of Russian communist Revolution, around 80% of the Russian public was illiterate and so it is hard to know what the people understood about what they were supporting (communism). Certainly, the peasants who wanted land reform in the countryside, were often unpleasantly surprised when the farms they had seized from the estates of the nobles even before the revolution were seized by communist commissars after the revolution and made part of collective farms owned by the state. Perhaps it was enough for the pro-communist Russians that the system - hidebound, with hierarchical and hereditary castes, lack of social mobility, no social safety net, and extreme income inequality - would be overturned and the people would finally get some property (or so they thought) or at least some dignity and self-respect. Maybe that´s what they understood a communist revolution to represent, the downfall of the rich and the redistribution of their property among the poor masses - rather than the state owning everything, more or less a new state ¨monarchy¨ with the all-powerful state headed up by an strongman or dictator replacing the all-powerful monarch. There was probably no compelling voice, at least no voice that could rival that of the socialists, calling for the reform yet basic retention of the economic system because unless there was serious reform/redistribution, the system, if retained, would have simply prolonged the existence of the vast gulf in wealth between the many poor and the few rich (had the wealthy been allowed to keep their property and power). Sadly, the tendency for wealth and power to concentrate in the hands of the few, who then go on to take advantage of their favored situation, and further increase income inequality, leading to the worsening economic plight of the many, seems to be built in to capitalist democracies- which undergo regular economic ¨revolutions¨ of a sort when busts or depressions occur - wiping out the wealth of many of the rich, but unfortunately also taking down the fortunes of entire classes of society with them through mass unemployment, inflation, etc.
This is an interesting book - contains excellent illustrations, charts, and so forth - that will give the reader a great deal of information into this key pre-WWI sea battle, which was also a cause of the Russian Revolution, around 14 years later: Although the Tsar was no longer in power, the Provisional Government, which was composed of members of the ruling and political class, could not win a war - against the Germans this time - and the people realized that to stop their endless slaughter, they needed to remove the Provisional Government from power and end the war by signing a peace treaty with Germany, which is what Lenin had promised the cheering crowds he´d do and which he did do once the Bolshevik military forces overthrew the Provisional Government and seized control of the government. The ruling class had been seen as ineffectual and sclerotic, and although Lenin signed a peace treaty with Germany ceding thousands of square miles of Russian Empire territory to Germany, it was still seen by most as a plus since it ended the war, turned over a new leaf of Russian history, and hopefully leading to a better future under a new system. Sadly, many disagreed with this viewpoint and the country was wracked by civil war for five years with millions of Russians lost fighting each other. However, the long reign of the hereditary system of nobility and monarchy was finally gone forever - for better or worse, a new system was in effect, and the next chapter of Russian history was about to begin. Anyone interested in finding out more about one of the causes of the Russian Revolution - why Russia lost the Russo-Japanese War, basically the same basic reason it also lost the war against Germany in WWI, which led directly to the Russian Revolution - will find much of interest in this book.
Here are the paraphrased quotes:
¨[Only by 1893 did]...Japan [still a poor country, have the funds] ...to [purchase] ...its first modern battleships, the ¨Fuji¨ and the ¨Yashima,¨ from Britain.¨ [Sadly, Japan, similar to Western Imperialist powers at that time, thought that then backward countries like Korea, Manchuria, and China, did not deserve to be independent countries since they had not modernized, and thought Japan therefore had a right to invade and turn these countries into colonies.] [Naval warfare did not progress much for centuries until it]...underwent a radical transformation in the mid-19th century...[when] In 1860, France commissioned the ¨Gloire,¨ the first steam-powered ironclad warship, followed [in 1861] ...by Britain's ¨Warrior.¨ ¨By 1873, Britain had built HMS ¨Devastation,¨ the first sea-going turret ship...¨
¨[Several decades of development followed] ... before modern big-gun, ocean-going battleships became a practical reality in 1889-92.¨ ¨Naval artillery was revolutionized in 1885, when Britain [developed] ... the breech-loading 12-in/25-cal gun with improved muzzle velocity, and France introduced ¨Holtzer¨ steel projectiles that could [pierce] ... compound steel armor.¨ ¨[Battleship armament was complicated] ...by the emergence of the torpedo threat. In 1870, ...British engineer Robert Whitehead perfected a compressed-air powered torpedo...¨ ¨Russia [began] .... developing a major warship construction center at St. Petersburg in 1704....by the 1880s, it [could build] ...its own battleships.¨ ¨Russia [built] ...its own ironclads in the 1860s and by 1876 it [had built] ...its first battleship, the ¨Petr Veliki.¨ ¨... Russian-built turrets and engine-room equipment [weighed more] ....than the French built versions...[so] ...the Borodino-class [battleships designed by Dmitri V. Skvortsov of St. Petersburg´s New Admiralty yard] ...increase in their displacement had a major impact on their combat-effectiveness.¨ ¨The [Imperial Japanese Navy] IJN ordered its first [iron-clad]... warship from Britain in 1875.¨ ¨...Japan could not begin constructing battleships in its own yards until May 1905...¨ ¨The ...mobility of IJN battleships was... inhibited by a ...shortage of high-grade coal. Japanese domestic coal was poor quality and the IJN [had to import] ...coal from Britain.¨ ¨Until [the close of the 19th century] ... battleships had [used] ...signal flags for inter-ship communications and [under] ...good visibility conditions, signal flags could be read out to 7 km. [After nightfall] ...flashing lights could ...be used to send messages, but these were slow. Wireless radio communications became feasible in 1895 and four years later the Russian battleship ¨Tri Sviatitelia¨ ...became the fist warship in the world equipped with radio, although the Popov set initially only [would work at] ... a range of 5-10 km.¨ ¨Early radio sets were extremely heavy - up to 6 tons - and even by 1905 ...only capable of intermittent contact out to a maximum of 60 km.¨ ¨...unlike the Japanese the Russians made little effort to build team spirit. ...battleship crews were split into a rigid hierarchy between ranks that reflected the class-consciousness of Tsarist Russia.¨ ¨...rations for the enlisted were inadequate, and poor-quality food was the immediate cause of the mutiny on the battleship ¨Potemkin¨ in the Black Sea in May 1905.¨ ¨This ...dysfunctional relationship [between officers and crew] ---although not universal - was common enough to destroy any respect Russian sailors had for their officers, and it would contribute... to defeat, then revolution.¨ ¨...[IJN] sailors were discouraged from reading newspapers that might contain socialist or radical viewpoints; the IJN wanted to [make sure] ...their sailors were not distracted from their duty by a swirl of competing ideas.¨ ¨Rozhestvensky´s...Squadron was not able to depart Libau in Latvia until October 15, 1904, [because of]...the difficulty in arranging for at-sea coaling. After a seven-month accident-filled voyage Rozhestvensky´s fleet finally reached Cam Ranh Bay on May 9...¨ ¨Tsushima ... less a battle than an execution of an untrained mob.¨ ¨...the Russian Navy [had focused on building] ...a fleet of very powerful battleships for sea control, but neglected to develop lighter units to supplement the battle fleet.¨
January 17, 2018
This volume is dedicated to a comparison between the battleships used by Russia and Japan in their conflict of 1905. Normally, this task is done in a form of a template where opposing weapon systems are compared in different departments – design, technology, intended purpose and practical use. In this case, such approach is not possible because both sides used a variety of designs and technical characteristics varied from ship to ship, even in same fleet. The analysis is therefore a bit more generic and limited only to the first third of the volume. The rest of this booklet focuses on the naval actions during Russo-Japanese War, with focus on the two battles that defined this conflict – indecisive engagement in Battle of Yellow Sea and subsequent annihilation of Russia’s Baltic Fleet at Tsushima.
As so often before, this volume makes me wonder about selection of topics for booklets in Osprey’s Duel series. To be honest, a technical comparison between Japanese and Russian vessels doesn't make much sense, for a single reason. While the author identifies some generic differences between Russia and Japan regarding ship design, choice of armament and technological aspects of munitions, he fails to show that any of these technological differences did play major role in this particular conflict. True, the sets of advantages and flaws of the ships under Russian and Japanes command did to a certain degree dictate what alternatives were available to the commanders of opposing fleets. But regardless, the final outcome of that war was dictated not by technological advantages, but by human factor!
Of course one could argue that the real value of this volume consists of the fact that it shows this very thing – that quite often the technological differences between equipment of combatants actually plays only minor role in armed conflict. The funny thing is that at least for me, this is the inevitable conclusion that can be drawn from most of Duel booklets. I find it somewhat ironic, considering the purpose of the series.
For me personally, the real value of this booklet can be found outside its intended scope. Russo-Japanese War of 1905 is one of ‘white spots’ in my knowledge about military history. Before picking up this volume, all I knew about it was that it was about Port Arthur and that battle of Tsushima took place during its course. As it turns out, this booklet is a pretty decent introduction to the naval history of that conflict. So if you’re after a primer about War of 1905, this publication may be of interest!
As so often before, this volume makes me wonder about selection of topics for booklets in Osprey’s Duel series. To be honest, a technical comparison between Japanese and Russian vessels doesn't make much sense, for a single reason. While the author identifies some generic differences between Russia and Japan regarding ship design, choice of armament and technological aspects of munitions, he fails to show that any of these technological differences did play major role in this particular conflict. True, the sets of advantages and flaws of the ships under Russian and Japanes command did to a certain degree dictate what alternatives were available to the commanders of opposing fleets. But regardless, the final outcome of that war was dictated not by technological advantages, but by human factor!
Of course one could argue that the real value of this volume consists of the fact that it shows this very thing – that quite often the technological differences between equipment of combatants actually plays only minor role in armed conflict. The funny thing is that at least for me, this is the inevitable conclusion that can be drawn from most of Duel booklets. I find it somewhat ironic, considering the purpose of the series.
For me personally, the real value of this booklet can be found outside its intended scope. Russo-Japanese War of 1905 is one of ‘white spots’ in my knowledge about military history. Before picking up this volume, all I knew about it was that it was about Port Arthur and that battle of Tsushima took place during its course. As it turns out, this booklet is a pretty decent introduction to the naval history of that conflict. So if you’re after a primer about War of 1905, this publication may be of interest!
August 9, 2023
A short and well written account of the naval duel between Russia and Japan in 1904-05. I had read about the battle of Tsushima before, but never read anything about the earlier clashes. The first half of the book (the fighting between the Japanese navy and the Russian Pacific squadron that happened before Tsushima) was very interesting to me because it brought into focus the fact that on paper the Russians were the stronger power and the early clashes were not entirely one-sided. The disaster at Tsushima was not inevitable. A better led and better trained Russian relief force could have beaten the Japanese. But as it happens, they were neither well led, nor well trained. Still, they fought with suicidal bravery in many cases but ended up losing very decisively in one of the great naval battles of history. Comparison with Trafalgar is common, but in many ways this was a more decisive victory than Trafalgar. The Imperial Japanese Navy modeled itself on the Royal Navy (including a tradition of relentless aggression, even when outnumbered or outgunned) and they outdid their mentors.
Worth a read.
Worth a read.
July 8, 2014
A well-written and lavishly-illustrated account of the naval aspects of the Russo-Japanese War. Forczyk provides fine insight into the technological developments that led to the rise of the pre-dreadnaught battleship as the ultimate (though very temporary) arbiter of naval power. While he give less attention to the roles of politics, leadership, and training than technology, they all get their due in this well-balanced brief account.
March 31, 2009
Very decent analysis of a microcosm of the Battle of Tsushima. Good technical information, decent drawings, excellent analysis. I enjoyed it.
October 6, 2014
Well written and lavishly illustrated. Technical details are kept readable without being overwhelming. Worth going into an historian's library while enjoyable for the casual reader.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews