In the wake of the 2019 general election result, Stuart Hall's scholarship became a source of solace for many on the left. Acclaimed for its ideological analysis of the Thatcherist phenomenon, from its emergence out of the so-called "crisis of Keynesianism" to the astonishing third consecutive majority won in 1987, Hall masterfully draws on Gramscian theory to produce an intriguing compilation of articles on the appeal of Thatcher to British voters. While I will elucidate on this below, in the interest of brevity Hall's general thesis is as follows: Thatcher's success lay significantly (though not wholly) in her rhetorical manipulation of ordinary societal concerns in order to present a radical-right political agenda as their common-sense solution.
The essays in the first section provide the historical and political context; they document the Wilson and Callaghan governments' switch to monetarism in response to the stagflation brought about predominately by the Oil Shocks (what Hall calls 'a crisis of a for British capitalism' (p.30)), and of the creeping discursive turn that came to characterise Thatcherism. For Hall, 'Thatcher's 'populism' signals its unexpected ability to harness to its project certain popular discontents, to cut across and between the different divisions in society and to connect with certain aspects of popular experience...We underestimate the degree to which Thatcherism has succeeded in representing itself as 'on the side of the little people' (p.6). It is often recounted that Callaghan would have won the election had it been called earlier, and Hall comprehensively sketches out how - indeed - Labour's management of the crisis enabled the late-70s Conservatives to exploit its internal contradictions. He argues the crisis actually began earlier in the 60s, 'not simply in terms of the massive struggle to incorporate the working classes into the capitalist state, as junior partners in the management of the crisis, but also in terms of the consequent divisions within the class, the growth of sectional class consciousness, of economism, syndicalism and reformist opportunism' (p.31). While Labour presented itself as the natural party of the working classes, the imminent crisis and social dislocations it produced within the working classes themselves exposed a contradiction at the heart of Labourism. Callaghan's bungling handling of the trade union disputes enabled Thatcherism to present itself as a necessary disciplinary force against the unions "holding the country to ransom", as the cliche goes.
There is a great irony that, despite winning on the back of slogans criticising Labour's handling of the economy and its presiding over record-high unemployment levels, Thatcher not only continued the monetarist policy begun under Wilson and Callaghan but also tripled unemployment in her first term. Hall points this out when he notes the 'yawning discrepancy between Thatcher's ideological advances and its economic failures' (p.155). But this is precisely his point - these facts are immaterial to Thatcherisms appeal: 'Neither Keynesianism nor monetarism...win votes as such in the electoral marketplace. But, in the discourse of 'social market values', Thatcherism discovered a powerful means of translating economic doctrine into the language of experience, moral imperative and common sense' (p.47).
The second section develops Hall's larger theoretical framework. Drawing primarily on Gramsci's conception of hegemony, he charts the shift from consent to coercion under Thatcher (p.36). Hall labels the rightward turn "authoritarian populism", but argues Thatcherism was not so much "hegemonic" in the sense it unified 'a major social bloc and '[won] the consent' of the great majority of the subordinate classes of society...to a major task of social reconstruction' (p.91), rather it contained within it a 'hegemonic project...designed to renovate society as a whole. And, in doing so, it understood that it must organize on a variety of social and cultural sites at once, both in society and in the state, on moral and cultural, as well as economic and political terrain, using them all to initiate the deep reformation of society' (p.91). This "authoritarian populism" is not to be confused with mere popular consent, the consent generated by AP is very much of the petty-bourgeois kind in which the 'people' are constructed and secured 'through an effective interpellation, to the practices of the dominant classes' (p.140).
For all its strengths, the essays do presuppose knowledge of 20th century British social history and any reader would greatly benefit from a substantial grasp of Marxist (particularly Gramscian) theory. He makes frequent mention of how even the Keynesian consensus preceding Thatcher inevitably fell apart because of the inherent contradictions of capitalism, yet he fails to clarify what any of these are. In these ways, it falls down greatly. But these things do not render the book inaccessible by any means. And it is easy to note the parallels between Hall's society and our political climate today: a social and economic crisis provides the wider context, there is an electoral swing to the right, a Conservative party actively courts far-right figures after a flirtation with moderation, the same Conservative party appropriates the far-right's rhetoric (eg. with consistent appeals above party heads and to "the people" (p.39)), the government look keen on curtailing civil liberties in the name of security, a resurgent left faces the paradox of a burgeoning Labour party membership while failing to sell itself in the wider public, the acquiescent media is awash with moral panics (mostly concerning migrants or refugees). The list goes on.
Perhaps the most enlightening essay for the strategy-searching left is 'Blue Election, Election Blues', in the book's third section, in which Hall contrasts Labour's campaign momentum with the result that delivered Thatcher's third term in office. In keeping with the analysis, he observes how elections do not so much measure politics as they 'create' it. He argues Labour has much to learn from Thatcherist strategy, though - lest he is misunderstood - not from Thatcheris's new 'consensus'. That is, Labour's future successes rely on their ability to articulate a vision for prosperity that links their proposed policies to a grander narrative about societal progress. And perhaps, we can observe, Blair's success lies somewhat in his understanding this.
It is tempting to overstretch the comparisons, though. There are also many differences. It is difficult, for instance, to determine whether we are currently seeing a resurgence of what Hall terms "neoliberalism" (begun under Thatcher, continued under Blair, and in some form under Brown, Cameron, and May) or whether - indeed - the election of the Johnson government signals the beginning of a "new" ideological period as Thatcher's did in 1979. Further, while evidence from the past decade suggest the Conservatives are a continued threat to civil liberties (especially for minorities), this is done less so in the name of security (as it was under Blair) but - contradictorily - in the name of liberty itself in the form of persistent allusions to a "threat to free speech".
But much of 'Hard Road' generally makes for depressing reading for those on the left. It brings comfort to recognise its apt diagnosis of the left's image problem post-1979, and certainly helps explain the appeal of both Thatcherism and Blairism (Hall, writing in 1988, makes the ironic suggestion that Labour would be unlikely to find success in a general switch rightward on p.12). But in its implications that in order for Labour to win again it must undertake a rhetorical transformation, one cannot help but feel pessimistic this problem will be adequately addressed. And if it is addressed, it might - as under Blair - come at the expense of principle.