"For nearly a quarter of a century, Pulitzer Prize nominee William C. Davis has been one of our best writers on the Civil War... The Cause Lost extends that tradition of excellence with provocative new insights" University of Kansas
We have come a long way in interpreting the Confederacy, yet traditional history does little to dispel the myths and long-held beliefs surrounding the Civil War and the leaders of the Confederate States. And whilst widely-believed events pertaining to the victories and defeats of the South can be found widely throughout biographies, literature, TV and film, they are often far from accurate, or omit the truth altogether.
One such gap between fact and fiction can be exemplified in the perception of the Confederacy’s president, Jefferson Davis. Many of his personal correspondences offer us an insight into the fundamental issues he suffered whilst forging relationships with his generals, for which the South’s move for independence undoubtedly suffered.
Similarly, a cold, hard look at Stonewall Jackson soon exposes him as far less than the demigod that others would have us believe. Also misunderstood was the extent of the war west of the Appalachians. Largely ignored by historians until recently, the lack of appreciation for its scale does not make the level of its destruction any less real.
Double Pulitzer Prize-nominee William C. Davis’ collection of essays, written over twenty years, unveils the truth from underneath the façade of the history books and explores the impact of dispelling those myths on our understanding of the entire Confederate story.
Praise for William C. Davis
“A wonderful book, written by a man with full command of, and great love for, his subject. Davis grasps the war in its totality, decently and respectfully. He does not so much demolish myths as clarify and nuance them.” —Washington Times
“Celebrated author William C. Davis here offers us stimulating essays full of provocative opinions. Will provoke plenty of healthy debate.” —Blue & Gray Magazine
“A fine analysis of the way in which myth-making can distort history.” — Kirkus Reviews
William C. Davis is an American historian and former Professor of History who specialises in the Civil War and Southern States. Twice nominated for the Pulitzer Prize, he serves on the boards of Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission, the Civil War Preservation Trust, and the Museum of the Civil War Soldier in Petersburg, Virginia. A prolific writer, he has written or edited more than forty works on the subject and is four-time winner of the Jefferson Davis Award.
Currently professor of history at Virginia Tech, William C. Davis has written over fifty books, most about the American Civil War. He has won the Jefferson Davis Prize for southern history three times, the Jules F. Landry Award for Southern history once, and has been twice nominated for the Pulitzer Prize.
For several years, he was the editor of the magazine Civil War Times Illustrated. He has also served as a consultant on the A&E television series Civil War Journal.
Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
Having been educated in the North and having read many books about the Civil War from such a perspective, I'm attracted to titles which emphasize Southern perspectives. Thus, when I saw this at a San Francisco resale shop I snapped it up.
This book is actually a series of essays on a wide variety of topics generally focused on issues and personalities pertaining to The Confederate States of America. It is not primarily an examination of myths about the South, though such are explored and exploded. It does, however, generally address controversial or neglected aspects of the war in an engaging, sometimes witty, manner.
Davis is definitely on top of the subject and, for an academic, he writes very well. I found the book highly entertaining, finishing it over two sessions at the Precita Park Cafe.
Another classic for reference material. This book really breaks down the deceptive facades that have been painted by traditional history books about Confederate leaders. This is a book I could reread over and over.
The Cause Lost is a very good book for those who seek to understand what others have misunderstood. In many ways, learning, rationally, about the Civil War is like getting a lesson from Yoda- the firs thing you must do is unlearn what you have learned.
The book is actually a reasoned attack on the various myths as to why the South actually lost the civil war and why the war was fought in the first place. In many ways, its a quick read, but gives the reader a lot to think about.
The very first chapter is dedicated to the Cause's most misunderstood creation: Jefferson Davis. In a nutshell, Davis has been given heroic qualities for even holding the Confederacy together, while others (mostly Southern apologists who would do anything but blame the Confederate Military) claim that Davis is the reason the North won the war.
While the truth is not "somewhere in the middle" is clear that Davis had many flaws (most notably, that he was elected to multiple offices and NEVER completed a term), and of his most notorious was the fear of making final decisions wherein he had to chose between two opposing forces. The most dramatic of these was the potential removal of the notoriously bad commander Braxton Bragg, and how Davis went to Bragg and the men complaining about Bragg. Each and every complainer stated that they refused to continue to serve with Bragg. Davis kept Bragg anyway (for many reasons, hardly any good). The author basically states that Davis was very human, all too human, and that his mistakes were ones we all make everyday. Davis is not the reason the South lost, but he was also a reason they would not win.
Other myths and legends addressed:
-The myth of the better Confederate Leadership: this one is laid bare. Yes, the Union had bad leaders, but they had more leaders overall, hence they would have more bad ones. Davis explains that Braxton Bragg, Albert Sydney Johnston, Joseph Johnston, and many others were actually really, really bad commanders and did little, if anything, correct. Davis explains that the Confederate military leadership,as a whole, was peevish,temperamental and lacked imagination. Most notably that other than Lee, Bragg (a terrible general) went on the offensive more than any other Conf. leader. This,a s the author notes, is more a reflection on the limited Conf. leaders than it is on Bragg.
-The "Indomitable Southern Spirit" is laid waste. Basically, the author states that in 1862 the Confederates were doing well, so their soldiers were bragging. By 1863, with the reversals, soldiers started fleeing the battlefields; confederate desertion rates skyrocketed, and so did letters from home saying, in a nutshell, "Come Home; its not worth it." The idea that the South refused to bend to the North's pressures is hogwash; the South was surrendering in large chunks starting in 1863 (coincidentally, the same years as the Emancipation Proclamation). Their people were being beaten into submission non-stop since Gettysburg.
-That England was "this close" to recognizing the South. Nope. England wanted the South to win a battle before they even MET on the subject of recognition; recognition would take many more victories AND EVEN THEN England seemed to be more interested in negotiating a peace than intervening.
-The entire persona of Stonewall Jackson; that he was very eccentric, if not schizophrenic, but that many of the rumors we have heard lacked any historic documentation (ie: he sucked on lemons (probably not), he hated pepper (no)). And in Jackson, the South has found the ultimate "What If" hyperbole point: "What if Jackson had not been killed at Chancellorsville?" Davis slams this point: Jackson's name would have been there along side Longstreet and Pickett as "generals who lost at Gettysburg." The main point is that Jackson was a very good leader, but he also had issues and he could not have reasonably been expected to turn the whole war.
-Th idea that the South lost the war through loss of will. The book states that the South lost for far greater reasons and that merely by having "more will" they could not have willed themselves to victory.
-But the book saves the best for last; that the South's reasons for going tow ar was slavery. The book explains in detail how any ideal that other rights were at stake; or that "their way of life" was threatened, or that the North somehow forced the war on the South is all nonsense. The book drives home the point that the South could not live without their slaves and that that point- above all others is why the war was fought. The book splits the proverbial hair, though, when it states that the soldiers fought not to keep men in bondage, but to prevent an invasion from the North. The book, though, does not ask the more probing question: Since when did the soldiers of the war identify why the war was being fought? (the answer is "rarely ever" and most likely not here).
-The book also lays waste to the apologists views that the South had a right to succeed from the Union or that the North was actually responsible for slavery. The author explains away these theories that are nothing more than "Southern Pride" trying to save face.
-The book has a throw away chapter on the Civil War in film. Take it or leave it.
I hesitate giving the book 4+ stars because the book could have covered more ground and added in more depth (more primary sources, more expounding on their points, etc). There were also other myths that I wanted covered (ie- the myth that Lee and Jackson were against slavery- there is virtually no evidence for either). And the book has a few views I find questionable- that the Southern Flag is not an image of racial intolerance (then explain to me why it became so popular RIGHT AFTER "Brown v. the Board of Education" in the South). Finally, the book was written in 1994, so its dated (which is an odd thing to say about a history book). Overall, a solid but not spectacular book.
Any "Confederate" apologist should read this. I use the quotes because the Confederacy was never really a country. This book does a good job of destroying some of the myths created by Southern apologists as to why they lost the war.
However, this Davis did lack evidence in trying to prove some of his main points especially in the first part of the book dealing with Jefferson Davis. William Davis is also not the best writer of nonfiction so it is a bit of a slog. It might be due to the fact this this wasn't intended to be a book in the first place. It's a collection of essays that Davis wrote at various times.
The one thing I vehemently disagree with him about is the Confederate Battle Flag debate. He does mention that the flag became fashionable in the SOUth after Brown v Board of Education which should have been the end of the story. But then he goes on lengthy paragraph about how the flag represented the "purely American values" that all men and women still fight for today. He says that 90% of those white southerners who fight for the South didn't even own slaves. When you have your political leaders leading stating unequivocally and traveling throughout the South defending slavery and white supremacy prior to the start of the war, then that battle flag should not be honored.
This book seeks to gently propagate the disproven, intellectually-defunct myth of the lost cause invented after the civil war by Confederate sympathizers who wanted to change the historical narrative, despite its title. Davis suggests that slavery may not have been the full driver of the Confederacy’s attempts to overthrow the national government. He further posits (hopefully without the prejudice that such a statement naturally suggests) that a majority of slaves might have actually preferred the Confederacy. Davis’ book is an example of how propaganda can disguise itself as “scholarship.” While ostensibly starting from the admission that the Lost Cause is a myth, he nonetheless subtly inserts counterpoints that could make the reader think he believes it.
I have never been disappointed in a book by Mr. Davis. This is a compact analysis of the myths of the Confederacy; you can consider it a precursor to his great book, Look Away.
Apparently this was mostly from a group of papers the author had written. A couple of them were quite good, others less so and a few were poor. Not a horrible read, just very uneven.
In looking at the lost cause of the Confederacy, the author, who is a serious historian of the Civil War, has pondered a great deal about the elements of the lost cause myths of the South and has, in a very implicit way, sought to address those concerns without inflaming the audience of pro-Confederate readers who are likely to be the biggest market for a discussion like this one. Even though I am by no means a partisan of the Lost Cause, it is something I have read about a good deal and so I consider myself generally pretty familiar with the various reasons and excuses that are used by the South to undercut the pain of having lost the Civil War, and it looks like the author is very familiar as well and chooses to address them in a subtle but profound way that is well worth investigating. A great deal of heat and light has been spent in the Civil War and sometimes it is worth addressing questions without raising the hackles of the reader, so as to be able to make one's point without too much drama being involved.
This book is about 200 pages long and is divided into four parts and twelve relatively short chapters. The author begins with a list of illustrations and an introduction. After that there is a discussion of Jefferson Davis' toxic relationship with most of his generals (I), with a discussion on Jefferson Davis' insecurity and the way it has proven to be an enigma for many historians (1), the troubled relationship between Davis, Johnston, and Beauregard (2), and Davis and Lee's successful partnership (3). This leads to a discussion of forgotten wars (II), such as the siege of Charleston (4), the fighting in the West and its savagery (5), and the forgotten front of the Trans-Mississippi and the way it tied down Confederate troops that could have been useful elsewhere (6). This leads to a discussion of excuses and turning points along the course to Confederate defeat (III), which includes chapters on the relationship between the lost cause and the lost will to fight (7), the turning point that wasn't in the Election of 1864 (8), and the considerable skill that Breckinridge showed in trying to keep the South's armies going despite his own pessimism about their cause (9). Finally, the book ends with a discussion of The Confederacy in myth and posterity (IV), with chapters on Stonewall Jackson (10), the myths and realities of the Confederacy (11), and the Civil War and the Confederacy in cinema (12), as well as notes and an index.
In looking at this book as a whole, it appears as if there are a few parallel cases being made for the failures of the Confederacy. Although the Confederates thought that their elan would counteract their inferiority in numbers and material resources relative to the North, Davis gently deals with a few of their more profound weaknesses. For one, they did not have enough strength in leadership to command their armies, having to repeatedly resort to Johnston despite knowing that he did not have enough fight in him because there was no one else available despite his repeated failures, especially after the defeats of Bragg, Hood, Pemberton, and others. In addition to this, the author discusses Davis' own insecurities and how hard it was for others to work with him because they simply did not realize how much he needed information and have the will to supply that need. Similarly, the author discusses the inability that the South had to fight on interior lines with their inferior numbers, because the political pressure to hold on to their border territory was so intense that it led repeatedly to the loss of armies that were sent in order to retake territory lost to the Union. If the South could have won, it did not, and it is not worth making excuses about it.
The author looks at many of the myths and beliefs that have arisen around the Civil War, focusing primarily on the Confederacy. In addition, he does nice brief biographical sketches of many of the key men involved in directing war efforts from the South. There is a really good chapter about all the myths that surround Stonewall Jackson many of which are still believed while others have a way of emerging. One must take care in choosing a book about this Confederate general as a number of the authors have little factual background about the man.
The leader learns much about Jefferson Davis who led the South. He was a man who focused on every detail, could not tolerate those who disagreed with him and wanted to make every decision about the war, believing that he was an expert about being a soldier and a leader. He thought he was a good judge of character but most of his generals were weak, egotistical or had other character faults. Robert E. Lee was the exception. In addition, I learned about a man named John C. Breckinridge whose role toward the end of the war as secretary of war worked well under the circumstances to guide the generals and convinced others that the best ending was to sign a treaty with the North rather than break up the South battle by battle into little pieces. He was respected by all with whom he worked.
As one makes way through this book, check out other sources. One of the best television efforts about the Civil War was developed by Ken Burns which caught the interest of the public. It was called simply The Civil War. The author recommends the movies Zulu, Glory and The Perfect Tribute for historical accuracy and interest. It is difficult to choose books about the war, the key personnel involved, or any of its aspects. Some are based on hearsay, others on personal beliefs, still others focus on the author's role, real or imagined.
All in all I enjoyed this read very much, learning much as I went from chapter. Perhaps the most entertaining segment was about a German general whose life was fraught with bad luck.
The author presents a carefully researched and well-written examination of the Confederacy, including interesting information about Jefferson Davis and the principal generals, discussion of the causes of the Civil War, and explanation of some myths of that time period. He includes information about the war west of the Mississippi River which is commonly overlooked in other accounts of the war. His prose is pleasing and is sprinkled with humor. He is not pedantic or boring. The reasons for not giving a 5 star rating is that he states that many of the southern slaves would have readily fought for the south if given a chance. The Autobiography of Frederick Douglas and 12 Years a Slave would suggest otherwise. The author also makes an offhand comment about Ulysses Grant being one of the worst US presidents. There is some current analysis of Grant’s presidency that offer him higher esteem. In any case, I highly recommend this book. I gathered much new information. His analyses are clearly presented.
I was not impressed with this book. It felt like a bunch of essays that did not fit well together all smashed together. Out of three sections, the "Lost Cause" is not really even really critiqued until the last portion, making the title feel slightly misleading. When the LC is critiqued, the critique is not even that compelling. For example, a whole chapter on Stonewall Jackson, attempting to cut the hero down to size, really only provides two reasons for de-mythologizing him. 1) He was a hypochondriac supposedly. Ok, If this is true, then I'm even more impressed that he endured the unsanitary conditions of the battlefield. 2) He did not like lemons. So what? It's just not well written or researched.
If you appreciate reading as many verifiable facts as possible before the author of a documentary states opinions, and you prefer the author to logically compare their opinions to others, then you will agree with my rating. As a chemist and sci-fi buff who's trying to read more non-fiction I am glad I found this. I think it will help me have constructive discussions with those trying to use myths about the 1880s to justify current political actions.
RECOMMENDED Reviewed in the United States on January 11, 2021 Verified Purchase A great look at the Civil War by an established historian. I found the chapter on John C. Breckenridge to be most interesting. Had he been the Secretary of War for the Confederate states, from the beginning, the outcome may have been much different... Jefferson Davis was out of his depth and should not have been placed as the President
This book does an excellent job debunking a lot of the mythos that surrounds the Confederate States of America. It takes apart the lies and half-truths found in postwar memoirs and "Lost Cause" histories, and points out some things that neo-Confederates and those with a foolish nostalgia for the "Lost Cause" would do well to consider.
Author isn't interested in a factual look at historical events. Spends a lot of time intersecting various anecdotes about people he likes and talking about how much the people he doesn't like are terrible. Author seems to cite historical evidence when he likes what it says but then use conjecture when he doesn't have facts
Great insights into the Civil War from a stone-cold expert on the war and the Confederacy. Davis makes a great point in a speculative essay about McClellan winning the election of 1864. Lincoln would have had four months to prosecute the war and it's unlikely a President McClellan would have reversed course. Essentially, McClellan wins, and the South loses anyway.
Very opinionated review. Sometimes the reasons for his opinions are very well reasoned and well presented. Sometimes not. He is obviously well qualified to give his opinion and most of the time he is right.
A confirmation of Hood's abilities, and a very good appraisal of the political elements in play that led to Hood's appointment as commander of Army of Tenn (CSA). Also shows the stark differences in resources as being a major factor in the ultimate outcome of the war.
Davis' work is lively and informative but it sometimes crosses the line from understanding the Confederacy on its own terms to outright sympathy and special pleading. To Davis' credit he is clear that slavery was the cause of succession and the war.
I chose to give this book 5 Stars because it is one of the most complete essay’s of the war that I’ve read. A must-read for those interested in a 360-view of the times, e.g. the war, politics, civilian attitudes...
In a way this book is a scholarly version of Mythbusters, focusing on a sample of the myths that have arisen over the years about the Civil War and the Confederacy. A war with the impact of the Civil War is bound to spawn many myths, and Mr. Davis adroitly weaves a number of them and their refutations into his well-researched and interest-holding narratives. I am not going to go over all of them, for many are covered, but I will go over two to me appear to be two sides of the same coin:
1. The myth that the war was fought over states’ rights and not for slavery 2. The myth that the Confederate soldiers fought for slavery
Having lost the war, the defeated southern states changed their narrative to make their cause seem more noble. As Mr. Davis stated, “A reading of the congressional debates for the decades prior to the war, of the editorials in Southern newspapers, of the speeches of leading regional statesmen, produces no list of rights endangered; only one right. Slavery. No one at the time complained that the federal government was interfering in state taxation, road building, internal commerce, militia, elections, civil or military appointments, external trade, or anything else. In fact, the states rights defence of secession in 1860-1861 did not really appear in force until after 1865 as builders of the Lost Cause myth sought to distance themselves from slavery.” Given that the Confederate states seceded over the issue of slavery, it seems a foregone conclusion that the Confederate soldiers fought for slavery, but that, too, is a myth, a very pernicious myth that slanders them. Again, “The widespread Northern myth that the Confederates went to the battlefield to perpetuate slavery is just that, a myth. Their letters and diaries, in the tens of thousands, reveal again and again that they fought and died because their Southern homeland was invaded and their natural instinct was to protect home and hearth.” This makes perfect sense to me. The rich and powerful slave holding elite who voted to secede to protect their economic clout were not the same as the poor masses who fought the battles and most definitely did not have the same priorities. As the saying goes, “a rich man’s war, a poor man’s fight.” Furthermore, a few generations ago, several members of my wife’s family tree fought for the Confederacy, and one of them was subsequently shot by the Klu Klux Klan at his front door, a cross burning in his front yard, for the dastardly crime of helping a black neighbor plow his fields. That hardly sounds like someone who would have fought with the purpose of preserving slavery; yet, he had fought for the Confederacy.
Because some of the myths of the Civil War pertain to the actions in the Trans-Mississippi West, Mr. Davis gives some attention to that theater of the war, and I found that thoroughly fascinating. Having grown up in West Tennessee only an hour from Shiloh, my interest in the Civil War tended to focus on the spectacular battles, such as Shiloh, Antietam, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Petersburg, etc., to the neglect of other campaigns and theaters of the war. Once I was more familiar with the Dredd Scott case, I became convinced that it made the Civil War inevitable. Either the South would secede to preserve its slave economy or the North would secede to preserve its free-state status in the event that a subsequent court case was decided in such a way as to rule that all laws banning slavery were unconstitutional. In such a scenario, I envisioned the Civil War being fought primarily in the West over control of the western territories. As it turns out, that very war was fought in the Trans-Mississippi West. So, I stand educated.
Finally, I appreciated the chapter on the treatment of the Civil War in film, especially his discussion of the 80s mini-series The Blue and the Gray, “a positively stupid fictional story, filled with cliches, that nevertheless depicted a fair amount of action and historical background and did it more effectively than anything before.” Having watched the entire mini-series with complete fascination as a teenager, I cannot argue with anything Mr. Davis says about it, whether positive or negative. That said, for its flaws, it helped to stir my interest in the war, and for that I am thankful.
So, what is my verdict about the book? It is an outstanding book about a controversial topic written by a talented historian who is unafraid to swim against the tide of culture and opinion. Well done!
This is a lengthy, but fact-filled tome on the events leading up to and including the Civil War. There were a few passages that gave me pause for thought, specifically:
We learn that politics was a tad different in the nineteenth century insofar as . the ethic of the time dictated that the man did not seek office but that the office sought the man. Jefferson Davis, for example, was selected in 1843 as a convention delegate, then he allowed himself to be nominated for a seat in the Mississippi legislature. In this, as in every other political race in his career, Davis was an entirely passive participant. Quite different than today’s political course.
The author further states that the legalistic Southerners tried to view the Constitution as a contract. Unfortunately, that viewpoint breaks down when viewed as a lawyer views a contract. There are very few ways to legally break a contract unilaterally. One is if the agreement contains a specifically stated means of withdrawal or a time limit. Others include duress, fraud, mutual mistake of material fact – none of which applies to the Union in 1860 or to the Constitution.
I found this a curious statement:
. . . in many minds the mere fact that the Confederates fired the first hostile shots is enough for most people to decide responsibility for turning a confrontation into a war. But there are those who argue that Lincoln manoeuvred [sic] Davis into being the aggressor and therefore that the Union president bears the responsibility. Certainly he made it clear from the day of his inauguration that if war came, Southerners would have to fire first, and to some degree he put them in a position from which they either had to shoot or back down. His oath to “protect and defend” the Constitution gave him no other choice. Franklin Roosevelt did somewhat the same thing with the Japanese in 1941, and there are those who argue that he forced them to attack Pearl Harbour [sic].
And another passage that can give one pause:
As of this moment secession is not and never has been a right inherent in the Constitution, but that is not to say that someday it will not become a right if attempted again and successfully. These myths interlock and often support each other. Unravelling one tends to undermine the next. If slavery and not state rights led to secession, and if secession was not a legal right, then what does this say about the argument that the Union itself was responsible for the outbreak of hostilities when it attempted to reinforce Fort Sumter, forcing the Charlestonians to open fire on the fort? It says rather plainly that this, too, is a myth and one like so many others founded to relieve the Confederates of their share of responsibility for the war that followed.
💥 Recommended as a differing interpretation of history, with many points not covered in public schools, nor colleges, for that matter. 🟣