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Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World
From the former secretary of defense and author of the acclaimed #1 best-selling memoir, Duty, a candid, sweeping examination of power in all its manifestations, and how it has been exercised, for good and bad, by American presidents in the post-Cold War world.
Since the end of the Cold War, the global perception of the United States has progressively morphed from dominant international leader to disorganized entity, seemingly unwilling to accept the mantle of leadership or unable to govern itself effectively. Robert Gates argues that this transformation is the result of the failure of political leaders to understand the complexity of American power, its expansiveness, and its limitations. He makes clear that the successful exercise of power is not limited to the use of military might or the ability to coerce or demand submission, but must encompass as well diplomacy, economics, strategic communications, development assistance, intelligence, technology, ideology, and cyber. By analyzing specific challenges faced by the American government in the post-Cold War period--Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Russia, China, and others--Gates deconstructs the ways in which leaders have used the instruments of power available to them. With forthright judgments of the performance of past presidents and their senior-most advisers, firsthand knowledge, and insider stories, Gates argues that U.S. national security in the future will require learning, and abiding by, the lessons of the past, and re-creating those capabilities that the misuse of power has cost the nation.
Since the end of the Cold War, the global perception of the United States has progressively morphed from dominant international leader to disorganized entity, seemingly unwilling to accept the mantle of leadership or unable to govern itself effectively. Robert Gates argues that this transformation is the result of the failure of political leaders to understand the complexity of American power, its expansiveness, and its limitations. He makes clear that the successful exercise of power is not limited to the use of military might or the ability to coerce or demand submission, but must encompass as well diplomacy, economics, strategic communications, development assistance, intelligence, technology, ideology, and cyber. By analyzing specific challenges faced by the American government in the post-Cold War period--Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Russia, China, and others--Gates deconstructs the ways in which leaders have used the instruments of power available to them. With forthright judgments of the performance of past presidents and their senior-most advisers, firsthand knowledge, and insider stories, Gates argues that U.S. national security in the future will require learning, and abiding by, the lessons of the past, and re-creating those capabilities that the misuse of power has cost the nation.
752 pages, Paperback
First published June 16, 2020
419 people are currently reading
2070 people want to read
About the author
Robert M. Gates
16 books125 followersRobert Gates is a former U.S. Secretary of Defense and former Director of the CIA. Between those stints he was president of Texas A&M University, and he currently serves as chancellor of the College of William & Mary in addition to running a consultancy, Rice Hadley Gates LLC.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 98 reviews
July 16, 2020
Let the men of wisdom speak
A major theme of this book is that since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has not used the non-military forms of power well. This book is long on fact and short on opinion. You will learn the facts of the last 30 year of foreign policy, but organized chronologically by hotspot. Read and learn. I'm sure every major foreign policy player in the country will read this. I pray that Joe Biden's foreign policy team will debate it at length.
A major theme of this book is that since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has not used the non-military forms of power well. This book is long on fact and short on opinion. You will learn the facts of the last 30 year of foreign policy, but organized chronologically by hotspot. Read and learn. I'm sure every major foreign policy player in the country will read this. I pray that Joe Biden's foreign policy team will debate it at length.
December 14, 2020
Reading the book I almost feel like being the POTUS, with Gates advising me what to do with all the hot spots with American interests. Key point is America has been too quick to use its military might but not the non-military means: social, economic and diplomatic methods. Meanwhile, China has always followed Sun Tze’s Art of War advice: the best win is to win a war without fighting one.
1. More propaganda of what America has done for the world. Learn from China. For example, how Bush refused to cut food aid to North Korea because he didn’t want its citizens to suffer alongside its repressive regime.
2. A master agency to coordinate the non military means is needed; funding needs to be increased while not cutting defence budget. (Tough when the deficit is already so high)
3. Make military objective clear and avoid overreach, and give enough resources for the Armed forces to do the job. Limit military force to situations where direct American interest is harmed. Not every single dictator needs or should be disposed. The American public no longer has the stomach for being the World Police, after the quagmires of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.
4. International action has taught countries including Korea and Iran that without nuclear power they can be destroyed like Iraq, Libya, or invaded like Ukraine.
5. Do not threaten unless you are ready to follow through, referring to Obama’s Red Line.
6. Get involved in international institutions such as WTO, NATO, Paris agreement, WHO, UN. Consider rejoining the TPP, or even the AIIB.
7. Leave North Korea alone now that it has nuclear weapons. The regime has probably correctly realized that it is only safe with the possession.
8. Protect EU/NATO allies, but force them to pay more for their own defence.
9. China is the biggest threat. Use non military means because it is super strong.
10. Invest in Africa again; China is already its number one trading partner.
11. America will realistically need to work with dictators but it does not need to love them. It should continue to spread diplomacy.
12. America cannot always ensure good outcome despite the best strategy because local institutions may be weak, infrastructures poor or cultural differences too great.
A great book! However after reading this, one realizes that in order for the international community not to crush your despotic authoritarian regime, you need to develop nuclear weapons even if it means starving your people... otherwise you will become the next Saddam Hussein/Gaddafi...
1. More propaganda of what America has done for the world. Learn from China. For example, how Bush refused to cut food aid to North Korea because he didn’t want its citizens to suffer alongside its repressive regime.
2. A master agency to coordinate the non military means is needed; funding needs to be increased while not cutting defence budget. (Tough when the deficit is already so high)
3. Make military objective clear and avoid overreach, and give enough resources for the Armed forces to do the job. Limit military force to situations where direct American interest is harmed. Not every single dictator needs or should be disposed. The American public no longer has the stomach for being the World Police, after the quagmires of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.
4. International action has taught countries including Korea and Iran that without nuclear power they can be destroyed like Iraq, Libya, or invaded like Ukraine.
5. Do not threaten unless you are ready to follow through, referring to Obama’s Red Line.
6. Get involved in international institutions such as WTO, NATO, Paris agreement, WHO, UN. Consider rejoining the TPP, or even the AIIB.
7. Leave North Korea alone now that it has nuclear weapons. The regime has probably correctly realized that it is only safe with the possession.
8. Protect EU/NATO allies, but force them to pay more for their own defence.
9. China is the biggest threat. Use non military means because it is super strong.
10. Invest in Africa again; China is already its number one trading partner.
11. America will realistically need to work with dictators but it does not need to love them. It should continue to spread diplomacy.
12. America cannot always ensure good outcome despite the best strategy because local institutions may be weak, infrastructures poor or cultural differences too great.
A great book! However after reading this, one realizes that in order for the international community not to crush your despotic authoritarian regime, you need to develop nuclear weapons even if it means starving your people... otherwise you will become the next Saddam Hussein/Gaddafi...
November 13, 2020
A sobering and even-handed look at the successes and failures of American administrations after the cold war. This book helped me exit my echo chamber a bit. Gates has a clear view of the need for American power in forms far beyond military. At our best, we could be united behind our ideals. Gates unabashedly says we need to be sure people know the good we are doing and give us credit for it. Little about the book acknowledges legitimate gripes others might have with American power, but it does highlight the importance of US promotion of democratic ideals. Otherwise, we run the risk of being only one of a handful of options for smaller countries to choose from as oppressive overlord. The book is enlightening, though a bit dense. It slowed my reading progress, but I'm glad to have read it.
October 12, 2020
An Inside Look at Power
Robert M. Gates has been inside the political halls of power in Washington, D.C. for decades in various roles in the Central Intelligence Agency and as the Secretary of Defense. He has served with multiple Presidents—both Republican and Democrat. His perspective in EXERCISE OF POWER is well-told and interesting.
I listened to this audiobook cover to cover and enjoyed the insights. Sometime America has used their power successfully to influence world events. Other times we have missed opportunities. Gates tells both sides of this situation and brings his personal history into the text as well as careful research. I recommend listening to EXERCISE OF POWER.
W. Terry Whalin is an editor and the author of more than 60 books including his latest 10 Publishing Myths, Insights Every Author Needs to Succeed .
Robert M. Gates has been inside the political halls of power in Washington, D.C. for decades in various roles in the Central Intelligence Agency and as the Secretary of Defense. He has served with multiple Presidents—both Republican and Democrat. His perspective in EXERCISE OF POWER is well-told and interesting.
I listened to this audiobook cover to cover and enjoyed the insights. Sometime America has used their power successfully to influence world events. Other times we have missed opportunities. Gates tells both sides of this situation and brings his personal history into the text as well as careful research. I recommend listening to EXERCISE OF POWER.
W. Terry Whalin is an editor and the author of more than 60 books including his latest 10 Publishing Myths, Insights Every Author Needs to Succeed .
December 10, 2024
This is the kind of book students in national security and political science classes read.
Author Robert Gates, of course, has a sterling reputation in this arena. Beginning his career as an analyst at CIA, he rose to the top of that agency and eventually served as Secretary of Defense under Presidents Bush II and Obama. He's a thoughtful, sober man who has been a part of many of the major foreign policy choices the US has made over the last thirty or more years.
In the book, Gates considers the use of American power, across the DIME spectrum, as it related to issues he worked over the course of his career. From confronting AIDS in Africa to dealing with North Korea to working with our allies, Gates writes about the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools at the President's disposal. Further, he writes about the US national security apparatus; including CIA, State, DoD, and the National Security Council; and how it has succeeded or failed with various challenges.
This book isn't just a walk down memory lane, however. In his closing chapters, Gates draws together the lessons he's learned over his long career and offers a holistic approach to national security issues that'll be sure to inform many conversations both in the classroom and in the highest levels of the American national security decisionmaking apparatus.
This is a fascinating book, well written and well read by narrator George Newbern. If you're a national security professional, you won't want to miss it.
Author Robert Gates, of course, has a sterling reputation in this arena. Beginning his career as an analyst at CIA, he rose to the top of that agency and eventually served as Secretary of Defense under Presidents Bush II and Obama. He's a thoughtful, sober man who has been a part of many of the major foreign policy choices the US has made over the last thirty or more years.
In the book, Gates considers the use of American power, across the DIME spectrum, as it related to issues he worked over the course of his career. From confronting AIDS in Africa to dealing with North Korea to working with our allies, Gates writes about the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools at the President's disposal. Further, he writes about the US national security apparatus; including CIA, State, DoD, and the National Security Council; and how it has succeeded or failed with various challenges.
This book isn't just a walk down memory lane, however. In his closing chapters, Gates draws together the lessons he's learned over his long career and offers a holistic approach to national security issues that'll be sure to inform many conversations both in the classroom and in the highest levels of the American national security decisionmaking apparatus.
This is a fascinating book, well written and well read by narrator George Newbern. If you're a national security professional, you won't want to miss it.
May 25, 2021
I have long admired Robert Gates. When George W. Bush needed someone to clean up after Rumsfeld, he asked Gates to come out of retirement to do the job. When Barack Obama was elected 2 years later, he asked Gates to stay on as Secretary of Defense for the sake of continuity while the nation was engaged in 2 wars. It is rare we find someone who is willing to place his duty to the nation above his or her personal needs. Gates is that rare person.
He is also a spiritual descendant of Truman, Eisenhower and George C. Marshall. This book is both an essay on post-Cold War foreign affairs and a detailed history from his personal perspective. The main thrust of his 600 page argument is that, unlike the aforementioned trio, each president since the end of the Cold War has squandered the opportunity to affect global affairs for the benefit of the US and our allies. They have done so, according to Gates, because they have lost sight of all our levers of power except the prowess of our military. By deploying our military power first rather than as a last resort, we fail to take advantage of our alliances, our commercial resources and the power of the message of American democracy. As a result, our reputation around the world is in tatters. And our strategic foes — principally China and Russia but also Iran and North Korea — are eating our lunch.
He provides detailed examples of where we have gone wrong and also what we have done well. In the end, he proposes solutions. I might argue (he certainly would) that presidents pay attention to what he has to say.
From my perspective, the book is well written and makes an effective argument. My solitary complaint is that he goes into too much detail, providing dates of meetings, who was in attendance what each had to offer. The detail is so voluminous (and impressive) that I found it difficult to remember what his message was as I read it. When I have read great books, I have always wanted more when I’ve finished. In this case, I was glad I was through. Too bad. I really like his message.
He is also a spiritual descendant of Truman, Eisenhower and George C. Marshall. This book is both an essay on post-Cold War foreign affairs and a detailed history from his personal perspective. The main thrust of his 600 page argument is that, unlike the aforementioned trio, each president since the end of the Cold War has squandered the opportunity to affect global affairs for the benefit of the US and our allies. They have done so, according to Gates, because they have lost sight of all our levers of power except the prowess of our military. By deploying our military power first rather than as a last resort, we fail to take advantage of our alliances, our commercial resources and the power of the message of American democracy. As a result, our reputation around the world is in tatters. And our strategic foes — principally China and Russia but also Iran and North Korea — are eating our lunch.
He provides detailed examples of where we have gone wrong and also what we have done well. In the end, he proposes solutions. I might argue (he certainly would) that presidents pay attention to what he has to say.
From my perspective, the book is well written and makes an effective argument. My solitary complaint is that he goes into too much detail, providing dates of meetings, who was in attendance what each had to offer. The detail is so voluminous (and impressive) that I found it difficult to remember what his message was as I read it. When I have read great books, I have always wanted more when I’ve finished. In this case, I was glad I was through. Too bad. I really like his message.
October 7, 2025
I stumbled upon this book at a used book store, think trade in books for credit kind, and boy did I find a gem. The author, Robert Gates, has been working in the highest levels of national gov that have to do with geopolitics, since the end of the Cold War. Head of department of defense, NSC secretary, things of that nature spanning from Bush (41) to Trump. He maintains his neutral apolitical stance while walking the reader through a history lesson on different countries and how our relationships with them have evolved since the Cold War. Whether it be Iran, Iraq, Colombia, Somalia, Libya, Syria or our good superpower friends: China and Russia. Gates analyzes what he calls the, elements of power, to analyze how different presidents responded to different situations. These elements include military action, economic sanctions, UN pressure, propaganda/communications or alliances to try to further American interests while also limiting potential damages/threats. A must read if you are a fan of geopolitics or just want a neutral analysis of different administrations handlings of the most significant geopolitical events of our lifetime, the neutral part is hard to come by these days. While hindsight is 20/20, the lessons learned are materialized into more succinct ideals that can be applied to the elements of power, and used to evaluate our actions going forward in this new world.
November 8, 2020
Any book by Bob Gates will be a masterclass of erudition and leadership and this latest offering is no exception. Given his experience as Secretary of Defense for two Presidents, director of the CIA, Air Force career, and place on the National Security Council; he speaks with the kind of objectivity and purpose that comes from seeing 8 administrations come and go and maintaining an analyst's perspective on the relation between their ideology and their (in)effectiveness.
He frames the discussion here, on the exercise of the US's global power, through the image of the instruments of a symphony with the administration and President most specifically acting as its conductor. These instruments include, of course, the military, however he also makes great discussion around the non-military instruments such as economic leverage, cyber capability, development assistance, strategic communications, intelligence gathering, alliances/diplomacy, science and technology, culture/ideology/religion, the private sector, nationalism, and wise leadership skills.
Having established this lense, Gates then takes you through the steps that US administrations have taken essentially since the demise of the Soviet Union - Trump and how each has, mostly ineffectively, wielded the conductor's baton. Perhaps the standout section for me is on the lack of effective strategic communications on the positive work administrations have taken and the successes we have had with aid programs and development assistance. This section is filled with agencies, initiatives, and programs that I had never heard of, mainly due to a lack of effective communication and discussion of this work in the public sphere, thus, allowing to persist the notion that we just give away aid and get nothing to return among nationalist-isolationist types.
There is no denying that his vision of US influence is one that many on the outer edges of both sides of the US political spectrum would find to be "old-school, neo-con, hawkish, etc..." however he makes a compelling case, given the ascent of China and Russia, for the effective use of our available symphony of power. As he concludes:
"The critical question, though, is whether, even with all the right military and nonmilitary tools, presidents, Congress, and the American people will recognize that our long-term self-interest demands that we continue to accept the burden of global leadership."
He frames the discussion here, on the exercise of the US's global power, through the image of the instruments of a symphony with the administration and President most specifically acting as its conductor. These instruments include, of course, the military, however he also makes great discussion around the non-military instruments such as economic leverage, cyber capability, development assistance, strategic communications, intelligence gathering, alliances/diplomacy, science and technology, culture/ideology/religion, the private sector, nationalism, and wise leadership skills.
Having established this lense, Gates then takes you through the steps that US administrations have taken essentially since the demise of the Soviet Union - Trump and how each has, mostly ineffectively, wielded the conductor's baton. Perhaps the standout section for me is on the lack of effective strategic communications on the positive work administrations have taken and the successes we have had with aid programs and development assistance. This section is filled with agencies, initiatives, and programs that I had never heard of, mainly due to a lack of effective communication and discussion of this work in the public sphere, thus, allowing to persist the notion that we just give away aid and get nothing to return among nationalist-isolationist types.
There is no denying that his vision of US influence is one that many on the outer edges of both sides of the US political spectrum would find to be "old-school, neo-con, hawkish, etc..." however he makes a compelling case, given the ascent of China and Russia, for the effective use of our available symphony of power. As he concludes:
"The critical question, though, is whether, even with all the right military and nonmilitary tools, presidents, Congress, and the American people will recognize that our long-term self-interest demands that we continue to accept the burden of global leadership."
March 7, 2021
A very persuasive and urgent argument that the U.S. must reinvest in and redeploy non-military instruments of power—as we did quite effectively during the Cold War—if we are to compete with and constrain Russia, Iran, and, especially, China in the 21st century.
Gates is a lucid thinker and clear writer who possesses a strong point of view on how we should respond to foreign policy challenges as informed by 40 years of experience in the White House situation room working under 8 different Presidents. I really enjoyed his forthright and pithy overviews of the U.S.’s involvement in a dozen different foreign policy hot spots around the world, including Russia, North Korea, Africa, Iraq, Syria, and more. He effectively argues that, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. presidents have too readily turned to the military and to economic sanctions versus employing a full “symphony” of instruments, including diplomacy, aid, strategic communications, culture, cyber tools, and more. It made my blood boil to read how we have allowed so many of these tools to atrophy in recent years due to lack of appreciation, lack of funding, and—especially—lack of a strategy.
He tries to maintain objectivity and even-handedness in his judgement of our recent Presidents’ successes and failures in this arena, though it’s clear he rates both Bush 41 and 43 highly; he seemed less impressed with Clinton and Obama.
He wraps up with a very good summary of lessons to be learned and possible steps forward in order to improve results. I was most struck by his conviction that the whole national security apparatus needs restructuring and reform, as does the State Department, USAID, and a host of other agencies. It will be difficult to accomplish this however at a time when Congress can’t seem to agree on anything and so I am pessimistic we will see this happen on Biden’s watch. Meanwhile, China continues to invest aggressively in all the different instruments of power at home and abroad, accruing global influence and power at a rate that we will find increasing difficult to keep pace with.
I found this a riveting and provocative read and I learned a lot about the history of our involvement with different countries. I also left with a lot of sympathy for our post-Cold War presidents who, all too often, were forced to choose the “least bad option” in so many different foreign policy situations. Gates is telling us not only that we will have more and better options if we work to rebuild our non-military instruments of power, but that we can likely avoid getting painted into corners in the first place. I hope someone bought this book for Biden, Jake Sullivan, Antony Blinken, and Lloyd Austin for Christmas and that they read it.
Gates is a lucid thinker and clear writer who possesses a strong point of view on how we should respond to foreign policy challenges as informed by 40 years of experience in the White House situation room working under 8 different Presidents. I really enjoyed his forthright and pithy overviews of the U.S.’s involvement in a dozen different foreign policy hot spots around the world, including Russia, North Korea, Africa, Iraq, Syria, and more. He effectively argues that, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. presidents have too readily turned to the military and to economic sanctions versus employing a full “symphony” of instruments, including diplomacy, aid, strategic communications, culture, cyber tools, and more. It made my blood boil to read how we have allowed so many of these tools to atrophy in recent years due to lack of appreciation, lack of funding, and—especially—lack of a strategy.
He tries to maintain objectivity and even-handedness in his judgement of our recent Presidents’ successes and failures in this arena, though it’s clear he rates both Bush 41 and 43 highly; he seemed less impressed with Clinton and Obama.
He wraps up with a very good summary of lessons to be learned and possible steps forward in order to improve results. I was most struck by his conviction that the whole national security apparatus needs restructuring and reform, as does the State Department, USAID, and a host of other agencies. It will be difficult to accomplish this however at a time when Congress can’t seem to agree on anything and so I am pessimistic we will see this happen on Biden’s watch. Meanwhile, China continues to invest aggressively in all the different instruments of power at home and abroad, accruing global influence and power at a rate that we will find increasing difficult to keep pace with.
I found this a riveting and provocative read and I learned a lot about the history of our involvement with different countries. I also left with a lot of sympathy for our post-Cold War presidents who, all too often, were forced to choose the “least bad option” in so many different foreign policy situations. Gates is telling us not only that we will have more and better options if we work to rebuild our non-military instruments of power, but that we can likely avoid getting painted into corners in the first place. I hope someone bought this book for Biden, Jake Sullivan, Antony Blinken, and Lloyd Austin for Christmas and that they read it.
August 28, 2020
Gates Advises About US Foreign Policy
Robert Gates, former CIA Director and Secretary of Defense, talks about Foreign Policy from President Carter to President Obama and a little President Trump. He breaks down important incidents in foreign policy by country. How presidents deal with them and some suggestions how what could have been better or what went right. He covers Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan and others. I found it really insightful especially about Libya. Important read.
Robert Gates, former CIA Director and Secretary of Defense, talks about Foreign Policy from President Carter to President Obama and a little President Trump. He breaks down important incidents in foreign policy by country. How presidents deal with them and some suggestions how what could have been better or what went right. He covers Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan and others. I found it really insightful especially about Libya. Important read.
November 4, 2020
Robert Gates renders useless the notion of “lifelong government employee” as a pejorative. He is incisive, dedicated and brutally honest about himself, his Presidents and the Teams surrounding them. Anyone with even a modest interest in recent history or foreign affairs will both enjoy and benefit from reading this (or his other) books. Reading this and Gen. McMaster’s “Battlegrounds”, with his notion of ‘strategic narcissism’, offers a richly paired deep dive.
December 28, 2022
I feel like this style of book is often devoid of substance. But I was prompted to read this by a very interesting oral history interview Gates did for the Miller center.
This book has a few intriguing ideas, but I suspect these could have been distilled to a longform essay. Most of this text is an unremarkable summary of the last 30 years of American foreign policy.
This book has a few intriguing ideas, but I suspect these could have been distilled to a longform essay. Most of this text is an unremarkable summary of the last 30 years of American foreign policy.
April 7, 2021
does a great job in defending its central thesis but found myself disagreeing on the weight of certain events (mogadishu was a failure for what we let happen after, BRI is so overrated). great read still
June 8, 2025
Pleasantly surprised by how fascinated I was by this book. Having not been entirely familiar with the foreign policies of Raegan, the Bushes, Clinton, Obama, and Trump’s first term, this was an excellent review of how each administration approached American foreign policy in 15 different countries. All together, Gates does an excellent job describing many of the global decisions and events that laid the groundwork for the international environment the US finds itself in today. For me, this book was deeply insightful to providing the backing for my own personal thoughts on how I’d advocate current/future administrations recognize America’s role as a global leader. While there certainly is validity behind reassessing the balance of global dependence on the US, we also must not fail to recognize the impact our diplomatic commitment to our allies has on strengthening American excellence/leadership.
July 11, 2020
3.5 stars.
September 20, 2020
Wow. This was a great book to listen to. Current media is so devoid of information. We hear the same sound bites over and over again. I appreciated this behind the door look into recent American history. More information really helps to paint the picture and give a better background for the decisions that were made. If only we could learn from history and not repeat these mistakes.
July 5, 2020
Recent history meets philosophy and foreign policy as Gates argues for an aggressive approach to non-military intervention abroad while at the same time acknowledging the very real limits of power, especially in regards to military force.
July 22, 2020
This book starts with the basic questions about American power: “To what end do we use it? What are our purposes and goals in the world beyond protecting our won interests, in particular when it comes to advancing freedom and democracy?” (p4) The author starts by presenting several instruments of power and addressing how Presidents can use those instruments. The author then gives ten case studies in the post-cold war period (when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991). The author finishes with lessons learned, which is an extremely strong section, highlighting the new times we are in (no longer the cold war), the new challenges we face (e.g., having a long-term strategy for addressing a more assertive China, dealing with an intransigent North Korea, addressing the disruption caused by Russia’s destabilizing activities; as well as climate change and its implications), and some practical changes that we as a nation need to make, in particular to using all non-military levers of power in an integrated way, assuming we believe our best interests are best protected by measured and sustained global engagement and leadership.
I also got a glimpse of the author’s vast knowledge and practical experience from years of serving the United States. It is reassuring that such people existed … and can only hope that they can be recruited to future administrations to serve the United States.
I had first heard of the book during a interview on the PBS News Hour between the host (Judy Woodruff) and the author, Robert Gates. I was impressed by his assertion, central to the book, that the US has many instruments of power, and used many effectively during the cold-war period, but recently has relied on fewer and fewer of these, to the detriment of the US (and perhaps the world’s) well-being. This statement resonated with me, prompting me to read the book.
The author identifies several instruments of power:
• Military
• Diplomacy
• Economic Leverage
• Cyber Capabilities
• Development Assistance
• Communications
• Intelligence
• Alliances
• Science and Technology
• Culture
• Ideology
• The Private Sector
• Religion
• Nationalism
These need to be harnessed by wise and courageous leadership.
Gates next described how a President exercises power, and describes the National Security Councils composition (“president, vice president, secretaries of state and defense, with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (senior military adviser) and the director of national intelligence (as of 2005) as principle intelligence adviser”) (p 59), and its workings (and what prevents with from working). A key theme in this chapter is that the current structure, set up in 1947, post-World War II, to handle the Cold War, has not kept up in the post-Cold War era, and needs to be rethought. He outlines the types of problems now facing, including
• Military missions (that often becomes non-military)
• Non-military missions
• Covert operations
• Nation-building
• Offensive use of cyber capabilities for political purposes
• Strategic communications
• Humanitarian and development assistance
• Intervention in internal conflicts in other countries
The last five areas are called out by the author as where the “US Government simply is not organized to exercise power effectively” (p74).
The examples cover events in Iran; Somilia, Haiti and the Yugoslav Wars; Colombia; Afghanistan; Iraq; Africa; Russia; Georgia, Libya, Syria and Ukraine; North Korea; and China. In these examples, the author provides a brief summary of the challenges of the example, a history and context for decisions made, and for roads not taken. He related back to the various instruments of power, used and not used. These examples are informative. However, the style of writing is such that is feels a bit like Monday quarterbacking (i.e., coaching after the event is over). I found this distracting and it detracted (me) from the lessons that could have been provided.
The chapter on Russia is quite interesting. One point noted is that Putin believed that H. Clinton’s statement about having a government accountable to people as interference in Russia’s election (pp 278 – 279), and later had not inhibitions about undermining her campaign.
Also, the author states (p278) that Putin was convinced the US had a role in fomenting large anti-Putin demonstration in Moscow and elsewhere surrounding the parliamentary election in December 2011 and his own election … citing Clinton’s public comments in support of the demonstrators. Interestingly, the author does not confirm or deny this allegation … unless other places where he does admit mistakes or states his views, often counter to those of the President he is serving.
One theme that comes up is that the United States does not use Strategic Communication (in some cases, just saying how much we are contributing to food or disaster relieve), “whether because of moral qualms or skepticism or lack of imagination” (p 333).
I also note there is no mention of the challenge with Israel.
The chapter on North Korea is very good – since it lays bare the challenges of dealing with N Korea for any president. The chapter on China is excellent. We will have to come to a long-term strategy for addressing China’s rise.
His final chapter, Lessons Learned, is very strong, and very pragmatic, with concrete suggestions. We are in a new world, different from the post WWII, when many of the institutions we currently have were set up. The challenges we in the US face today, both with nationals such as China, Russia, N. Korea and Iran, as well as with challenges of climate change and migration, are different from those faced 75 years ago, and we as a nation should act differently.
In reading this book, I come away with a different impression for Bush 43. This does not change my opinion that the beginning of endless was his administration unfortunate legacy to the US, but it does shine a light on this thinking (unrealistic – aspirations did not match resources – both in amounts and types – too much responsibility for the military which is not trained for nation-building) and his positive contribution to Africa – which is almost never talked about.
Gates is certainly has led an interesting (sometimes controversial) life
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_.... I know very little about his biography until I looked, towards the end of reading the book. It was clear from the writing that he knew quite a bit of history – and not surprisingly it was his major, formal education culminating with a Ph.D. Whatever the truth of the controversy, it was insightful to learn that we had intelligence and individuals with in depth knowledge in positions of responsibility.
FB Comment: This is an insightful book by a historian and an experienced practitioner of the levers of power in the United States Government. The author explains several levers of power (most non-military), provides 10 case studies, starting with history, then in many cases first-hand experience of the levers of power used and not used. His bottom line is that the US needs to re-imagine how to use, in an integrated manner, the non-military levers of power to advance its goals, and the governmental structural changes that need to be made to realize the power of those levers. [It is assumed that there is a strong military as a means of last resort and assurance.] Well worth reading for this history, insights and practical changes suggested!
Finally, I wish to quote a section about higher education and the science and technology level (p 406).
“As noted earlier, higher education and the science and technology sector are both important instruments of power. We will shoot ourselves in the foot if we allow our partisan debates over immigration to curtail the flow of foreign students coming to U.S. universities and seeing firsthand what freedom looks like. Similarly, the government’s failure to adequately fund basic research will have dire consequences down the road. As secretary, I increased Defense funding in this area, but those increase have long since disappear.”
I also got a glimpse of the author’s vast knowledge and practical experience from years of serving the United States. It is reassuring that such people existed … and can only hope that they can be recruited to future administrations to serve the United States.
I had first heard of the book during a interview on the PBS News Hour between the host (Judy Woodruff) and the author, Robert Gates. I was impressed by his assertion, central to the book, that the US has many instruments of power, and used many effectively during the cold-war period, but recently has relied on fewer and fewer of these, to the detriment of the US (and perhaps the world’s) well-being. This statement resonated with me, prompting me to read the book.
The author identifies several instruments of power:
• Military
• Diplomacy
• Economic Leverage
• Cyber Capabilities
• Development Assistance
• Communications
• Intelligence
• Alliances
• Science and Technology
• Culture
• Ideology
• The Private Sector
• Religion
• Nationalism
These need to be harnessed by wise and courageous leadership.
Gates next described how a President exercises power, and describes the National Security Councils composition (“president, vice president, secretaries of state and defense, with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (senior military adviser) and the director of national intelligence (as of 2005) as principle intelligence adviser”) (p 59), and its workings (and what prevents with from working). A key theme in this chapter is that the current structure, set up in 1947, post-World War II, to handle the Cold War, has not kept up in the post-Cold War era, and needs to be rethought. He outlines the types of problems now facing, including
• Military missions (that often becomes non-military)
• Non-military missions
• Covert operations
• Nation-building
• Offensive use of cyber capabilities for political purposes
• Strategic communications
• Humanitarian and development assistance
• Intervention in internal conflicts in other countries
The last five areas are called out by the author as where the “US Government simply is not organized to exercise power effectively” (p74).
The examples cover events in Iran; Somilia, Haiti and the Yugoslav Wars; Colombia; Afghanistan; Iraq; Africa; Russia; Georgia, Libya, Syria and Ukraine; North Korea; and China. In these examples, the author provides a brief summary of the challenges of the example, a history and context for decisions made, and for roads not taken. He related back to the various instruments of power, used and not used. These examples are informative. However, the style of writing is such that is feels a bit like Monday quarterbacking (i.e., coaching after the event is over). I found this distracting and it detracted (me) from the lessons that could have been provided.
The chapter on Russia is quite interesting. One point noted is that Putin believed that H. Clinton’s statement about having a government accountable to people as interference in Russia’s election (pp 278 – 279), and later had not inhibitions about undermining her campaign.
Also, the author states (p278) that Putin was convinced the US had a role in fomenting large anti-Putin demonstration in Moscow and elsewhere surrounding the parliamentary election in December 2011 and his own election … citing Clinton’s public comments in support of the demonstrators. Interestingly, the author does not confirm or deny this allegation … unless other places where he does admit mistakes or states his views, often counter to those of the President he is serving.
One theme that comes up is that the United States does not use Strategic Communication (in some cases, just saying how much we are contributing to food or disaster relieve), “whether because of moral qualms or skepticism or lack of imagination” (p 333).
I also note there is no mention of the challenge with Israel.
The chapter on North Korea is very good – since it lays bare the challenges of dealing with N Korea for any president. The chapter on China is excellent. We will have to come to a long-term strategy for addressing China’s rise.
His final chapter, Lessons Learned, is very strong, and very pragmatic, with concrete suggestions. We are in a new world, different from the post WWII, when many of the institutions we currently have were set up. The challenges we in the US face today, both with nationals such as China, Russia, N. Korea and Iran, as well as with challenges of climate change and migration, are different from those faced 75 years ago, and we as a nation should act differently.
In reading this book, I come away with a different impression for Bush 43. This does not change my opinion that the beginning of endless was his administration unfortunate legacy to the US, but it does shine a light on this thinking (unrealistic – aspirations did not match resources – both in amounts and types – too much responsibility for the military which is not trained for nation-building) and his positive contribution to Africa – which is almost never talked about.
Gates is certainly has led an interesting (sometimes controversial) life
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_.... I know very little about his biography until I looked, towards the end of reading the book. It was clear from the writing that he knew quite a bit of history – and not surprisingly it was his major, formal education culminating with a Ph.D. Whatever the truth of the controversy, it was insightful to learn that we had intelligence and individuals with in depth knowledge in positions of responsibility.
FB Comment: This is an insightful book by a historian and an experienced practitioner of the levers of power in the United States Government. The author explains several levers of power (most non-military), provides 10 case studies, starting with history, then in many cases first-hand experience of the levers of power used and not used. His bottom line is that the US needs to re-imagine how to use, in an integrated manner, the non-military levers of power to advance its goals, and the governmental structural changes that need to be made to realize the power of those levers. [It is assumed that there is a strong military as a means of last resort and assurance.] Well worth reading for this history, insights and practical changes suggested!
Finally, I wish to quote a section about higher education and the science and technology level (p 406).
“As noted earlier, higher education and the science and technology sector are both important instruments of power. We will shoot ourselves in the foot if we allow our partisan debates over immigration to curtail the flow of foreign students coming to U.S. universities and seeing firsthand what freedom looks like. Similarly, the government’s failure to adequately fund basic research will have dire consequences down the road. As secretary, I increased Defense funding in this area, but those increase have long since disappear.”
Read
December 23, 2020As an American, geopolitics is interesting for a lot of reasons. It's a story in which we can always see ourselves as the main character and it's a riveting story: deep main character, with a lot of flaws, (like a lot) but generally a well-intentioned force. Intentions don't really mean shit when it comes to foreign affairs apparently though.
Gates successfully rids the book of partisan slant, and this makes it a more interesting read. I've learned that POTUS is probably the worst job in the world, and that every president makes decision first as an individual with beliefs and second, as a democrat/republican, or what have you.
It's also made me realize how little most Americans know the history of other countries and how that influences our engagements with them.
Gates successfully rids the book of partisan slant, and this makes it a more interesting read. I've learned that POTUS is probably the worst job in the world, and that every president makes decision first as an individual with beliefs and second, as a democrat/republican, or what have you.
It's also made me realize how little most Americans know the history of other countries and how that influences our engagements with them.
January 5, 2021
this book was an awful reminder of self-important shady mfers who make huge FP decisions that harm millions, all while unelected. former secedef and CIA director Robert Gates doesn't say anything too interesting about his involvement in foreign conflicts like Iraq (which he claims was a preventative war), and he often downplays the influence of the CIA.
supporters will read exercise of power as a call for less aggressive American hegemony. 'but he's arguing for less wars' they'll say. but note that Gates never argues for shrinking the military, and his idea of statecraft remains largely coercive.
supporters will read exercise of power as a call for less aggressive American hegemony. 'but he's arguing for less wars' they'll say. but note that Gates never argues for shrinking the military, and his idea of statecraft remains largely coercive.
July 22, 2020
Not fond of the listicles of "bad guy behavior" seeking to justify strategic choices. If nothing provides a comprehensive overview of national security challenges as viewed from the beltway.
November 13, 2022
"Exercise of Power" fits like a glove: America is the reluctant global superpower and Robert M. Gates nails it when, in his concluding sentence, he writes that future success depends on if "...presidents, Congress, and the American people will recognize that our long-term self-interest demands that we continue to accept the burden of global leadership."
I truly appreciate this book, even more so because I own a signed copy of it. I tuned into a webinar featuring Secretary Gates from the Bush School of Government and Public Service in 2020 when "Exercise of Power" was published, and a lot has changed in the world since 2020, especially with respect to the war in Ukraine.
With respect to events that have taken place since 2020, and now that election 2022 results are rolling in, Republicans in Congress need to keep their eyes on the prize: total victory for Ukraine in its war with the Russian invaders is of paramount importance in combating the existential threat that autocrats and dictators pose to liberal democracies made up of freedom loving people, like those in Ukraine who are fighting so bravely.
That said, Secretary Gates's book "Exercise of Power" is just as relevant these two years after it was published as ever, especially when it comes to government reform in the USA, and especially with respect to soft power agencies that can do so much in enhancing American national power such as the Department of State and USAID.
I loved Secretary Gates's idea for "National Security Committees" in both the US House of Representatives and the US Senate, composed of members of siloed other committees, that would enhance Congress's role in providing important national security guidance to the president, and which would enhance the American public's role, through our elected Congressmen and Senators, in deciding appropriate government response to questions of conducting the US interagency and military "symphony of power" in our foreign policy.
"Exercise of Power" is the second of Secretary Gates's books that I have read, and of the four that he has written, the first of three that I own that I have read. What is notable is the author's over 50 years of service to the United States of America. It is my contention that we Americans, as we move forward, must find in each and every single one of our hearts, our own incentive to be of service to our country and therefore to the world.
I agree with Secretary Gates, and an excellent by-product of "Exercise of Power" is that as one reads this fantastic book, one asks oneself about what would be appropriate to do if one were President of the United States, with respect to leading the country on delicate matters of foreign policy.
But rest assured, politics in this country have to come first; we have to get our politics right before we can move forward with respect to any other matter, even economic matters. Perhaps Secretary Gates's book's greatest contribution is that it has a lot of suggestions about how a President can lead in a bipartisan fashion to move our country forward out of these times of polarization in order to help all Americans understand each one of our own roles in helping to create a better world.
I truly appreciate this book, even more so because I own a signed copy of it. I tuned into a webinar featuring Secretary Gates from the Bush School of Government and Public Service in 2020 when "Exercise of Power" was published, and a lot has changed in the world since 2020, especially with respect to the war in Ukraine.
With respect to events that have taken place since 2020, and now that election 2022 results are rolling in, Republicans in Congress need to keep their eyes on the prize: total victory for Ukraine in its war with the Russian invaders is of paramount importance in combating the existential threat that autocrats and dictators pose to liberal democracies made up of freedom loving people, like those in Ukraine who are fighting so bravely.
That said, Secretary Gates's book "Exercise of Power" is just as relevant these two years after it was published as ever, especially when it comes to government reform in the USA, and especially with respect to soft power agencies that can do so much in enhancing American national power such as the Department of State and USAID.
I loved Secretary Gates's idea for "National Security Committees" in both the US House of Representatives and the US Senate, composed of members of siloed other committees, that would enhance Congress's role in providing important national security guidance to the president, and which would enhance the American public's role, through our elected Congressmen and Senators, in deciding appropriate government response to questions of conducting the US interagency and military "symphony of power" in our foreign policy.
"Exercise of Power" is the second of Secretary Gates's books that I have read, and of the four that he has written, the first of three that I own that I have read. What is notable is the author's over 50 years of service to the United States of America. It is my contention that we Americans, as we move forward, must find in each and every single one of our hearts, our own incentive to be of service to our country and therefore to the world.
I agree with Secretary Gates, and an excellent by-product of "Exercise of Power" is that as one reads this fantastic book, one asks oneself about what would be appropriate to do if one were President of the United States, with respect to leading the country on delicate matters of foreign policy.
But rest assured, politics in this country have to come first; we have to get our politics right before we can move forward with respect to any other matter, even economic matters. Perhaps Secretary Gates's book's greatest contribution is that it has a lot of suggestions about how a President can lead in a bipartisan fashion to move our country forward out of these times of polarization in order to help all Americans understand each one of our own roles in helping to create a better world.
December 3, 2022
This is the second book I’ve read by Gates and both were excellent. I read this book via audio but should have gone hard copy to gather more notes. I’d forgotten how experienced Gates is in our national security process and agencies; wish he still had a role in our government due to his depth of knowledge and experience. Some key excerpts are below:
- While we worry about nuclear proliferation, in truth cyber weapons are more likely to be used than nuclear weapons because they are potentially more damaging; much less risky for the attacker and tougher to trace to the aggressor. Cyber is the most versatile instrument of power because it can be used both overtly and covertly. PJK: So obvious now that the author put it in writing. I still wonder however if Russia will use a tactical nuke in Ukraine. While I’ve thought a lot about cyber threats over the years, I did not fully grasp the advantages that Gates described.
- Hadley concluded: The National Security Advisor is always moving from crisis to crisis, usually at the 11th hour… but if all you do is manage crises you have no time to develop and implement strategies designed to avoid them and shape events. PJK: So true! Are you a crisis manager/leader or a strategic planner? There are some key differences thus when I was a battalion operations officer I physically moved my planner out of the operations center as the minute-by-minute craziness of the environment was too distracting. I have personally been overwhelmed by the crisis of the day in a few assignments vs focusing on the long-term… in the Pentagon, in Afghanistan, etc.
- Chapter 5. So what can we learn from our success in preventing Columbia from descending into a narco-state? The lesson: a tough, courageous national leader willing to use force against the bad guys yet also work with all elements of society is a precondition for U.S. success in stabilizing a country long wracked by violence. And a leader also committed to democratic principles and strengthening/creating the rule of law in the country is a huge bonus. In Columbia, we had both. We also had a 15-year program in that country through administrations of both parties along with Congressional support. Also, Columbia asked us for help. PJK: Our nation’s success in helping Columbia is an outlier as compared to our efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. The points highlighted by Gates are pure genius; and obvious now. They are great points to consider should the U.S. consider future engagement(s) in other countries.
- “We got drug in… and we can’t crawl out.” Soviet leader after their invasion… and same for the U.S. PJK: Never heard this quote before that was attributed to a Soviet military general referencing their country’s efforts in Afghanistan in 1979-89. Sadly, the U.S.’s engagement there had too many similarities.
- While we worry about nuclear proliferation, in truth cyber weapons are more likely to be used than nuclear weapons because they are potentially more damaging; much less risky for the attacker and tougher to trace to the aggressor. Cyber is the most versatile instrument of power because it can be used both overtly and covertly. PJK: So obvious now that the author put it in writing. I still wonder however if Russia will use a tactical nuke in Ukraine. While I’ve thought a lot about cyber threats over the years, I did not fully grasp the advantages that Gates described.
- Hadley concluded: The National Security Advisor is always moving from crisis to crisis, usually at the 11th hour… but if all you do is manage crises you have no time to develop and implement strategies designed to avoid them and shape events. PJK: So true! Are you a crisis manager/leader or a strategic planner? There are some key differences thus when I was a battalion operations officer I physically moved my planner out of the operations center as the minute-by-minute craziness of the environment was too distracting. I have personally been overwhelmed by the crisis of the day in a few assignments vs focusing on the long-term… in the Pentagon, in Afghanistan, etc.
- Chapter 5. So what can we learn from our success in preventing Columbia from descending into a narco-state? The lesson: a tough, courageous national leader willing to use force against the bad guys yet also work with all elements of society is a precondition for U.S. success in stabilizing a country long wracked by violence. And a leader also committed to democratic principles and strengthening/creating the rule of law in the country is a huge bonus. In Columbia, we had both. We also had a 15-year program in that country through administrations of both parties along with Congressional support. Also, Columbia asked us for help. PJK: Our nation’s success in helping Columbia is an outlier as compared to our efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. The points highlighted by Gates are pure genius; and obvious now. They are great points to consider should the U.S. consider future engagement(s) in other countries.
- “We got drug in… and we can’t crawl out.” Soviet leader after their invasion… and same for the U.S. PJK: Never heard this quote before that was attributed to a Soviet military general referencing their country’s efforts in Afghanistan in 1979-89. Sadly, the U.S.’s engagement there had too many similarities.
December 27, 2020
Most of the international relations books I read are academic so it was good to read a book written by someone actually directly engaged with U.S. foreign policy. And Robert Gates is one of those few people who have worked in multiple presidential administrations over several decades, including as CIA director and as secretary of defense under George W. Bush and Obama.
Gates' book is focused on the exercise of a symphony of power for an effective foreign policy - involving not just military power, but also economic power, diplomacy, cyber, development assistance, communications, alliances, sciences and technology, the private sector, and culture and ideology. Gates then proceeds to present chapter-by-chapter reviews of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis different countries, or groupings of countries, focused on the post-cold War presidents Bush Sr., Clinton, Bush Jr., Obama, and Trump.
Whether or not you agree with all of his opinions and conclusions, this is an important book in reviewing U.S. foreign policy successes and failures in the post-Cold War world. I found myself recalibrating my opinions and thinking on more than one matter as I read this book. I also appreciated the inside institutional scope in terms of better understanding how U.S. foreign policy actually works - or doesn't work - in institutional and organizational terms.
Gates makes a strong case for the U.S. needing to emphasize much more strongly non-military levers of power in its foreign policy. Too often the emphasis is on military means rather than the various other means available to us in exercising our power. Gates also makes a strong case for being more strategic and deliberate in when and where we exercise our military power - not relying on the military for nation-building efforts, avoiding mission creep, and ensuring that we are committed to completing our strategic objectives when we send in our military rather than sending in the troops and then not giving them the required resources or letting politics end the mission too early. I'm also more convinced, based on Gates' analysis and the historical examples presented, that military-humanitarian interventions (which I'm otherwise prone to potentially favor) are likely better dealt with through regional and international institutions rather than the U.S. military alone.
Gates' book is focused on the exercise of a symphony of power for an effective foreign policy - involving not just military power, but also economic power, diplomacy, cyber, development assistance, communications, alliances, sciences and technology, the private sector, and culture and ideology. Gates then proceeds to present chapter-by-chapter reviews of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis different countries, or groupings of countries, focused on the post-cold War presidents Bush Sr., Clinton, Bush Jr., Obama, and Trump.
Whether or not you agree with all of his opinions and conclusions, this is an important book in reviewing U.S. foreign policy successes and failures in the post-Cold War world. I found myself recalibrating my opinions and thinking on more than one matter as I read this book. I also appreciated the inside institutional scope in terms of better understanding how U.S. foreign policy actually works - or doesn't work - in institutional and organizational terms.
Gates makes a strong case for the U.S. needing to emphasize much more strongly non-military levers of power in its foreign policy. Too often the emphasis is on military means rather than the various other means available to us in exercising our power. Gates also makes a strong case for being more strategic and deliberate in when and where we exercise our military power - not relying on the military for nation-building efforts, avoiding mission creep, and ensuring that we are committed to completing our strategic objectives when we send in our military rather than sending in the troops and then not giving them the required resources or letting politics end the mission too early. I'm also more convinced, based on Gates' analysis and the historical examples presented, that military-humanitarian interventions (which I'm otherwise prone to potentially favor) are likely better dealt with through regional and international institutions rather than the U.S. military alone.
October 1, 2025
Gates has a great deal to tell us about the way the U.S. government operates. He has collected a series of comments from prominent political actors well worth pondering [and then what???].
Every war is predicted to be short and that prediction is almost always wrong.
“If all you do is manage crises, you have no time to develop strategies designed to avoid them.“
Big bureaucracies offer a few incentives for people in lower levels to challenge conventional wisdom. The drive for consensus is deep in the institutional DNA.
“The bureaucracy produces three alternatives: A - no change; B - ridiculous radical change,certain to be rejected, and C - modest modifications to existing policy - the bureaucracy‘s choice."
“The system is a lot better at killing bad ideas than it is at creating new ones.“
Our State Department is “stunningly bureaucratic.”
As a stubborn, slow moving bureaucracy the Defense Department can make the State Department look as sleek and nimble as an America’s cup sailboat.
When Gates was secretary "there were 27 bureaucratic layers between most action officers in the Pentagon and me."
I don’t think any of the presidents I worked for (except maybe Bush 41) ever thought the State Department really worked for them, but instead viewed it to some kind of alien entity within his administration.
"The biggest doves in Washington wear uniforms, partly because they fear - with good reason - that if things don’t go well, politicians will abandon them."
The biggest hawks in the White House situation room are often the diplomats. [In particular, Madeleine Albright and Hilary Clinton. E.g.: “Albright was as usual, the foremost advocate of a military response." ]
Congressional micro management is experienced every day.
On national security problems presidents rarely have good choices. They just have to figure out the least bad decision.
The U.S. intervention in Somalia was “the first military intervention driven by CNN“ with its constant coverage of starving Somali children.
Donald Rumsfeld said in November 2001 “We ought not to make a career out of transforming Afghanistan."
The Obama "surge" in 2010 in Afghanistan made significant headway “but the progress was temporary because thanks to Obama‘s deadline. The Taliban knew we would be pulling out the following year."
North Korea produced on June 26, 2008 a long awaited declaration reporting on the amount of plutonium they controlled.
The delivery of the declaration was supposed to trigger removal of restrictions, however, in a case of you can’t make this stuff up, the actual copy of the North Korean declaration handed over was covered with dust that contained particles of enriched uranium which the north still denied having.
Every war is predicted to be short and that prediction is almost always wrong.
“If all you do is manage crises, you have no time to develop strategies designed to avoid them.“
Big bureaucracies offer a few incentives for people in lower levels to challenge conventional wisdom. The drive for consensus is deep in the institutional DNA.
“The bureaucracy produces three alternatives: A - no change; B - ridiculous radical change,certain to be rejected, and C - modest modifications to existing policy - the bureaucracy‘s choice."
“The system is a lot better at killing bad ideas than it is at creating new ones.“
Our State Department is “stunningly bureaucratic.”
As a stubborn, slow moving bureaucracy the Defense Department can make the State Department look as sleek and nimble as an America’s cup sailboat.
When Gates was secretary "there were 27 bureaucratic layers between most action officers in the Pentagon and me."
I don’t think any of the presidents I worked for (except maybe Bush 41) ever thought the State Department really worked for them, but instead viewed it to some kind of alien entity within his administration.
"The biggest doves in Washington wear uniforms, partly because they fear - with good reason - that if things don’t go well, politicians will abandon them."
The biggest hawks in the White House situation room are often the diplomats. [In particular, Madeleine Albright and Hilary Clinton. E.g.: “Albright was as usual, the foremost advocate of a military response." ]
Congressional micro management is experienced every day.
On national security problems presidents rarely have good choices. They just have to figure out the least bad decision.
The U.S. intervention in Somalia was “the first military intervention driven by CNN“ with its constant coverage of starving Somali children.
Donald Rumsfeld said in November 2001 “We ought not to make a career out of transforming Afghanistan."
The Obama "surge" in 2010 in Afghanistan made significant headway “but the progress was temporary because thanks to Obama‘s deadline. The Taliban knew we would be pulling out the following year."
North Korea produced on June 26, 2008 a long awaited declaration reporting on the amount of plutonium they controlled.
The delivery of the declaration was supposed to trigger removal of restrictions, however, in a case of you can’t make this stuff up, the actual copy of the North Korean declaration handed over was covered with dust that contained particles of enriched uranium which the north still denied having.
August 4, 2020
Presidents Eisenhower, Reagan and Bush 41 were supremely adept at wielding the instruments of power during critical Cold War years, according to former CIA Director and SecDef Robert Gates in this new sweeping historical volume. The post-Cold War era has brought myriad foreign policy challenges of its own and there is almost none more qualified to bring a straightforward moderate look at these and how US presidents and administrations have handled them than Gates, with his ~40+ years of government experience spanning multiple Administrations—both Democrat and Republican.
“This book assesses their post–Cold War successors’ decisions in fifteen critical places, the effectiveness of their use of the instruments of American power, and the lessons we must learn for the future.”
“I believe that each of the fifteen significant post–Cold War challenges I will examine in the pages to follow must be addressed in its own narrative as it has evolved over time. This will provide the continuity—the story line—essential to understanding the response by successive presidents, and why those challenges remain before us in every instance. Accordingly, I address the challenges separately and roughly chronologically, dating from when each first confronted post–Cold War American leaders. I will also deal with the reality that all the presidents had to confront many of these problems simultaneously and that, routinely, each problem impacted and influenced U.S. decisions on other problems—a sort of three-dimensional chess.” “...a critical component of this book is my effort to explain how and why presidents made the decisions they did, who most influenced them, and the style unique to each.”
In these pages we take away that thorny international affairs problems never really go away and that adept, proportional and appropriate use of ALL instruments of power—not just the DIME (read first chapter on what they all are as I don’t want to spoil it here)—are required to thoughtfully and deliberately respond and protect American interests. A fantastic read!
“This book assesses their post–Cold War successors’ decisions in fifteen critical places, the effectiveness of their use of the instruments of American power, and the lessons we must learn for the future.”
“I believe that each of the fifteen significant post–Cold War challenges I will examine in the pages to follow must be addressed in its own narrative as it has evolved over time. This will provide the continuity—the story line—essential to understanding the response by successive presidents, and why those challenges remain before us in every instance. Accordingly, I address the challenges separately and roughly chronologically, dating from when each first confronted post–Cold War American leaders. I will also deal with the reality that all the presidents had to confront many of these problems simultaneously and that, routinely, each problem impacted and influenced U.S. decisions on other problems—a sort of three-dimensional chess.” “...a critical component of this book is my effort to explain how and why presidents made the decisions they did, who most influenced them, and the style unique to each.”
In these pages we take away that thorny international affairs problems never really go away and that adept, proportional and appropriate use of ALL instruments of power—not just the DIME (read first chapter on what they all are as I don’t want to spoil it here)—are required to thoughtfully and deliberately respond and protect American interests. A fantastic read!
January 1, 2021
Gates argues that the American government was a lot more focused during the Cold War. With a common enemy, we understood the necessity of using all the levels of government and power to fight the USSR. Military, economic aid and development, strategic communications, intelligence and investment in scientific discovery all went to countering Soviet influence around the world. Since the end of the Cold War, various departments within the government have road their own hobby horses.
Congress has defunded the State Department, and development aid to a dangerous level and the military has had to plan for all possible contingencies.
Gates shows this decline in effective American power by analyzing specific challenges faced by the American government in the post-Cold War period--Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Russia, and China. He tops this analysis with judgments of the performance of past presidents and their senior-most advisors, first-hand knowledge, and insider stories.
Why I started this book: Overdrive hold arrived and I was aware of just how many people are waiting behind me.
Why I finished it: Fascinating to see a former Secretary of Defense argue that the United States has relied too much on the military when dealing with its foreign policy. Gates argues that we need more tools in the tool box, that we need to fund the State Department, have a better American PR department and that our military can't solve every problem. That we need to coordinate economic power, development aid, PR, together when dealing with other countries and global crises.
Congress has defunded the State Department, and development aid to a dangerous level and the military has had to plan for all possible contingencies.
Gates shows this decline in effective American power by analyzing specific challenges faced by the American government in the post-Cold War period--Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Russia, and China. He tops this analysis with judgments of the performance of past presidents and their senior-most advisors, first-hand knowledge, and insider stories.
Why I started this book: Overdrive hold arrived and I was aware of just how many people are waiting behind me.
Why I finished it: Fascinating to see a former Secretary of Defense argue that the United States has relied too much on the military when dealing with its foreign policy. Gates argues that we need more tools in the tool box, that we need to fund the State Department, have a better American PR department and that our military can't solve every problem. That we need to coordinate economic power, development aid, PR, together when dealing with other countries and global crises.
August 2, 2020
Bob Gates' latest book is about the different kinds of power that nations can exert in their international roles, focusing on the U.S. and how it has used these forms of power in the post-Cold War era. In addition to the military power which has been used predominantly by America in this era, he delineates several non-military forms which can be employed in the international arena: diplomacy, economic leverage such as sanctions and development assistance, cyber, communications, intelligence (spying), alliances, science and technology, and several others.
He reviews how these various forms of power have been used in America's dealings with Colombia, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Yugoslavian conflicts, Africa, Russia, Ukraine and North Korea. He offers an analysis of the effectiveness of our actions in these countries and whether or not they were successful. A recurring theme is that non-military forms of power could have been applied more often in these conflicts, and that America's image in the world has suffered as a result. We are seen as too quick to resort to military solutions to global issues.
As an advisor and cabinet member in several administrations, he is able to offer insights into the
strategic thinking (and lack of it) that was employed during these conflicts. In the final chapter, he offers recommendations for the use of military and non-military power , especially communications, where he feels that the U.S. needs to do a better job of coordinating and disseminating our views for the maintenance of world peace.
He reviews how these various forms of power have been used in America's dealings with Colombia, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Yugoslavian conflicts, Africa, Russia, Ukraine and North Korea. He offers an analysis of the effectiveness of our actions in these countries and whether or not they were successful. A recurring theme is that non-military forms of power could have been applied more often in these conflicts, and that America's image in the world has suffered as a result. We are seen as too quick to resort to military solutions to global issues.
As an advisor and cabinet member in several administrations, he is able to offer insights into the
strategic thinking (and lack of it) that was employed during these conflicts. In the final chapter, he offers recommendations for the use of military and non-military power , especially communications, where he feels that the U.S. needs to do a better job of coordinating and disseminating our views for the maintenance of world peace.
October 14, 2021
I can understand why 7 Presidents were interested in having Mr.Gates’ voice at their tables. However, this is a case study in why there needs to be multiple voices. Mr. Gates is quite selective in his presentation of events. If this were a high level overview of some important historical “moments,” that would be fine. But this is not an overview. He is making an argument. He wants us to accept his conclusions. Rules of evidence apply.
That’s not to say that I found no value here. His point that there are multiple ways to influence actions of nation-states, and that the likelihood of success is increased when multiple methods are employed rather than over- relying on one, is certainly valuable. You wouldn’t think grown people need to be persuaded of that, but it turns out they do. I think he did a good job, and that is an important contribution.
However I found the arrogance which not only permeates his presentation of his own actions and ideas but also underlies his vision of the role of the US internationally to be very off-putting. I suspect he might have been able to reach a broader audience if he had reigned that in, remembered that throwing out ad hominem statements to support a conclusion is one of the first fallacies one learns in their freshman logic/critical thinking class, and respected his readers’ abilities to digest a more complete and nuanced presentation of the events under analysis. As presented, however, I’m pretty sure he’s just preaching to the choir. (Yes, a cliche. But if the shoe fits….)
That’s not to say that I found no value here. His point that there are multiple ways to influence actions of nation-states, and that the likelihood of success is increased when multiple methods are employed rather than over- relying on one, is certainly valuable. You wouldn’t think grown people need to be persuaded of that, but it turns out they do. I think he did a good job, and that is an important contribution.
However I found the arrogance which not only permeates his presentation of his own actions and ideas but also underlies his vision of the role of the US internationally to be very off-putting. I suspect he might have been able to reach a broader audience if he had reigned that in, remembered that throwing out ad hominem statements to support a conclusion is one of the first fallacies one learns in their freshman logic/critical thinking class, and respected his readers’ abilities to digest a more complete and nuanced presentation of the events under analysis. As presented, however, I’m pretty sure he’s just preaching to the choir. (Yes, a cliche. But if the shoe fits….)
July 11, 2024
"Exercise of Power" provides a comprehensive yet easy-to-follow dive into every major U.S. military and non-military operation since the Cold War. Having served more than half a dozen presidents from the fall of the Soviet Union to our incursions into Iraq and Afghanistan, Mr. Gates has witnessed first-hand the many triumphs and fatal mistakes of the post-Cold War presidents. He contends that presidents often fail to capitalize on the diverse array of options, what he frequently refers to as "non-military instruments of power," made available.
The former Secretary of Defense discusses everything from our failing strategic communication efforts to our underfunded State Department's diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian initiatives. While Mr. Gates admits these tools may not have been the defining factor in our failed nation-building efforts in Haiti, for example, the continued negligence of our potential "symphony of power" is painfully apparent compared to our rivals. For instance, the People's Republic of China is enabled to explore economic, ideological, cultural, scientific, technological, and practically any other field they desire. For the U.S. to stand any hope of challenging China in the decades to come, it is imperative to fund and develop our non-military instruments.
Overall, "Exercise of Power" weaves an engaging narrative of our nation's past while providing an excellent analysis of how our leaders can avoid such mistakes in the future.
The former Secretary of Defense discusses everything from our failing strategic communication efforts to our underfunded State Department's diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian initiatives. While Mr. Gates admits these tools may not have been the defining factor in our failed nation-building efforts in Haiti, for example, the continued negligence of our potential "symphony of power" is painfully apparent compared to our rivals. For instance, the People's Republic of China is enabled to explore economic, ideological, cultural, scientific, technological, and practically any other field they desire. For the U.S. to stand any hope of challenging China in the decades to come, it is imperative to fund and develop our non-military instruments.
Overall, "Exercise of Power" weaves an engaging narrative of our nation's past while providing an excellent analysis of how our leaders can avoid such mistakes in the future.
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