What do you think?
Rate this book
How to Make Love to a Despot: An Alternative Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century
After generations of foreign policy failures, the United States can finally try to make the world safer—not by relying on utopian goals but by working pragmatically with nondemocracies.
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has sunk hundreds of billions of dollars into foreign economies in the hope that its investments would help remake the world in its own image—or, at the very least, make the world “safe for democracy.” So far, the returns have been disappointing, to say the least. Pushing for fair and free elections in undemocratic countries has added to the casualty count, rather than taken away from it, and trying to eliminate corruption entirely has precluded the elimination of some of the worst forms of corruption. In the Middle East, for example, post-9/11 interventionist campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have proved to be long, costly, and, worst of all, ineffective.
Witnessing the failure of the utopian vision of a world full of market-oriented democracies, many observers, both on the right and the left, have begun to embrace a dystopian vision in which the United States can do nothing and save no one. Accordingly, calls to halt all assistance in undemocratic countries have grown louder. But, as Stephen D. Krasner explains, this cannot be an weak and poorly governed states pose a threat to our stability. In the era of nuclear weapons and biological warfare, ignoring troubled countries puts millions of American lives at risk.
“The greatest challenge for the United States now,” Krasner writes, “is to identify a set of policies that lie between the utopian vision that all countries can be like the United States . . . and the dystopian view that nothing can be done.” He prescribes a pragmatic new course of policy. Drawing on decades of research, he makes the case for “good enough governance”—governance that aims for better security, better health, limited economic growth, and some protection of human rights. To this end, Krasner proposes working with despots to promote growth.
In a world where a single terrorist can kill thousands or even hundreds of thousands of people, the United States does not have the luxury of idealistically ignoring the rest of the world. But it cannot remake the world in its own image either. Instead, it must learn how to make love to despots.
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has sunk hundreds of billions of dollars into foreign economies in the hope that its investments would help remake the world in its own image—or, at the very least, make the world “safe for democracy.” So far, the returns have been disappointing, to say the least. Pushing for fair and free elections in undemocratic countries has added to the casualty count, rather than taken away from it, and trying to eliminate corruption entirely has precluded the elimination of some of the worst forms of corruption. In the Middle East, for example, post-9/11 interventionist campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have proved to be long, costly, and, worst of all, ineffective.
Witnessing the failure of the utopian vision of a world full of market-oriented democracies, many observers, both on the right and the left, have begun to embrace a dystopian vision in which the United States can do nothing and save no one. Accordingly, calls to halt all assistance in undemocratic countries have grown louder. But, as Stephen D. Krasner explains, this cannot be an weak and poorly governed states pose a threat to our stability. In the era of nuclear weapons and biological warfare, ignoring troubled countries puts millions of American lives at risk.
“The greatest challenge for the United States now,” Krasner writes, “is to identify a set of policies that lie between the utopian vision that all countries can be like the United States . . . and the dystopian view that nothing can be done.” He prescribes a pragmatic new course of policy. Drawing on decades of research, he makes the case for “good enough governance”—governance that aims for better security, better health, limited economic growth, and some protection of human rights. To this end, Krasner proposes working with despots to promote growth.
In a world where a single terrorist can kill thousands or even hundreds of thousands of people, the United States does not have the luxury of idealistically ignoring the rest of the world. But it cannot remake the world in its own image either. Instead, it must learn how to make love to despots.
320 pages, Kindle Edition
Published April 7, 2020
7 people are currently reading
73 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
February 1, 2021
How to Make Love to a Despot: An Alternative Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century, by Steve D. Krasner, is an interesting foreign policy analysis that advocates for rational choice foreign policy initiatives over other forms of external state building. Krasner argues that dealing with dictators and allowing for slow change, rather than attempting to build democratic polities, is the only way for changes to occur that are positive. Krasner states that the dominant form of statecraft is despotism in some form, and liberal democracies are rare breeds. Not every state can achieve "Denmark" - or if other states are to, than much development needs to take place. This means foreign policy experts and international state builders need to make room for despotism in some form.
This may sound like a poor argument, but Krasner hits the nail on the head. Becoming a democracy is difficult; in fact, recent historical trends show a democratic decline globally. From stable Western democracies, to regimes in Africa and beyond, democracies are on the downswing slowly, as governments in Hungary, Czechia, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia and beyond slide away from democratic tradition that have been recently implemented, toward a sort of electorally sound democracy that is not liberal, nor fully democratic. There are numerous cases globally, and even the bastion of democracy in the globe, and the global hegemon, the USA, seems to be sliding toward a form of institutional corruption of state capture by capital, executive order by the President, and political deadlock from competing interests. Democracy is difficult and messy; it is consensus from the needs and wants of competing elites, industry, military, civil society, and numerous other intersecting interest groups. States with weaker institutions, histories of despotism, with internal conflict and strife, or suffering from economic stagnation, all find it difficult to achieve consolidated democracy. This is a fact that has frustrated external state-builders, like the IMF and World Bank, the US and USSR, and so forth. State builders often approach their craft from a utopian standpoint, assuming that creating economic growth, technological improvements, and institutional capacity will allow democracy to bloom. There have been some successful cases; Japan and Germany are the poster-states for this method. Even so, many more have not succeeded. Afghanistan and Iraq, Vietnam, China, Turkey, Egypt, Nigeria, and so many more nations have been unsuccessful in combating internal strife, corruption, and despotism.
Krasner argues that this is the norm. Democracies in their current form have really only been around since the turn of the 20th century at the earliest. Even at that point, modern democracies like the UK, USA and France all had much more despotic governments that excluded minorities, women and political opponents, and ruled large swathes of the world through colonialism and imperialism. Modern democracies like we see today are rare, and rather new. Their institutions are still seeped in traditions that had been used for oppression. To encourage growth toward a democratic ideal, states need to create their own systems, look at others as role models, and most importantly, keep their nations stable and secure. This is the most pressing difficulty. Security concerns often cause nascent democracies to backslide, whether through coups and regime changes, or the need for a centralized security apparatus that can combat security concerns. This requires the consent of elites, which may need to be bought through resource extraction and capture. It may also require questionable methods, internal warfare, or worse. These things are terrible, but Krasner argues, can be mitigated through international support that is not tied to unpopular institutional changes that may not work in the targeted polity.
This book had some fascinating chapters on models that have failed, specifically Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as Nigeria. It does offer some interesting blueprints, like the Plan Colombia policy that the US adopted. Although Colombia still suffers from internal strife and corruption, it has seen its inequality rates fall slightly, a peace deal with FARC rebels, and the ability to extend governance farther into the interior than ever before. Japan and Germany are also discussed as ideal. Mostly, however, this book is an examination of rational choice policy in international relations, and is a policy book that focuses on why rational choice - ie. dealing with actors on the ground, and generating realistically implementable policy changes works better than adapting utopian and institutional capacity logic.
This is a book that, in the early chapters, has not aged well. It argues that the United States is a beacon on a hill for other nations, who look up to its institutions. It argues that viruses may develop in third world states, and that due to their lack of healthcare infrastructure, will spread to and represent a threat to Western democracies. There is a logic here, and one that COVID-19 seems to prove. However, one of the worst performers for health care right now is the United States. Its private health care model is inadequate to face the crisis. And other nations, such as my native country, Canada, are not far behind. The state in these nations lacks the capacity or ability to implement standards and enforce them. Anti-mask and anti-vaccine rhetoric abounds, and sometimes leads to violence. Elites get vaccinated before those that really need it. Privately manufactured vaccines are stockpiled and sold at high prices, or constrained and released for political gain. Institutional marketing - a form of elite lead corruption found in Western democracies, is leading to a deep erosion of public trust in government. Krasner wrote this book before the COVID-19 outbreak; he is not a prophet, and it shows here. Even so, this book shows starkly the blinders many Western policymakers have been wearing. Weak nations appease the United States because they have no choice. Global actors like the EU, Russia, China and India, as well as numerous regional powers, continue to slowly carve out there own spheres of influence and create greater space for indigenous policy choices. This is an interesting era, and Krasner's book is an interesting piece of discourse on it.
I had some issues with this book, related to its wonky historical perspective. Even so, this book really is a focused look at international relations discourse and policy perspectives related to rational choice theory. From that perspective, it is well done. It's thesis is that external state builders cannot achieve good governance, and therefore should work toward good enough governance. This was a solid read for what it was, and I would look for Krasner in future reads. This may be a tough pill to swallow for the utopians among us; those that think democracy is insolvable, and that nations will achieve democracy if only they get rich enough. This is a falsehood in foreign policy in a big way. States like Singapore, China, Argentina, and many Easter European electoral democracies show that illiberal democracy may be more likely in states where democracy has little or no historical tradition. Democracy can still flourish in some of these states; South Korea, Taiwan and Germany are all excellent examples. Even so, what we see today, and will probably continue to see, are mixed regimes. Rwanda, Brazil and Turkey may be more likely than Denmark, Iceland or Canada.
All in all, a cautious nod of approval for me. Definitely a challenging read for someone who lives in a consolidated democracy. Even so, the arguments for rational choice theory seem to constantly meet reality. Another book on this topic, called The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty, looked at this dichotomy in a more nuanced and analytical fashion. It argues for different perspectives, but may be a good back to back read for those looking to brush up on modern international relations theory. This book; not bad!
This may sound like a poor argument, but Krasner hits the nail on the head. Becoming a democracy is difficult; in fact, recent historical trends show a democratic decline globally. From stable Western democracies, to regimes in Africa and beyond, democracies are on the downswing slowly, as governments in Hungary, Czechia, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia and beyond slide away from democratic tradition that have been recently implemented, toward a sort of electorally sound democracy that is not liberal, nor fully democratic. There are numerous cases globally, and even the bastion of democracy in the globe, and the global hegemon, the USA, seems to be sliding toward a form of institutional corruption of state capture by capital, executive order by the President, and political deadlock from competing interests. Democracy is difficult and messy; it is consensus from the needs and wants of competing elites, industry, military, civil society, and numerous other intersecting interest groups. States with weaker institutions, histories of despotism, with internal conflict and strife, or suffering from economic stagnation, all find it difficult to achieve consolidated democracy. This is a fact that has frustrated external state-builders, like the IMF and World Bank, the US and USSR, and so forth. State builders often approach their craft from a utopian standpoint, assuming that creating economic growth, technological improvements, and institutional capacity will allow democracy to bloom. There have been some successful cases; Japan and Germany are the poster-states for this method. Even so, many more have not succeeded. Afghanistan and Iraq, Vietnam, China, Turkey, Egypt, Nigeria, and so many more nations have been unsuccessful in combating internal strife, corruption, and despotism.
Krasner argues that this is the norm. Democracies in their current form have really only been around since the turn of the 20th century at the earliest. Even at that point, modern democracies like the UK, USA and France all had much more despotic governments that excluded minorities, women and political opponents, and ruled large swathes of the world through colonialism and imperialism. Modern democracies like we see today are rare, and rather new. Their institutions are still seeped in traditions that had been used for oppression. To encourage growth toward a democratic ideal, states need to create their own systems, look at others as role models, and most importantly, keep their nations stable and secure. This is the most pressing difficulty. Security concerns often cause nascent democracies to backslide, whether through coups and regime changes, or the need for a centralized security apparatus that can combat security concerns. This requires the consent of elites, which may need to be bought through resource extraction and capture. It may also require questionable methods, internal warfare, or worse. These things are terrible, but Krasner argues, can be mitigated through international support that is not tied to unpopular institutional changes that may not work in the targeted polity.
This book had some fascinating chapters on models that have failed, specifically Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as Nigeria. It does offer some interesting blueprints, like the Plan Colombia policy that the US adopted. Although Colombia still suffers from internal strife and corruption, it has seen its inequality rates fall slightly, a peace deal with FARC rebels, and the ability to extend governance farther into the interior than ever before. Japan and Germany are also discussed as ideal. Mostly, however, this book is an examination of rational choice policy in international relations, and is a policy book that focuses on why rational choice - ie. dealing with actors on the ground, and generating realistically implementable policy changes works better than adapting utopian and institutional capacity logic.
This is a book that, in the early chapters, has not aged well. It argues that the United States is a beacon on a hill for other nations, who look up to its institutions. It argues that viruses may develop in third world states, and that due to their lack of healthcare infrastructure, will spread to and represent a threat to Western democracies. There is a logic here, and one that COVID-19 seems to prove. However, one of the worst performers for health care right now is the United States. Its private health care model is inadequate to face the crisis. And other nations, such as my native country, Canada, are not far behind. The state in these nations lacks the capacity or ability to implement standards and enforce them. Anti-mask and anti-vaccine rhetoric abounds, and sometimes leads to violence. Elites get vaccinated before those that really need it. Privately manufactured vaccines are stockpiled and sold at high prices, or constrained and released for political gain. Institutional marketing - a form of elite lead corruption found in Western democracies, is leading to a deep erosion of public trust in government. Krasner wrote this book before the COVID-19 outbreak; he is not a prophet, and it shows here. Even so, this book shows starkly the blinders many Western policymakers have been wearing. Weak nations appease the United States because they have no choice. Global actors like the EU, Russia, China and India, as well as numerous regional powers, continue to slowly carve out there own spheres of influence and create greater space for indigenous policy choices. This is an interesting era, and Krasner's book is an interesting piece of discourse on it.
I had some issues with this book, related to its wonky historical perspective. Even so, this book really is a focused look at international relations discourse and policy perspectives related to rational choice theory. From that perspective, it is well done. It's thesis is that external state builders cannot achieve good governance, and therefore should work toward good enough governance. This was a solid read for what it was, and I would look for Krasner in future reads. This may be a tough pill to swallow for the utopians among us; those that think democracy is insolvable, and that nations will achieve democracy if only they get rich enough. This is a falsehood in foreign policy in a big way. States like Singapore, China, Argentina, and many Easter European electoral democracies show that illiberal democracy may be more likely in states where democracy has little or no historical tradition. Democracy can still flourish in some of these states; South Korea, Taiwan and Germany are all excellent examples. Even so, what we see today, and will probably continue to see, are mixed regimes. Rwanda, Brazil and Turkey may be more likely than Denmark, Iceland or Canada.
All in all, a cautious nod of approval for me. Definitely a challenging read for someone who lives in a consolidated democracy. Even so, the arguments for rational choice theory seem to constantly meet reality. Another book on this topic, called The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty, looked at this dichotomy in a more nuanced and analytical fashion. It argues for different perspectives, but may be a good back to back read for those looking to brush up on modern international relations theory. This book; not bad!
December 22, 2023
An intelligent man makes an insightful argument with entirely too many words, most of which seem to be chosen for maximum repetitiveness.
Still, a very educational read!
Still, a very educational read!
August 12, 2020
Interesting book on the state of American foreign policy, which looks in particular at instances when the United States succeeding in creating consolidated democracies (Japan & Germany) and spectacularly failed (Iraq & Afghanistan). Krasner develops his theory on the development of democracies by citing and investigating copious examples from Sub-saharan africa and south america, as well as the American South after the Civil War.
Over all the book was interesting, and benefitted from relatively simple, easy to remember conclusions. A major drawback of this book is that it is written in the style of academia (too many specific examples of each theoretical point) which makes the book entirely too long and somewhat tedious.
My copy is 250 pages, the same argumentation could have been achieved in half of that, if not less.
Over all the book was interesting, and benefitted from relatively simple, easy to remember conclusions. A major drawback of this book is that it is written in the style of academia (too many specific examples of each theoretical point) which makes the book entirely too long and somewhat tedious.
My copy is 250 pages, the same argumentation could have been achieved in half of that, if not less.
March 20, 2022
I firmly disagree with this book. It's a clear example of bad analysis, a history of the world without critical context or understanding of economics, biased by an American worldview, rots the very foundations of the argument.
The book has an interesting, if ultimately incorrect, idea - perhaps sinking billions of dollars into the development of foreign economies and intervening in other countries militarily to impose democracy, human rights, and end corruption is a long, costly, and worst of all, ineffective strategy. Pitched as a middle road between a failed utopian vision of the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy and a dystopian abandonment of world responsibility through isolationism, Steve makes a case for realism in American foreign policy - replacing the "good governance" of the Washington Consensus with "good enough governance". In his view, this is the pragmatic choice between our ideological and moral values and our own national security and interest.
There is an omission of the many, many, many times that the US has "made love to despots", supporting them and overthrowing/killing/intimidating those who might lead progress. There is a lack of critical analysis in these instances of the moral and humanitarian implications, but also of the links to American interest (are we really more secure or are we just supporting the profit of elites and ultimately undermining our own democracy?)
And for all the analysis of "Blowback" from the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, there is a lack of understanding that "Blowback" is also a part of "making love to despots", coups, election interference, and other US foreign policy actions. This leaves us incomplete as we see all the incompetence of one option, are given a select few examples of where the other option "worked" even though the approach itself is not responsible for "success" as it is poorly defined.
There are some truths here, Steve sees the flaws in American grand strategy. But given an incomplete picture of history and economics, he misdiagnoses their cause and ultimately comes to a conclusion that amounts to - we should go back to what "worked before" during the Cold War.
Some specific example:
- Plan Columbia is described as an exemplary model for "good enough governance". This is a situation in which a people's movement for sovereignty, human rights, and the opportunity to develop has been crushed and oppressed by violence from a US-backed elite. This is a country where 3 men own more than 10% of the country's GDP, in the US (a country which has it's own inequality problem) that would equate to $2 trillion (more than 11x the wealth of Jeff Bezos). The United States provided financial aid, covert intel, and military resources (including 200 attack helicopters) to the Columbian government and army with the specific intention of aiding a regime with weak legitimacy. By supporting a return to the status quo, the US keeps the Columbian state and elite reliant on American goodwill and the Columbian people subservient to corporate interests. This is a far more dystopian vision of the future, would it not be better to stop propping-up the corrupt elite leading to change.
- Japan and Germany are described a triumph for American democracy. However, it's clear that both countries totalitarian systems had been discredited by total defeat in WW2. In it's place a new system would arise and their would be influence by both the governing philosophies of the modern super powers - the USSR (Communism) and the US (Capitalism). Given the high-levels of education, industrial know-how, and skill of their populations, both countries were in a great position to grow and prosper regardless of their choice of economic system following reconstruction. Yet, a capitalistic system was preferred by and backed by the elites as a means of maintaining their control and exploitation of the working class. In both West Germany and Japan rather than relying on democracy to guide this process, the US would intervene directly to guarantee that the choice beneficial to its interests succeeded.
- Iraq and Afghanistan - both countries are clearly flawed states by design, with the US attempting to prop-up centralized nation-states despite borders that divide and combine peoples of different tribe, culture, language, ethnicity, and religion. Without a sharing of power, the cultivation of trust & identity, and economic incentives to cooperation over competition/conflict these fault lines play a critical role in US failure in both countries. I think Steve's suggestions here are reasonable assuming an inability to change borders. However, it's clear that if the US publicly acknowledged this issue and guided the reorganization of states into consolidated polities it would actually lay a better foundation for democracy and prosperity. Unfortunately doing so would "open a can of worms" as the Middle East is far from the only part of the world where Colonialism led to deeply flawed borders. A restructuring of the nation-state system at large was not being considered (and was even considered sacrilegious because of the risks involved to American interests), so this was ignored. I think the simpler option was to not intervene at all in this case - but assuming intervention, we had a responsibility to do far more, not less.
The book has an interesting, if ultimately incorrect, idea - perhaps sinking billions of dollars into the development of foreign economies and intervening in other countries militarily to impose democracy, human rights, and end corruption is a long, costly, and worst of all, ineffective strategy. Pitched as a middle road between a failed utopian vision of the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy and a dystopian abandonment of world responsibility through isolationism, Steve makes a case for realism in American foreign policy - replacing the "good governance" of the Washington Consensus with "good enough governance". In his view, this is the pragmatic choice between our ideological and moral values and our own national security and interest.
There is an omission of the many, many, many times that the US has "made love to despots", supporting them and overthrowing/killing/intimidating those who might lead progress. There is a lack of critical analysis in these instances of the moral and humanitarian implications, but also of the links to American interest (are we really more secure or are we just supporting the profit of elites and ultimately undermining our own democracy?)
And for all the analysis of "Blowback" from the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, there is a lack of understanding that "Blowback" is also a part of "making love to despots", coups, election interference, and other US foreign policy actions. This leaves us incomplete as we see all the incompetence of one option, are given a select few examples of where the other option "worked" even though the approach itself is not responsible for "success" as it is poorly defined.
There are some truths here, Steve sees the flaws in American grand strategy. But given an incomplete picture of history and economics, he misdiagnoses their cause and ultimately comes to a conclusion that amounts to - we should go back to what "worked before" during the Cold War.
Some specific example:
- Plan Columbia is described as an exemplary model for "good enough governance". This is a situation in which a people's movement for sovereignty, human rights, and the opportunity to develop has been crushed and oppressed by violence from a US-backed elite. This is a country where 3 men own more than 10% of the country's GDP, in the US (a country which has it's own inequality problem) that would equate to $2 trillion (more than 11x the wealth of Jeff Bezos). The United States provided financial aid, covert intel, and military resources (including 200 attack helicopters) to the Columbian government and army with the specific intention of aiding a regime with weak legitimacy. By supporting a return to the status quo, the US keeps the Columbian state and elite reliant on American goodwill and the Columbian people subservient to corporate interests. This is a far more dystopian vision of the future, would it not be better to stop propping-up the corrupt elite leading to change.
- Japan and Germany are described a triumph for American democracy. However, it's clear that both countries totalitarian systems had been discredited by total defeat in WW2. In it's place a new system would arise and their would be influence by both the governing philosophies of the modern super powers - the USSR (Communism) and the US (Capitalism). Given the high-levels of education, industrial know-how, and skill of their populations, both countries were in a great position to grow and prosper regardless of their choice of economic system following reconstruction. Yet, a capitalistic system was preferred by and backed by the elites as a means of maintaining their control and exploitation of the working class. In both West Germany and Japan rather than relying on democracy to guide this process, the US would intervene directly to guarantee that the choice beneficial to its interests succeeded.
- Iraq and Afghanistan - both countries are clearly flawed states by design, with the US attempting to prop-up centralized nation-states despite borders that divide and combine peoples of different tribe, culture, language, ethnicity, and religion. Without a sharing of power, the cultivation of trust & identity, and economic incentives to cooperation over competition/conflict these fault lines play a critical role in US failure in both countries. I think Steve's suggestions here are reasonable assuming an inability to change borders. However, it's clear that if the US publicly acknowledged this issue and guided the reorganization of states into consolidated polities it would actually lay a better foundation for democracy and prosperity. Unfortunately doing so would "open a can of worms" as the Middle East is far from the only part of the world where Colonialism led to deeply flawed borders. A restructuring of the nation-state system at large was not being considered (and was even considered sacrilegious because of the risks involved to American interests), so this was ignored. I think the simpler option was to not intervene at all in this case - but assuming intervention, we had a responsibility to do far more, not less.
August 3, 2022
A nice book jacket covers the fact that this is a book that peddles an interesting idea very poorly. Essentially, Krasner's conceit is that the US shouldn't be so obsessed with misguided and naive nation-building in vein with lofty western liberal ideals. Obviously this aspect of US Foreign Policy is highly criticized, and for good reason. In lieu, Krasner suggests that US aid should be granted to countries that are doing "good enough governance". These countries may still have power in the hands of a rent-seeking elite, but as long as they are making gradually more liberally minded small policy changes, that works.
The problem is that Krasner doesn't really explain what a foreign policy centered on "good enough governance" means. He dedicates most of the book on the US's failures of policy. It came off as really irritating at times. The only time where I felt Krasner provided a concise example of his hypothetical policy framework was when he described Colombia post-peace agreement with the FARC. Wow, how that chapter has aged like Milk!
To make matters worse, there is a portion of a chapter where Krasner more or less condones Soviet interventionism in the Warsaw Pact because the Soviets cared more for "good enough governance" than democracy building. Is this example suppose to make me think that Krasner's argument is appealing? Because it doesn't. It's actually just stupid.
The problem is that Krasner doesn't really explain what a foreign policy centered on "good enough governance" means. He dedicates most of the book on the US's failures of policy. It came off as really irritating at times. The only time where I felt Krasner provided a concise example of his hypothetical policy framework was when he described Colombia post-peace agreement with the FARC. Wow, how that chapter has aged like Milk!
To make matters worse, there is a portion of a chapter where Krasner more or less condones Soviet interventionism in the Warsaw Pact because the Soviets cared more for "good enough governance" than democracy building. Is this example suppose to make me think that Krasner's argument is appealing? Because it doesn't. It's actually just stupid.
October 23, 2020
pretty good beginner book on specific topics of FoPo, and it makes an interesting case. might return to it at some point
January 4, 2024
I liked two things about this book:
1. It highlights its main argument so often that it's impossible not to have it stuck in you. Here it goes: Instead of striving to develop (or impose) a consolidated democracy in the countries considered "failed or failing," the US should rather aim to establish a "good enough governance."
2. References to Dylan Thomas? Several references are made to the poem "Do Not Go Gently into That Good Night." Each time, those made me think of the Morphine song - Do not go quietly onto your grave. I don't know what this information will help me in discussing this book on my Foreign Policy Analysis course, or how it would contribute to this review, but it was simply an appealing detail.
1. It highlights its main argument so often that it's impossible not to have it stuck in you. Here it goes: Instead of striving to develop (or impose) a consolidated democracy in the countries considered "failed or failing," the US should rather aim to establish a "good enough governance."
2. References to Dylan Thomas? Several references are made to the poem "Do Not Go Gently into That Good Night." Each time, those made me think of the Morphine song - Do not go quietly onto your grave. I don't know what this information will help me in discussing this book on my Foreign Policy Analysis course, or how it would contribute to this review, but it was simply an appealing detail.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews