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China's Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia
Under the ambitious leadership of President Xi Jinping, China is zealously transforming its wealth and economic power into potent tools of global political influence. But China's foreign policy initiatives, even the vaunted "Belt and Road," will be shaped and redefined as they confront the ground realities of local and regional politics outside China. In China's Western Horizon, Daniel S. Markey, a scholar of international relations and former member of the U.S. State Department's policy planning staff, previews how China's efforts are likely to play out along its "western horizon: " across the swath of Eurasia that includes South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
Drawing from extensive interviews, travels, and historical research, Markey describes how perceptions of China vary widely within states such as Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran. Powerful and privileged groups across the region often expect to profit from their connections to China, while others fear commercial and political losses. Similarly, Eurasian statesmen are scrambling to harness China's energy purchases, arms sales, and infrastructure investment. These leaders are working with China in order to outdo their strategic competitors, including India and Saudi Arabia, and simultaneously negotiating relations with Russia and America. On balance, Markey anticipates that China's deepening involvement will play to the advantage of regional strongmen and exacerbate the political tensions within and among Eurasian states. To make the most of America's limited influence in China's backyard (and elsewhere), he argues that U.S. policymakers should pursue a selective and localized strategy to serve America's specific aims in Eurasia and to better compete with China over the long run.
Drawing from extensive interviews, travels, and historical research, Markey describes how perceptions of China vary widely within states such as Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran. Powerful and privileged groups across the region often expect to profit from their connections to China, while others fear commercial and political losses. Similarly, Eurasian statesmen are scrambling to harness China's energy purchases, arms sales, and infrastructure investment. These leaders are working with China in order to outdo their strategic competitors, including India and Saudi Arabia, and simultaneously negotiating relations with Russia and America. On balance, Markey anticipates that China's deepening involvement will play to the advantage of regional strongmen and exacerbate the political tensions within and among Eurasian states. To make the most of America's limited influence in China's backyard (and elsewhere), he argues that U.S. policymakers should pursue a selective and localized strategy to serve America's specific aims in Eurasia and to better compete with China over the long run.
336 pages, Hardcover
Published March 2, 2020
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April 10, 2022
China's Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia, by Daniel Markey, is a newer look at China's economic and political objectives West of its borders. Markey looks at Chinese objectives in Pakistan, the "show room" of China's Belt and Road Initiative, and one of China's closest political partners. Markey also examines Kazakhstan, where the BRI was kickstarted, as well as the Middle East, comparing Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Russia. Finally, an obligatory section on the impacts of US foreign policy is present. China's objectives are multifaceted - China looks to increase the economic opportunities of the nations within its periphery, thus increasing economic activity in a region largely neglected by the international community over the previous decades pre-2000's. One of the main reasons for this is the need for secure routes for import/export, especially within the energy sector. China is particularly vulnerable to maritime chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, and seeks more secure land routes within and between friendly nations. Thus transit facilities to Europe are being built across the Eurasian continent, with Khorgos, in Kazakhstan, a prime example. China is also seeking to build secure and functional naval ports and bases along the maritime route of the BRI, with ports in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Cambodia and Djibouti already in the works.
Markey notes the interesting contrasts between the economic and political aims of China's BRI and push westward. The nations China invests in are highly volatile, and political upheaval, whether tied to cycles of autocratic leader or the transition between democratically elected political parties, effect BRI investments. In a democratic country, one political party is often tied closely to Chinese investment, whereas an opposing party may look to stall or reconsider said projects - closely tying electoral cycles to great power politics in the region. Regional rivalries and hegemonic overtones are also present. China seeks to secure oil and gas resources, and thus trades with both Saudi Arabia (by far its biggest oil supplier) and Iran, both arch-rivals in the Middle East. The threat of conflict in these areas is not small, and China seeks to balance both interests while continuing a secure source of necessary energy resources. In contrast, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian states, are vulnerable to Russian hegemonic pressures - a topic more pressing than ever in the face of its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the continued verbal threats and pressures being exerted on Kazakhstan in the wake of the invasion. Russia is certainly a central part of the BRI, and it remains to be seen what will change in terms of its severance from the global economic system. Will this put a strain on China-Russia relations, or will China step in and gain a greater share of the Russian economy as a result of Russia's vulnerability? This will and many other factors are at play, and will dynamically change after the writing of this review. Suffice to say, however, Russia remains an active and aggressive partner in Central Asia - Markey calls Russia the "Gun" and China the "Bank" in this 2020 read. Will Russia jealously pursue hegemony in Kazakhstan, or will Chinese interests in securing energy and transit routes play out? Will the two states be able to cooperate, or not? Remains to be seen.
A big topic of this book, however, transcends what China wants. One of the biggest factors that will play a role in China's ability to pursue BRI goals and projects is the wants and needs of local actors. This is a topic that is often ignored in many analysis on the BRI, or its geopolitical implications. It is often noted that China will either get its way, or not, depending on the actions of Western actors and investment groups. However, the biggest, and sadly, the most neglected stakeholders in these analyses are local actors. The whims of the Kazakh political elite, and their constituents, will arguably have a greater say in Chinese projects than those of any great power or regional partner, for example. China will navigate the waters of the wants and needs of local populations and politicians, and is doing so rather awkwardly at first, although this author posits, with greater flexibility and confidence as time goes on. China has been rather benign (but not always so, see Tibet annexation, Korean War, or the China-Vietnam conflict in 1979 as examples) on the political front, often seeking partnerships and agreements over territory or political influence in recent years. This may change over time, as China becomes increasingly imbedded in the interests of projects in neighbouring states. An interesting recent example is China's attempts to unite Nepal's two Communist parties into a joint electoral bloc, which was briefly successful but collapsed in early 2022. It remains to be seen whether China will attempt to ally with one party in an electoral system, or will seek project support at the bureaucratic-level, thus transcending electoral cycles, but potentially weakening public support. Events in Pakistan in early 2022, with a potential no-confidence vote against President Imran Khan in the works, show the vulnerability of China's political support, and may be an interesting case study.
All in all, a very interesting book that is quite on the pulse of events that we may see occur in terms of China's outreach to neighbouring nations. Although published in 2020, and written in the pre-COVID era, this book has interesting commentary that is relevant to China's attempts at economic and political outreach right up to the time of writing. Interesting discussion on China's naval ambitions in the Solomon Islands, its outreach to political parties in Nepal and Pakistan, and its relationship with Russia and the Central Asian states in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict in early 2022, are all present within this book and examined within the context of a few notable nations. The questions and analysis on how China may react to conflicts between two BRI states, the ambitions of regional powers, and through the political cycles of electoral politics, are all current and pressing geopolitical events that will be of interest in the coming decade or longer. Markey's book give a great overview of some of these issues, and how they may effect foreign policy in other nations, notably the US.
Markey notes the interesting contrasts between the economic and political aims of China's BRI and push westward. The nations China invests in are highly volatile, and political upheaval, whether tied to cycles of autocratic leader or the transition between democratically elected political parties, effect BRI investments. In a democratic country, one political party is often tied closely to Chinese investment, whereas an opposing party may look to stall or reconsider said projects - closely tying electoral cycles to great power politics in the region. Regional rivalries and hegemonic overtones are also present. China seeks to secure oil and gas resources, and thus trades with both Saudi Arabia (by far its biggest oil supplier) and Iran, both arch-rivals in the Middle East. The threat of conflict in these areas is not small, and China seeks to balance both interests while continuing a secure source of necessary energy resources. In contrast, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian states, are vulnerable to Russian hegemonic pressures - a topic more pressing than ever in the face of its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the continued verbal threats and pressures being exerted on Kazakhstan in the wake of the invasion. Russia is certainly a central part of the BRI, and it remains to be seen what will change in terms of its severance from the global economic system. Will this put a strain on China-Russia relations, or will China step in and gain a greater share of the Russian economy as a result of Russia's vulnerability? This will and many other factors are at play, and will dynamically change after the writing of this review. Suffice to say, however, Russia remains an active and aggressive partner in Central Asia - Markey calls Russia the "Gun" and China the "Bank" in this 2020 read. Will Russia jealously pursue hegemony in Kazakhstan, or will Chinese interests in securing energy and transit routes play out? Will the two states be able to cooperate, or not? Remains to be seen.
A big topic of this book, however, transcends what China wants. One of the biggest factors that will play a role in China's ability to pursue BRI goals and projects is the wants and needs of local actors. This is a topic that is often ignored in many analysis on the BRI, or its geopolitical implications. It is often noted that China will either get its way, or not, depending on the actions of Western actors and investment groups. However, the biggest, and sadly, the most neglected stakeholders in these analyses are local actors. The whims of the Kazakh political elite, and their constituents, will arguably have a greater say in Chinese projects than those of any great power or regional partner, for example. China will navigate the waters of the wants and needs of local populations and politicians, and is doing so rather awkwardly at first, although this author posits, with greater flexibility and confidence as time goes on. China has been rather benign (but not always so, see Tibet annexation, Korean War, or the China-Vietnam conflict in 1979 as examples) on the political front, often seeking partnerships and agreements over territory or political influence in recent years. This may change over time, as China becomes increasingly imbedded in the interests of projects in neighbouring states. An interesting recent example is China's attempts to unite Nepal's two Communist parties into a joint electoral bloc, which was briefly successful but collapsed in early 2022. It remains to be seen whether China will attempt to ally with one party in an electoral system, or will seek project support at the bureaucratic-level, thus transcending electoral cycles, but potentially weakening public support. Events in Pakistan in early 2022, with a potential no-confidence vote against President Imran Khan in the works, show the vulnerability of China's political support, and may be an interesting case study.
All in all, a very interesting book that is quite on the pulse of events that we may see occur in terms of China's outreach to neighbouring nations. Although published in 2020, and written in the pre-COVID era, this book has interesting commentary that is relevant to China's attempts at economic and political outreach right up to the time of writing. Interesting discussion on China's naval ambitions in the Solomon Islands, its outreach to political parties in Nepal and Pakistan, and its relationship with Russia and the Central Asian states in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict in early 2022, are all present within this book and examined within the context of a few notable nations. The questions and analysis on how China may react to conflicts between two BRI states, the ambitions of regional powers, and through the political cycles of electoral politics, are all current and pressing geopolitical events that will be of interest in the coming decade or longer. Markey's book give a great overview of some of these issues, and how they may effect foreign policy in other nations, notably the US.
September 12, 2022
Good book. Tackles China's Western frontier. Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, but also China. Offers some insights into U.S.' strategy toward China. Some good points on BRI, too. Good to read together with Elizabeth Economy's "The World According to China".
January 16, 2025
China's Western Horizon: Beijing and the new Geopolitics of Eurasia by Daniel Markey is a very capable narrative exploration of a China's dynamic and changing ties with different regions across Asia, focusing mostly on South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. It is good, but it is also showing its age. What might have been prescient and highly instructive in 2018/19 (likely when the writing was just about wrapped up) is showing its age at the turn of 2025. Some of it is evergreen, but other sections need a bit of an update.
November 8, 2022
Page 159 (my book)
China’s influence is like a rising tide that seeps into every open space.
The author examines China’s geo-political relations to the west of her borders – with Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and the Middle East (Iran and Saudi Arabia).
China is expanding its grandiose plans of a “Belt and Silk Initiative” which is a vast economic transportation link to the West. It is involved in building a port in Gwadar, Pakistan, along with railroads and roads to Pakistan. This would facilitate its access to essential oil supplies in the Persian Gulf.
The same is happening in Kazakhstan with the construction of massive projects. In Pakistan, it has to deal with a very corrupt infrastructure (the U.S. knows all about this). Also, there is a tenuous line of not offending. In the case of Pakistan, India could become very suspicious of strong ties between China and its perennial adversary, Pakistan. India could easily perceive China as transgressing its power base in the Indian Ocean.
With Kazakhstan, Russia could also feel threatened as it sees Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan…) as its sphere of influence.
China likes to assert that its expansion is purely economic, but as the author states, there are always political and military implications associated with economic development. How will Russia and India deal with this? Will tensions escalate?
China is now installing its own military base in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa. This is the first time its military is moving beyond China. When Libya fell apart in 2011 China sent its military to help evacuate 35,000 of its citizens.
China is buying more and more oil from both Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is essential to maintain it’s economic growth. Iran was a good customer for China to pursue – as it was isolated from the West. In return, China sells it military weapons. To a lesser extent, it also sells military equipment to Saudi Arabia – but certainly not at the same level as the U.S.
The author brings up that it is easy for China to deal with these authoritarian regimes. They speak the same language. China also sells them I.T. expertise, enabling them to survey and monitor their citizens. There is no need for them to discuss human rights. China is largely unconcerned about atrocities, like the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. I did feel the author somewhat hypocritical on this topic – the U.S. has for several decades supported vicious dictatorships in Central and South America who had little regards to human rights abuses. Mind you, from time to time the U.S. had to face exposure from the media for this, something that China does not have to concern itself with – at least within its own media.
This is a highly interesting, and topical book. Prior to the ascent of Xi Jinping, China was relatively quiet on the international stage. Now it is far more vocal – or muscular. It constantly protests against U.S. hegemony – and does not shy away from projecting its own dominance – or hegemony.
Even though China is more comfortable dealing with authoritarian regimes, it also has to deal with the unpredictability that surfaces in those precarious regions. In Pakistan (page 74) terrorists killed several Chinese workers. China may have to bring in some kind of military to protect its economic projects.
In the West, it may have to face other concerns like human rights issues and environmental laws, but it generally does not worry about physical threats. One must remember that the vast bulk of China’s trade is with Western countries.
China position in the world has changed dramatically in the last thirty years. Before, it was hardly recognized as an international power player – and many countries are only now starting to realize and digest its power as the new giant.
Page 17
By 2020, 200 million Chinese, a number that would rank as the seventh largest country in the world, will travel outside China each year for business.
The author discusses that China has established an international banking system – “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank” to compete with the IMF.
This book was published before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It would be interesting to know how this is viewed from the Chinese perspective. Also, there is no mention of Covid. The Taliban are now back in charge in Afghanistan – this must be a source of concern to China.
Page 111
Russia’s 2018 GDP measured less than 12 percent of China’s… Russia accounted for a tiny 1.9 percent of China’s overseas export in 2017.
Page 115
As China continues to grow it threatens to leave Russia “at the margins of international decision-making.”
One further note – this book is over 300 pages in length – and over 100 pages consist of footnotes.
China’s influence is like a rising tide that seeps into every open space.
The author examines China’s geo-political relations to the west of her borders – with Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and the Middle East (Iran and Saudi Arabia).
China is expanding its grandiose plans of a “Belt and Silk Initiative” which is a vast economic transportation link to the West. It is involved in building a port in Gwadar, Pakistan, along with railroads and roads to Pakistan. This would facilitate its access to essential oil supplies in the Persian Gulf.
The same is happening in Kazakhstan with the construction of massive projects. In Pakistan, it has to deal with a very corrupt infrastructure (the U.S. knows all about this). Also, there is a tenuous line of not offending. In the case of Pakistan, India could become very suspicious of strong ties between China and its perennial adversary, Pakistan. India could easily perceive China as transgressing its power base in the Indian Ocean.
With Kazakhstan, Russia could also feel threatened as it sees Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan…) as its sphere of influence.
China likes to assert that its expansion is purely economic, but as the author states, there are always political and military implications associated with economic development. How will Russia and India deal with this? Will tensions escalate?
China is now installing its own military base in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa. This is the first time its military is moving beyond China. When Libya fell apart in 2011 China sent its military to help evacuate 35,000 of its citizens.
China is buying more and more oil from both Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is essential to maintain it’s economic growth. Iran was a good customer for China to pursue – as it was isolated from the West. In return, China sells it military weapons. To a lesser extent, it also sells military equipment to Saudi Arabia – but certainly not at the same level as the U.S.
The author brings up that it is easy for China to deal with these authoritarian regimes. They speak the same language. China also sells them I.T. expertise, enabling them to survey and monitor their citizens. There is no need for them to discuss human rights. China is largely unconcerned about atrocities, like the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. I did feel the author somewhat hypocritical on this topic – the U.S. has for several decades supported vicious dictatorships in Central and South America who had little regards to human rights abuses. Mind you, from time to time the U.S. had to face exposure from the media for this, something that China does not have to concern itself with – at least within its own media.
This is a highly interesting, and topical book. Prior to the ascent of Xi Jinping, China was relatively quiet on the international stage. Now it is far more vocal – or muscular. It constantly protests against U.S. hegemony – and does not shy away from projecting its own dominance – or hegemony.
Even though China is more comfortable dealing with authoritarian regimes, it also has to deal with the unpredictability that surfaces in those precarious regions. In Pakistan (page 74) terrorists killed several Chinese workers. China may have to bring in some kind of military to protect its economic projects.
In the West, it may have to face other concerns like human rights issues and environmental laws, but it generally does not worry about physical threats. One must remember that the vast bulk of China’s trade is with Western countries.
China position in the world has changed dramatically in the last thirty years. Before, it was hardly recognized as an international power player – and many countries are only now starting to realize and digest its power as the new giant.
Page 17
By 2020, 200 million Chinese, a number that would rank as the seventh largest country in the world, will travel outside China each year for business.
The author discusses that China has established an international banking system – “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank” to compete with the IMF.
This book was published before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It would be interesting to know how this is viewed from the Chinese perspective. Also, there is no mention of Covid. The Taliban are now back in charge in Afghanistan – this must be a source of concern to China.
Page 111
Russia’s 2018 GDP measured less than 12 percent of China’s… Russia accounted for a tiny 1.9 percent of China’s overseas export in 2017.
Page 115
As China continues to grow it threatens to leave Russia “at the margins of international decision-making.”
One further note – this book is over 300 pages in length – and over 100 pages consist of footnotes.
September 24, 2024
So, this book is about the foreign policy of China, specifically focused on the nations to the west. The author makes the point early on that a lot of the U.S-based discussion of Chinese foreign policy covers primarily Southeast Asia, so this is an area that could use some attention.
Right off the bat, let me say that this is more of an academic book than a popular history sort of thing. The author doesn't have a political agenda (or at least not an obvious one) and is a senior research professor dealing in these types of issues. The book is therefore not intended to be a narrative or a piece designed to push a specific policy, but is a more serious look at China's influence across the region.
The book starts off with a brief overview, and then discusses Chinese relations with three nations specifically, which were chosen to represent different geographical areas. The three nations chosen were Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran. While all three don't necessarily have the same relationship with China as their neighbors, the author felt like these were reasonable cases studies.
I'm not going to get into the details on each nation, but Markey does a nice job of covering the background of the relationship with China and any critical internal considerations before getting into detail on China's policy. One key point that the author makes early and is demonstrated throughout the book is that each nation is a very individual and critical actor in the relationship. They have their own internal politics and the leaders have their own agenda, which may or may not align with Chinese interests. All of them need to consider their relationship with China, but that doesn't mean they will blindly follow wherever they are lead.
One common theme is China's use of economic power as opposed to direct political influence. China has historically officially been very non-interventionist when it comes to other nations and plays up that philosophy regularly. The reality is (as usual) more nuanced, but the author does demonstrate that China's policy is slowly becoming more assertive, even if they use the same language as previously.
The final section of the book deals with US-China relations, specifically with regard to the region in question. Markey seems to be recommending a mixed policy toward nations in the area, treating each individually instead of a one-size-fits-all agenda. I would have personally preferred more concrete recommendations, but Markey really presented things as more of options or a menu than a coherent strategy.
Overall the book was well written and I enjoyed it. It is a bit dry when compared to popular history books, but I thought it fit a niche that I was unaware of. I learned a lot reading it and I think a little bit differently now about the interaction between nations in that region of the world. Overall I felt it was worth the read and I'm glad I picked it up.
Right off the bat, let me say that this is more of an academic book than a popular history sort of thing. The author doesn't have a political agenda (or at least not an obvious one) and is a senior research professor dealing in these types of issues. The book is therefore not intended to be a narrative or a piece designed to push a specific policy, but is a more serious look at China's influence across the region.
The book starts off with a brief overview, and then discusses Chinese relations with three nations specifically, which were chosen to represent different geographical areas. The three nations chosen were Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran. While all three don't necessarily have the same relationship with China as their neighbors, the author felt like these were reasonable cases studies.
I'm not going to get into the details on each nation, but Markey does a nice job of covering the background of the relationship with China and any critical internal considerations before getting into detail on China's policy. One key point that the author makes early and is demonstrated throughout the book is that each nation is a very individual and critical actor in the relationship. They have their own internal politics and the leaders have their own agenda, which may or may not align with Chinese interests. All of them need to consider their relationship with China, but that doesn't mean they will blindly follow wherever they are lead.
One common theme is China's use of economic power as opposed to direct political influence. China has historically officially been very non-interventionist when it comes to other nations and plays up that philosophy regularly. The reality is (as usual) more nuanced, but the author does demonstrate that China's policy is slowly becoming more assertive, even if they use the same language as previously.
The final section of the book deals with US-China relations, specifically with regard to the region in question. Markey seems to be recommending a mixed policy toward nations in the area, treating each individually instead of a one-size-fits-all agenda. I would have personally preferred more concrete recommendations, but Markey really presented things as more of options or a menu than a coherent strategy.
Overall the book was well written and I enjoyed it. It is a bit dry when compared to popular history books, but I thought it fit a niche that I was unaware of. I learned a lot reading it and I think a little bit differently now about the interaction between nations in that region of the world. Overall I felt it was worth the read and I'm glad I picked it up.
June 13, 2023
China is the cash cow your illiberal, totalitarian country might just need. As China floats billions of dollars in loans and backs massive infrastructure programs to unstable governments, they continue to keep a low profile and avoid political disputes with local and global governments.
Well documented information on China’s interactions in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East that raises unanswered questions regarding motivation. The writing style was difficult to read with points being repeated or belabored. It seemed to me the organization of chapters and paragraphs could have been organized more cohesively to produce a flowing account. In spite of that, 4 stars for the eye opening and informative reporting.
Well documented information on China’s interactions in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East that raises unanswered questions regarding motivation. The writing style was difficult to read with points being repeated or belabored. It seemed to me the organization of chapters and paragraphs could have been organized more cohesively to produce a flowing account. In spite of that, 4 stars for the eye opening and informative reporting.
October 6, 2020
Not many books take a close look at China's relations with its regional neighbors in Central Asia like this book does, unfortunately it doesn't fully address how current conditions in Xinjiang effect things, but still well worth a read.
January 7, 2021
Boring and unimaginative. No discussion of finance. Poor analysis.
June 4, 2021
Excellent book. There is a lot more to infer from what the author does NOT mention.
January 9, 2023
Surprisingly good, actually. Balanced and interesting. Perhaps not enough breadth, like it became too focused on one country instead of using one case study and linking to others (basically, it claims to use one country as a representative of China's dealings with each region, but sometimes it doesn't really feel like the regional links are made, possibly because this is a hopeless task in that China really treats each nation on its own terms).
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews