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Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front
Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941–1942: Schwerpunkt
The German panzer armies that swept into the Soviet Union in 1941 were an undefeated force that had honed their skill in combined arms warfare to a fine edge. The Germans focused their panzers and tactical air support at points on the battlefield defined as Schwerpunkt - main effort - to smash through any defensive line and then advance to envelope their adversaries.
Initially, these methods worked well in the early days of Operation Barbarossa and the tank forces of the Red Army suffered defeat after defeat. Although badly mauled in the opening battles, the Red Army's tank forces did not succumb to the German armored onslaught and German planning and logistical deficiencies led to over-extension and failure in 1941. In the second year of the invasion, the Germans directed their Schwerpunkt toward the Volga and the Caucasus and again achieved some degree of success, but the Red Army had grown much stronger and by November 1942, the Soviets were able to turn the tables at Stalingrad.
Robert Forczyk's incisive study offers fresh insight into how the two most powerful mechanized armies of the Second World War developed their tactics and weaponry during the critical early years of the Russo-German War. He uses German, Russian and English sources to provide the first comprehensive overview and analysis of armored warfare from the German and Soviet perspectives. His analysis of the greatest tank war in history is compelling reading.
Initially, these methods worked well in the early days of Operation Barbarossa and the tank forces of the Red Army suffered defeat after defeat. Although badly mauled in the opening battles, the Red Army's tank forces did not succumb to the German armored onslaught and German planning and logistical deficiencies led to over-extension and failure in 1941. In the second year of the invasion, the Germans directed their Schwerpunkt toward the Volga and the Caucasus and again achieved some degree of success, but the Red Army had grown much stronger and by November 1942, the Soviets were able to turn the tables at Stalingrad.
Robert Forczyk's incisive study offers fresh insight into how the two most powerful mechanized armies of the Second World War developed their tactics and weaponry during the critical early years of the Russo-German War. He uses German, Russian and English sources to provide the first comprehensive overview and analysis of armored warfare from the German and Soviet perspectives. His analysis of the greatest tank war in history is compelling reading.
296 pages, Paperback
First published February 1, 2014
228 people are currently reading
393 people want to read
About the author
Robert Forczyk
58 books73 followersRobert Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 34 reviews
May 24, 2019
A highly readable account of the armour warfare on the Eastern Front during the years 1941-1942. The author gives a good overview of the tactics used, the errors made and the reason why the war progressed as it progressed. The author served in tanks himself, and this is shown throughout the book. Highly recommended!
The employment of Germany's armoured forces during the initial attack in 1941 was shaped by three wrong assumptions made by Hitler. First, the war was suspected to be short and no provisions were made for a protracted war. Second, the terrain and wheather were expected to play no impact on the campaigns. And lastly, the conviction was that the Russian Army could be effectively and quickly destroyed. These assumptions put the German panzers at a deciding disadvantage.
But the Russians were to blame as well. Stalin thought that there would be adequate warning before the Germans would invade, giving Russian units to prepare and dig in. The second assumption was that the Red Army was capable of holding out against the Germans on its own, without the need for any foreign assistance.
One thing that Stalin did right, was the strategic assumption that industrial mobilization was they key to Russian victory and that the war would be won not by fancy manoeuvres, but the ability to sustain its forces in protracted operations. This resulted in a numerical advantage for the Russians, which in part neutralized the advantage the Germans had in superior tactics and quality.
The book is roughly divided in two parts. One part dealing with the operations in the first year, up to Operation Typhoon, and the second part the 1942 operations (Operation Blue) untill the defeat at Stalingrad.
The author has a background in tanks, which is expressed in numerous technical details about tank warfare, which you won't find in any other books. Also the author meticulously offers details about tank production (both for German and Russian sides), the impact of the operations on tanks (maintenance, repairs and so on) and quality improvements in tanks and ammunition.
All in all, highly recommended. This was one of the best books I've read about the Eastern Front in a long time. 4.5 stars.
The employment of Germany's armoured forces during the initial attack in 1941 was shaped by three wrong assumptions made by Hitler. First, the war was suspected to be short and no provisions were made for a protracted war. Second, the terrain and wheather were expected to play no impact on the campaigns. And lastly, the conviction was that the Russian Army could be effectively and quickly destroyed. These assumptions put the German panzers at a deciding disadvantage.
But the Russians were to blame as well. Stalin thought that there would be adequate warning before the Germans would invade, giving Russian units to prepare and dig in. The second assumption was that the Red Army was capable of holding out against the Germans on its own, without the need for any foreign assistance.
One thing that Stalin did right, was the strategic assumption that industrial mobilization was they key to Russian victory and that the war would be won not by fancy manoeuvres, but the ability to sustain its forces in protracted operations. This resulted in a numerical advantage for the Russians, which in part neutralized the advantage the Germans had in superior tactics and quality.
The book is roughly divided in two parts. One part dealing with the operations in the first year, up to Operation Typhoon, and the second part the 1942 operations (Operation Blue) untill the defeat at Stalingrad.
The author has a background in tanks, which is expressed in numerous technical details about tank warfare, which you won't find in any other books. Also the author meticulously offers details about tank production (both for German and Russian sides), the impact of the operations on tanks (maintenance, repairs and so on) and quality improvements in tanks and ammunition.
All in all, highly recommended. This was one of the best books I've read about the Eastern Front in a long time. 4.5 stars.
October 16, 2024
Tactical assessment of the Eastern Front tank battles. Bit amateurish in form.
The book offers pretty much what the title promises. It's somewhat dry recounting of events that involved tank forces of both sides of the conflict. It is very detailed on many occasions going as low as how many of what sorts of ammo was used in different combat situations. Sometimes the details are very interesting as to what kind of small details could have an effect to combat situations. Mostly the human element is completely disregarded in every other way than "skill to fight".
Yet the book has some flaws that might not be as bothersome to others. I felt that this was a bit amateurish take, especially as the book has very tight concept, Forczyk makes a lot of bold claims on overall strategic situations and the like. It barely passes off as a historical study as it uses mostly secondary sources, doesn't have proper referencing and his own opinions are just thrown there without much backing. Calling other historians having "fashionable" views while making unsubstantiated claims on totally different subject than what one is writing doesn't leave good impression. I'm actually surprised this guy has PhD as his methods are very poor. Maybe there was no proper editor or feedback to correct all the small stupidities in this.
Also the maps are poor and almost non-existing. This type of book could've really benefited from good maps.
Nevertheless I'm going to buy his second book too, but might avoid his other unless they go into the areas not covered by others.
The book offers pretty much what the title promises. It's somewhat dry recounting of events that involved tank forces of both sides of the conflict. It is very detailed on many occasions going as low as how many of what sorts of ammo was used in different combat situations. Sometimes the details are very interesting as to what kind of small details could have an effect to combat situations. Mostly the human element is completely disregarded in every other way than "skill to fight".
Yet the book has some flaws that might not be as bothersome to others. I felt that this was a bit amateurish take, especially as the book has very tight concept, Forczyk makes a lot of bold claims on overall strategic situations and the like. It barely passes off as a historical study as it uses mostly secondary sources, doesn't have proper referencing and his own opinions are just thrown there without much backing. Calling other historians having "fashionable" views while making unsubstantiated claims on totally different subject than what one is writing doesn't leave good impression. I'm actually surprised this guy has PhD as his methods are very poor. Maybe there was no proper editor or feedback to correct all the small stupidities in this.
Also the maps are poor and almost non-existing. This type of book could've really benefited from good maps.
Nevertheless I'm going to buy his second book too, but might avoid his other unless they go into the areas not covered by others.
November 30, 2016
Forcyzk writes a relatively readable account of the first two years of Eastern Front, bulwarked by extensive documentary research and his own experience as an American tanker. There's a lot of the boring details of the form "Kampfgruppe Raus advanced 10 km towards Plotsk until stopped by blocking detachments from the 15th Tank Corps, which was defeated at 1800 with heavy losses, leaving the path clear for...", but Forcyzk has an eye for the big picture and patterns.
In particular, Nazi Panzer divisions had absolute tactical supremacy due to high levels of training, radios, and well-ordered command structures that enabled decisive attacks against key objectives and flexible retreats. Soviet forces were decimated in the opening days of Barbarossa and never really recovered as a strategic or operational arm, New T-34 and KV-1 tanks were dispatched in penny packets for infantry support. Even though the Soviet medium and heavy tanks were qualitatively superior to early war Panzer IIIs and IVs, Nazi combined arm tactics and the Flak 88 minimized the Soviet advantage. More than anything else, the tyranny of distance and supply problems stopped the blitzkrieg, as mighty Panzer spearheads were reduced to handfuls of exhausted tanks and infantry companies right at the edge of strategic objectives. The Soviets, though they took catastrophic losses, were bettered prepared for the industrial war of annihilation than the Nazis, and attrition evened out the experience gap, as veteran NCOs and officers on the Nazi side died, and a few surviving Soviets became more competent at their jobs.
More than gun size and armor weight, Forcyzk has a feel for the operational qualities of tanks as part of a combined arms team, and the ways in which complicated German engineering hindered the performance of the Panzers, or how the Soviet practice of fighting 'buttoned-up' reduced situational awareness and left. There are some oddities. Forcyzk has an almost personal hatred of a few generals who's (over-inflated) memoirs dictated conventional history (Guderian and Zhukov). He's astute in noting that many tanks were light tanks with minimal combat effectiveness, like the Czech-produced Panzer 38(t) or the pre-war BT-series, but doesn't quite figure out what light tanks were for, or if they had an impact on battle one way or another.
As long as this book is $2 on kindle, it's a vital purchase for anyone interested in WW2 or tanks. I'm not sure how it'd hold up at a higher price point.
In particular, Nazi Panzer divisions had absolute tactical supremacy due to high levels of training, radios, and well-ordered command structures that enabled decisive attacks against key objectives and flexible retreats. Soviet forces were decimated in the opening days of Barbarossa and never really recovered as a strategic or operational arm, New T-34 and KV-1 tanks were dispatched in penny packets for infantry support. Even though the Soviet medium and heavy tanks were qualitatively superior to early war Panzer IIIs and IVs, Nazi combined arm tactics and the Flak 88 minimized the Soviet advantage. More than anything else, the tyranny of distance and supply problems stopped the blitzkrieg, as mighty Panzer spearheads were reduced to handfuls of exhausted tanks and infantry companies right at the edge of strategic objectives. The Soviets, though they took catastrophic losses, were bettered prepared for the industrial war of annihilation than the Nazis, and attrition evened out the experience gap, as veteran NCOs and officers on the Nazi side died, and a few surviving Soviets became more competent at their jobs.
More than gun size and armor weight, Forcyzk has a feel for the operational qualities of tanks as part of a combined arms team, and the ways in which complicated German engineering hindered the performance of the Panzers, or how the Soviet practice of fighting 'buttoned-up' reduced situational awareness and left. There are some oddities. Forcyzk has an almost personal hatred of a few generals who's (over-inflated) memoirs dictated conventional history (Guderian and Zhukov). He's astute in noting that many tanks were light tanks with minimal combat effectiveness, like the Czech-produced Panzer 38(t) or the pre-war BT-series, but doesn't quite figure out what light tanks were for, or if they had an impact on battle one way or another.
As long as this book is $2 on kindle, it's a vital purchase for anyone interested in WW2 or tanks. I'm not sure how it'd hold up at a higher price point.
July 18, 2017
“Tank Warfare on Eastern Front 1941-43” is an attempt to provide an objective analysis of how armour or more specifically, large armoured formations, were used on Eastern Front during the first two years of World War II. Considering the amount of literature written about World War II, it may seem strange that such a book needed to be written year 2016. But the fact is that the need for such analysis was indeed enormous and the author fills with it a gap that screamed for historian’s attention for decades.
So here’s the thing... In decades immediately after World War II, western ‘knowledge’ about events on Eastern Front came from a single source - high and medium-ranking German officers who were as interested in exonerating themselves as they were eager to please their new masters. Guderian, Mellenthin, von Manstein, von Luck… they all fought courageously against the Russian hordes and if only the corporal with the funny mustache stayed out of their way, they would have beaten the Ruski everyday of the week and twice on Sunday. From these self-serving memoirs it was easy to draw the conclusion that if it weren’t for overwhelming Soviet superiority in numbers, Hitler’s meddlings and General Winter, Germans would win the war in the East with same ease they conquered France. Then, when Soviet archives opened for a while in the nineties, some western historians like for example David Glantz and John Ericson attempted to straighten the record. But, in my personal opinion, they swung the pendulum far too much in the opposite direction. If one were to believe their version of events, it was the Russians that were the true professionals who were hindered by Stalin’s medlings while the Germans were the opportunistic amateurs who owed their early successes more to dumb luck than skill.
This book seems to indicate to me that the pendulum is once again swinging back and this time around chances are that everyone will get his fair shake. In many respects, Forczyk’s book is surprisingly conventional and confirms what’s already been said before. Readers looking for dramatic revelations will be sorely disappointed. But in one respect, this work is indeed unique - both sides, at least in my opinion, get an extremely fair evaluation in an analysis which is based almost always entirely on facts and cold statistics. The only exception seems to be Zhukov, with whom the author seems to have a huge axe to grind.
But what about the content of the book. Well… in simple terms, it’s a narrative of all major armour operations that took place from Barbarossa to the desperate attempts to break through to 6th Army surrounded at Stalingrad. The perspective is consistently held at operational level and deals most of the time with actions at army, corps and division level. On few occasions when narrative goes down to kampfgruppe or brigade level, it is to illustrate a specific point at operational level, not to describe ‘heroics’ of some officer. The narrative is focused on facts and data and thus it is saturated with names of generals, dates, unit designations and location names. In other words, text of this book is as dry as bone and will definitely not be to your casual reader’s taste.
Almost complete lack of maps makes following the narrative so much harder and here I must (yet again) make a special point - give me a break already, Pen&Sword! This book screams for some decent maps and in this day and age it is an inexcusable omission! If you don’t know how to provide graphic material for publications, get in touch with Osprey Publishing which knocks the ball out of the park in this department in each of their publications!
Even this grievous omission doesn’t however change the fact that this volume should be mandatory read for anyone genuinely interested in this particular topic. The depth of information in this book and author’s uncompromisingly objective analysis of the events and performance of both sides is to my best knowledge unparalleled and demands highest accolades.
So here’s the thing... In decades immediately after World War II, western ‘knowledge’ about events on Eastern Front came from a single source - high and medium-ranking German officers who were as interested in exonerating themselves as they were eager to please their new masters. Guderian, Mellenthin, von Manstein, von Luck… they all fought courageously against the Russian hordes and if only the corporal with the funny mustache stayed out of their way, they would have beaten the Ruski everyday of the week and twice on Sunday. From these self-serving memoirs it was easy to draw the conclusion that if it weren’t for overwhelming Soviet superiority in numbers, Hitler’s meddlings and General Winter, Germans would win the war in the East with same ease they conquered France. Then, when Soviet archives opened for a while in the nineties, some western historians like for example David Glantz and John Ericson attempted to straighten the record. But, in my personal opinion, they swung the pendulum far too much in the opposite direction. If one were to believe their version of events, it was the Russians that were the true professionals who were hindered by Stalin’s medlings while the Germans were the opportunistic amateurs who owed their early successes more to dumb luck than skill.
This book seems to indicate to me that the pendulum is once again swinging back and this time around chances are that everyone will get his fair shake. In many respects, Forczyk’s book is surprisingly conventional and confirms what’s already been said before. Readers looking for dramatic revelations will be sorely disappointed. But in one respect, this work is indeed unique - both sides, at least in my opinion, get an extremely fair evaluation in an analysis which is based almost always entirely on facts and cold statistics. The only exception seems to be Zhukov, with whom the author seems to have a huge axe to grind.
But what about the content of the book. Well… in simple terms, it’s a narrative of all major armour operations that took place from Barbarossa to the desperate attempts to break through to 6th Army surrounded at Stalingrad. The perspective is consistently held at operational level and deals most of the time with actions at army, corps and division level. On few occasions when narrative goes down to kampfgruppe or brigade level, it is to illustrate a specific point at operational level, not to describe ‘heroics’ of some officer. The narrative is focused on facts and data and thus it is saturated with names of generals, dates, unit designations and location names. In other words, text of this book is as dry as bone and will definitely not be to your casual reader’s taste.
Almost complete lack of maps makes following the narrative so much harder and here I must (yet again) make a special point - give me a break already, Pen&Sword! This book screams for some decent maps and in this day and age it is an inexcusable omission! If you don’t know how to provide graphic material for publications, get in touch with Osprey Publishing which knocks the ball out of the park in this department in each of their publications!
Even this grievous omission doesn’t however change the fact that this volume should be mandatory read for anyone genuinely interested in this particular topic. The depth of information in this book and author’s uncompromisingly objective analysis of the events and performance of both sides is to my best knowledge unparalleled and demands highest accolades.
January 9, 2023
Exactly what it says, a great book covering tank tactics, operational planning and maneuver warfare on the Eastern Front from 41-42. An insightful book offering great information related to difficulties suffered by the Red Army and explanations for early Wehrmacht success.
April 5, 2018
I was psyched to read Forczyk after finishing "We March Against England." The research and broad insights in this one are stellar, and it contains fascinating technical details about tank production on both the German and Russian sides.
That said, a paucity of maps seriously weakens this book and as a result I felt like I was "flying blind" in much of the book. It's possible to get down to micro-detail level and not neglect maps, as Noah Andre Trudeau's "Gettysburg..." shows. Had Forczyk done this, the book would have easily been five stars.
The book improves in the last twenty percent or so.
That said, a paucity of maps seriously weakens this book and as a result I felt like I was "flying blind" in much of the book. It's possible to get down to micro-detail level and not neglect maps, as Noah Andre Trudeau's "Gettysburg..." shows. Had Forczyk done this, the book would have easily been five stars.
The book improves in the last twenty percent or so.
May 12, 2018
It should be read, by all those panzer & WWII aficionados
Great INSIGHT, to many tactical details while having just a few undetailed maps, which requires own historical atlas or great knowledge of Russia’s interior to benefit from understanding geography of all those battles. But I guess it’s a common illness of such works.
Great INSIGHT, to many tactical details while having just a few undetailed maps, which requires own historical atlas or great knowledge of Russia’s interior to benefit from understanding geography of all those battles. But I guess it’s a common illness of such works.
June 7, 2024
In Operation Barbarossa, Hitler used 17 armored divisions and 3,160 tanks. Additionally, two self-propelled battalions of Pz.Abt.40 and Pz.Abt tanks were developed in Finalndi. 211 with 124 tanks, including 20 PzKpfw III.
Panzer-Department zur Sonderbedarf 40 (Panzer-abteilung z.b.V. 40), which translates as "tank unit for special purposes", was formed on March 8, 1940 for the German invasion of Norway and Denmark. The unit consisted mainly of Panzer I and Panzer II light tanks. Three Neubaufahrzeug tanks were assigned to Panzer-abteilung 40. The German Neubaufahrzeug series of prototype tanks (German for "newly built vehicle" - cover) was the first attempt to create a heavy tank for the Wehrmacht after Adolf Hitler's arrival in power. Multi-turreted, heavy and slow, they were not considered successful and only five were produced. The first prototypes of the vehicle were created in 1933, and by 1936, 5 copies of this tank were produced. However, the new vehicle never entered mass production.
In addition, there were also tanks in Libya 15 Pz.Div. under the command of Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel, and two armored brigades in France; no other units were formed in Germany. As a result, OKH directed all tanks in stock to Operation Barbarossa, having a limited monthly production to replenish the losses. In mid-1941, German industry produced an average of 250 tanks per month, half of which were PzKpfw III medium tanks. Experience from France and Belgium indicated that Germany could lose about 1/3 of its medium tanks even in a short 6-week campaign, which Hitler considered an acceptable level of losses. What's worse is that the German industry did not conduct research and development on tanks other than PzKpfw III and IV.
Four weeks before the start of Operation Barbarossa, the Heereswaffenamt (Land Weapons Office) only agreed that Henschel and Porsche began work on a prototype of a new heavy tank, but this program was considered a priority only after the first combat losses to Soviet tanks, the T-34 and the KV -1
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The Russians took the idea of angled armor from John Walter Christie's innovative M1931 tank and used it in the BT series tanks. Soviet spies managed to obtain information on tank designs in Great Britain. In less than two years, despite little experience in the design and production of armored combat vehicles, engineers managed to move from the prototype phase to serial production of T-26 and BT light tanks. Although they were forced to use foreign-designed engine components and weapons in the first generation of domestic tanks, some of the most talented Soviet engineers were located in the mines in Leningrad, Kharkov and Gorim.
Great progress was made by the extremely talented Kosntanin F. Chełplan in the design of a diesel engine, the first tests of the engine began in 1938. He was the chief designer of the famous V-2 (Russian: В-2) T-34 diesel tank engine, for which he was awarded the Order of Lenin. The engine is made of a light aluminum alloy. From 1927 he was a senior lecturer at the Kharkov Institute of Technology. A V angle of 60°, two overhead camshafts per row, four valves per cylinder opened by bucket tappets and direct fuel injection, all features found in modern diesel engines. Used in T-34, SU-85 and SU-100. It produced 500 hp at 1,800 rpm. V-2K: V-2 with increased injection pressure and higher engine speed, 1939. Used in the KV-1 and KV-2.
The deportation of Soviet Greeks was a series of forced resettlements of Greeks to the Soviet Union, ordered by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and carried out by the NKVD and MVD in 1942, 1944, and 1949.
Soviet authorities viewed the Greeks as a "foreign element" in the region, "hostile" and "unreliable" to Soviet rule. It was believed that their removal would strengthen Soviet hegemony in the Black Sea and Georgia
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Panzerbefehlswagen III Armored command vehicle used Fu-8 medium-range (MF) or Fu-6 very high resolution (VHF) radios. The commander could effectively command within a radius of 40 km when marching and up to 70 km when stationary. Based on VHF Fu-2 and Fu-5 with a range of 2-5 km.
Kfz. 265 Panzerbefehlswagen was the standard command tank of German armored divisions. Each armored division consisted of sixteen tank companies, divided into four battalions, two regiments, or one brigade, for a total of twenty-three headquarters.
The 265 was the first purpose-built armored command vehicle of the German Army; a type of armored fighting vehicle designed to provide the commander of an armored unit with mobility and communications on the battlefield. Development of the army's first mass-produced tank, the Panzer I Ausf.
The first prototypes of the vehicle were created in 1935, and serial production lasted from 1935 to 1938, ending with the production of approximately 200 tanks of this type. The vehicle was powered by a single Maybach NL 38TR engine with a power of 100 HP.
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Soldiers of the 3rd Panzer Group in front of a burning village
The doctrine adopted by the Panzerwaffe had two drawbacks. Basic flaws that were not visible in previous campaigns.
First of all, the Germans were logistically unable to sustain a series of flanking operations and creating cauldrons indefinitely (this is how the Germans defeated the Russians, encircling them like the Russians did against the Germans at Stalingrad). Eventually, fuel shortages and failures had to stop the advancement, and this gave the opponents a chance to control the situation.
Secondly, the doctrine was developed at a time when anti-tank defense was relatively weak, which allowed armored divisions to run down most infantry divisions caught in the open with impunity.
German generals blame Hitler's decision for the defeat in the war with the Soviet Union.
The August Crisis was a crisis of leadership in the highest command authorities of the Wehrmacht in July/August 1941 during the German-Soviet war. The course of the front in August 1941. The course of the front near Kiev, which Hitler wanted to pinch, is clearly visible, as well as a comparison of the compromise solution used.
Double victory at Vyazma and Bryansk In the double battle at Vyazma and Bryansk, they would be joined by nine Soviet armies consisting of 80 to 90 divisions by October 6. 663,000 Red Army soldiers are captured by the Germans. More than 1,200 Soviet tanks and 5,400 guns are destroyed or captured.
Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder was the first general to blame Hitler for the defeat at Moscow in his 1949 study "Hitler as General". “What had to come” has come. The engines, which were already "heavily loaded" before the Battle of Kiev, were "at the end of their endurance" during the Battle of Moscow, as well as autumn mud and an unusually early and extremely harsh winter. For the 1st Army Group Center, Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff, who was responsible for reconnaissance of the enemy, it was "Hitler's most serious mistaken decision" that "ultimately initiated and justified the loss of the entire war."
In 1965, in his book Moscow 1941, General Carl Wagener developed an eight-page simulation game in which Moscow would be surrounded on September 15, 1941, and German troops would then take up winter positions in time to have the best chance of victory in 1942. He describes the compromise as the “worst thing” about strategy.
General Kurt von Tippelskirch accused Hitler of violating Carl von Clausewitz's statement that an attack "which does not have the audacity to shoot like an arrowhead into the heart of an enemy state" could not succeed. At that time, the heart of Russia was Donbas.
The Battle of Alytus cost the Soviet 5th Panzer Division 73 tanks (16 T-28, 27 T-34 and 30 BT-7), while the German 7th Panzer Division lost 11 machines (7 PzKpfw 38(t) and 4 PzKpfw IV) . Most T-34s were lost due to crew errors. Two drowned in the Niemen, and the rest got stuck in yards and ditches.
According to Soviet sources, the Germans lost 30 tanks there, and this number includes tanks and other vehicles that were destroyed and damaged.
It is possible that one T-34 commanded by Sergeant Makogan was responsible for half of the German losses.
Fedorov's tanks had to travel 30 km to reach Alytus, and as a result, when the leading units of the division were already in place, Rothenburg's Panzer Regiment 25 was crossing the Neman. Lieutenant Ivan G. Wierzbicki, commanding the 2nd battalion of the 9th regiment, arrived as the first from 44 T-34. One of them, commanded by Sergeant Makogan, engaged the German column and destroyed a PzKpfw 38(t) while crossing the northern bridge. The clash with the Germans was their first encounter with the T-34 - less than 10 hours after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. Although the Russian T-34s were superior in every respect to the German PzKpfw 38(t), the Russians had only a few rounds of anti-tank ammunition. And the drivers had no experience in handling their new machines. (Russian drivers only knew how to drive Soviet T-27 tankettes, please do not confuse them with the Polish tankette.
Wierzbicki decided to use the area and hid the tanks while waiting for reinforcements. Soon, 24 T-28 tanks from the 1st battalion of the 9th tank regiment appeared. The German tanks could not get close enough to effectively fire their 37 mm guns and were blocked by Soviet combat vehicles. Temporarily blocked, Rothenburh called in the Luftwaffe, which bombarded Russian tanks.
At the same time, a small group of the 7th Panzer-Division captured the south bridge, but was blocked by 45 BT-7s of the Soviet 10th Tank Regiment.
Fedorov launched three counterattacks, which inflicted some losses on the Germans, but his forces were literally melting before his eyes. Unlike the Germans, Fedorov had minimal infantry and artillery support, no air support, and much less fuel and ammunition for his tanks. .
During the German occupation (1941–1944), the Nazis murdered between 60,000 and 70,000 Jews in the Alytus region (in the Vidzgiris Forest, the south-eastern suburbs of the city, on the left bank of the river).
The June Uprising was a brief period of the history of Lithuania in late June 1941 between the first Soviet and the Nazi occupations.
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Kyiv, boiler closure September 1-20.
Despite the arrival of the NKVD's 23rd Mechanized Division (which did little in the fighting), the 40th Army began to retreat east and Soviet resistance was waning. Hasso von Manteuffel and Walter Model were able to get through to Romni and regroup most of the divisions well behind the Soviet rear.
The model proved that in the 1941 campaign he was one of the most talented and aggressive tank commanders, ready to take extreme risks - which influenced his rapid career development in the Wehrmacht.
He shot himself in the head in the forest on April 21, 1945. The place of his death, between Duisburg and the village of Lintorf, is today in the town of Ratingen. The model was buried in the place where he shot himself.
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The tank clash near Mtsensk on October 6 had a great impact on the tank fighting on the Eastern Front, even though only one tank battalion was involved on each side. Although German tankers were shocked when the KV-1 and T-34 appeared during the June border fighting, in fact the German armored unit was not destroyed by the Soviet "miracle weapons". The OKH special commission, sent to examine the T-34 and KV-1 captured at Rosienie on June 27, concluded that 88 mm anti-aircraft guns would be sufficient to deal with these Soviet tanks, but near Mtsensk the "eighty-eight" were quickly put out of action. For the first time, the Red Army was able to use T-34s and KVs in sufficient numbers and under optimal conditions, demonstrating their significant tactical advantage.
The entire German tank company was completely destroyed, although only 7 crew members were killed.
The outcome of the battle shocked Guderian, who considered the losses of the 4th Panzer-Division "heavy". He wrote later: "The intention of a quick attack on Tula had to be abandoned for the time being. Guderian realized that at least some commanders of the Red Army had learned how to properly conduct armored operations. And the best German tank, the PzKpwf III, was outdated.
Operation Typhoon/Battle of Moscow. The Germans started it with a shortage of fuel and ammunition.
On December 10, the situation near the wedge became very difficult for Reinhardt, because the captain cut the Klin-Volokolamsky road and attacked the headquarters of the LVI armee korps located 4 kilometers from the wedge. (mot.) [Motorized] As a result, Schaal was forced to defend his command post with rifle in his hands.
Kuznetsova had one advantage in his hand - a large outpost across the Moscow-Volga Canal, opposite the position of the 6th Panzer-Division. This meant that the canal did not provide the Germans with real defense.
Overall, the Wehrmacht lost 830,903 people on the Eastern Front in 1941, 27% of whom were armored troops. The commanders were punished with expulsion, von Rundstedt, von Bock on December 18, Guderian on December 26.
Operation "Typhoon", the plan to attack Moscow, literally froze on the outskirts of the capital. Meanwhile, Stalin, thanks to Japan's passive attitude in the Far East, transferred 18 additional Siberian divisions. The total strength of the Red Army amounted to 1.25 million soldiers and 1.7 thousand. tanks.Passive attitude of the Japanese post?!!! Conducted on December 7, 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began at approximately 8 a.m. local time and was carried out by over 350 military aircraft. Many ships and planes were destroyed or seriously damaged.
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The T-34 tanks had a big advantage over the German tanks - the German tanks were stuck in the snow, while the Russian tanks ran well on soft, muddy ground. But the Russians couldn't drive in the first half of the war.
The attack of the 22nd Panzer-Division near Koropiec was the most botched German attack during the entire war on the Eastern Front.
32 of 142 machines were lost. 9 Pzkpfw II, 17 Pzkpfw 38(t) and 6 Pzkpfw IV
The battlefield was covered with thick fog and Wilhelm Koppenburg's machines entered it blindly, with visibility of only 50-100 meters. The commander quickly lost contact with the tanks and they came across a minefield. The Soviets quickly deployed a T-26 and four KV-1s, the 55th Tank Brigade and the 229th Independent Tank Battalion. The Germans suffered a 40% loss and returned to their starting positions.
On March 20, 1943, the regiment (along with the rest of the division) was disbanded in southern Russia. The staff was created by the Pz.Abt Staff. The 509th Panzer Gruppe 204 was incorporated into Panzer Regiment 201 of the 23rd Armored Division on April 9, 1943.
The 22nd Panzer Division was equipped with captured and obsolete Czech, French and German tanks
In the English article about the 22nd Panzer Division (Third Reich), it is written exactly the same, and even mentioned the author of the book from which I read it.
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The last German attempt to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front Operation Orlov, Battle of the Panzer North of Orel, also known as Operation Kutuzov.
It was a solidly prepared (though unfinished) defensive position, 5 to 7 km deep. It consisted of numerous resistance points connected by trenches, protected by extensive engineering barriers and minefields.
Some tanks fought with each other at a distance of only 200 m. One anti-tank gun could destroy 30 tanks. Many Russian tanks were American M3 Lee.
Rokossovsky used 400 cannons and 600 sorties of tactical aviation for the attack. Once the element of surprise was over, the German fortifications became virtually impregnable thanks to assault guns.
During the attack, German commanders fell as if on cue.
Equipment losses amounted to: 2,586 tanks, 892 guns and 1,014 aircraft. As a result of the operation, the Russians advanced 150 km west and defeated 15 German divisions. These losses further weakened the operational capabilities of the Germans in the subsequent fights against the Red Army.
Total German losses during the battle were 86,454 men. Red Army losses amounted to 112,529 killed and another 317,361 wounded. Losses in Red Army tanks and assault guns were particularly high, as 2,586 vehicles were destroyed or damaged during Kutuzov.
As a result of the operation, Soviet forces liberated Oryol and eliminated the Oryol bulge. The operation was named after the Russian commander Mikhail Kutuzov, who saved Russia from total defeat during the French invasion of 1812.
In the August battle for Rzhev, the Germans used new anti-tank weapons. - Improved anti-tank gun with a conical barrel 7.5 PAK 41. It used Panzergranate 41 with a tungsten core, which was able to penetrate the armor of the T-34 and KV-1 from a distance of up to 1,500 meters. Panzerabwehr-Abteilung (mot) 561 was equipped with 12 PAK 41s, and during the three-day battle near Zubców managed to stop the 6th and 8th Panzer Corps, the Russians were shocked that their tanks were no longer resistant. Of the 48 KV-1, 41 were completely destroyed, but the Russians, according to their principles, continued to fight until the total loss of troops.
The 7.5 cm Panzerjägerkanone 41 (7.5 cm Pak 41) was a semi-automatic, heavy rapid-fire cannon with a spring strut for the drive system. Except for its barrel design, the Krupp gun was a conventional weapon. The weapon was stored on a base plate with two struts. It was based on a conical barrel developed by Carl Puff.
Perfect. Very good for its size. It was designed to be small, air-dropped, yet powerful. The weapon had a conical barrel design using the Gerlich principle. Extremely effective and at the same time less mobile. Tungsten is extremely hard and abrasion resistant. Tungsten has a density of 19 g/c^3, so it would be a heavy weapon.
Gerlich once wrote: "National socialism means: hostility towards neighboring nations, internal tyranny, civil war, world war, lies, hatred, fratricide and limitless poverty."
After the Nazis took power on January 30, 1933, Gerlich was arrested on March 9, 1933 and imprisoned in the Dachau concentration camp, where he was shot on June 30, 1934 during the Night of the Long Knives. Gerlich advocated the restoration of the monarchy under Crown Prince Rupprecht. Gerlich had conservative views and published several anti-socialist articles in the right-wing press. I think this approach is close to me, and if terrorists, spreading terror and totalitarianism, came to power, they would kill me in labor camps because I have a diagnosis.
Panzer-Department zur Sonderbedarf 40 (Panzer-abteilung z.b.V. 40), which translates as "tank unit for special purposes", was formed on March 8, 1940 for the German invasion of Norway and Denmark. The unit consisted mainly of Panzer I and Panzer II light tanks. Three Neubaufahrzeug tanks were assigned to Panzer-abteilung 40. The German Neubaufahrzeug series of prototype tanks (German for "newly built vehicle" - cover) was the first attempt to create a heavy tank for the Wehrmacht after Adolf Hitler's arrival in power. Multi-turreted, heavy and slow, they were not considered successful and only five were produced. The first prototypes of the vehicle were created in 1933, and by 1936, 5 copies of this tank were produced. However, the new vehicle never entered mass production.
In addition, there were also tanks in Libya 15 Pz.Div. under the command of Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel, and two armored brigades in France; no other units were formed in Germany. As a result, OKH directed all tanks in stock to Operation Barbarossa, having a limited monthly production to replenish the losses. In mid-1941, German industry produced an average of 250 tanks per month, half of which were PzKpfw III medium tanks. Experience from France and Belgium indicated that Germany could lose about 1/3 of its medium tanks even in a short 6-week campaign, which Hitler considered an acceptable level of losses. What's worse is that the German industry did not conduct research and development on tanks other than PzKpfw III and IV.
Four weeks before the start of Operation Barbarossa, the Heereswaffenamt (Land Weapons Office) only agreed that Henschel and Porsche began work on a prototype of a new heavy tank, but this program was considered a priority only after the first combat losses to Soviet tanks, the T-34 and the KV -1
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The Russians took the idea of angled armor from John Walter Christie's innovative M1931 tank and used it in the BT series tanks. Soviet spies managed to obtain information on tank designs in Great Britain. In less than two years, despite little experience in the design and production of armored combat vehicles, engineers managed to move from the prototype phase to serial production of T-26 and BT light tanks. Although they were forced to use foreign-designed engine components and weapons in the first generation of domestic tanks, some of the most talented Soviet engineers were located in the mines in Leningrad, Kharkov and Gorim.
Great progress was made by the extremely talented Kosntanin F. Chełplan in the design of a diesel engine, the first tests of the engine began in 1938. He was the chief designer of the famous V-2 (Russian: В-2) T-34 diesel tank engine, for which he was awarded the Order of Lenin. The engine is made of a light aluminum alloy. From 1927 he was a senior lecturer at the Kharkov Institute of Technology. A V angle of 60°, two overhead camshafts per row, four valves per cylinder opened by bucket tappets and direct fuel injection, all features found in modern diesel engines. Used in T-34, SU-85 and SU-100. It produced 500 hp at 1,800 rpm. V-2K: V-2 with increased injection pressure and higher engine speed, 1939. Used in the KV-1 and KV-2.
The deportation of Soviet Greeks was a series of forced resettlements of Greeks to the Soviet Union, ordered by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and carried out by the NKVD and MVD in 1942, 1944, and 1949.
Soviet authorities viewed the Greeks as a "foreign element" in the region, "hostile" and "unreliable" to Soviet rule. It was believed that their removal would strengthen Soviet hegemony in the Black Sea and Georgia
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Panzerbefehlswagen III Armored command vehicle used Fu-8 medium-range (MF) or Fu-6 very high resolution (VHF) radios. The commander could effectively command within a radius of 40 km when marching and up to 70 km when stationary. Based on VHF Fu-2 and Fu-5 with a range of 2-5 km.
Kfz. 265 Panzerbefehlswagen was the standard command tank of German armored divisions. Each armored division consisted of sixteen tank companies, divided into four battalions, two regiments, or one brigade, for a total of twenty-three headquarters.
The 265 was the first purpose-built armored command vehicle of the German Army; a type of armored fighting vehicle designed to provide the commander of an armored unit with mobility and communications on the battlefield. Development of the army's first mass-produced tank, the Panzer I Ausf.
The first prototypes of the vehicle were created in 1935, and serial production lasted from 1935 to 1938, ending with the production of approximately 200 tanks of this type. The vehicle was powered by a single Maybach NL 38TR engine with a power of 100 HP.
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Soldiers of the 3rd Panzer Group in front of a burning village
The doctrine adopted by the Panzerwaffe had two drawbacks. Basic flaws that were not visible in previous campaigns.
First of all, the Germans were logistically unable to sustain a series of flanking operations and creating cauldrons indefinitely (this is how the Germans defeated the Russians, encircling them like the Russians did against the Germans at Stalingrad). Eventually, fuel shortages and failures had to stop the advancement, and this gave the opponents a chance to control the situation.
Secondly, the doctrine was developed at a time when anti-tank defense was relatively weak, which allowed armored divisions to run down most infantry divisions caught in the open with impunity.
German generals blame Hitler's decision for the defeat in the war with the Soviet Union.
The August Crisis was a crisis of leadership in the highest command authorities of the Wehrmacht in July/August 1941 during the German-Soviet war. The course of the front in August 1941. The course of the front near Kiev, which Hitler wanted to pinch, is clearly visible, as well as a comparison of the compromise solution used.
Double victory at Vyazma and Bryansk In the double battle at Vyazma and Bryansk, they would be joined by nine Soviet armies consisting of 80 to 90 divisions by October 6. 663,000 Red Army soldiers are captured by the Germans. More than 1,200 Soviet tanks and 5,400 guns are destroyed or captured.
Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder was the first general to blame Hitler for the defeat at Moscow in his 1949 study "Hitler as General". “What had to come” has come. The engines, which were already "heavily loaded" before the Battle of Kiev, were "at the end of their endurance" during the Battle of Moscow, as well as autumn mud and an unusually early and extremely harsh winter. For the 1st Army Group Center, Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff, who was responsible for reconnaissance of the enemy, it was "Hitler's most serious mistaken decision" that "ultimately initiated and justified the loss of the entire war."
In 1965, in his book Moscow 1941, General Carl Wagener developed an eight-page simulation game in which Moscow would be surrounded on September 15, 1941, and German troops would then take up winter positions in time to have the best chance of victory in 1942. He describes the compromise as the “worst thing” about strategy.
General Kurt von Tippelskirch accused Hitler of violating Carl von Clausewitz's statement that an attack "which does not have the audacity to shoot like an arrowhead into the heart of an enemy state" could not succeed. At that time, the heart of Russia was Donbas.
The Battle of Alytus cost the Soviet 5th Panzer Division 73 tanks (16 T-28, 27 T-34 and 30 BT-7), while the German 7th Panzer Division lost 11 machines (7 PzKpfw 38(t) and 4 PzKpfw IV) . Most T-34s were lost due to crew errors. Two drowned in the Niemen, and the rest got stuck in yards and ditches.
According to Soviet sources, the Germans lost 30 tanks there, and this number includes tanks and other vehicles that were destroyed and damaged.
It is possible that one T-34 commanded by Sergeant Makogan was responsible for half of the German losses.
Fedorov's tanks had to travel 30 km to reach Alytus, and as a result, when the leading units of the division were already in place, Rothenburg's Panzer Regiment 25 was crossing the Neman. Lieutenant Ivan G. Wierzbicki, commanding the 2nd battalion of the 9th regiment, arrived as the first from 44 T-34. One of them, commanded by Sergeant Makogan, engaged the German column and destroyed a PzKpfw 38(t) while crossing the northern bridge. The clash with the Germans was their first encounter with the T-34 - less than 10 hours after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. Although the Russian T-34s were superior in every respect to the German PzKpfw 38(t), the Russians had only a few rounds of anti-tank ammunition. And the drivers had no experience in handling their new machines. (Russian drivers only knew how to drive Soviet T-27 tankettes, please do not confuse them with the Polish tankette.
Wierzbicki decided to use the area and hid the tanks while waiting for reinforcements. Soon, 24 T-28 tanks from the 1st battalion of the 9th tank regiment appeared. The German tanks could not get close enough to effectively fire their 37 mm guns and were blocked by Soviet combat vehicles. Temporarily blocked, Rothenburh called in the Luftwaffe, which bombarded Russian tanks.
At the same time, a small group of the 7th Panzer-Division captured the south bridge, but was blocked by 45 BT-7s of the Soviet 10th Tank Regiment.
Fedorov launched three counterattacks, which inflicted some losses on the Germans, but his forces were literally melting before his eyes. Unlike the Germans, Fedorov had minimal infantry and artillery support, no air support, and much less fuel and ammunition for his tanks. .
During the German occupation (1941–1944), the Nazis murdered between 60,000 and 70,000 Jews in the Alytus region (in the Vidzgiris Forest, the south-eastern suburbs of the city, on the left bank of the river).
The June Uprising was a brief period of the history of Lithuania in late June 1941 between the first Soviet and the Nazi occupations.
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Kyiv, boiler closure September 1-20.
Despite the arrival of the NKVD's 23rd Mechanized Division (which did little in the fighting), the 40th Army began to retreat east and Soviet resistance was waning. Hasso von Manteuffel and Walter Model were able to get through to Romni and regroup most of the divisions well behind the Soviet rear.
The model proved that in the 1941 campaign he was one of the most talented and aggressive tank commanders, ready to take extreme risks - which influenced his rapid career development in the Wehrmacht.
He shot himself in the head in the forest on April 21, 1945. The place of his death, between Duisburg and the village of Lintorf, is today in the town of Ratingen. The model was buried in the place where he shot himself.
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The tank clash near Mtsensk on October 6 had a great impact on the tank fighting on the Eastern Front, even though only one tank battalion was involved on each side. Although German tankers were shocked when the KV-1 and T-34 appeared during the June border fighting, in fact the German armored unit was not destroyed by the Soviet "miracle weapons". The OKH special commission, sent to examine the T-34 and KV-1 captured at Rosienie on June 27, concluded that 88 mm anti-aircraft guns would be sufficient to deal with these Soviet tanks, but near Mtsensk the "eighty-eight" were quickly put out of action. For the first time, the Red Army was able to use T-34s and KVs in sufficient numbers and under optimal conditions, demonstrating their significant tactical advantage.
The entire German tank company was completely destroyed, although only 7 crew members were killed.
The outcome of the battle shocked Guderian, who considered the losses of the 4th Panzer-Division "heavy". He wrote later: "The intention of a quick attack on Tula had to be abandoned for the time being. Guderian realized that at least some commanders of the Red Army had learned how to properly conduct armored operations. And the best German tank, the PzKpwf III, was outdated.
Operation Typhoon/Battle of Moscow. The Germans started it with a shortage of fuel and ammunition.
On December 10, the situation near the wedge became very difficult for Reinhardt, because the captain cut the Klin-Volokolamsky road and attacked the headquarters of the LVI armee korps located 4 kilometers from the wedge. (mot.) [Motorized] As a result, Schaal was forced to defend his command post with rifle in his hands.
Kuznetsova had one advantage in his hand - a large outpost across the Moscow-Volga Canal, opposite the position of the 6th Panzer-Division. This meant that the canal did not provide the Germans with real defense.
Overall, the Wehrmacht lost 830,903 people on the Eastern Front in 1941, 27% of whom were armored troops. The commanders were punished with expulsion, von Rundstedt, von Bock on December 18, Guderian on December 26.
Operation "Typhoon", the plan to attack Moscow, literally froze on the outskirts of the capital. Meanwhile, Stalin, thanks to Japan's passive attitude in the Far East, transferred 18 additional Siberian divisions. The total strength of the Red Army amounted to 1.25 million soldiers and 1.7 thousand. tanks.Passive attitude of the Japanese post?!!! Conducted on December 7, 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began at approximately 8 a.m. local time and was carried out by over 350 military aircraft. Many ships and planes were destroyed or seriously damaged.
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The T-34 tanks had a big advantage over the German tanks - the German tanks were stuck in the snow, while the Russian tanks ran well on soft, muddy ground. But the Russians couldn't drive in the first half of the war.
The attack of the 22nd Panzer-Division near Koropiec was the most botched German attack during the entire war on the Eastern Front.
32 of 142 machines were lost. 9 Pzkpfw II, 17 Pzkpfw 38(t) and 6 Pzkpfw IV
The battlefield was covered with thick fog and Wilhelm Koppenburg's machines entered it blindly, with visibility of only 50-100 meters. The commander quickly lost contact with the tanks and they came across a minefield. The Soviets quickly deployed a T-26 and four KV-1s, the 55th Tank Brigade and the 229th Independent Tank Battalion. The Germans suffered a 40% loss and returned to their starting positions.
On March 20, 1943, the regiment (along with the rest of the division) was disbanded in southern Russia. The staff was created by the Pz.Abt Staff. The 509th Panzer Gruppe 204 was incorporated into Panzer Regiment 201 of the 23rd Armored Division on April 9, 1943.
The 22nd Panzer Division was equipped with captured and obsolete Czech, French and German tanks
In the English article about the 22nd Panzer Division (Third Reich), it is written exactly the same, and even mentioned the author of the book from which I read it.
---
The last German attempt to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front Operation Orlov, Battle of the Panzer North of Orel, also known as Operation Kutuzov.
It was a solidly prepared (though unfinished) defensive position, 5 to 7 km deep. It consisted of numerous resistance points connected by trenches, protected by extensive engineering barriers and minefields.
Some tanks fought with each other at a distance of only 200 m. One anti-tank gun could destroy 30 tanks. Many Russian tanks were American M3 Lee.
Rokossovsky used 400 cannons and 600 sorties of tactical aviation for the attack. Once the element of surprise was over, the German fortifications became virtually impregnable thanks to assault guns.
During the attack, German commanders fell as if on cue.
Equipment losses amounted to: 2,586 tanks, 892 guns and 1,014 aircraft. As a result of the operation, the Russians advanced 150 km west and defeated 15 German divisions. These losses further weakened the operational capabilities of the Germans in the subsequent fights against the Red Army.
Total German losses during the battle were 86,454 men. Red Army losses amounted to 112,529 killed and another 317,361 wounded. Losses in Red Army tanks and assault guns were particularly high, as 2,586 vehicles were destroyed or damaged during Kutuzov.
As a result of the operation, Soviet forces liberated Oryol and eliminated the Oryol bulge. The operation was named after the Russian commander Mikhail Kutuzov, who saved Russia from total defeat during the French invasion of 1812.
In the August battle for Rzhev, the Germans used new anti-tank weapons. - Improved anti-tank gun with a conical barrel 7.5 PAK 41. It used Panzergranate 41 with a tungsten core, which was able to penetrate the armor of the T-34 and KV-1 from a distance of up to 1,500 meters. Panzerabwehr-Abteilung (mot) 561 was equipped with 12 PAK 41s, and during the three-day battle near Zubców managed to stop the 6th and 8th Panzer Corps, the Russians were shocked that their tanks were no longer resistant. Of the 48 KV-1, 41 were completely destroyed, but the Russians, according to their principles, continued to fight until the total loss of troops.
The 7.5 cm Panzerjägerkanone 41 (7.5 cm Pak 41) was a semi-automatic, heavy rapid-fire cannon with a spring strut for the drive system. Except for its barrel design, the Krupp gun was a conventional weapon. The weapon was stored on a base plate with two struts. It was based on a conical barrel developed by Carl Puff.
Perfect. Very good for its size. It was designed to be small, air-dropped, yet powerful. The weapon had a conical barrel design using the Gerlich principle. Extremely effective and at the same time less mobile. Tungsten is extremely hard and abrasion resistant. Tungsten has a density of 19 g/c^3, so it would be a heavy weapon.
Gerlich once wrote: "National socialism means: hostility towards neighboring nations, internal tyranny, civil war, world war, lies, hatred, fratricide and limitless poverty."
After the Nazis took power on January 30, 1933, Gerlich was arrested on March 9, 1933 and imprisoned in the Dachau concentration camp, where he was shot on June 30, 1934 during the Night of the Long Knives. Gerlich advocated the restoration of the monarchy under Crown Prince Rupprecht. Gerlich had conservative views and published several anti-socialist articles in the right-wing press. I think this approach is close to me, and if terrorists, spreading terror and totalitarianism, came to power, they would kill me in labor camps because I have a diagnosis.
July 1, 2022
蘇德戰場雖然是後來被稱之為「第二次世界大戰」的其中一部分，但如果我們把觀察限縮在主要交戰國的框架內，會發現它不論是在規模、戰場範圍、動員人口跟死傷總數都是數一數二，幾乎很難再找到同等水平的類比對象(當然也希望不要再有)。而在這場戰爭中，裝甲兵器的運用則是雙方最主要的決勝關鍵。入侵者企圖以這種新式戰術的機動跟突破性打一場速戰速決的交鋒，而防禦方則以彼之道，還施彼身的倒打一把，最終逆轉取勝。這本書跟其他相同主題的差異即在於，作者羅伯特‧A. 福爾奇克(Robert Forczyk)把重心放在這兩邊是如何此消彼長的反轉過程，從以往較少被討論的科研發展方向、後勤影響等角度去試圖給出解答。福爾奇克在知名的軍武出版商魚鷹社(Osprey)著作甚豐，範圍頗廣，但從其過往曾在裝甲師任官的經驗來看，本書可能是其得意之作。個人對於坦克的喜好，這本書在剛推出的時候就吸引了我的目光，翻過後覺得不錯，等到一有特價就立刻入手閱畢，果然不失所望。
福爾奇克在本書中的討論方式是以年份為限，從巴巴羅薩行動開始的41年，一直到大局底定的44年止；每一章開始都先分析交戰雙方的軍備、後勤與戰略局勢，再詳述當年發生的裝甲戰經過，最後再來個總結。作者的文筆不錯，提供的數據詳實，分析的也頭頭是道，有些根據其親身經驗給出的結論都頗讓人信服，相信閱讀者都會深有所得。中譯本表現不差，兩位譯者的譯文流暢，要說缺點大概就是地圖還是略少。(不過我看這是忠於原書)
以歷史的後見之明來說，蘇德戰爭的結局看上去像是早就注定好了一樣。從大戰略上來說，希特勒一開始的假設就是錯誤的，他期待蘇聯會跟法國一樣在短短的幾個禮拜內就潰敗投降，他那句：「蘇聯就是棟將傾的大廈，只差我們腳一踹」的意思是，幾場大型殲滅戰打一打，紅軍就會徹底喪失力量，史達林就沒了抵抗意志。這種判斷失誤源自於：嚴重低估蘇聯的現有兵力跟後備資源，還有該國社會體制底下能夠發揮的動員能量，以及當你採取了滅絕戰所導致的抵抗意志。而事實上是，史達林以及蘇聯當局長期被包圍的危機感，導致它們從一開始國防政策就是持久戰的態勢，即便國內確實有一些政治上的問題，但預測它會土崩瓦解確實過於樂觀。不過，如果說今天納粹黨是以「打倒布爾什維克暴政」的解放者的態度發動這場戰爭，那麼結局或許難料，但這基本上按照現在的一句網路用語的說法就是「違反人設」，是不現實以及太過後見之明的假定，沒有意義。
這產生的結果是，為了避免導致民眾的厭戰程度的攀升，在政治上希特勒始終不願意輕易地開始戰時動員，以至於即便實際上已經過了三年，德國始終還是在和平的經濟體制中。而且，最諷刺的是，國防軍依賴裝甲力量，但他們在這方面的資源投入卻遠遠不及蘇聯，三、四號坦克開發緩慢，生產效率低下，不管是在擴充師團單位或者是補充戰損都無法有效滿足。1941年德國的所有坦克總生產量是3788，被打得亂七八糟的蘇聯卻還能有5877的量。而且德國的情報單位效率低下，戰前根本不知道蘇聯已經開發出T-34、KV1，以至於前線交火後才大吃一驚。(有個有趣的紀載，蘇德互不侵犯條約之後，雙方又開始交流戰車技術，當希特勒心不甘情不願地端出四號戰車給來訪的紅軍科研人員時，對方卻覺得他們故意裝瘋賣傻拿次等貨敷衍而大發脾氣，結果德國人反而一頭霧水。) 導致這種問題的情況有一部分來自德國高層在資源分配上的一團混亂，三軍各自爭奪，而希特勒又喜歡做各種武器實驗，動輒把成熟的生產線移去做無謂的新單位生產，這在他的對手史達林眼中是絕對不能忍的。作者強調的另外一個坦克科技上落後的問題在於引擎，當蘇聯人已經在使用更有效率以及不容易著火等優點的柴油時，國防軍從科研單位到軍官都認為“沒有必要”，而敷衍了元首指示的替換命令。(但是這個問題個人查了一些資料，德國科研人員似乎也有自己的充分理由，例如戰略資源欠缺，以及轉換汽油科技已然成熟的沉澱成本等)另外，說來有趣的是，德國人最初對坦克的觀念跟美國一樣，他們也不喜歡戰車之間彼此交鋒，因為即使勝了也會受損影響戰力，而且不容易補充，他們更喜歡把坦克交給反坦炮去處理(美國人則是開發坦克殲擊車)。這也讓國防軍一開始的開發方向跟蘇聯走上不同的道路。但諷刺的是，庫斯克會戰雙方的觀念卻就此逆轉。作者指出：
實際上庫斯克之戰德蘇雙方都沒有達成自己計畫中的目標。
國防軍就不用說了。紅軍本來計畫引誘敵人踏入陷阱重創之後再反擊，但史達林沒有給予前線將帥太多的發揮空間，他們害怕德軍過度深入突破戰線，早早的就將預備的裝甲力量投入反擊，結果變成雙方硬碰硬的消耗戰。
曼斯坦因在他的回憶錄中聲稱這是場「失去的勝利」，但這是不正確的，德軍正一頭撞入紅軍早就佈好的陷阱，完全違反了「避實擊虛」這個兵法上的大原則。而且他們在此戰後得出了錯誤的結論，虎式取得的好戰績讓他們更加認為只有依賴重型裝甲才能扭轉戰局，把資源投入在生產這些數量少的巨獸，淪入「老虎難敵猴群」的困境之中。(儘管實戰中證明虎 I 跟豹式在防禦戰時的效果很好)
反之，蘇軍儘管飽嚐虎式跟豹式之苦，不得不加緊研發T-34/85跟IS2，但他們仍然堅信中型坦克才是主力，對付裝甲依靠火炮跟反坦等手段即可。此外，反擊的失敗也讓他們再次體悟到匆促的作戰是無效率之舉，更加深刻的理解多兵種配合才是未來的取勝之道。
德國人逐漸放棄自己早年的優勢，而蘇聯人則是學習並開發出自己的強項，戰局益發一面傾斜。
正如前所述，相對來說，蘇聯在經濟動員，生產力量以及科研上都佔優勢，但在政治上，史達林的大清洗嚴重打擊了紅軍骨幹，導致許多有能力的軍官永久的損失，同時，破壞了圖哈切夫斯基等人原本屬於領先群雄的「大縱深作戰學說」。他把早早編成的機械化裝甲軍都打散到各步兵單位，結果看到德軍在法國大獲全勝之後才又匆匆的重新再編，然而混亂卻已造成。紅軍坦克雖然在數量上跟技術上領先德國，但他們不重視無線電效果，各車之間難以協調，車長又不像德國人總是會從指揮塔出來觀望感知局勢變動，因此常常失盡先機而被痛打(坦克戰之間先開砲往往就決定勝負了)，而這根本問題還是在於紅軍根本來不及孰悉多兵種協同作戰，再加上史達林動輒外行的干涉，以至於它們在初期始終被動。不過這方面，也涉及到了蘇聯高層的私心，他們並不希望士兵過分菁英化，這有可能會對政權造成威脅，教育總是僅止於中等程度。據說一些紅軍將士佔領德國的軍校時，為他們的敵人受的訓練水平感到驚訝不已。
再來的一個要點對雙方都有影響，但國防軍顯然更吃虧，那就是距離與氣候。
從39年的蘇德邊境到莫斯科的漫長距離，中間的交通狀況，還有俄羅斯的冬季氣候，顯然希特勒跟國防軍在發動戰爭前都低估了這些因素。下雨造成的泥濘影響了道路，裝甲部隊的履帶在這種路況上的耗損程度比起在西歐更加快速，而德國後勤補充卻往往跟不上。說來諷刺，限制裝甲師行動跟造成戰力低下的不是紅軍的戰車或反坦，而是裝備的自然損耗跟油料的問題。再來，希特勒完全沒有設想過會打到冬季，以至於他臨時下令向民眾募集冬衣以提供給前線士兵時，引起了家屬們極大的憤怒。而德國的坦克設計上也無法面對這個季節，不只是人，機械裝備也都面臨嚴苛的考驗。
最後一個問題帶一點爭議，那就是「租借法案」對這場戰爭的影響。蘇聯把他們的精力集中在了坦克，對裝甲車、偵查車與火炮等輔助單位則嚴重忽視，這在發動一場機動作戰時是非常關鍵的影響。除此之外，戰爭初期大量喪失領土也同時意味著失去控制的資源，代表著即便工廠順利撤退也沒有原料可以生產。這些幾乎都是依賴來自英、美的支持方能彌補。平心而論，無疑的，莫斯科如果沒有「租借法案」，要獨力面對強敵是有很大的困難的。美國戰史名家格蘭茲(David M. Glantz)的評論較為持平：「美國人用罐頭買了蘇聯人的鮮血，去換取對德國的勝利。」
總而言之，雖然德軍在初期節節獲勝，但上述這些缺失的一一暴露而且難以克服，速戰速決已經成了一場夢，而納粹高層至此仍沒有想過要打一場持久戰，但史達林的國防政策很早前就已經「超前部署」。於是我們看到，開始占優勢的一方逐漸失去先機，甚至步上對方的後塵；而失敗的一方痛定思痛學會對方的技巧還更上一層樓，終於將戰局逆轉過來。歷史最大的諷刺在於，希特勒不但沒有打倒其最痛恨的敵人，反而將它們淬鍊成一股龐大的軍事機器，並將在往後近半個世紀裡掌握半個世界。
這並不是福爾奇克第一本譯作的引進，更早之前有同是蘇德戰場的《哈爾科夫1942》，略晚於本書出版的有講法國淪陷的《紅色方案》。此外，還有很多其他佳作等待翻譯，不過個人雖然樂見，礙於興趣程度未必會照單全收。我反而比較推薦本書跟最近也剛再版的，前面提過的格蘭茲關於本主題的大作《巨人的碰撞》搭配著看，關於東線主題基本架構也就差不多了。如果要從其他面向的納粹主題切入，理查德‧埃文斯 (Richard J．Evans) 的《第三帝國三部曲》跟伊恩‧克肖(Ian Kershaw)的《希特勒傳》，拿這兩位學者的作品打底也是非常札實。
以上。
福爾奇克在本書中的討論方式是以年份為限，從巴巴羅薩行動開始的41年，一直到大局底定的44年止；每一章開始都先分析交戰雙方的軍備、後勤與戰略局勢，再詳述當年發生的裝甲戰經過，最後再來個總結。作者的文筆不錯，提供的數據詳實，分析的也頭頭是道，有些根據其親身經驗給出的結論都頗讓人信服，相信閱讀者都會深有所得。中譯本表現不差，兩位譯者的譯文流暢，要說缺點大概就是地圖還是略少。(不過我看這是忠於原書)
以歷史的後見之明來說，蘇德戰爭的結局看上去像是早就注定好了一樣。從大戰略上來說，希特勒一開始的假設就是錯誤的，他期待蘇聯會跟法國一樣在短短的幾個禮拜內就潰敗投降，他那句：「蘇聯就是棟將傾的大廈，只差我們腳一踹」的意思是，幾場大型殲滅戰打一打，紅軍就會徹底喪失力量，史達林就沒了抵抗意志。這種判斷失誤源自於：嚴重低估蘇聯的現有兵力跟後備資源，還有該國社會體制底下能夠發揮的動員能量，以及當你採取了滅絕戰所導致的抵抗意志。而事實上是，史達林以及蘇聯當局長期被包圍的危機感，導致它們從一開始國防政策就是持久戰的態勢，即便國內確實有一些政治上的問題，但預測它會土崩瓦解確實過於樂觀。不過，如果說今天納粹黨是以「打倒布爾什維克暴政」的解放者的態度發動這場戰爭，那麼結局或許難料，但這基本上按照現在的一句網路用語的說法就是「違反人設」，是不現實以及太過後見之明的假定，沒有意義。
這產生的結果是，為了避免導致民眾的厭戰程度的攀升，在政治上希特勒始終不願意輕易地開始戰時動員，以至於即便實際上已經過了三年，德國始終還是在和平的經濟體制中。而且，最諷刺的是，國防軍依賴裝甲力量，但他們在這方面的資源投入卻遠遠不及蘇聯，三、四號坦克開發緩慢，生產效率低下，不管是在擴充師團單位或者是補充戰損都無法有效滿足。1941年德國的所有坦克總生產量是3788，被打得亂七八糟的蘇聯卻還能有5877的量。而且德國的情報單位效率低下，戰前根本不知道蘇聯已經開發出T-34、KV1，以至於前線交火後才大吃一驚。(有個有趣的紀載，蘇德互不侵犯條約之後，雙方又開始交流戰車技術，當希特勒心不甘情不願地端出四號戰車給來訪的紅軍科研人員時，對方卻覺得他們故意裝瘋賣傻拿次等貨敷衍而大發脾氣，結果德國人反而一頭霧水。) 導致這種問題的情況有一部分來自德國高層在資源分配上的一團混亂，三軍各自爭奪，而希特勒又喜歡做各種武器實驗，動輒把成熟的生產線移去做無謂的新單位生產，這在他的對手史達林眼中是絕對不能忍的。作者強調的另外一個坦克科技上落後的問題在於引擎，當蘇聯人已經在使用更有效率以及不容易著火等優點的柴油時，國防軍從科研單位到軍官都認為“沒有必要”，而敷衍了元首指示的替換命令。(但是這個問題個人查了一些資料，德國科研人員似乎也有自己的充分理由，例如戰略資源欠缺，以及轉換汽油科技已然成熟的沉澱成本等)另外，說來有趣的是，德國人最初對坦克的觀念跟美國一樣，他們也不喜歡戰車之間彼此交鋒，因為即使勝了也會受損影響戰力，而且不容易補充，他們更喜歡把坦克交給反坦炮去處理(美國人則是開發坦克殲擊車)。這也讓國防軍一開始的開發方向跟蘇聯走上不同的道路。但諷刺的是，庫斯克會戰雙方的觀念卻就此逆轉。作者指出：
實際上庫斯克之戰德蘇雙方都沒有達成自己計畫中的目標。
國防軍就不用說了。紅軍本來計畫引誘敵人踏入陷阱重創之後再反擊，但史達林沒有給予前線將帥太多的發揮空間，他們害怕德軍過度深入突破戰線，早早的就將預備的裝甲力量投入反擊，結果變成雙方硬碰硬的消耗戰。
曼斯坦因在他的回憶錄中聲稱這是場「失去的勝利」，但這是不正確的，德軍正一頭撞入紅軍早就佈好的陷阱，完全違反了「避實擊虛」這個兵法上的大原則。而且他們在此戰後得出了錯誤的結論，虎式取得的好戰績讓他們更加認為只有依賴重型裝甲才能扭轉戰局，把資源投入在生產這些數量少的巨獸，淪入「老虎難敵猴群」的困境之中。(儘管實戰中證明虎 I 跟豹式在防禦戰時的效果很好)
反之，蘇軍儘管飽嚐虎式跟豹式之苦，不得不加緊研發T-34/85跟IS2，但他們仍然堅信中型坦克才是主力，對付裝甲依靠火炮跟反坦等手段即可。此外，反擊的失敗也讓他們再次體悟到匆促的作戰是無效率之舉，更加深刻的理解多兵種配合才是未來的取勝之道。
德國人逐漸放棄自己早年的優勢，而蘇聯人則是學習並開發出自己的強項，戰局益發一面傾斜。
正如前所述，相對來說，蘇聯在經濟動員，生產力量以及科研上都佔優勢，但在政治上，史達林的大清洗嚴重打擊了紅軍骨幹，導致許多有能力的軍官永久的損失，同時，破壞了圖哈切夫斯基等人原本屬於領先群雄的「大縱深作戰學說」。他把早早編成的機械化裝甲軍都打散到各步兵單位，結果看到德軍在法國大獲全勝之後才又匆匆的重新再編，然而混亂卻已造成。紅軍坦克雖然在數量上跟技術上領先德國，但他們不重視無線電效果，各車之間難以協調，車長又不像德國人總是會從指揮塔出來觀望感知局勢變動，因此常常失盡先機而被痛打(坦克戰之間先開砲往往就決定勝負了)，而這根本問題還是在於紅軍根本來不及孰悉多兵種協同作戰，再加上史達林動輒外行的干涉，以至於它們在初期始終被動。不過這方面，也涉及到了蘇聯高層的私心，他們並不希望士兵過分菁英化，這有可能會對政權造成威脅，教育總是僅止於中等程度。據說一些紅軍將士佔領德國的軍校時，為他們的敵人受的訓練水平感到驚訝不已。
再來的一個要點對雙方都有影響，但國防軍顯然更吃虧，那就是距離與氣候。
從39年的蘇德邊境到莫斯科的漫長距離，中間的交通狀況，還有俄羅斯的冬季氣候，顯然希特勒跟國防軍在發動戰爭前都低估了這些因素。下雨造成的泥濘影響了道路，裝甲部隊的履帶在這種路況上的耗損程度比起在西歐更加快速，而德國後勤補充卻往往跟不上。說來諷刺，限制裝甲師行動跟造成戰力低下的不是紅軍的戰車或反坦，而是裝備的自然損耗跟油料的問題。再來，希特勒完全沒有設想過會打到冬季，以至於他臨時下令向民眾募集冬衣以提供給前線士兵時，引起了家屬們極大的憤怒。而德國的坦克設計上也無法面對這個季節，不只是人，機械裝備也都面臨嚴苛的考驗。
最後一個問題帶一點爭議，那就是「租借法案」對這場戰爭的影響。蘇聯把他們的精力集中在了坦克，對裝甲車、偵查車與火炮等輔助單位則嚴重忽視，這在發動一場機動作戰時是非常關鍵的影響。除此之外，戰爭初期大量喪失領土也同時意味著失去控制的資源，代表著即便工廠順利撤退也沒有原料可以生產。這些幾乎都是依賴來自英、美的支持方能彌補。平心而論，無疑的，莫斯科如果沒有「租借法案」，要獨力面對強敵是有很大的困難的。美國戰史名家格蘭茲(David M. Glantz)的評論較為持平：「美國人用罐頭買了蘇聯人的鮮血，去換取對德國的勝利。」
總而言之，雖然德軍在初期節節獲勝，但上述這些缺失的一一暴露而且難以克服，速戰速決已經成了一場夢，而納粹高層至此仍沒有想過要打一場持久戰，但史達林的國防政策很早前就已經「超前部署」。於是我們看到，開始占優勢的一方逐漸失去先機，甚至步上對方的後塵；而失敗的一方痛定思痛學會對方的技巧還更上一層樓，終於將戰局逆轉過來。歷史最大的諷刺在於，希特勒不但沒有打倒其最痛恨的敵人，反而將它們淬鍊成一股龐大的軍事機器，並將在往後近半個世紀裡掌握半個世界。
這並不是福爾奇克第一本譯作的引進，更早之前有同是蘇德戰場的《哈爾科夫1942》，略晚於本書出版的有講法國淪陷的《紅色方案》。此外，還有很多其他佳作等待翻譯，不過個人雖然樂見，礙於興趣程度未必會照單全收。我反而比較推薦本書跟最近也剛再版的，前面提過的格蘭茲關於本主題的大作《巨人的碰撞》搭配著看，關於東線主題基本架構也就差不多了。如果要從其他面向的納粹主題切入，理查德‧埃文斯 (Richard J．Evans) 的《第三帝國三部曲》跟伊恩‧克肖(Ian Kershaw)的《希特勒傳》，拿這兩位學者的作品打底也是非常札實。
以上。
March 2, 2017
First a word of caution: I read only the introductory and conclusionary parts. Why? Because most of the operational parts were too repetitive and mechanic to my liking. Forczyk is a good writer and he's explicitly opposed to the kind of war history where events are looked at only from the "map war game" perspective, but for battle descriptions he's chosen quite a straight-forward narrative where divisions, corps and armies maneuver, logistics are a major consideration, weather varies and the opposing states and commanders make strategic decisions.
If you're fond of, for example, Beevor's captivating writing style or Ian W. Toll's, covering the war in the Pacific islands, beautifully flowing narrative, you may find most of this book a bit boring. It feels as if the writer had all the means and understanding to carry the reader through a great story, an exciting narrative, but instead too often he just chooses to list operational history, battle after battle.
If you're fond of, for example, Beevor's captivating writing style or Ian W. Toll's, covering the war in the Pacific islands, beautifully flowing narrative, you may find most of this book a bit boring. It feels as if the writer had all the means and understanding to carry the reader through a great story, an exciting narrative, but instead too often he just chooses to list operational history, battle after battle.
August 8, 2023
This is the best book I read on armour warfare. Mr. Forczyk's wrote a clear, crisp, understandable account of the first two years of the war on Russia.
Viewing this war in a chronological order, Mr. Forczyk exposes the blunders on both sides that prevented decisive victory. He re-enforces how poor German logistics doomed the Panzerwaffen. What was enlightening to me was how lacking the Russians were with their logistics. The T-34 did not appear in appreciabel numbers until late summer 1942, and how important the lend-lease armour was in keeping Russian tank divisions stocked. These are some of the many enlightening factors presented in this book. I cannot wait to read the second volume.
Viewing this war in a chronological order, Mr. Forczyk exposes the blunders on both sides that prevented decisive victory. He re-enforces how poor German logistics doomed the Panzerwaffen. What was enlightening to me was how lacking the Russians were with their logistics. The T-34 did not appear in appreciabel numbers until late summer 1942, and how important the lend-lease armour was in keeping Russian tank divisions stocked. These are some of the many enlightening factors presented in this book. I cannot wait to read the second volume.
August 12, 2020
Panzer History
Good overview of Barbarossa, with great detail into armored warfare and the fighting on the Eastern Front, during World War 2.
I enjoyed the book and have also read some of the author’s other books. Highly recommended.
Some editing errors, ebook version...(whole section reprinted in the middle of nowhere,) also some spelling misprints.
In my experience, not being familiar with detailed Russian geography, I find additional reference maps are required when reading the book. The maps included are limited.
Good overview of Barbarossa, with great detail into armored warfare and the fighting on the Eastern Front, during World War 2.
I enjoyed the book and have also read some of the author’s other books. Highly recommended.
Some editing errors, ebook version...(whole section reprinted in the middle of nowhere,) also some spelling misprints.
In my experience, not being familiar with detailed Russian geography, I find additional reference maps are required when reading the book. The maps included are limited.
July 7, 2024
Robert Forczyk has a delivered a great contemporary account of a rapidly aging subject. He can write a hundred more accounts as far as I'm concerned. As a child growing up, my best friends could talk about these subjects and warfare to the wee hours of the morning. What amazes me is the insight he adds. Logistics, supplies, design, temperament, all crucial aspects to any campaign, but he pulls it together so well. It's literally all in the title. The nonsense and propaganda he cuts thru is worth the price alone. Also, somehow, (honesty) he conveys the story with fresh eyes.
March 15, 2025
A solid account of the first two year on the Eastern Front. I appreciate that Forczyk puts forward strong opinions - but I do wish his sources were not all secondary, and he'd have footnotes for some of the specific data he sites (like loses and fuel usage etc). Like many accounts, the prose can tend to flow into alpha-numeric soup with units numbers, both Roman and Arabic spilling across the page. When it gets back you can skim ahead to any given paragraph's conclusion and get the jist.
September 6, 2020
An excellent account of armoured warfare on the eastern front during 1941-2. The reasoning behind the failure of both sides is thoughtful and considered. It makes a lot more sense than the “Russian winter”. Great understanding and descriptions of the various tanks and their strengths and weaknesses. Thoroughly enjoyable.
October 5, 2024
Great read
Great read very interesting description of tank warfare in 1941-42 and there where Some actions I had never even heard of, also showed some of the Great tank Leaders in a less than flattering light and both sides suffering from the Enlightened Ideas of their Great Leaders. Great read.
Great read very interesting description of tank warfare in 1941-42 and there where Some actions I had never even heard of, also showed some of the Great tank Leaders in a less than flattering light and both sides suffering from the Enlightened Ideas of their Great Leaders. Great read.
November 25, 2017
A different view
This is a penetrating and somewhat rigorous analysis of armoured warfare on the Russian front, from Barbarossa to Stalingrad. The author uses documentary evidence to dispel some of the received wisdom surrounding these campaigns.
This is a penetrating and somewhat rigorous analysis of armoured warfare on the Russian front, from Barbarossa to Stalingrad. The author uses documentary evidence to dispel some of the received wisdom surrounding these campaigns.
February 3, 2022
Very interesting, learned a lot, and gave me a lot to think about. Meticulously researched, extremely detailed with a lot of facts/data presented. Amazing he found, gathered, and synthesized all of this information. I'll read the next one.
September 12, 2017
This really is a great book. Covers the topic in a way I've not seen before and covers it well
January 31, 2018
Good
Good book would read another one each month kept me interested need to be cheaper to buy as once read you delete them
Good book would read another one each month kept me interested need to be cheaper to buy as once read you delete them
February 15, 2018
Excellent review of the early years of the German-Russian campaign
This is a detailed summary of the early years of World War II on the eastern front. Could have used more maps.
This is a detailed summary of the early years of World War II on the eastern front. Could have used more maps.
March 28, 2019
Interesting read, flows well and easy to follow
May 13, 2019
Very Good detailed read
Not quite 4.5 stars, very good detailed read for the time span it tries to cover. One book really is not enough.
Not quite 4.5 stars, very good detailed read for the time span it tries to cover. One book really is not enough.
September 16, 2021
A good study of German tanks and mobile guns during the middle years of ww2. It gives a good overview of the weapons and the tactical uses of them
July 8, 2024
An in-depth examination of the tank battles of the Easter-Front. Unlike many other books I've read Robert Forczyk is not afraid to insert his feeling on decisions made by both sides.
December 28, 2025
Excellent book with extreme detail, but suffers from somewhat dull writing. Highly reccomend having a map on hand when reading.
April 17, 2024
The narrative is good but the maps are sparse. Unless you are intimately familiar with Russian geography you will be swimming in obscure place names. I think the lack of maps is a real issue that could easily have been addressed.
So, this is a book for people that are already knowledgeable about the Eastern Front and just want to read some more tank battles.
So, this is a book for people that are already knowledgeable about the Eastern Front and just want to read some more tank battles.
April 9, 2016
This detailed accounting of Germany's invasion of the USSR concentrates on the armored and motorized weaponry of the two armies. Operation Barbarossa failed in 1941 for various reasons which came back to haunt the Germans in 1942 when the focus on Moscow turned south towards the Caucasus and the desperate need for oil.
Poor planning seemed to plague the opponents when they often overextended themselves in "just one more push" mentality. The author clearly states mistakes made, especially those of Hitler and Stalin, who interfered incessantly, as well as mistakes made by panzer and Soviet commanders in the field. For the Russians, that frequently resulted in the ultimate punishment in their bid to halt the German onslaught.
Although both sides had tanks, although of varying quality, in abundance in the early years, the Germans had to cope with distance, terrain, weather and supply shortages, even in 1941, while the Russians had the tenacity to endure while hundreds of thousands of men were taken prisoner in the surrounded 'kessels' of the Eastern Front. By the end of 1941, the USSR was able to counter-attack forcing the Germans to regroup for 1942.
The move towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus dominates 1942. Reading about the losses of men and tanks, I couldn't help visualizing these two titans as old-time bare knuckle brawlers who went on and on, round after round, trying to land the knockout blow. That was not destined for 1942. It would take three more years of attrition, blood and death before the winner's hand could be raised in victory.
Poor planning seemed to plague the opponents when they often overextended themselves in "just one more push" mentality. The author clearly states mistakes made, especially those of Hitler and Stalin, who interfered incessantly, as well as mistakes made by panzer and Soviet commanders in the field. For the Russians, that frequently resulted in the ultimate punishment in their bid to halt the German onslaught.
Although both sides had tanks, although of varying quality, in abundance in the early years, the Germans had to cope with distance, terrain, weather and supply shortages, even in 1941, while the Russians had the tenacity to endure while hundreds of thousands of men were taken prisoner in the surrounded 'kessels' of the Eastern Front. By the end of 1941, the USSR was able to counter-attack forcing the Germans to regroup for 1942.
The move towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus dominates 1942. Reading about the losses of men and tanks, I couldn't help visualizing these two titans as old-time bare knuckle brawlers who went on and on, round after round, trying to land the knockout blow. That was not destined for 1942. It would take three more years of attrition, blood and death before the winner's hand could be raised in victory.
April 18, 2016
If you're looking for detailed strategic and tactical analysis of tank warfare between the Germans and Soviets during the first years of the Eastern Front, look no further than this book. It's one that demands precise reading, as the author expects the reader to keep up with the large array of army groups and commanders. If you do, you'll be rewarded with a much more nuanced understanding of the entire Eastern Front.
September 10, 2016
Extremely well written and informative. Rarely does a book throw a completely new light on a subject one thought one understood.
This is one such book. The author has been in a tank himself and his knowledge shows.
This is one such book. The author has been in a tank himself and his knowledge shows.
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