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"Lee Is Trapped and Must Be Taken": Eleven Fateful Days After Gettysburg, July 4-14, 1863
Thousands of books and articles examine nearly every aspect of the Civil War, but the important retreat of the armies from the Gettysburg battlefield to the Potomac River has been but little covered. Until now, no one had produced a critical analysis of the command decisions made during that fateful time based upon available intelligence. "Lee is Trapped and Must be Taken" Eleven Fateful Days after Gettysburg, July 4 to July 14, 1863, by Thomas J. Ryan and Richard R. Schaus, now available in paperback, rectifies this oversight.
This comprehensive day-by-day account, which begins after the end of the Gettysburg battle, examines how Maj. Gen. George G. Meade organized and motivated his Army of the Potomac in response to President Abraham Lincoln's mandate to bring about the "literal or substantial destruction" of Gen. Robert E. Lee's defeated and retreating Army of Northern Virginia. As far as Lincoln was concerned, if Meade aggressively pursued and confronted Lee before he could escape across the flooded Potomac River, "the rebellion would be over."
The long and bloody three-day battle exhausted both armies. Both commanders faced the difficult tasks of rallying their troops for more marching and fighting. Lee had to keep his army organized and motivated enough to conduct an orderly withdrawal into Virginia. Meade faced the same organizational and motivational challenges with the added expectation of catching and defeating a still-dangerous enemy. Central to their decision-making was the information they received from their intelligence gathering resources about the movements, intentions, and capability of the enemy. The eleven-day period after Gettysburg was a battle of wits to determine which commander better understood the information he received and directed his army accordingly. Prepare for some surprising revelations.
Ryan and Schaus rely on a host of primary sources to craft their study, including letters, memoirs, diaries, official reports, newspapers, and telegrams. The threading of these intelligence gems creates a gripping narrative with a significant amount of new information--which the authors use to offer their own direct and often damning conclusions. "Lee is Trapped and Must be Taken" is a sequel to Thomas Ryan's Spies, Scouts, and Secrets in the Gettysburg Campaign (Savas Beatie, 2015), the recipient of the Bachelder-Coddington Literary Award and Gettysburg Civil War Round Table Distinguished Book Award.
This comprehensive day-by-day account, which begins after the end of the Gettysburg battle, examines how Maj. Gen. George G. Meade organized and motivated his Army of the Potomac in response to President Abraham Lincoln's mandate to bring about the "literal or substantial destruction" of Gen. Robert E. Lee's defeated and retreating Army of Northern Virginia. As far as Lincoln was concerned, if Meade aggressively pursued and confronted Lee before he could escape across the flooded Potomac River, "the rebellion would be over."
The long and bloody three-day battle exhausted both armies. Both commanders faced the difficult tasks of rallying their troops for more marching and fighting. Lee had to keep his army organized and motivated enough to conduct an orderly withdrawal into Virginia. Meade faced the same organizational and motivational challenges with the added expectation of catching and defeating a still-dangerous enemy. Central to their decision-making was the information they received from their intelligence gathering resources about the movements, intentions, and capability of the enemy. The eleven-day period after Gettysburg was a battle of wits to determine which commander better understood the information he received and directed his army accordingly. Prepare for some surprising revelations.
Ryan and Schaus rely on a host of primary sources to craft their study, including letters, memoirs, diaries, official reports, newspapers, and telegrams. The threading of these intelligence gems creates a gripping narrative with a significant amount of new information--which the authors use to offer their own direct and often damning conclusions. "Lee is Trapped and Must be Taken" is a sequel to Thomas Ryan's Spies, Scouts, and Secrets in the Gettysburg Campaign (Savas Beatie, 2015), the recipient of the Bachelder-Coddington Literary Award and Gettysburg Civil War Round Table Distinguished Book Award.
372 pages, Paperback
First published August 15, 2019
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88 people want to read
About the author
Thomas J. Ryan
11 books9 followersThomas Joseph Ryan, born 1942, is a Canadian author.
Ryan moved into the USA and worked as a computer troubleshooter. Living in Garden Grove, California in 1977 he wrote his most known work, the science fiction novel The Adolescence of P-1. The story is one of the earliest fictional depictions of a computer virus and how it intelligently can spread through a computer network.
Ryan moved into the USA and worked as a computer troubleshooter. Living in Garden Grove, California in 1977 he wrote his most known work, the science fiction novel The Adolescence of P-1. The story is one of the earliest fictional depictions of a computer virus and how it intelligently can spread through a computer network.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
July 9, 2025
Eleven Days After Gettysburg
Following the defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg (July 1 -- July 3, 1863) , Robert E. Lee, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia determined on a retreat. Retreats are always hazardous, and the retreat from Gettysburg was particularly so. Lee's army was far from its base and had to travel over 40 miles to reach the Potomac River and cross over into Virginia. Lee was handicapped by his long trains, the condition of his army, and by foul weather. The Potomac River had swollen and Lee was unable to cross. He faced an attack from the Union Army with his back to the river. With all the difficulties, Lee managed to cross to the south bank of the Potomac on July 14, 1863, bringing his army to safety.
From the conclusion of the retreat to the present, there has been controversy about the retreat. Broadly, the issue is whether the Union Army of the Potomac and its commanding general, George Meade, were as aggressive as they should have been in cutting Lee off and forcing him to fight north of the Potomac. President Lincoln, for one, was notably displeased because he thought that Meade had allowed Lee's army to escape.
A great deal has been written about Gettysburg and there is much to learn. In broad accounts of the battle, the retreat usually only gets a brief treatment at the end of the book. Fortunately, in recent years, the Gettysburg retreat has received considerable attention, and there are at least three excellent book-length studies each of which offers its own perspective on the battle and on the retreat.
In 2005, Kent Masterson Brown wrote "Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign". This study focused on the Southern war aims in invading Pennsylvania and found that these aims were in part realized even with the defeat at Gettysburg. Brown offered a careful analysis of the retreat and of the factors which inhibited the Union pursuit and the options available to Meade to cut the Confederate army off.
In 2008, Eric Wittenberg, J. David Petruzzi, and Michael F. Nugent wrote "One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4 -- 14, 1863". The authors wrote to dispel the myth that Lee's retreat was uncontested by emphasizing the extent of the fighting during Meade's pursuit. The authors have a particular interest in cavalry and emphasized the role of the competing troopers, North and South. The book described the military action on the retreat in commendable detail.
The third new book on the retreat is the work under review, "Lee is Trapped and Must be Taken" Eleven Faithful Days after Gettysburg, July 4-- 14, 1863" by Thomas Ryan and Richard Schaus. Both authors have long experience in military intelligence, and Ryan has written an award-winning book, "Spies, Secrets, and Scouts in the Gettysburg Campaign" as a predecessor to this volume. Their new book focuses on the gathering and use of intelligence by the two armies during the Gettysburg retreat and pursuit. In particular, the book discusses the intelligence gathered by the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information (BMI) during the retreat and the use or misuse the Union army made of it.
The book evidences a great deal of research, some of which has not been used before in any study, and offers a good detailed study of the retreat. The book is organized on a day-by-day basis which allows the reader to follow the frequently confusing events. The work begins with an excellent short opening chapter on the Battle of Gettysburg itself and concludes with materials showing responses in the retreat's immediate aftermath and with a chapter showing how other scholars have viewed the retreat. In addition to discussing intelligence gathering and use, the book discusses the political context of the retreat as President Lincoln and General in Chief Halleck followed the unfolding events with dismay. Lincoln was chagrined throughout with Meade's pursuit and with Lee's escape. Ryan and Schaus also bring in materials sometimes overlooked in studying the retreat. They study the fate of the many Union prisoners and they also return back to Gettysburg to consider the treatment of the wounded in the aftermath of the battle. The book includes good maps for each day of the retreat which help in the understanding of the text.
There is a great deal to like in this book for readers interested in Gettysburg and in military intelligence. Although I learned a great deal, I found much of this study unconvincing. The thrust of the book is that General Meade was too slow, unimaginative, and lackadaisical in his pursuit, thus allowing Lee to escape. The authors give Meade credit for his success as a defensive commander at Gettysburg, after only three days in charge of the Army of the Potomac. But they find that Meade did not understand the purpose of the retreat -- to cut off and cripple the enemy army rather than simply forcing it from Northern soil. The authors find Meade at virtually every turn overly cautious. In places, they recognize the difficulty of a frontal attack on the Confederate positions. But they offer alternatives to a frontal attack that they find were known and available to Meade and not pursued.
This type of criticism of Meade is not new, of course, but it has not been an uncontested view. I wasn't convinced, and the use of BMI reports didn't make me think differently. Broadly, Meade had to look to the condition of his own exhausted army and the need to resupply it from a distant base. His army had been through a great deal, and the rainy weather hampered his pursuit at Gettysburg at least as much as it hampered Lee. Meade's pursuit options were limited because he was under orders to protect Washington, D.C as well as to attack and cut off Lee. The decision to delay in attacking the Confederate's strongly fortified position at Williamsport was probably correct, even on the authors' account given the strength of the Confederate position. It isn't clear that the alternatives the book suggests would have fared better.
There are some broader factors in evaluating Meade's actions that the book doesn't consider adequately. Pursuits of defeated armies in the Civil War, such as at Antietam, Manassas, Chickamauga, Shiloh, and other battles rarely were able to inflict substantial additional damage. Meade's pursuit was more aggressive than the pursuits following other major battles. In addition, the Civil War before, during and after Gettysburg is replete with instances showing the hazards of a frontal attack on an entrenched position. Meade made, in the view of many, a reasonable and probably correct choice in not attacking at Williamsport. The two earlier books on the retreat both take a far more measured and cautious approach to Meade's leadership than does this book. The authors of "One Continuous Fight" are cautiously critical of Meade in places but devote most of their criticism to the deployment of the Union cavalry. In sum, I think this book is overly harsh and polemical against General Meade at virtually every point. A more balanced perspective would have been welcome and appropriate.
One of the values of reading history is to understand and consider multiple accounts of the same events. It is important to learn perspective, whether the subject is military, political, or social history. Thus, I found it valuable to read and learn from the three recent book length studies of the Gettysburg retreat, each of which has its own perspective and its own virtues. I was not convinced by Ryan's and Schaus' treatment of Meade, but I enjoyed thinking again about Gettysburg and the retreat. The publisher, Savas Beatie, kindly sent me a review copy of this book.
Robin Friedman
Following the defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg (July 1 -- July 3, 1863) , Robert E. Lee, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia determined on a retreat. Retreats are always hazardous, and the retreat from Gettysburg was particularly so. Lee's army was far from its base and had to travel over 40 miles to reach the Potomac River and cross over into Virginia. Lee was handicapped by his long trains, the condition of his army, and by foul weather. The Potomac River had swollen and Lee was unable to cross. He faced an attack from the Union Army with his back to the river. With all the difficulties, Lee managed to cross to the south bank of the Potomac on July 14, 1863, bringing his army to safety.
From the conclusion of the retreat to the present, there has been controversy about the retreat. Broadly, the issue is whether the Union Army of the Potomac and its commanding general, George Meade, were as aggressive as they should have been in cutting Lee off and forcing him to fight north of the Potomac. President Lincoln, for one, was notably displeased because he thought that Meade had allowed Lee's army to escape.
A great deal has been written about Gettysburg and there is much to learn. In broad accounts of the battle, the retreat usually only gets a brief treatment at the end of the book. Fortunately, in recent years, the Gettysburg retreat has received considerable attention, and there are at least three excellent book-length studies each of which offers its own perspective on the battle and on the retreat.
In 2005, Kent Masterson Brown wrote "Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign". This study focused on the Southern war aims in invading Pennsylvania and found that these aims were in part realized even with the defeat at Gettysburg. Brown offered a careful analysis of the retreat and of the factors which inhibited the Union pursuit and the options available to Meade to cut the Confederate army off.
In 2008, Eric Wittenberg, J. David Petruzzi, and Michael F. Nugent wrote "One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4 -- 14, 1863". The authors wrote to dispel the myth that Lee's retreat was uncontested by emphasizing the extent of the fighting during Meade's pursuit. The authors have a particular interest in cavalry and emphasized the role of the competing troopers, North and South. The book described the military action on the retreat in commendable detail.
The third new book on the retreat is the work under review, "Lee is Trapped and Must be Taken" Eleven Faithful Days after Gettysburg, July 4-- 14, 1863" by Thomas Ryan and Richard Schaus. Both authors have long experience in military intelligence, and Ryan has written an award-winning book, "Spies, Secrets, and Scouts in the Gettysburg Campaign" as a predecessor to this volume. Their new book focuses on the gathering and use of intelligence by the two armies during the Gettysburg retreat and pursuit. In particular, the book discusses the intelligence gathered by the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information (BMI) during the retreat and the use or misuse the Union army made of it.
The book evidences a great deal of research, some of which has not been used before in any study, and offers a good detailed study of the retreat. The book is organized on a day-by-day basis which allows the reader to follow the frequently confusing events. The work begins with an excellent short opening chapter on the Battle of Gettysburg itself and concludes with materials showing responses in the retreat's immediate aftermath and with a chapter showing how other scholars have viewed the retreat. In addition to discussing intelligence gathering and use, the book discusses the political context of the retreat as President Lincoln and General in Chief Halleck followed the unfolding events with dismay. Lincoln was chagrined throughout with Meade's pursuit and with Lee's escape. Ryan and Schaus also bring in materials sometimes overlooked in studying the retreat. They study the fate of the many Union prisoners and they also return back to Gettysburg to consider the treatment of the wounded in the aftermath of the battle. The book includes good maps for each day of the retreat which help in the understanding of the text.
There is a great deal to like in this book for readers interested in Gettysburg and in military intelligence. Although I learned a great deal, I found much of this study unconvincing. The thrust of the book is that General Meade was too slow, unimaginative, and lackadaisical in his pursuit, thus allowing Lee to escape. The authors give Meade credit for his success as a defensive commander at Gettysburg, after only three days in charge of the Army of the Potomac. But they find that Meade did not understand the purpose of the retreat -- to cut off and cripple the enemy army rather than simply forcing it from Northern soil. The authors find Meade at virtually every turn overly cautious. In places, they recognize the difficulty of a frontal attack on the Confederate positions. But they offer alternatives to a frontal attack that they find were known and available to Meade and not pursued.
This type of criticism of Meade is not new, of course, but it has not been an uncontested view. I wasn't convinced, and the use of BMI reports didn't make me think differently. Broadly, Meade had to look to the condition of his own exhausted army and the need to resupply it from a distant base. His army had been through a great deal, and the rainy weather hampered his pursuit at Gettysburg at least as much as it hampered Lee. Meade's pursuit options were limited because he was under orders to protect Washington, D.C as well as to attack and cut off Lee. The decision to delay in attacking the Confederate's strongly fortified position at Williamsport was probably correct, even on the authors' account given the strength of the Confederate position. It isn't clear that the alternatives the book suggests would have fared better.
There are some broader factors in evaluating Meade's actions that the book doesn't consider adequately. Pursuits of defeated armies in the Civil War, such as at Antietam, Manassas, Chickamauga, Shiloh, and other battles rarely were able to inflict substantial additional damage. Meade's pursuit was more aggressive than the pursuits following other major battles. In addition, the Civil War before, during and after Gettysburg is replete with instances showing the hazards of a frontal attack on an entrenched position. Meade made, in the view of many, a reasonable and probably correct choice in not attacking at Williamsport. The two earlier books on the retreat both take a far more measured and cautious approach to Meade's leadership than does this book. The authors of "One Continuous Fight" are cautiously critical of Meade in places but devote most of their criticism to the deployment of the Union cavalry. In sum, I think this book is overly harsh and polemical against General Meade at virtually every point. A more balanced perspective would have been welcome and appropriate.
One of the values of reading history is to understand and consider multiple accounts of the same events. It is important to learn perspective, whether the subject is military, political, or social history. Thus, I found it valuable to read and learn from the three recent book length studies of the Gettysburg retreat, each of which has its own perspective and its own virtues. I was not convinced by Ryan's and Schaus' treatment of Meade, but I enjoyed thinking again about Gettysburg and the retreat. The publisher, Savas Beatie, kindly sent me a review copy of this book.
Robin Friedman
September 26, 2022
This book posits the question: did General George G. Meade really do all he could to trap Lee's Army of Northern Virginia on the north side of the Potomac after the battle of Gettysburg?? The authors take it day by day from July 4-14 1863 and give us their analysis as to Meade's plans and actions. This book fills a necessary void in the literature written about Gettysburg and is best read pared up with Kent Masterson Brown's 2005 book on Lee's retreat from battle in Pennsylvania. A worthy effort and very well done.
December 20, 2019
There are episodes in history that one hears about, in passing, time and time again, without ever having much of an opportunity to study that episode in depth. A famous example is the eleven days that passed between the end of the Battle of Gettysburg and Lee's crossing of the Potomac back into Virginia. As any student of the American Civil War knows, Lee was unable to get across the flooded Potomac, but — despite Abraham Lincoln's exhortations — Meade did not follow up on his victory and a potentially golden opportunity to smash Lee's army and compel its surrender was lost. The war in the east continued for another 21½ bloody months.
With this in mind, I stumbled upon "Lee Is Trapped…" in the bookstore at the Gettysburg visitor's center and I knew I had to buy it and read it as soon as possible. And, while I learned a great deal — SPOILER ALERT: Meade screwed up in more ways that you can probably count — I walked away with less satisfaction than I had hoped.
Don't get me wrong. Mssrs. Ryan and Schaus have mastered the subject material. The book is well researched. Generally speaking, their prose is both informative and easy to digest. And upon completion of the book, I had a very clear understanding of the challenges of each army and how they met — or didn't meet — them.
But I also walked away with the impression that the authors were hell-bent on cramming something from every one of their voluminous list of sources into each chapter. Do you want to know what Jeb Stuart and his men were doing on July 10, 1863? Mssrs. Ryan and Schaus will tell you. They will tell you, based upon Confederate dispatches. And then they will tell you again, based upon Union intelligence. And then they will tell you again, based upon what one of the Union signal corps observed. And then they will tell you again… well, you get the idea.
It's a shame that I reacted this way, because they really have compiled an impressive and remarkable story and I can readily say that I am now much better versed in the battle's aftermath. Much, much better.
But if I were to advise the authors, what I would say is that synthesis is a good thing. It's great that you have so many sources, but identify one or two — or, better yet, synthesize one or two together — in order to tell a more compelling tale. Because, in the end, all that information is useless if the reader's eyes are glazing over.
Bottom line: if you are deeply interested in every aspect of the Civil War and no detail is too small, then this book is for you. Otherwise, you might want to go elsewhere. Four stars for the authors' efforts and deep understanding; but only four stars because the authors didn't engage me as much as I had hoped.
With this in mind, I stumbled upon "Lee Is Trapped…" in the bookstore at the Gettysburg visitor's center and I knew I had to buy it and read it as soon as possible. And, while I learned a great deal — SPOILER ALERT: Meade screwed up in more ways that you can probably count — I walked away with less satisfaction than I had hoped.
Don't get me wrong. Mssrs. Ryan and Schaus have mastered the subject material. The book is well researched. Generally speaking, their prose is both informative and easy to digest. And upon completion of the book, I had a very clear understanding of the challenges of each army and how they met — or didn't meet — them.
But I also walked away with the impression that the authors were hell-bent on cramming something from every one of their voluminous list of sources into each chapter. Do you want to know what Jeb Stuart and his men were doing on July 10, 1863? Mssrs. Ryan and Schaus will tell you. They will tell you, based upon Confederate dispatches. And then they will tell you again, based upon Union intelligence. And then they will tell you again, based upon what one of the Union signal corps observed. And then they will tell you again… well, you get the idea.
It's a shame that I reacted this way, because they really have compiled an impressive and remarkable story and I can readily say that I am now much better versed in the battle's aftermath. Much, much better.
But if I were to advise the authors, what I would say is that synthesis is a good thing. It's great that you have so many sources, but identify one or two — or, better yet, synthesize one or two together — in order to tell a more compelling tale. Because, in the end, all that information is useless if the reader's eyes are glazing over.
Bottom line: if you are deeply interested in every aspect of the Civil War and no detail is too small, then this book is for you. Otherwise, you might want to go elsewhere. Four stars for the authors' efforts and deep understanding; but only four stars because the authors didn't engage me as much as I had hoped.
February 20, 2021
This book is very interesting read, especially for any history nerd interested in the US Civil War. I know the Battle of Gettysburg well, but learning about it's aftermath was even better. Interesting to see how many times the Army of the Potomac had in capturing the Army of Northern Virginia after they beat Lee's army at Gettysburg.
October 14, 2025
A book is worth reading when it prompts you to ask questions, and this left me with two:
1. What would have happened if Meade had taken Lee and the war ended sooner? I'm at the age where I look back on my life and see where decisions I made - jobs, partners, moves- changed the trajectory of my and my family's life. I've never regretted these paths, because they led me to where I am, but no doubt my life would be very different with other choices. On a national level, how would our country have been different if the war ended nearly two years earlier? We have an ancestor who was killed at the age of 48 at the Battle of Jenkins Ferry in 1864, and another who was taken prisoner in Tennessee in September 1863, eventually landing in Andersonville. Multiply that by the untold number of families impacted by the war. This suffering could have been avoided. Enslaved people would have had more precious months of freedom. Would reconstruction and reunion have gone smoother without the extra years of bitterness and suffering?
2. Why was Grant willing to fight when Meade and so many others weren't? What was it in his personality and background that enabled his greatness? I have one theory: generals were timid because they didn't want to risk failure. Grant had overcome personal and professional failure. As is true in so much of life, it's hard to take the risk needed to succeed if you let fear of failure determine your actions.
Will be looking to future reading in hopes of answering these questions.
1. What would have happened if Meade had taken Lee and the war ended sooner? I'm at the age where I look back on my life and see where decisions I made - jobs, partners, moves- changed the trajectory of my and my family's life. I've never regretted these paths, because they led me to where I am, but no doubt my life would be very different with other choices. On a national level, how would our country have been different if the war ended nearly two years earlier? We have an ancestor who was killed at the age of 48 at the Battle of Jenkins Ferry in 1864, and another who was taken prisoner in Tennessee in September 1863, eventually landing in Andersonville. Multiply that by the untold number of families impacted by the war. This suffering could have been avoided. Enslaved people would have had more precious months of freedom. Would reconstruction and reunion have gone smoother without the extra years of bitterness and suffering?
2. Why was Grant willing to fight when Meade and so many others weren't? What was it in his personality and background that enabled his greatness? I have one theory: generals were timid because they didn't want to risk failure. Grant had overcome personal and professional failure. As is true in so much of life, it's hard to take the risk needed to succeed if you let fear of failure determine your actions.
Will be looking to future reading in hopes of answering these questions.
January 1, 2025
Not a bad book; well-researched with an argument I mostly agree with. The main reason I didn't enjoy it is that it engages in a sort of uncharitable armchair generalship that is only possible with a lot of hindsight. There are more than a few sections where they spin a counterfactual so far down the rabbit hole that it’s almost laughable.
Part of the conceit here is that Meade had many opportunities to bring on a “decisive” battle before Lee managed to return to Virginia. This may be possible, but not likely in my opinion. There was not a single decisive battle in the Civil War and it is just as likely that a battle immediately following Gettysburg with Lee now on the defensive would be just another major attritional engagement in the pattern of the war’s other battles. Heaping so much blame onto Meade for another battle not happening is fair to a point, but not sufficient.
Good history isn’t about what could have happened, it’s about what did happen and why. There are far too many “could haves” and “should haves” here. I get the sense that the writers would have enjoyed writing and alternative history where Meade does everything right instead of everything wrong.
Part of the conceit here is that Meade had many opportunities to bring on a “decisive” battle before Lee managed to return to Virginia. This may be possible, but not likely in my opinion. There was not a single decisive battle in the Civil War and it is just as likely that a battle immediately following Gettysburg with Lee now on the defensive would be just another major attritional engagement in the pattern of the war’s other battles. Heaping so much blame onto Meade for another battle not happening is fair to a point, but not sufficient.
Good history isn’t about what could have happened, it’s about what did happen and why. There are far too many “could haves” and “should haves” here. I get the sense that the writers would have enjoyed writing and alternative history where Meade does everything right instead of everything wrong.
February 2, 2024
The author does a superb job documenting Lee’s retreat from his loss at Gettysburg to the crossings of the Potomac River. The Army of the Potomac conducts an agonizingly slow and overly timid pursuit, giving Lee the time he needs to build bridges and flat boats to evacuate his wounded, his artillery, his Union prisoners and his booty from the campaign. While waiting for the swollen river to recede enough to move the rest of his army to Virginia, his troops build a fortified defensive line in anticipation of a Federal attack. Meade, with the advice of his subordinate generals, creeps toward the Potomac at a pace reminiscent of McCllelan’s advance on Richmond during the Peninsula Campaign. Complaining of the absence of reliable scouting information of the Confederate position, Meade ignores Lincoln’s pleas to finish of Lee’s army, angering the President (though he did win Gettysburg) thus destroying a chance to win the war.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
November 2, 2023
The Confederate retreat and Union pursuit following the Battle of Gettysburg is an aspect of the campaign that a lot of books on the battle do not generally cover in any detail. So I was very interested in learning more, as I love to read about the Gettysburg Campaign.
This was an interesting book and presented it's arguments and information very well. It was a balanced, detailed account and I am glad I read it.
This was an interesting book and presented it's arguments and information very well. It was a balanced, detailed account and I am glad I read it.
February 8, 2024
A very clear explanation of Lee's escape from the battle at Gettysburg. A strong case is made to show Meade's lack of leadership in the aftermath of the battle allowing Lee and the rebel army to withdraw to Virginia virtually unmolested. This led to another year and a half of war when Meade very possibly could have ended the war in the 12 days after the battle of Gettysburg.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 3, 2024
Everything there is to know of Lee's retreat from Gettysburg. A subject I never read about in such detail. Very impressive research. Spoiler: Meade was too cautious. I do not blame him, he beat Lee, why give that away.
August 30, 2025
An interesting examination of the mistakes Meade made in the pursuit of Lee following the Battle of Gettysburg, though at times there does appear to be a particular bias against Meade rather than objectively examining the situation
November 11, 2019
"An incensed general Wadsworth of I Corps succinctly summed up the reaction of the Union troops when he was asked why Lee escaped: "Because, nobody stopped him"
"A council of war never fights"
General Meade is subjected to a less than favorable evaluation of his actions after the battle of Gettysburg - failure to understand the opportunity and importance of eliminating Lee's army, failure to establish a blocking force (frontal assault was not his only option), overestimating enemy strength (McClellan much?) and lack of agressiveness.
"A council of war never fights"
General Meade is subjected to a less than favorable evaluation of his actions after the battle of Gettysburg - failure to understand the opportunity and importance of eliminating Lee's army, failure to establish a blocking force (frontal assault was not his only option), overestimating enemy strength (McClellan much?) and lack of agressiveness.
December 28, 2019
Written generally from the perspective of those in the Union Army of the Potomac, the book offers plenty of grist for those critical of Union General Meade’s near reluctant pursuit of Lee’s somewhat bedraggled Army of Northern Virginia after the Battle of Gettysburg. That Lee’s Army escaped meant more warfare and more death. So, while the South lost the battle at Gettysburg, they “won” the retreat or, more accurately, the North lost the retreat.
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews