This book claims to be an introduction to Hegel's thought, but is well beyond that. Within limited space, Beiser managed to cover several pivotal points for any substantial understanding of Hegel.
The greatest virtue of the book is that it not only tries to single out ideas in Hegel that are relevant to our interests nowadays, but also situates them in their original conceptual and historical context, i.e. the post-enlightenment, early-romanticist era in Germany. By what Beiser calls a historical and hermeneutic approach, he was able to show that some of the ideas we usually attribute to Hegel's originality were actually quite common to a whole generation. In this way, Beiser not only brings to life an entire movement that is largely ignored, showing the great dynamicity of thought in it, but also creates the opportunity to locate more precisely Hegel's unique breakthrough. It is only against the background of his contemporaries, such as Fichte, Jacobi and Schelling, that Hegel's genuine greatness becomes manifest.
Specifically, Hegel's breakthrough must be assessed in comparison with the crisis of enlightenment rationalism, Kant and Fichte's subjectivist turn in response, and Jacobi and Schelling's charge that abstract understanding could never come to terms with the infinite - the subject par excellence of philosophy - which must be accessed through feelings or intuition. Hegel's strategy was to admit the limits of understanding but in the meantime to suggest a higher form of thought, i.e. speculative reason. The key difference is that, while understanding confines itself to finite concepts, speculative reason is able to adopt the same concepts and yet to allow them pass over into the infinite. Intuitivists like Schelling failed to see this possibility, because they deflated thought to just conceptual understanding. The intuition they championed, on the other hand, reveals only an inchoate and underdeveloped image of the infinite. Left on its own, it is unable to disclose in great concreteness every implication of the infinite. Speculative reason, however, has the patience to let the inchoate concept "go astray" in its various determination, as well as the tolerance to again incorporate all these determinations, albeit flawed in their own ways, back into itself. The result is a more concretely developed concept of the infinite, and philosophy is precisely this endless development.
Implied in this methodology is Hegel's unique idea of the identity of identity and non-identity. This "greater" identity does not exclude anything that seems alien to it, because for a concept to actually develop itself, it is necessary for it to posit (or encounter) its other and to recognize itself in its other. Moreover, it will become manifest that the other is not so much an absolute other than something whose otherness results only from limits of the context, or what Hegel calls abstraction. As soon as those limits are removed in speculative thought, the other ceases to be an absolute other and is reconciled into a greater whole.
This is the metaphysical principle Beiser finds in Hegel. He then argues that metaphysics is everywhere relevant in Hegel's system, for otherwise some of his claims on ethics or aesthetics would become incomprehensible. In each case, Beiser would first present the apparently opposing positions,then give evidences for / against interpreting Hegel toward either of the positions, and finally show how Hegel's metaphysical ground enables him to hold both while lifting their abstractness.
As a result, Beiser's interpretation of Hegel is balanced and uncompromising. Whenever he can, Beiser would rather make the best out of Hegel rather than dismiss his ideas as outdated, naïve, reactionary, or simply mistaken. This virtue comes mainly from Beiser's comprehensive grasp of the currents of German idealism.
There are, to be sure, points in the book that seem to render Hegel too systematic, as if he has an answer to every question or criticism. This scenario is plausible, yet if we consider Hegel's relation to his time, we are likely to feel that his major concern was not to systematize, but instead to question every system for its purported systematicity. His own system is unique and indefinitely inspiring, not because of its success and perfection, but because it is a failing one, which neither triumphs once and for all, nor fails completely. The dynamicity and openness of Hegel's thought consists precisely in this failing process as a process.