For most of the 1980s bloody wars were being fought in three Central American countries, all of them involving the United States. In El Salvador and Guatemala, guerrilla armies were attempting to overthrow right-wing dictatorships - the dictatorships, supported by the US, had ruled those countries for decades. In Nicaragua, the reverse was happening: the US was supporting rebel armies that were trying to overthrow the revolutionary Sandinista government, that in 1984 actually became an elected government. In the three wars, some 200,000 died and many more were maimed or forced to leave their homes.
Stephen Kinzer first visited Nicaragua a few years before the ‘triumph’ of the revolution in July 1979. He was well-informed about pre-revolutionary conditions, and the excesses and barbarity of the Somoza dictatorship. He was also well-placed to become the local correspondent for the New York Times, which is what he was from 1983 onwards. He was particularly well-suited to understanding and reporting on the ‘Contras’, who began their US-funded battles to attempt to reverse the Sandinista revolution in the same year.
On the surface, the three Central American wars had as neutral bystanders both Honduras and Costa Rica (the other nations of the original five that made up the region). In practice, as US allies, they were inextricably drawn in. Both were used as the sites of military bases for the Contra forces, and both were used to channel arms and money coming from the United States. Kinzer became the first journalist to expose this connection, when in March 1983 he and a photographer tracked down a Contra camp near the Nicaraguan border of Honduras and were even able to see US-supplied weaponry. Back in Nicaragua, he documented the Contras’ atrocities in remote border settlements (for example visiting Jalapa in early 1984, a few months before I went to the town and heard similar stories myself). When the CIA (blaming the Contras) began to mine Nicaragua’s ports in 1984, damaging ships and badly injuring numbers of seamen, he sought out the evidence in the port towns themselves and his publicity caused significant problems for President Reagan even within his own party.
Kinzer also recorded the mistakes being made by the inexperienced Sandinista government, though to my mind he gives insufficient emphasis to the extreme difficulties they faced in fighting both a war and an economic blockade, in a country that had been pillaged by Somoza and then deserted by a good proportion of its businessmen and skilled professionals, who fled to Miami and points north. He partly blames them for the fact that in the 1984 election Daniel Ortega faced very low-grade opposition, although the vote against him was by no means negligible despite the fact that US manipulation had ensured that most opposition leaders didn’t take part. Rather than being assuaged by Ortega’s formal election, Reagan (who won his own re-election days later) intensified the hostility, putting around a false story about Nicaragua buying Russian MiG jets. His ambassador made it clear to the Sandinistas that they would now face the full might of the Contras.
Kinzer chronicles the disastrous war which inevitably failed to defeat the Sandinistas militarily but was a major factor in their eventual electoral defeat, in 1990, by which time a majority of the population were simply fed up with conscription, young people dying in the mountains, and the hardships of a barely functioning economy.
He describes two particular incidents very well. One is the capture of Eugene Hasenfus, a pilot from the US contracted to fly supplies to the Contra. Hasenfus instantly talked about how his missions were organised, revealing how the CIA were circumventing Congressional bans on providing the Contra with weapons and supplies. The other is the death of a young US engineer working in Nicaragua, Ben Linder, who was caught by the contra when inspecting a hydro-electric project he’d built to bring electricity to a small community near San Jose de Bocay in 1987. Both events exposed the reality of the Contra war and its destructive aims, and helped the push towards the eventual peace process (which Kinzer also describes).
Stephen Kinzer makes many observations which chime with my own experiences of living in Nicaragua for 12 years. One which particularly caught my attention is his comment about how quickly, once peace was agreed, the former combatants were talking to each other and behaving almost as if the war had never happened. There have been problems, of course, including small groups who for years never gave up their weapons. But, in contrast to many other war-torn countries, it is remarkable how quickly Nicaragua became a peaceful place to live and how soon people who had been mortal enemies were reconciled and even became friends.