The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited

مولد مشكلة اللاجئين الفلسطينين #1

by Benny Morris

Morris' earlier work exposed the realities of how 700,000 Palestinians became refugees during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. While the focus of this edition remains the war and exodus, new archival material considers what happened in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, and how these events led to the collapse of urban Palestine. Revealing battles and atrocities that contributed to the disintegration of rural communities, the story is harrowing. The refugees now number four million and their cause remains a major obstacle to regional peace. First Edition Hb (1988): 0-521-33028-9 First Edition Pb (1989): 0-521-33889-1

Genres: History, Israel, Middle East, Politics, Nonfiction, History and Politics

666 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1988

About the author

Benny Morris is professor of history in the Middle East Studies department of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in the city of Be'er Sheva, Israel. He is a key member of the group of Israeli historians known as the "New Historians".

Reviews

[Cliff · Rating 4 out of 5]

I've been working on issues related to the Palestinian refugee problem. I bought this book, mostly because it is the ONLY book that is exclusively about how the problem came to be of which I am aware. While any book on such a super-heated topic is likely to get criticized on both sides, as this one has, if there is only one book, I'm glad it's this one. While Morris chooses language that at times super-charged, this is an extraordinarily well-researched book that tries as best he can to establish the facts of what happened. It doesn't take much to realize that Given the chaotic nature of the 1948 conflict, the multitude of personalities involved, and other similar problems, it is remarkable that he is able to be as objective as he is, in spite of the fact that on some level, some of what he's describing can only really be understood with some degree of subjectivity, or at the very least very murky evidence-based objectivity, in terms of the intents and motivations of people. Which is not to say he did not make mistakes or draw too much conclusions from too little evidence at times, I've seen interesting arguments that he did exactly that, but my little research, the extraordinarily well footnoted nature of this book, and my gut, tell me he got most things right.

The big takeaway from this book is that the Arabs who came to be refugees as a result of the 1948 war, which it must be acknowledged was started first by the Grand Mufti's mobs and then by surrounding nations attacking Israel, did not become so for one reason, but for many reasons. There was no unifying plan on either side, there was no one motivation for most actions.

Many Arabs left their homes of their own accord, for different reasons at different times. Many were expelled as part of a battle when they either were, or were indistinguishable from, a hostile force. Some, although only a few in the grand scheme of things, were expelled for what most would consider illegitimate reasons, but even those was during a fog of war under complicated circumstances. There was no unifying plan. Sometimes the Israelis asked the Arabs to stay when they were in the process of leaving, sometimes they didn't. Sometimes the Arabs did stay as a result, sometimes they didn't. Christian Arabs were on average treated better than Muslim Arabs, but at the same time, Christian Arabs were less hostile than Muslim Arabs to the fledgling State of Israel.

It is easy for someone to read through this books and find a thousand things they find unfortunate or distasteful, as would any chronicle of the fallout from a war. Ironically, since Morris was unable to access Arab records, he seems to focus more on Jewish faults than Arab faults. To the degree he's one-sided, he's one-sided against his own people, not for them, although he works to stress balance and understanding of the situation always. Ultimately, nothing in this book takes away from the central fact of the conflict: while neither side is perfect, only one side accepts the legitimacy of the very existence of their rivals. That difficult truth is, that the plight of the refugees has been a sacrifice made on the altar of that truth. And that is a tragedy for both Palestinians and Israelis alike.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Benny Morris could be considered the dean of the "new historians" who broke with the original semi-official histories of the founding of the State of Israel and, this, his ground-breaking history of how and why 700,000 Palestinians became refugees is vital for understanding what actually happened, to whom and why, during the Naqba/Israel War of Independence. It should be noted that Dr. Morris had access to the Israel Defense Forces archives for that war, not a privilege granted to every historian. The new edition has information about the fighting in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa the original lacked, and about the destruction of those Arab urban centers. The book has a very helpful index and maps to aid research on a particular settlement or village. To repeat myself, if you have an interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it behooves you to acquaint yourself with the origins of one of its central components, and Professor Morris has written the authoritative account.

[AskHistorians]

Written by one of the most prolific writers on the history of Israeli conflict, this "New Historian" book refutes many of the traditional Israeli historian arguments about how Palestinian refugees came to be in 1948. It uses declassified documents to paint a far more comprehensive and well-sourced picture of the 1948 war's effect on the local population, and is one of the most well-researched books on the subject out there.

[Mohammed omran · Rating 5 out of 5]

وطنهم.
النكبة جرحا عميقا في المجتمع الفلسطيني، وأثرت ليس فقط على أولئك الذين تم تهجيرهم مباشرة، ولكن ً تركت
ًضا على أحفادهم
أي الذين نشأوا في مخيمات الالجئين أو في الشتات. لقد قطعت أوصال األُ
َ
سر والمجتمعات،
مما أدى إلى فقدان الثقافة و حس ا لجميع الفلسطينيين، الذين ال ي ازلون
ً
ا مفتوح
ً
االنتماء. النكبة ال ت ازل جرح
يواجهون تداعياتها على الرغم من مرور الوقت. عندما توفي والدي قبل شهرين، شعرت باأللم مرة أخرى لعدم
لقائي بعماتي اللواتي تم تهجيرهن، وعدم معرفتي ما إذا كن على قيد الحياة أم متوفيات ، أو ما إذا ن
ْ
م

ل
َ
ع عن
ا منذ والدته. ال ي ازل الشعور
ً
ً بشدة الصدمة الناجمة عن فقدان عائلته بأكملها حتى
والدي الذي كان يتيم قويا
وقتنا الحاضر.
بغض النظر عن مكان إقامة الفلسطيني، فإن صدمة النكبة تظل حية ومؤلمة. وبينما يكافحون للتصالح مع
م بهم في تلك األوقات المظلمة. ليس من المستغرب َ
فقدان ت ارثهم ونمط حياتهم، يستمر شعور العجز الذي أل
َ أن العديد من شيوخنا رفضوا مناقشة هذا الماضي المؤلم، كونه
ببساطة غير محتمل. لم يناقشني والد ي بهذا
الشأن، ولم أتعلم عنه في المدرسة عندما كنت طفلة. فقد كان كل بيت وكل شارع وكل مؤسسة خاضعة إلشراف
سلطة الرقابة والسلطة التأديبية اإلسرائيلية.
كفلسطينية نشأت داخل الخط األخضر، بدأت أدرك أن العديد من االسرائيليين لديهم رغبة ضئيلة لفهمي أو
فهم شعبي. يبدو أنهم يكتفون بالتمسك بالفكرة بأن األرض كانت غير مأهولة قبل النكبة، وأنها اآلن تنتمي بحق
ً إلى أولئك الذين كانوا ا
سابق دو ن وطن. هم يقبلون االعتقاد بأن سكان األرض األصلي ين هم مجرد عرب عاشوا
هناك، دون أي ارتباط عميق باألرض. فكان عتبرون المالكين
ُ
كما لو أن العرب عاشوا بجانب اليهود، الذين ي
الشرعيين لألرض، منذ األزل.
اإلس ارئيليون ليسوا على د ارية واسعة بالصدمة المستمرة التي ال زال الفلسطينيون ا من
ً
الذين تم تهجيرهم قسر
منازلهم يعانون ويالتها. واألسوأ من ذلك، أن الحكومات اإلسرائيلية ترفض االعتراف بأن العنف الذي يتعرض
له الفلسطينيو ا في العنف الجسدي
ً
ن ليس محصور فقط. بل إنه متأصل بشكل عميق في هيكل الدولة ذاتها -
تعزى المسؤولية عن طرد الفلسطينيين من وطنهم بشكل حصري ُ في نظمها ومؤسساتها و أنظمتها. فال يمكن أن
إلى قلة من القادة اإلس ارئيليين، مثل ديفيد بن غوريون، أو إلى شخصيات حالية مثل بيتسالئيل سموتريتش،
وإيتامار بن غفير، أو بنيامين نتنياهو، الذين يسعون لمواصلة وتكثيف هذا اإلرث المدمر. و عندما نتحدث عن
من ضد ظ أهمية محاسبة األفراد على جرائمهم الماضية والحالية، فإنه من األهمية بمكان أن ندرك أن العنف ال م
الفلسطينيين قائم ضمن الهياكل األساسية للمجتمع اإلسرائيلي - في مؤسساته االجتماعية والسياسية
ا، يفوق الهجمات الجسدية المرئية على
ً
ا بعيد المدى ومستدام
ً
واالقتصادية. تترك آثار هذا العنف الهيكلي أثر
الفلسطينيين وممتلكاتهم. مع وجود أكثر من 60 ا وعدد كبير من السياس
ً
ا تمييزي
ً
قانون ات المستهدفة للمواطنين
الفلسطينيين في إسرائيل، كما حرم الفلسطينيون من جميع أنواع الحقوق
ُ
يتمتع اليهود بم ازيا كبيرة بينما ي .
لفهم الحقيقة الكاملة لمأساة النكبة والصدمة المستمرة التي يعاني منها الفلسطينيون، من المهم تنميق تجاربهم.
فيتعين علينا أن ندرك أن وراء ا
ً
كل إحصائية وعنوان وق ارر سياسي، هناك أشخاص حقيقيون يمتلكون قصص
حقيقية و نضاالت حقيقية. فعن طريق االستماع إلى هذه األصوات وتعزيزها، يمكننا أن نبدأ في فهم تعقيد
وعمق تجربة الشعب الفلسطيني.
على المجتمع الدولي أن يفهم أن النضال الفلسطيني من أجل العدالة تدفعه الرغبة في رؤيته وسماعه و تقييمه
كبشر. فهو نضال من أجل اإلقرار والكرامة واالحترام.
ْ
إن الدعوة إلى "محو الماحي" في هذا السياق هي تعبير
قوي عن النضال الفلسطيني من أجل العدالة واالعتراف. وهو يشير إلى المطالبة باالعتراف بالنكبة ومعالجتها،
وكذلك االعت ارف بحقوق الفلسطينيين في العودة إلى ديارهم وأرضهم واحترامها. إنها صرخة من أجل استعادة
العدالة والكرامة وكذلك من أجل االعتراف بالشعب الفلسطيني كأعضاء متساوين في األسرة البشرية.
لم يعد باإلمكان تجاهل صدمة النكبة. فمن الضروري أن يدرك العالم، وإس ارئيل على وجه الخصوص، أهمية
هذا الحدث ويفهمونه. لقد تم تشكيل تصورات الشعبين اليهودي والفلسطيني من خالل التجارب التاريخية
الصادمة. فقد كان تأسيس وصعود دولة إسرائيل عام 1948 بمثابة لحظة خالص لإلسرائيليين. النكبة، مع
ا في التاريخ بالنسبة للفلسطينيين الذين نزحوا
ذلك، ليست فصالً مغلق بشكل دائم ويعيشون في المنفى أو تحت ً
االحتالل. الصدمة مستمرة ولها تأثير على الحياة اليومية لكل فلسطيني، ولهذا السبب ال يمكن نسيان النكبة
أو محوها.
أن يعترف العالم، وإسرائيل على وجه الخصوص، بأهمية هذا الحدث وأن يفهمه. لقد تأثرت تصورات الشعبين
اليهودي والفلسطيني بتجارب تاريخية مؤلمة. تأسيس دولة إسرائيل وصعودها في عام 1948 كانت لحظة تمت
ا في التاريخ بالنسبة للفلسطينيين الذين تم تهجيرهم
ً
بها فداء لإلس ارئيليين. ومع ذلك، النكبة ليست فصالً مغلق
بشكل دائم ويعيشون في المنفى أو تحت االحتالل. الصدمة مستمرة وتؤثر على حياة الفلسطينيين اليومية،
ولهذا السبب ال يمكن نسيان النكبة أو محوها.
ا. إنه المفتاح لتحقيق الهدوء واالستق ارر
ً
التعامل مع تداعيات النكبة هو الطريقة الوحيدة إليجاد حل والمضي قدم
والحياة الطبيعية في األرض المقدسة. ولكن، يمكن أن يحدث ذلك فقط إذا تحملت إسرائيل وبقية العالم
مسؤولياتهم عن المشاركة في تهجير الفلسطينيين المستمر وعدم حصولهم على جنسية. فإن عدم االعتراف
بالمشكلة ومعالجتها يعرقل التقدم نحو حل سلمي وعادل.
د. كارول دانيال كسبري هي عالمة اجتماع ولديها درجة الدكتو اره متعددة التخصصات في تحليل وحل الن ازعات.
تمتلكلديها أكثر من 20 ا من الخبرة في تصميم وقيادة ب ارمج في مجال تخفيف الص ارعات وبناء السالم
ً
عام
والمناصرة والمقاومة الالعنفية في بيئات دولية معقدة، مع التركيز على منطقة الشرق األوسط وشمال أفريقيا
وأوروبا. وهي مديرة مشاركة مسؤولة في برنامج حل النزاعات في مركز كارتر و باحث ة غير مقيمة في برنامج
معهد الشرق األوسط حول فلسطين والشؤون الفلسطينية- اإلسرائيلية

[Sam · Rating 4 out of 5]

This rating is of the first edition of the book, which is very good.
Later editions, so far as I am aware, have been annotated and rewritten retrospectively in an attempt to justify the crimes, detailed meticulously in the text, of the emerging Zionist state, thus losing much of the impartiality and relative objectivity which makes this first edition a crucial book on the history of the establishment of Israel.

[Nada Helmy · Rating 3 out of 5]

احتلال فلسطين وطمس تراثها وصمة عار في جبين العالم !
حاول الكاتب أن يلتزم الحياد في وصف الحقائق لكن جاء في كثير من المواضع مبررا(بدون أدلة حسب كلامه نفسه) لجرائم اسرائيل.

[Bradley Farless · Rating 4 out of 5]

Clear, concise presentation of history based on good research. It doesn't paint a pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian picture; it just presents the facts and conclusions that can readily be drawn from those facts. It's a little dry, though, so don't pick it up thinking it's going to read like a historical fiction novel.

Update (almost 2 years after the first reading): Read through it a second time, this time for a graduate seminar in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. I think I got a lot more from it this time, but I could still give it a third and probably a fourth reading. This thing is rich in detail and presents a complex and nuanced approach to the causes and continued existence of the refugee problem. Maybe it's a sign that I've been studying history for too long, but this time around I found some parts of the book exciting. Still, it's definitely not something I would call pleasure reading. Worth it though if you have an interest in Israeli history in general, the 48 war, or current Middle Eastern politics.

[Jasper Sendler · Rating 4 out of 5]

Presented some fresh and challenging evidence to repudiate the traditional Zionist claims in the 1980s. Challenges many flawed narratives, eg. ‘A land without people’. However, exonerates the yishuv leadership. More convincing accounts come from Pappé, Flapan, Qumsiyeh, and Abu Sitta.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Should be paired with "The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine" by Ilan Pappe, to give differing "new Israeli historian" accounts of 1947-1949.

[Ehab mohamed · Rating 2 out of 5]

ملأ كتابه بالحقائق والمقدمات الصادقة التي يجب ألا تنتج إلا نتائج صادقة برهانية، ولكن عقليته الصهونية آبت عليه ذلك، وكعادة الصهيانة لا تشغلهم الحقائق، ولكن يشغلهم ما يريدون ولو خالفوا كل معقول.

ختم الرجل كتابه بأكذوبة كبرى ألا وهي أن مولد مشكلة اللاجئين الفلسطنيين جاءت بسبب الحرب العربية على (دولة) إسرائيل وعدم رغبتهم في قبول (التقسيم) .... لا والله!!

يعني السبب مكنش أن اليهود وحتى قبل وعد بلفور كانوا بيمارسوا كل الوساخات ويستولوا على الأرض ويحظروا دخول أي عربي

يعني مش علشان الأمم المتحدة قسمت أرض الفلسطنيين (الأغلبية) وانتزعتها منهم علشان تمنحها لليهود (الأقلية) وحتى إن سلمنا بالتقسيم نفسه ..فهل من المعقول أن تأخذ الأقلية ٥٥ بالمائة من أرض ليست أرضهم أصلا؟! ... لأ فعلا ملهمش حق الفلسطنيين... المفروض كانوا سابوها كلها زي ما اليهود عايزين ومستمرين.

الكاتب لا تشغله التناقضات فيقول لنا أن تعرض اليهود للاعتداءات من العرب خاصة في الفترة من ١٩٣٦ إلى ١٩٣٩ كانت سببا في (الفظائع) - وهي الكلمة التي اختارها بدلا من المذابح - التي ارتكبها جيش (الدفاع) .. جيش الدفاع الذي لم يكتف بما اقتطعته له الأمم المتحدة فالتهم كل شئ .. الغريب أن في الفترة التي استشهد بها كان مع الجيش البريطاني فيلق يهودي لقمع ثورة العرب وهذا الفيلق صار نواة الجيش الإسرائيلي لاحقا ... بالإضافة إلى ما تركته بريطانيا لهم من سلاح وذخيرة قبل مغادرتها وأعلنت أنها سرقت!

الكاتب يصور اليهود أنهم قلة ضعيفة تدافع عن نفسها .. ولكنه لا يني يكلمنا عن مدافع ودبابات وقاذفات وصورارخ بل وطائرات أوقعت الرعب في قلوب العرب .... يا ترى كل الأسلحة ديه جت إمتى ولحقوا يتدربوا عليها إزاي .. وهما أقلية مهضومة؟

يقول لك أن العرب كعادتهم بالغوا في وصف (الفظائع) مما أدى إلى موجات نزوح جماعية من الخوف وبالتالي الطرد لم يقم به العصابات الإسرائيلية!!!

طيب إيه هي الفظائع اللي بالغوا فيها : عادي يا سيدي شوية أطفال كسروا أدمغتهم ببنادق وكم بنت(طفلة) اغتصبوها على كام واحد جمعوهم في بيت وفجروه وكام شاب - مش كتير ٥٠ أو ستين كدة - جمعهوهم في ميدان عام وأعدموهم أمام أمهاتهم وأم كدة شايلة طفلها خلوها تنضفلهم مكانهم وبعد كدة قتلوها وطبعا علشان هما حنينين وطيبين قتلوا الطفلة معاها، وهما ماشيين بقا كانوا بيدوسوا الجثث بعربياتهم وهما بيضحكوا - بس يا سيدي شفت العرب بيبالغوا إزاي ويخوفوا الناس من الحاجات البسيطة ديه!!

الغريب أن كل هذه الفظائع - بحد تعبيره - نقلها نصا عن مصادر إسرائيلية موثوقة وليست عربية!

يقول أنه لم تكن هناك نية للتهجير لدى عصابات اليهود ولكن العرب بعد أن كانت تقذفهم الطائرات وتقتلهم القنابل وتدوسهم السيارات وتقتنصهم الطلقات التي تطلق عشوائيا بدون تمييز وتقتل قطعانهم وماشيتهم ويعدم ويؤسر شبابهم وتفجر منازلهم  وتقطع عنهم المياه ويمنع عنهم الغذاء وتقفل في أوجههم فرص العمل، بعد كل ذلك كان يغادر العرب طوعا!

تعليق مهم

إسرائيل تدعي في كل مكان أن حماس تستخدم المدنيين كدروع بشرية وهو مما يبرر لها قتل المدنيين ليصلوا إلى حماس، هذا مع الترويج لما فعلته حماس في السابع من أكتوبر على أنه مذبحة في صفوف المدنيين (اليهود) الأبرياء،... ولكن ما لا يعلمه الكثيرون أن هؤلاء المدنيين (اليهود) الأبرياء قد زرعتهم إسرائيل في مستوطنات على الحدود مباشرة ليكونوا دروع (مدنية) لحماية الحدود، بمعنى آخر إسرائيل زرعت هؤلاء المدنيين وفقا لتخطيط مسبق مدروس ليكونوا دروع بشرية وخط دفاع أول على الحدود....، هذا ليس استنتاج ولا ظن بل هذا مذكور في الكتاب حرفا!

ملاحظات سريعة من وحي الكتاب
- الصهاينة لا عهود لهم.
- الصهاينة لا يتعاملون بلغة المنطق بل بلغة القوة وفرض الأمر الواقع.
- الصهاينة لا حلفاء لهم ويتلاعبون بالكل لحسابهم الخاص.
- في مفاوضاتهم يقولون شيئا ويقصدون غيره.
- في مفاوضاتهم لا يقدمون تنازلات إلا إذا كانت مقابل فوائد أكبر.
- في مفاوضاتهم يتشددون ولا يتنازولون ثم وبعد أن تشتعل الأحداث وتتأزم الأمور يطرحون عرض هزيل عالمين أنه سيرفض قطعا وذلك ليقلبوا الطاولة على الطرف الآخر ويكون هو المتشدد.
- الحرب النفسية والبروباجندا لدى اليهود جزء لا يتجزأ من حربهم، فهم يرون أن كسر الروح المعنوية باستخدام القوة المفرطة يجعل الآخرين يخافون ويخضعون دون مواجهة مباشرة.

[Stephen Heiner · Rating 5 out of 5]

video book review part 1: https://youtu.be/yWbHvBx8U8U
video book review part 2: https://youtu.be/NazoMBBkn5g

express review: https://youtu.be/MJ5ZaHon5Eo

One of the most important books you can read on the Palestinian refugee question. A small part of me wishes it was one of the earliest books I had read, simply because of how much information I would have gotten early on. But now, more than two dozen books in, I'm glad to be able to read it and separate Morris' painstaking and foundational research which proves that Palestinians were expelled, murdered, raped, etc., not that they were "told to leave by their leaders," from his shockingly disjointed disagreement with his own facts. For example, he tells us on page 29 that the Palestinians "entered the war without a national militia" yet repeats throughout the text that the Palestinians "started the war." How can a country without an army, much less a national militia, "start a war," and how do you account for the fact that the majority of the expulsions of Palestinians occurred before May 14, 1948, when the Jewish entity declared itself a state, and that those expulsions happened inside the UN-mandated land for the Jewish state, meaning that Israel was evicting its own Palestinian citizens? Morris' Zionism blinds him to the facts that he can't help, as an honest historian, sharing with us.

It's the single longest text I've read in my studies in this area, and as such, I don't expect most people to get through it, even if they can get past the intimidation of the size of it before they order it. But I promise you it will be worth it, especially the endnotes at the end of each chapter.

"Rather, the Zionist public catechism, at the turn of the century, and well into the 1940s, remained that there was room enough in Palestine for both peoples; there need not be a displacement of Arabs to make way for Zionist immigrants or a Jewish state." (p. 43)

"Eliahu Berlin, a leader of the Knesset Yisrael religious party, proposed that 'taxes should be increased so that the Arabs will flee because of the taxes.'" (p. 51)

(quoting Chaim Weizmann) "The Arab is often called the son of the desert. It would be truer to call him the father of the desert. His laziness and primitivism turn a flourishing garden into a desert. Give me the land occupied by one million Arabs, and I will easily settle five times that number of Jews on it." (p. 53)

(from the 1940 diary of Yosef Weitz) "If the Arabs leave it, the country will become wide and spacious for us...the only solution [after World War II ends] is a Land of Israel, at least a western Land of Israel [i.e. Palestine], without Arabs. There is no room here for compromises....There is no way but to transfer all of them, save perhaps for [the mainly Christian Arabs of] Bethlehem, Nazareth and old Jerusalem. Not one village must be left, not one [beduin] tribe. The transfer must be directed at Iraq, Syria and even Transjordan. For this goal funds will be found...And only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb millions of our brothers and the Jewish problem [in Europe] will cease to exist. There is no other solution." (p. 54)

"By 1948, transfer was in the air. The transfer thinking that preceded the war contributed to the denouement by conditioning the Jewish population, political parties, military organizations and military and civilian leaderships for what happened. Thinking about the possibilities of transfer in the 1930s and 1940s had prepared and conditioned hearts and minds for its implementation in the course of 1948 so that, as it occurred, few voiced protest or doubt; it was accepted as inevitable and natural by the bulk of the Jewish population." (p. 60)

(from a JAE draft statement, Dec 1947) "Many thousands of Arabs will be living in the Jewish State. We want them to feel, right from this moment, that provided they keep the peace, their lives and property will be as secure as that of their Jewish fellow-citizens." (p. 70)

(from a pamphlet produced by the Arab Department of the Histadrut) "[T]he Arab worker, clerk and peasant in the Jewish state will be citizens with equal rights and duties...In this state there will be no room for discrimination..." (p. 70)

"Plan D provided for the conquest and permanent occupation, or levelling, of villages and towns." (p. 164)

"Throughout [April-June 1948] Arbs who had fled were prevented from returning to their homes." (p. 171)

(regarding the attack on Jaffa) "The mortars were aimed roughly at the port area, the Clock Square, the prison, King George Boulevard and Ajami...It should be made clear that IZL attack with mortars was indiscriminate and designed to create panic among the civilian inhabitants." (p. 213)

"Deir Yassin had taken place a fortnight before and was fresh in everyone's mind...this was a major factor in the inhabitants' precipitate exodus." (p. 214)

"Deir Yassin...had signed a non-belligerency pact with its Jewish neighbors and repeatedly had barred entry to foreign irregulars." (p. 237)

"It is worth noting that throughout 1948, Ben-Gurion had always avoided personally issuing explicit expulsion or transfer orders." (p. 232)

"By 10 April, Haganah orders explicitly called for the 'liquidation' of villages...'cleansing' operations...'to attack with the aim of annihilation and destruction and arson'" (p. 235)

(regarding the oft-repeated Zionist claim that "their leaders told them to leave") "I have found no contemporary evidence of such blanket, official 'calls,' by any Arab government. And I have found no evidence that the Palestinians or any substantial group left because they heard such 'calls' or orders from outside Arab leaders." (p. 269)

"The Jewish community will not be able to withstand the pressure of the returning Arabs, especially in view [of the fact] that most of the Arab property in Safad has been stolen and plundered since the Arabs left." (p. 316)

(quoting Ben-Gurion) "[W]e should prevent their return...We must settle Jaffa, Jaffa will become a Jewish city...to allow the return of the Arabs to Jaffa would be...foolish." (p. 318)

"The operations is going according to plan and...the units reached their objectives...they blow up all the houses and burn all the beduin tents...We have begun the systematic burning of the [Lake] Hula [area] villages." (p. 347)

(quoting Aharon Cohen) "Will our state be built on the destruction of Arab settlements?" (p. 355)

"[T]here was a necessity and unrepeatable opportunity in the near future to determine facts on the ground which any political solution in the future will not be able to ignore." (p. 373)

(quoting Ra'anan Weitz) "Wherever conditions make it necessary, the new settlement should be established [on the site of] the existing village." (p. 379)

"Allon reportedly asked: 'What shall we do with the Arabs?' Ben-Gurion responded with a dismissive, energetic gesture with his hand and said: 'Expel them.'" (p. 429)

"Some were stripped by soldiers of their valuables as they left town or at checkpoints along the way." (p. 432)

"And the October-November atrocities were simply too concentrated, widespread and severe to be ignored." (p. 486)

(quoting Aharon Cisling) "I couldn't sleep all night...this is something that determines the character of the nation...Jews too have committed Nazi acts." (p. 488)

"More ambitiously, on 11 March the IDF mounted a series of major pushes eastward, to 'create facts' on the ground in advance of the UN survey of the Jordanian and Israeli positions scheduled for later that day." (p. 519)

"Ben-Gurion denied 'emphatically that Israel had expelled the Arabs...the State of Israel expelled nobody and will never do it,' he said." (p. 555)

(quoting Elias Sasson) "[T]he Jews believe that it is possible to achieve peace without [paying] any price, minimal or maximal." (p. 571)

"Jewish troops often randomly killed individual prisoners of war, farm hands in the fields and the occasional villager who had stayed behind." (p. 592)

[Anatoly Bezrukov · Rating 4 out of 5]

Мастрид для интересующихся проблемой.
Моррис показывает со ссылкой на огромный массив архивного материала причины и ход возникновения проблемы палестинских беженцев. Автор полагает, что у лидеров Ишува не было никакого изначального замысла изгнания арабов с территории будущего Израиля; исход арабов в каждом конкретном случае (в зависимости от места и конкретного момента) имел свою причину или комплекс причин. Основным фактором явилась, конечно же, Война за независимость, которую инициировали не евреи, а арабы, не согласившиеся с Резолюцией о создании двух государств на территории Палестины. Иногда арабы проявляли собственную инициативу, иногда были напуганы боевыми действиями или не выдерживали напряжения, связанного с войной. В других ситуациях местные командиры Хаганы, Эцель или Лехи (а впоследствии - Армии обороны Израиля) проявляли инициативу по изгнанию населения или разрушению населённых пунктов, принимая во внимание чисто военные соображения.
Таким образом, не было никакого "целенаправленного геноцида палестинцев", равно как и не было "полностью добровольного побега с насиженных мест": истина где-то посередине.
Как бы то ни было, после того, как арабы в большом количестве покинули свои города и деревни, руководство Ишува пришло к очевидному выводу, что пускать их обратно нельзя: ни по военным, ни по политическим соображениям. Арабские же лидеры тоже не спешили их ассимилировать: беженцы нужны были им в первую очередь как инструмент давления на Израиль; сами по себе они арабов из соседних государств не интересовали.
Книга обстоятельная и вызывает впечатление объективного дотошного исследования. Единственный минус - практически полное отсутствие арабских источников, но Моррис в предисловии прямо предупреждает, что эта проблема (возникшая не по его вине) имеет место.

[Danilo Lipisk · Rating 4 out of 5]

אין ספק שהמחקר של בני מוריס הוא עדיין המחקר המושלם ביותר בנושא הפליטים הפלסטינים של מלחמת העצמאות. לא קראתי את הספר "המקורי" שלו. קראתי את הספר המעודכן שלו אחרי שקראתי את הספר של ה"יריב" של מוריס, אילן פפה – The Ethnic Clean of Palestine. הספר נראה לי כמו תשובה לטענות של פפה כי הייתה תוכנית מראש לגרש את המקסימום האפשרי את הערבים מא''י.

הספר הזה של מוריס הוא פרגמטי יותר ו"ניטרלי" יותר, נגיד ככה... לעומת הספר של פפה כי נוטל האשמה על כל ה"נכבה" על התנועה הציונית. מוריס טוען כי עזיבתם/גירושם של הפלסטינית הייתה תוצאה של שילוב של גורמים, כולל גירוש מכוון באזורים מסוימים ובריחה ספונטנית של אוכלוסיות פלסטיניות באחרים. הוא מכיר באירועים של גירוש וטבח, אך טוען שהפעולות הללו היו חד פעמיות ולא חלק מתוכנית מאורגנת של "טיהור אתני". בפרקים אחרים של הספר, מוריס ביקורתי יותר כלפי המנהיגים הערבים והפלסטינים באותה תקופה, ומטיל עליהם חלק מהאחריות להסלמה של הסכסוך.
מה שכן, מחקרו של מוריס מפוצץ כמה מיתוסים - אין כזה דבר "הצבא המוסרי בעולם". פלמ''ח וההגנה התנהגו בדיוק כמו כל צבא אחר בעולם בכל ההיסטוריה. ביצעו מעשי הזוועה, רצח המונים, אונס, גירוש, עינוי וכו'.אצ''ל ולח''י נהגו ממש כמו ארגוני טרור.

[Water Cat · Rating 2 out of 5]

My review is divided into three main parts: an analysis of the book itself, a note for potential readers, and further suggested readings.

1)
a) In this book, Benny Morris claims to have uncovered evidence of local Arab evacuation orders, supposedly further 'complicating' the nature of the 1947–1949 Palestinian exodus. However, a closer examination of his annotated bibliography reveals that most, if not all, of his evidence consists of indirect speculations recorded in Israeli (and, to a lesser extent, British) sources—documents that reflect what Israeli or British officials thought had happened rather than direct evidence of actual events.

His claim then faces a major obstacle: the findings of the preeminent historian and political scientist Walid Khalidi, whose classic study of the 1947–1949 Palestinian exodus was based on a thorough examination of Arab sources, including official records, newspapers, and press releases. Khalidi found no evidence of evacuation orders, at least not in the way Morris describes them (see "Why Did the Palestinians Leave, Revisited"). In fact, Khalidi found the opposite—Arab authorities often sought to persuade people to stay.

A case in point is Khalidi’s detailed study of the Palestinian-Arab exodus from Haifa, "The Fall of Haifa, Revisited," which thoroughly debunks large portions of Morris’s account. That said, while Khalidi’s research is authoritative, it is possible that he could not account for every local incident. There may have been more Arab-initiated evacuations than he acknowledges, though readers are encouraged to consult "All That Remains", an encyclopedic profile of the occupied and depopulated Palestinian-Arab villages of 1948, edited by Khalidi. Without having read the entire encyclopedia myself, I speculate that the reality lies somewhere between Khalidi’s and Morris’s estimates regarding evacuation orders. However, what is overwhelmingly clear—confirmed even by Morris’s own evidence—is that the primary causes of the Palestinian exodus were war conditions and ethnic cleansing (i.e., coercion).

2)
a) One of the book’s strongest chapters addresses the issue of "transfer" in Zionist thinking—a euphemism for the systematic expulsion of the Palestinian people. While valuable, this chapter is not the most comprehensive study on the subject. Readers seeking a more in-depth analysis should consult "Expulsion of the Palestinians" by political scientist and scholar of religion and literature Nur-Eldeen Masalha, which thoroughly examines "transfer" thinking leading up to and during the 1947–1948 war and its attendant exodus.

Although Morris frames the origins of the conflict as a result of Arab aggression toward Jewish immigrants, his own research contradicts this conclusion. As political scientist, theorist, historian, and international jurist Norman Finkelstein observes:

"Morris contended in his groundbreaking study, Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, that, on the contrary, from the mid-1930s 'the idea of transferring the Arabs out . . . was seen as the chief means of assuring the stability of the "Jewishness" of the proposed Jewish State,' while in Righteous Victims he wrote that 'the transfer idea . . . was one of the main currents in Zionist ideology from the movement’s inception.' In another seminal essay, Morris documented that 'thinking about the transfer of all or part of Palestine’s Arabs out of the prospective Jewish state was pervasive among Zionist leadership circles long before 1937.'"

Finkelstein ultimately concludes, based on Morris’s own chronology, that "Zionist transfer was cause and Arab resistance effect in an ever-expanding spiral" (see page 256 of"Knowing Too Much").

b) The book concludes by claiming—without evidence—that the Palestinian refugee problem is the primary obstacle to peace. While this assertion is at least partially true, Morris frames it as a result of Arabs using propaganda about the refugee crisis to derail peace efforts. This claim is particularly peculiar given that Morris wrote this book during a period when many of his fellow New Historians, critical sociologists, and investigative journalists were uncovering evidence that debunked key Israeli foundational myths. Many of these revelations were catalyzed by Israel’s brutal 1982 invasion of Lebanon (see Simha Flapan’s "Zionism and the Palestinians, 1917–1947" and "The Birth of Israel, 1948–1952" for an accessible but scholarly survey of the New Historians’ findings and the impact of 1982 on Israeli historiography).

To gain a deeper understanding of the refugee question’s role in the conflict, readers should consult:

"Palestine Reborn" – Walid Khalidi
"The Politics of Denial" – Nur-Eldeen Masalha
"Palestinian Refugees" – Edited by Naseer Aruri
"Israel and the Palestinian Refugees" – Edited by Eyal Benvenisti, Chaim Gans, and Sari Hanafi

3)
a) Although I have provided numerous suggested readings, it is worth noting that this book was intended to be built upon in Morris’s subsequent works, namely "1948 and After" (see the second edition) and "Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956".

b) At the outset, Morris includes a rather weak section on Jewish military preparedness. Readers interested in better research on this topic should consult "The Hebrew Reconquista of Palestine" by Walid Khalidi and the first volume of "The History of Israel’s War of Independence" by preeminent military historian/theorist Uri Milstein.

For a superior study of the wider Arab world’s military preparedness, see Eliezer Tauber’s "The Arab Military Force in Palestine Prior to the Invasion of the Arab Armies, 1945–1948". To better understand Palestinian-Arab society before the exodus, "Before Their Diaspora" by Walid Khalidi (latest edition) is essential. Lastly, a case study offering a deep dive into the dynamics of the Yishuv can be found in "Colonizing Palestine" by historical sociologist Arīj Ṣabbāgh-Khūrī.

[Pepper · Rating 4 out of 5]

Exhaustive scholarly tome that outlines the phases of the flight of Arabs from Palestine - predominantly voluntary. Interesting to find out that at some points the Arab leaders were encouraging people to flee and later threatening them is they did. The early flight of the rich, meant Arab cities were left with no working businesses - no shops, etc. There was no Israeli policy to encourage immigration. The famous Israeli flattening of villages happened primarily in two cases: the village was a hotbed of terrorists or it was blocking the connecting of the major cities of Jewish population (the roads were controlled by Arabs and this was the one of the close calls that might have caused Israel to lose the war). Much destruction resulted. There was a tremendous influx of migrants from Europe and Arab states at the same time. And, of course, Israel refused to let those who fled - who assumed they would lose the wars (the civil and the attack from neighboring states) - return.

[Dana Ladani · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is interesting because you will find positive reviews from both pro Israel and pro Palestinian supporters (to an extent). At least those who are grounded in some sort of reality. It is for people who understand that the war of independence or the catastrophe (how you view it) was brutal. For Israelis, it was a war of survival and for Palestinians, it created a refugee problem (what happened after that is not addressed in this book). However, the book shows through evidence, that there were MANY causes for the flight of Palestinians and that it was not a plan put in place prior to partition. My one problem with the book is that it does now address Arab atrocities which leaves readers believing they never occurred (which they did) but more so at the beginning of the war.

[Tuvi_yah · Rating 4 out of 5]

Die deutsche Übersetzung gibt es hier leider noch nicht, deswegen hier: kurz gesagt, ein Monstrum von Buch, das in seiner Detailversessenheit und Tiefe das bisher beeindruckendste Buch zum Themenkomplex Nahost ist, das ich gelesen habe. Nicht nur, dass Morris Dorf für Dorf die Geschichte aufrollt, er bricht auch mit altbekannten Narrativen und bleibt dabei immer an Originalquellen. Leider ein Stern Abzug, weil ich mir gern etwas mehr arabische Perspektive gewünscht hätte, was aber angesichts der der umfangreichen Archivarbeit wahrscheinlich einfach nicht machbar war. Dennoch, absolute Leseempfehlung.

[Xavier Alexandre · Rating 5 out of 5]

I don't think there is any book with more precise details about how Arabs living in Israel became refugees. The author demonstrates convincingly that Ben Gurion and his government had no plans to drive the Arabs out, even though they welcomed the facts on the ground, and expelled some, on a case to case basis.

Once former Arab residents of Israel became refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt, they were not offered citizenship (except Jordan), guaranteeing that many of their descendants would become supporters of or active terrorists '

[Robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

Born of war, not by design, and far more nuanced due to the complexities of British Mandate society than many in 2025 would like to believe. A horrific byproduct of Arab-Jewish conflict against the backdrop of the Jewish death struggle in Europe just before. But not a result of calls from Arab leaders—only very locally—as I was taught. A helpful, detailed study from village to village. It's also interesting how Israeli archives (state, IDF, other) confirm the conclusions.

[Emma Wong · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is excellent in terms of it's sourcing and scholarly detail. It is not, however, an easy read. It's a scholarly work. If you are looking for an easier read that covers much of the same information in a much more digestible way, I'd suggest reading Morris's other book called 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War.

[Ian M. Herzberg · Rating 5 out of 5]

Classic text in Israeli/Palestinian conflict

An effort at a balanced view of the origin of the central issue in the world’s most intractable conflict. Scholarly and comprehensive, but not a light read.

[Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

The research is thorough and the evidence compelling, but not for Morris’ conclusion that the Nakba was essentially an accident. He clearly demonstrates that the Yishuv (and then Israel) carried out wilful ethnic cleansing.

[Md Azmir Fakir · Rating 2 out of 5]

Okay, so I read about 30 pages, decided the author was thoroughly biased and boring and gave up reading it.

[Roan24 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Cuts through all the myths

[Linus Sjöstrand · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read for understanding the Nakba

[Alan · Rating 5 out of 5]

A foundation for a realistic understanding of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Morris paints a vivid picture of the war that lead to Israel's birth as well as the Palestinian refuge problem. He has a bit of commentary but mostly saves his interpretations for his other book 1948 and After.

[Anne · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read the original book, not this "revisited" version.