For the Parmenidean monist, there are no distinctions whatsoever-indeed, distinctions are unintelligible. In The Parmenidean Ascent , Michael Della Rocca aims to revive this controversial approach on rationalist grounds. He not only defends the attribution of such an extreme monism to the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides, but also embraces this extreme monism in its own right and expands these monistic results to many of the most crucial areas of philosophy, including being, action, knowledge, meaning, truth, and metaphysical explanation. On Della Rocca's account, there is no differentiated being, no differentiated action, knowledge, or meaning; rather all is being, just as all is action, all is knowledge, all is meaning.
Motivating this argument is a detailed survey of the failure of leading positions (both historical and contemporary) to meet a demand for the explanation of a given phenomenon, together with a powerful, original version of a Bradleyan argument against the reality of relations. The result is a rationalist rejection of all distinctions and a skeptical denial of the intelligibility of ordinary, relational notions of being, action, knowledge, and meaning.
Della Rocca then turns this analysis on the practice of philosophy itself. Followed to its conclusion, Parmenidean monism rejects any distinction between philosophy and the study of its history. Such a conclusion challenges methods popular in the practice of philosophy today, including especially the method of relying on intuitions and common sense as the basis of philosophical inquiry. The historically-minded and rationalist approach used throughout the book aims to demonstrate the ultimate bankruptcy of the prevailing methodology. It promises-on rationalist grounds-to inspire much soul-searching on the part of philosophers and to challenge the content and the methods of so much philosophy both now and in the past.
Like many, I want the PSR taxi to stop within walking distance of Classical Theism sans modal collapse. Della Rocha drives it over a cliff and beyond the stars. Favorite quote:
"In making this Parmenidean Ascent — in eliding the distinctions and relations traditionally associated with the notion of being and advancing to a view of being without relations — one adopts a view of reality that is, in some ways, analogous to Aquinas’ view of God. For Aquinas, God is subsistent being itself, being without any internal distinctions, purely simple being. Being or substance, as I invoke it here, is like God, as Aquinas sees God. However, it is important for Aquinas that God, as perfectly simple, is distinct from the created world of finite, composite, substances. By contrast, on my view, there is no such distinction between God or pure being and a world of other beings. There is just being. When we make the Parmenidean Ascent with regard to substance, we do not lose the finite, related things we know and love, for those things could never coherently be conceived anyway. Rather, again, we finally see the world aright."
Bring a towel. Your face will melt. Brilliant, amazing book. We are experiencing a Golden Age of Metaphysics, Ontology, and Natural Theology. Dig in. This book is Very Important. (So is Karofsky's Case for Necessitarianism. PSR? She don't need no stinkin' PSR for Monism!)
Definitely the best meta-philosophy text I’ve ever read. I really took my time with this, and I’m thoroughly convinced of the Bradleyian arguments presented here in favour of Radical (or Existence) Monism. I do want more from MDR on the topic of undifferentiated meaning and truth, but perhaps that shall come in the future. This really tops everything I’ve read. As much as I’d like to say that I’m a changed man after having experienced this text, change is a concept only applicable to Doxa, that which “is not” and “cannot be inquired into at all”.
Messed me up, I can expand on this. I was attempting to defend DR against the possible objections that could be raised in light of his work: for example, the rejection of the principle of charity, or, in Chapter 1, the seeming disregarding of the interdependence found in Parmenides between what is and what can be thought. I gave up on my project because I realized that I must get further acquainted with Plato before I’m able to move on to Parmenides and engage deeply, but if you’re looking for a companion to reading Parmenides’s “On Nature”, then I claim that it’s an useful work.
A defence of radical monism by following the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which means that this book, this review, you and me are all One. There are no distinctions whatsoever, because distinctions, themselves, are impossible. Thought provoking, that's for sure.