The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs

by Lisa Bortolotti

In an ideal world, our beliefs would satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as foster the acquisition, retention, and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis. We may also experience impairments in perception, memory, learning, and reasoning in the course of our lives. Such limitations and impairments give rise to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, and beliefs that are elaborated delusional, motivated delusional, or optimistically biased.

In this book, Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent , where, in some contexts, the adoption, maintenance, or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs, yet it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade-off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness, which in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality
without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.

Genres: Philosophy, Psychology

178 pages, Hardcover

Published June 30, 2020

About the author

I am Professor of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham.

My main research area is the philosophy of cognitive science, and in my work I have mostly focused on the limitations of human cognition and human agency including faulty reasoning, delusions, confabulations, irrational beliefs, poor knowledge of the self, distorted memories, unreliable self narratives, self deception, implicit bias, inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviour, unrealistic optimism and positive illusions.

I am also interested in the relationship between science and society and in the ethical issues emerging from biomedical research, psychiatry, reproduction, parenting, and the treatment of nonhuman animals.

I currently lead a 5-year project on Pragmatic and Epistemic Role of Factually Erroneous Cognitions and Thoughts (PERFECT), funded by a European Research Council Consolidator Grant (2014-2019).

My latest book is Irrationality (Polity Press, 2014). I am currently writing a new research monograph provisionally entitled The Epistemic Innocence of Imperfect Cognitions.

Reviews

[Astrid Dzul Hori · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's a great approach to delusions not as a consequence of mental disease but as a way of deal with extreme situation. Bortolotti develops the concept "Epistemic Innocence" and present examples to illustrate the epistemic benefits of elaborated delusions. It's an interesting philosophical proposal to reconsider delusions not just as irrational beliefs but as a part of a partial surviving process for people with mental disease. Specially by not loosing their agency in social processes.

[Mills College Library]

128.33 B7394 2020