The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad

by Steven K. O'Hern

In this revealing insider's look at the US intelligence community's efforts to fight the insurgency in Iraq, author Steven K. O'Hern, who served in Iraq in 2005 as a senior intelligence officer, offers a critical assessment of our intelligence failures and suggests ways of improving our ability to fight an often elusive enemy.O'Hern criticizes America's military leaders for being enamored with high-technology solutions for all situations, including intelligence operations. Essentially, we are still relying on an intelligence system that was designed to beat the Soviet army. Using examples from human source operations conducted in Iraq, this book explains why human intelligence-not technology-is the key to defeating an insurgency and why the US is so poor at using what the military calls "HUMINT."O'Hern also cites internal structural problems that work against effective intelligence operations. The author gives examples of missed opportunities that resulted from information being caught in "stovepipes" and red tape.In conclusion, he cautions that these unresolved problems will continue to affect the United States in any future conflict against an insurgency.

Genres: Military Fiction

292 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 2008

Reviews

[Stingray · Rating 3 out of 5]

With „The Intelligence Wars“ Steven K. O’Hern provides the reader with a description of the difficulties of recruiting and handling human intelligence sources in post-war Iraq from a senior intelligence leaders position.
The author has a clear dedication to provide the public with a description of the pitfalls of interagency rivalry, lacking communication, coordination and the everyday difficulties of human intelligence operations in Iraq. Whereas the public may have visions of James Bond or Jason Bourne chasing insurgents, O’Hern describes the limits of case officers even meeting their agents in Baghdad or communicating with them. Effective intelligence work here was hindered by stove piping of reports, lacking coordination and not disseminating intelligence to the people who could act upon it.
Whereas the shortfalls O’Hern describes are true and important, he does tend to repeat the message over and over again, which becomes annoying over time. Also, while O’Hern has the perspective of a senior intelligence leader in a coordinating function, he can only describe his unique experience and does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the topic. The average reader may thus not find the account as interesting as the professional for lack of the professional background. Professionals on the other hand will understand O’Hern but have to speculate on all the secret information he has to omit from his account.
In summary this book in an interesting addition to growing literature on Iraq experiences but does only provide limited insights and few new information on the U.S. intelligence endeavor in Iraq.

[Coleman Reedy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good points in the book with interesting commentary but on a specific element of Baghdad.