In his Farewell Address of 1796, President George Washington admonished the young nation "to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." Isolationism thereafter became one of the most influential political trends in American history. From the founding era until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States shunned strategic commitments abroad, making only brief detours during the Spanish-American War and World War I. Amid World War II and the Cold War, Americans abandoned isolationism; they tried to run the world rather than run away from it. But isolationism is making a comeback as Americans tire of foreign entanglement. In this definitive and magisterial analysis-the first book to tell the fascinating story of isolationism across the arc of American history-Charles Kupchan explores the enduring connection between the isolationist impulse and the American experience. He also refurbishes isolationism's reputation, arguing that it constituted dangerous delusion during the 1930s, but afforded the nation clear strategic advantages during its ascent.
Kupchan traces isolationism's staying power to the ideology of American exceptionalism. Strategic detachment from the outside world was to protect the nation's unique experiment in liberty, which America would then share with others through the power of example. Since 1941, the United States has taken a much more interventionist approach to changing the world. But it has overreached, prompting Americans to rediscover the allure of nonentanglement and an America First foreign policy. The United States is hardly destined to return to isolationism, yet a strategic pullback is inevitable. Americans now need to find the middle ground between doing too much and doing too little.
Isolationism has been at the center of national policy since the founding of the United States. Most of us are familiar with President George Washington's Farewell Address in 1796 when he warned America "to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."
Of course, as American history has born out, US foreign policy has swung back and forth ever since, leading the nation into world war and a host of smaller military actions of various degrees of success or failure. Charlies Kupchan has written an important book memorializing the history of isolationism in American policymaking.
What I find remarkable about isolationism - and as Kupchan very ably points out in his book - is the staying power of isolationism as an ideology during the course of American history. Conversely, one could argue, we also see the staying power of an ideology of heavy engagement, of being the world's policeman, and nation building. It is not going away anytime soon and with the recent tragedy and leadership failures on how to withdraw from Afghanistan, we are likely to enter a new period of rigorous debate over isolationsim. Kupchan's book is a highly useful if not indespensable guide to understanding the historic implications of isolationism.
Thought-provoking history of U.S. foreign policy that persuasively argues that isolationism was used effectively in the early and middle years of the U.S. to shield the U.S. from involvement Europe's interstate conflicts, thus allowing the U.S. to develop an industrial base and grow through trade. It's not an argument for all forms of isolationism, though. Kupchan acknowledges that the isolationists in the interwar period in the 1930s were delusional in thinking that the U.S. could avoid the hostilities provoked by the Axis powers. This book is an interesting balance to the dominant narratives in U.S. foreign policy, which tend to denigrate isolationism generally on the basis that post WW2 liberal internationalism requires an interventionist foreign policy. But as the book notes, the post WW2 bipartisan consensus on liberal internationalism has broken down. The book argues that a new U.S. strategy should learn from the successes of U.S. isolationism in the past, particularly the need to focus on the development of the national economy and other domestic institutions. For this reason, the foreign policy establishment does a disservice by characterizing any retrenchment as 1930s isolationism. The book argues that the U.S. should use partnerships to deal with issues that have no unilateral solution, and grow influence by being an exemplar rather than a crusader with a foreign policy that is idealist in voice and realist in practice.
America is often depicted as an ever-expanding, militaristic empire that has the roots of its wealth and technological edge in foreign interventions. This book provides a refutation of this view, detailing the historical and intellectual roots of American isolationism. Interestingly, this work is more gripping when the author is just providing the historical facts, rather than when he presents his own opinions.
The first thing to notice about this work is its detailed description of early debates about the foreign policy of the young American nation after its founding. Notably, the discussion provided on American foreign policy is much more detailed for the period between American founding and World War II, which leaves a bit of dissatisfaction. One might imagine there will be a more in-depth history of American non-isolation in the Cold War era, but this is mostly absent, and when presented, is depicted in a mostly negative light. The effects of American intervention in the faith of countries like Germany, South Korea, and Japan, and by extension, the peace-keeping role of American-led liberal order after WWII is completely neglected. Furthermore, the notable incident of the Perry Expedition, in which US forcefully broke Japan's deep isolation and opened it to the world in mid 19 century is also not discussed as far as I remember.
As the book progresses, it becomes increasingly difficult to neglect the political bias of the author for Democratic governments. Kupchan, of course, has served as "[the] special assistant to the president and senior director for European affairs on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) in the Barack Obama administration", and this clearly is reflected in his assessment of Obama's foreign policies. For instance, the embarrassing backtracking of Obama over his red-line violation when the Syrian government attacked its own citizens with chemical weapons is casually blamed on the lack of support in congress, neglecting the fact that Obama was the leader of the Democratic party back then, and a big chunk of Democrats opposed taking any meaningful action against the Syrian government. Obama, which was a very popular president among his Democratic and liberal base, is at least partly to blame for the failure to bring the Capitol's Democrats in line. Another failure of Obama's foreign policy that is also just pushed under the rug is the role that his decisions regarding the military presence in Iraq played in making a power vacuum in Iraq, and thus giving rise to ISIS. It's hard to argue that Obama's foreign policy has been anything but a failure when it comes to Iraq and Syria.
Furthermore, JCPOA, the agreement signed between Iran and the six world powers (US, China, Germany, France, UK, and Russia) is praised as a masterpiece of foreign policy that was supposed to save the world from a nuclear Iran. This, again, neglects some inconvenient facts: Iran was arming terrorists in Syria and Iraq during the same time, and had a big role in the expansion of ISIS. In addition, the deal was highly unpopular with Americans. Both the American public and Congress had a negative view of JCPOA, which is the reason Obama's administration needed to resort to executive action to "pass" it as a law. This of course meant that any future Republican administration would pull out of the deal. Maybe a better deal that was not as favorable to the Iranian government would have had better support from the American people. This of course is another failure of Obama's administration.
In conclusion, I think this book is mostly a nice read when it comes to pre-21 century American foreign policy. However, as I mentioned before, there is a pronounced drop in the quality when Kupchan starts to give his own subjective views.