What do you think?
Rate this book
The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy Versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China
The United States of America has been the most powerful country in the world for over seventy years, but recently the U.S. National Security Strategy declared that the return of great power competition with Russia and China is the greatest threat to U.S. national security. Further, many analysts predict that America's autocratic rivals will have at least some success in disrupting-and, in the longer term, possibly even displacing-U.S. global leadership.
Brilliant and engagingly written, The Return of Great Power Rivalry argues that this conventional wisdom is wrong. Drawing on an extraordinary range of historical evidence and the works of figures like Herodotus, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu and combining it with cutting-edge social science research, Matthew Kroenig advances the riveting argument that democracies tend to excel in great power rivalries. He contends that democracies actually have unique economic, diplomatic, and military advantages in long-run geopolitical competitions. He considers autocratic advantages as well, but shows that these are more than outweighed by their vulnerabilities.Kroenig then shows these arguments through the seven most important cases of democratic-versus-autocratic rivalries throughout history, from the ancient world to the Cold War. Finally, he analyzes the new era of great power rivalry among the United States, Russia, and China through the lens of the democratic advantage argument. By advancing a "hard-power" argument for democracy, Kroenig demonstrates that despite its many problems, the U.S. is better positioned to maintain a global leadership role than either Russia or China.
A vitally important book for anyone concerned about the future of global geopolitics, The Return of Great Power Rivalry provides both an innovative way of thinking about power in international politics and an optimistic assessment of the future of American global leadership.
Brilliant and engagingly written, The Return of Great Power Rivalry argues that this conventional wisdom is wrong. Drawing on an extraordinary range of historical evidence and the works of figures like Herodotus, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu and combining it with cutting-edge social science research, Matthew Kroenig advances the riveting argument that democracies tend to excel in great power rivalries. He contends that democracies actually have unique economic, diplomatic, and military advantages in long-run geopolitical competitions. He considers autocratic advantages as well, but shows that these are more than outweighed by their vulnerabilities.Kroenig then shows these arguments through the seven most important cases of democratic-versus-autocratic rivalries throughout history, from the ancient world to the Cold War. Finally, he analyzes the new era of great power rivalry among the United States, Russia, and China through the lens of the democratic advantage argument. By advancing a "hard-power" argument for democracy, Kroenig demonstrates that despite its many problems, the U.S. is better positioned to maintain a global leadership role than either Russia or China.
A vitally important book for anyone concerned about the future of global geopolitics, The Return of Great Power Rivalry provides both an innovative way of thinking about power in international politics and an optimistic assessment of the future of American global leadership.
304 pages, Hardcover
Published March 27, 2020
62 people are currently reading
315 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
January 27, 2021
An ambitious but ultimately mediocre, intellectually weak read.
The strongest part was the China and Russia analyses, which are clearly the author's expertise. These were well written, and a strong defense of modern neoliberalism.
The weakest part was the history. The author is clearly not a historian; he makes unfounded or incorrect statements. He is especially ignorant of non-European history, and misses historical examples that could challenge his thesis. For example: he highlights Machiavelli on republican advantage, without considering the earlier, more thorough, and contravening analysis of Chanakya. He ignores the example of the Licchavii republics, which offer a counterexample to his thesis of republican/democratic advantage. I found it weak.
Most egregiously, he contradicts himself: He cites the victory of the Greeks vs the Persians as an example of quality over quantity in democracies, but then somehow cites Hannibal vs the Romans, in which numerically-inferior but better performing Carthaginians repeatedly beat the Romans, as continued proof of his thesis. I found his argument unsatisfying, and an example of shoehorning the evidence to fit the thesis.
He claims a universal analysis, but ultimately this is a Western analysis and vulnerable to confounding variables due to this effect.
The strongest part was the China and Russia analyses, which are clearly the author's expertise. These were well written, and a strong defense of modern neoliberalism.
The weakest part was the history. The author is clearly not a historian; he makes unfounded or incorrect statements. He is especially ignorant of non-European history, and misses historical examples that could challenge his thesis. For example: he highlights Machiavelli on republican advantage, without considering the earlier, more thorough, and contravening analysis of Chanakya. He ignores the example of the Licchavii republics, which offer a counterexample to his thesis of republican/democratic advantage. I found it weak.
Most egregiously, he contradicts himself: He cites the victory of the Greeks vs the Persians as an example of quality over quantity in democracies, but then somehow cites Hannibal vs the Romans, in which numerically-inferior but better performing Carthaginians repeatedly beat the Romans, as continued proof of his thesis. I found his argument unsatisfying, and an example of shoehorning the evidence to fit the thesis.
He claims a universal analysis, but ultimately this is a Western analysis and vulnerable to confounding variables due to this effect.
August 4, 2022
Foreign Policy
This was a very interesting book on international economics and foreign policy.
One of the better political reads lately. It covers lots of topics and was a good basis for further readings.
Would recommend!
4.6/5
This was a very interesting book on international economics and foreign policy.
One of the better political reads lately. It covers lots of topics and was a good basis for further readings.
Would recommend!
4.6/5
November 19, 2025
Matthew Kroenig’s The Return of Great Power Rivalry advances the claim that republican democracies possess decisive advantages over autocratic regimes in economic resilience, soft power projection, and the prudent conduct of warfare. Kroenig’s argument is grounded in Democratic Peace Theory and a wealth of empirical evidence, positing that states such as the United States and its Western allies maintain structural advantages vis-à-vis competitors like Russia and China.
However, Kroenig’s normative privileging of democracies glosses over the historical processes - colonialism, settler expansion, and exploitative practices - that facilitated Western ascendancy between the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Notably, Britain’s wartime mobilization was inseparable from its imperial resources, while the United States’ development hinged upon the dispossession of indigenous peoples. These complexities are underrepresented in Kroenig's account, raising questions about the durability of liberal advantages in a postcolonial era.
While Kroenig highlights the mutual support among democracies, recent empirical realities challenge this narrative. The frequent collaboration of the US with autocratic regimes for strategic purposes, as well as divergent democratic responses to security threats, demonstrates that liberal solidarity is often contingent, not categorical.
Kroenig’s work offers a significant contribution to ongoing debates about the future of great power competition, supported by substantial data and analysis. Nevertheless, the argument would benefit from greater nuance, especially in its engagement with historical context, diverse forms of democratic governance, and the evolving nature of international alliances. As geopolitical realities shift, simplistic dichotomies between democracy and autocracy may obscure more than they illuminate.
However, Kroenig’s normative privileging of democracies glosses over the historical processes - colonialism, settler expansion, and exploitative practices - that facilitated Western ascendancy between the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Notably, Britain’s wartime mobilization was inseparable from its imperial resources, while the United States’ development hinged upon the dispossession of indigenous peoples. These complexities are underrepresented in Kroenig's account, raising questions about the durability of liberal advantages in a postcolonial era.
While Kroenig highlights the mutual support among democracies, recent empirical realities challenge this narrative. The frequent collaboration of the US with autocratic regimes for strategic purposes, as well as divergent democratic responses to security threats, demonstrates that liberal solidarity is often contingent, not categorical.
Kroenig’s work offers a significant contribution to ongoing debates about the future of great power competition, supported by substantial data and analysis. Nevertheless, the argument would benefit from greater nuance, especially in its engagement with historical context, diverse forms of democratic governance, and the evolving nature of international alliances. As geopolitical realities shift, simplistic dichotomies between democracy and autocracy may obscure more than they illuminate.
March 26, 2024
A fascinating and timely exploration of the age-old struggle between democratic and autocratic powers. A Council on Foreign Relations member, friend and professor at Georgetown, Kroenig takes readers on a journey through history, examining how great powers have clashed and competed throughout the ages. From ancient Rome to the Cold War, he shows how the battle between democracy and autocracy has shaped the world we live in today. But, what sets this book apart is its focus on the current rivalry between the United States and China. Kroenig argues that we are entering a new era of great power competition, with the U.S. and China vying for dominance on the world stage. And he makes a compelling case that the outcome of this rivalry will have far-reaching implications for the future of global politics. What I love most about this book is Kroenig’s engaging writing style. He has a knack for making complex geopolitical concepts accessible and interesting, weaving together historical anecdotes, political theory, and real-world examples to create a compelling narrative. But don’t be fooled by the serious subject matter – “The Return of Great Power Rivalry” is also a surprisingly entertaining read. Kroenig injects humor and wit into his analysis, keeping readers engaged and entertained from start to finish. Overall, I highly recommend “The Return of Great Power Rivalry” to anyone interested in international relations, politics, or history. Whether you’re a seasoned scholar or just a casual reader looking to learn more about the world around you, this book is sure to educate, entertain, and provoke thought. So pick up a copy and dive into the riveting world of great power competition – you won’t be disappointed!
July 8, 2022
This book is a comparative study between autocracy and democracy. It explores the facts that make democracy superior to autocracy from ancient times to now. The author of the book provides examples of various empires which were existed in the past and elaborates his arguments in the light of the political systems those empires used to follow. He also shed a little light on the future while taking China, Russia and the US as an example of autocracy and democracy.
September 27, 2025
Interesting framing of great power competition over history with helpful examples. While I started and ended the book sharing the position of the central thesis, I’m not sure I’m better equipped to defend it.
April 9, 2022
With all this talk of Democracy v Autocracy, this is an excellent read to get caught up on the history and implications of this new rivalry.
Democracies win great power rivalries bc they are much stronger than autocracies in the 3 domains of economy, diplomacy, and military.
Democracy
• Economics: faster growth & more $
• Diplomacy: More alliances, last longer
• Militarily: Stronger & adaptable strategies
Autocracy
• Economy is centralized & political, easy to grow at first but slows down at higher income
• Diplomacy: fewer alliances, not trusted internationally
• Militarily: spend a lot on internal repression, centralized strategies
To build this case Kroenig surveys the academic literature then dives into 7 historical case studies. The theory holds in both the literature and case studies.
But we shouldn't get complacent because as you can tell many of those democracies are not still standing.
Democracies fall when their democratic institutions begin to crumble and they turn into a Demogogery (Athens) or Oligarchy (Venetian Republic).
So to win in the 21st-century great power rivalry we must take care of our vital democratic institutions at home.
• The Constitution & republican form of govt
• Civil & political freedoms
• Broad-based economic opportunity
• Strong defense
Democracies win great power rivalries bc they are much stronger than autocracies in the 3 domains of economy, diplomacy, and military.
Democracy
• Economics: faster growth & more $
• Diplomacy: More alliances, last longer
• Militarily: Stronger & adaptable strategies
Autocracy
• Economy is centralized & political, easy to grow at first but slows down at higher income
• Diplomacy: fewer alliances, not trusted internationally
• Militarily: spend a lot on internal repression, centralized strategies
To build this case Kroenig surveys the academic literature then dives into 7 historical case studies. The theory holds in both the literature and case studies.
But we shouldn't get complacent because as you can tell many of those democracies are not still standing.
Democracies fall when their democratic institutions begin to crumble and they turn into a Demogogery (Athens) or Oligarchy (Venetian Republic).
So to win in the 21st-century great power rivalry we must take care of our vital democratic institutions at home.
• The Constitution & republican form of govt
• Civil & political freedoms
• Broad-based economic opportunity
• Strong defense
July 20, 2025
Overall, a good look at democracy vs autocracy and the advantages and disadvantages of each system.
A few comments:
1. The best part of the book of the historical discussions of democracies from Greece through the United States. The historic vignettes of the rise and fall of great powers, to include Greece, Rome, Venice, the Dutch and then the English, provided a wealth of knowledge I was not familiar with.
2. The discussion of Russia's and China's shortfalls are well documented and are summarized, specifically their shortfalls with great power rivalry in the long-run.
3. Finally, the United States still has room to continue to remain the global leader on the world's stage; not because of personalities, but because of the institutions it has created. Should the U.S. impact these institutions, or not modernize them for current threats, the United States may see the emergence of a different great power (though that may or may not be a democracy).
A few comments:
1. The best part of the book of the historical discussions of democracies from Greece through the United States. The historic vignettes of the rise and fall of great powers, to include Greece, Rome, Venice, the Dutch and then the English, provided a wealth of knowledge I was not familiar with.
2. The discussion of Russia's and China's shortfalls are well documented and are summarized, specifically their shortfalls with great power rivalry in the long-run.
3. Finally, the United States still has room to continue to remain the global leader on the world's stage; not because of personalities, but because of the institutions it has created. Should the U.S. impact these institutions, or not modernize them for current threats, the United States may see the emergence of a different great power (though that may or may not be a democracy).
June 4, 2020
Great book on how democracies will always have a diplomatic, military, and economic advantage over their autocratic rivals. The book excels at pointing at what the over the top narratives of those who pronounce the U.S. power as declining or dead are too exaggerated. It's a design feature and not a bug for democracies to be messy, but when a democratic nation, especially the United States, sets its mind on a grand strategy, it will stick to it (despite the conventional wisdom) for a long time and across multiple administrations. Today's convergence of both GOP and Democrats on the position to stand up to China, despite some disagreements just two years ago, is a case in point.
February 4, 2023
This was an interesting analysis of the advantages that democracies have over autocracies. Kroenig makes a theoretical argument and follows it up with a series of historical case studies that, while certainly open to charges of cherry picking, do manage to persuade the reader as to the stability and improved decision making of democracies. He then uses this context to lay out the argument for a continuing American advantage over its Russian and Chinese rivals, analyzing what each nation would bring to a potential confrontation. Again, while the argument is far from being unassailable, the book does make a reasonable case for a more optimistic reading of current geopolitical trajectories.
July 16, 2022
Astonishing book
July 9, 2023
Anazine er Amazone
Extremely disappointing "scholarship" full of errors, misrepresentations and Eurocentrism
2/10
So many basic errors and misrepresentations!
- Russia invaded Georgia?, the UN report on this conflict explicitly stated that Georgia started the war
- Napoleon's Grand Armee was smashed by the Russians, the Battle of Waterloo was small potatoes vs. the Russian campaign (and the British would have been defeated at Waterloo without the intervention of Prussia)
- Nazi Germany destroyed the armies of the democratic France and Britain in a matter of weeks. 85% of the German armed forces then engaged with the non-democratic USSR and were defeated. The Normandy landing was a relative side-show compared to the defence of Moscow, Battle of Stalingrad, the Kursk Salient etc.
- Stalin aimed for "revolution in one country" and explicitly reined in the communist parties in Western Europe toward the end of WW2. He also allowed the western allies to smash the communist party in Greece. The Soviet Union was always a relatively weak defensive power (it had lost 25 million people in WW2 and massive parts of the country were laid waste).
- Russia was invited into Syria by the internationally recognized sovereign government of Syria to combat foreign-funded and supplied religious fundamentalist armies. The US and its allies illegally (under international law) attacked the sovereign state of Syria. Russia had learnt from the Libya regime change operation (a country which is still in shambles vs. the Southern European standard of living that its population previously enjoyed).
- The British Empire was established at a time of extremely limited democracy (land ownership requirements, no female emancipation) and its record within the Empire was horrific. It was the British that first invented the concentration camp, not the Nazis.
- The United States could not be counted as "free" in any true sense until the end of Jim Crow in the 1960s. It is also a country based upon conscious genocide (the native population) and slavery - a history that it has never come to terms with. The horrific slaughters to subjugate the Philippines at the end of the C19th also point to the brutality of this "democracy".
- Athens was an extremely limited "democracy" with the vast majority of the population excluded.
- The present day US has been likened to a "managed democracy" which the fate of Bernie Saunders (cheated twice out of the Democrat nomination) and the inability to pass a Medicare for All (repeatedly supported year after year by a majority of US citizens in polls and the standard in other Western nations) point to.
- "The leading states since the 1600s" have included non-democratic China and India until the early 1800s. I question whether the author has engaged with any actual scholars of non-Western history.
- China has kept its defence spending at 2% of GDP, well below the level of the US
- The author also leaves out the destabilization of foreign democracies such as Guatemala and Iran in the 1950s, and Chile in the 1970s, this is not war but it is certainly aggression. His thesis should perhaps be that "Western Europe and the White Settler Colonies don't tend to go to war with each other".
I could go on for page after page, but instead I will simply point to some much more balanced and informed views that far exceed the simplistic and misleading narratives used in this work:
Christopher Layne - The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present
Martin Jacques - When China Rules The World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World
Bastian van Apeldoorn and Nan de Graaff - American Grand Strategy and Corporate Elite Networks
Karl Polanyi - The Great Transformation The Political Economy and Economic Origins of Our Time
Gabriel Kolko - The Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945.
Sheldon S. Wolin - Democracy Incorporated
Zachary Karabell - Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World and the Cold War 1946-1962.
Rajan Menon - The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention
Greg Gandin - Empires Workshop Latin America, the United States, And The Rise of the New Imperialism
John Mearsheimer - Liberal Dreams and International Realities
Tony Wood - Russia Without Putin Money, Power, and Myths of the New Cold War
Stephen F. Cohen - Failed Crusade America And The Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia
Ken Booth - Strategy and Ethnocentrism
Roger Boyd
Extremely disappointing "scholarship" full of errors, misrepresentations and Eurocentrism
2/10
So many basic errors and misrepresentations!
- Russia invaded Georgia?, the UN report on this conflict explicitly stated that Georgia started the war
- Napoleon's Grand Armee was smashed by the Russians, the Battle of Waterloo was small potatoes vs. the Russian campaign (and the British would have been defeated at Waterloo without the intervention of Prussia)
- Nazi Germany destroyed the armies of the democratic France and Britain in a matter of weeks. 85% of the German armed forces then engaged with the non-democratic USSR and were defeated. The Normandy landing was a relative side-show compared to the defence of Moscow, Battle of Stalingrad, the Kursk Salient etc.
- Stalin aimed for "revolution in one country" and explicitly reined in the communist parties in Western Europe toward the end of WW2. He also allowed the western allies to smash the communist party in Greece. The Soviet Union was always a relatively weak defensive power (it had lost 25 million people in WW2 and massive parts of the country were laid waste).
- Russia was invited into Syria by the internationally recognized sovereign government of Syria to combat foreign-funded and supplied religious fundamentalist armies. The US and its allies illegally (under international law) attacked the sovereign state of Syria. Russia had learnt from the Libya regime change operation (a country which is still in shambles vs. the Southern European standard of living that its population previously enjoyed).
- The British Empire was established at a time of extremely limited democracy (land ownership requirements, no female emancipation) and its record within the Empire was horrific. It was the British that first invented the concentration camp, not the Nazis.
- The United States could not be counted as "free" in any true sense until the end of Jim Crow in the 1960s. It is also a country based upon conscious genocide (the native population) and slavery - a history that it has never come to terms with. The horrific slaughters to subjugate the Philippines at the end of the C19th also point to the brutality of this "democracy".
- Athens was an extremely limited "democracy" with the vast majority of the population excluded.
- The present day US has been likened to a "managed democracy" which the fate of Bernie Saunders (cheated twice out of the Democrat nomination) and the inability to pass a Medicare for All (repeatedly supported year after year by a majority of US citizens in polls and the standard in other Western nations) point to.
- "The leading states since the 1600s" have included non-democratic China and India until the early 1800s. I question whether the author has engaged with any actual scholars of non-Western history.
- China has kept its defence spending at 2% of GDP, well below the level of the US
- The author also leaves out the destabilization of foreign democracies such as Guatemala and Iran in the 1950s, and Chile in the 1970s, this is not war but it is certainly aggression. His thesis should perhaps be that "Western Europe and the White Settler Colonies don't tend to go to war with each other".
I could go on for page after page, but instead I will simply point to some much more balanced and informed views that far exceed the simplistic and misleading narratives used in this work:
Christopher Layne - The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present
Martin Jacques - When China Rules The World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World
Bastian van Apeldoorn and Nan de Graaff - American Grand Strategy and Corporate Elite Networks
Karl Polanyi - The Great Transformation The Political Economy and Economic Origins of Our Time
Gabriel Kolko - The Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945.
Sheldon S. Wolin - Democracy Incorporated
Zachary Karabell - Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World and the Cold War 1946-1962.
Rajan Menon - The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention
Greg Gandin - Empires Workshop Latin America, the United States, And The Rise of the New Imperialism
John Mearsheimer - Liberal Dreams and International Realities
Tony Wood - Russia Without Putin Money, Power, and Myths of the New Cold War
Stephen F. Cohen - Failed Crusade America And The Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia
Ken Booth - Strategy and Ethnocentrism
Roger Boyd
April 13, 2022
I cautiously agree with the central thesis of democratic advantage, although I am not as optimistic about the future of the USA as the author. And the overall argument, presenting examples of democratic advantage "in action", so to speak, is not that bad in itself.
Why only two stars then?
The entire opus reads like an essay written by a high-schooler. I am not sure whether this is intentional, but considering that the book purports to advance a novel analysis of the global situation, it would be a puzzling choice of style. To wit: simplistic analysis that ignores nuance, vocabulary that borders on Hollywoodish (attempts to use colloquialisms ring false in this context, just as they do in Lukashenko's folksy announcements), and plenty of elementary mistakes (for example, Putin was NOT a director of KGB, as is claimed here; he was a lowly apparatchik, only a lieutenant-colonel--and there are many more) that are detrimental to both narrative flow and veracity and undermine author's points.
As other reviewers have also notes, Kroenig's Western bias is on full display: he does not consider for a moment that the values of liberalism may not be universal, and that many people--including many well-meaning people--reject them. Whether these people are right or not is a different story, but we cannot ignore their existence as he does.
Sadly, not a successful argument. Sadly, because as I have already said, the central thesis is not incorrect and deserves a much more vigorous and sophisticated defense.
Why only two stars then?
The entire opus reads like an essay written by a high-schooler. I am not sure whether this is intentional, but considering that the book purports to advance a novel analysis of the global situation, it would be a puzzling choice of style. To wit: simplistic analysis that ignores nuance, vocabulary that borders on Hollywoodish (attempts to use colloquialisms ring false in this context, just as they do in Lukashenko's folksy announcements), and plenty of elementary mistakes (for example, Putin was NOT a director of KGB, as is claimed here; he was a lowly apparatchik, only a lieutenant-colonel--and there are many more) that are detrimental to both narrative flow and veracity and undermine author's points.
As other reviewers have also notes, Kroenig's Western bias is on full display: he does not consider for a moment that the values of liberalism may not be universal, and that many people--including many well-meaning people--reject them. Whether these people are right or not is a different story, but we cannot ignore their existence as he does.
Sadly, not a successful argument. Sadly, because as I have already said, the central thesis is not incorrect and deserves a much more vigorous and sophisticated defense.
November 19, 2024
To be honest, I’m shocked that this book has received so much critical acclaim. First of all, his quantitative analysis of the portion of world powers that were democracies (upwards of 75%) included empires only from 1600 onward. This timeframe gives undue weight to Western Europe after the discovery of the New World (look to Why the West Rules – For Now to see why this is important). Second, Kroenig ignores the long-lasting autocratic empires of China, the Middle East (Abbasid Empire/Ummayad Empires), and Africa (Congolese Empire and Timbuktu). Kroenig says, "Whenever there is a democratic global power, it defeats an autocratic global power," but does not address the question of how these autocratic global powers have managed to suppress the development of democratic global powers for so long (Kroenig does not claim that a democracy at any level will rise to challenge an autocratic global power). By keeping his analysis in the West, Kroenig offered what seemed more like a brief overview of Western hegemons (excluding inconvenient autocratic ones, like Charlamagne's Empire) than a convincing analysis of the foreign policy benefits of democracies compared to autocracies.
While I enjoyed getting a historical overview of Western democratic powers, I was disappointed by his weak argument. Maybe I should give him more grace, though. It’s his argument, but there seems to be just as much material for a counterargument.
While I enjoyed getting a historical overview of Western democratic powers, I was disappointed by his weak argument. Maybe I should give him more grace, though. It’s his argument, but there seems to be just as much material for a counterargument.
May 15, 2020
This book makes a very strong case (based on history, political philosophy and cutting-edge social science research) that democracies have a built-in hard power advantage over autocracies in great power competitions. And, apparently, the author isn't some kind of bleeding heart liberal as he advocates cutting entitlement expenditures to finance the significant defense budget needed for the United States to prevail in the great power contests with Russia and China.
The book also presents the outlines of a strategy that if implemented could go a long way towards preserving America's global leadership position. A core component of that strategy can be summed up by the following Winston Churchill quote (culled from the book): "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies and that is fighting without them." Thus, it certainly doesn't help to have a president who doesn't understand the value of democracy or of the rule of law and who believes that America doesn't need allies to secure its future prosperity and security.
The book also presents the outlines of a strategy that if implemented could go a long way towards preserving America's global leadership position. A core component of that strategy can be summed up by the following Winston Churchill quote (culled from the book): "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies and that is fighting without them." Thus, it certainly doesn't help to have a president who doesn't understand the value of democracy or of the rule of law and who believes that America doesn't need allies to secure its future prosperity and security.
September 17, 2021
(Audiobook) If nothing else, this work takes a more optimistic look at the Great Power Competition between the US and other powers, primarily China. The book starts by defining what it means by Great Power Competition and describing the works and analysis that is already out there. From there, the work discusses other instances of Great Power competition in history. The final parts focus on America, from its rivalry with the USSR to its future fight with China. Unlike some other works, this one is generally more optimistic about America’s future in such a competition, especially against an authoritarian regime. However, this was written before 2021. Will America still be democratic, or will it turn authoritarian as well?
Overall, a decent work that offers some useful insights into what America is and could face. Will it turn out as optimistic as the author portrays? Perhaps. It is not as negative as Graham Allison, but will the future of a potential China/US adversarial relationship be that positive? I wish it would be, but we shall see.
Overall, a decent work that offers some useful insights into what America is and could face. Will it turn out as optimistic as the author portrays? Perhaps. It is not as negative as Graham Allison, but will the future of a potential China/US adversarial relationship be that positive? I wish it would be, but we shall see.
July 30, 2021
A well-intentioned but repetitive discourse on the conflicting political ideologies of democracy and autocracy. Maybe I’m just thick, but it felt as if the book lacked the intellectual rigor I was expecting. Some historical sections seemed to contradict the points being raised with arguments that are unsatisfactory, and there is a large amount of repetition of the very same points. It was in the discussion of the contemporary autocratic advantage theory and its applications to China and Russia where this books shines.
Fundamentally, I’m glad I read it, as the lessons found here still have varying degrees of applicability in the viability of political institutions both real and fictional.
Fundamentally, I’m glad I read it, as the lessons found here still have varying degrees of applicability in the viability of political institutions both real and fictional.
January 1, 2026
An excellent book that is well researched and argued. The thesis is strong and believable. The only missing piece is what if the USA becomes more autocratic itself? Something that may be evolving with the current political situation. The premise that collective security, robust international trade, and adherence to the Constitution and Institutions are the elements of success is undeniable…but, do we as the collective American people understand this? That is the question…
January 15, 2023
The cover makes you think this is all about Russia and China verses the USA, but in reality this is a whirl wind tour through history of democratic versus autocratic regimes. Broad in scope but seen through the lease of Machiavelli, the author highlights the strengths of democracies on the world stage and the pitfalls of autocracies.
June 24, 2021
While this book was a fairly dense read, it provided an incredibly interesting overview of democracy v. autocracy from Athens to the US and gave a compelling argument for democratic dominance in the future. It's not a page-turner by any means, but really engaging if you are into that field.
January 15, 2022
Very US-centric and biased, cherrypicking historical moments to proof his point.
January 19, 2022
Very accessible read, but I do not feel that he sufficiently supports his claims. He jumps to conclusions without supporting evidence.
October 21, 2023
Great read on the GPC comparing the advantages and disadvantages of democracies and autocracies.
November 1, 2025
Pretty good, some typos
July 13, 2021
Okay this is not going to be a biased review here I promise. Even though, I had to read this book for the course I’m taking under Professor Kroenig, this book makes a really strong case based, on research, theory and history that democracy’s have a huge advantage compared to autocracy. Now coming from someone who has agreed with him on this topic, reading this book and analyzing the 7 cases given here— I can fully under why people think otherwise without thinking too much about it. I gave this book 4 stars in stead of 5 because although this was a really insightful book with a strong argument being made, the information wasn’t the easiest to read at times—obviously because I had less knowledge of certain topics. This is all and all a really good book with tons of information that anyone who is taking an IR class or is interested in international relations and is interested in Russia and China and how the autocratic governments rule, their weaknesses, strengths and how in the end, democracies always prevail.
June 4, 2021
While presenting a decent case for a rather ambitious stand, several elements hold this book back from being impressive. While proving that a democratic advantage exists, it fails to quantify in any usable terms how large this advantage is. While presenting a large range of case studies, the studies themselves vary too much to provide useful patterns (Carthage vs Rome is intuitively enormously different from Spain vs Netherlands). A more focused, in-depth and limited set of case studies might have worked better.
Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews