What do you think?
Rate this book


272 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1935
"الدين والعلم وجهان للحياة الاجتماعية. وقد برزت أهمية الدين منذ نشأة تاريخ الفكر على الأرض في حين برزت أهمية العلم فجأة في القرن السادس عشر بعد فترة من الوجود المتقطع عند الاغريق والعرب ليشكل على نحو متزايد الأفكار والمؤسسات التي نعيش في ظلها."
"العقائد هي المصدر الفكري للصراع المحتدم بين الدين والعلم. لكن الحدّة التي اتسمت بها معارضة الدين للعلم ترجع الى الصلة التي تربط العقيدة بالكنيسة كما تربطها بنظام الاخلاق. فالذين يعبّرون عن شكوكهم في العقيدة يضعفون سلطة رجال الكنيسة وقد يقللون دخلهم. أضف الى ذلك الاعتقاد بأنهم يدمرون الاخلاق لأن رجال الكنيسة درجوا على استخلاص الواجبات الاخلاقية من العقائد."
"في بادئ الأمر كاد البروتستانت ان يظهروا عداوة مريرة لكوبرنيكوس اكثر من الكاثوليك. فقد قال لوثر عنه ان "الناس يستمعون الى فلكي نصاب يحاول ان يبيّن ان الارض هي التي تدور وليس السماوات والشمس والقمر.. ولكن الكتاب المقدس يخبرنا ان هوشع امر الشمس وليس الأرض ان تقف مكانها". وكذلك كالفن الذي اورد الآية "١" من المزمور "٩٢"" أيضًا تثبتت المسكونة. لا تتزعزع: ليختتم "من الذي سيجرأ على وضع مرجعية كوبرنيكوس فوق مرجعية الروح القدس"
"استمرت الكنيسة الكاثوليكية في حظر تدريس دوران الأرض حتى العام 1835. وعندما أزيح في وارسو الستار عن التمثال الذي نحته ثوروالوش لكوربنيكوس عام 1829 اجتمع حشد من الناس لتكريم هذا الفلكي ولم يظهر في هذا الجمع قسيس واحد من القساوسة الكاثوليك."
"رغم ان رجال اللاهوت بعد احرازهم النصر المأساوي الكئيب على جاليليو وجدوا انه من الحكمة ان يتجنبوا التعبير عن موقف رسمي شديد التحديد مثلما فعلوا في حالة جاليليو فإنهم استمروا في دعوتهم الظلامية والوقوف في وجه العلم كلما وجدوا في أنفسهم الجرأة على ذلك. وهذا ما يتضح من موقفهم في موضوع المذنبات التي يرى العقل الحديث انها منفصلة عن الدين ولا تتصل به اتصالًا مباشرًا وحميمًا."
"بإمكاننا معرفة مقدار تخلف علم الجيولوجيا في تطوره عن علم الفلك من النظر الى حالة علم الجيولوجيا في عصر نيوتن. فنحن نرى ان وود وارد في العام 1695 يفسر وجود الصخور المترسبة بالافتراض بأن "كل الكرة الأرضية تفتت وتحللت بفعل الطوفان وان طبقات الأرض خرجت مستقرة من هذه الكتلة القذرة مثلما تترسب الرواسب الترابية في قاع المحلول""
"إن ثورة كوبرنيكوس لن تؤت ثمارها حتى يتلقى الانسان درسًا أكبر في التواضع عما نراه في الذين يظنون أن الانسان دليل كاف على وجود غاية في الكون."
"ظل الناس لقرون كثيرة يعتقدون في قدرة عظام القديسة روزاليا المحفوظة في باليرمو بإيطاليا على شفاء الأمراض. ولكن عندما قام عالم تشريح دنيوي بفحص هذه العظام اكتشف انها بقايا عظام ماعز. ومع ذلك فقد استمر الايمان بقدرتها على الشفاء."
"قد يكون الذين يرون ان الحرية الفكرية تهمهم شخصيًا أقلية في المجتمع ولكنها أقليّة تضم أكثر الناس أهمية بالنسبة للمستقبل. لقد شاهدنا أهمية كوبرنيكوس وجاليليو وداروين في تاريخ الانسانية."
We have here a sharp disagreement of great practical importance, but we have absolutely no means, of a scientific or intellectual kind, by which to persuade either party that the other is in the right. There are, it is true, ways of altering men's opinions on such subjects, but they are all emotional, not intellectual.....questions as to 'values' lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge.
On 16 November 1922, for instance, he gave a lecture to the General Meeting of Dr. Marie Stopes's Society for Constructive Birth Control and Racial Progress on "Birth Control and International Relations," in which he described the importance of extending Western birth control worldwide; his remarks anticipated the population control movement of the 1960s and the role of the United Nations.
This policy may last some time, but in the end under it we shall have to give way—we are only putting off the evil day; the one real remedy is birth control, that is getting the people of the world to limit themselves to those numbers which they can keep upon their own soil... I do not see how we can hope permanently to be strong enough to keep the coloured races out; sooner or later they are bound to overflow, so the best we can do is to hope that those nations will see the wisdom of Birth Control.... We need a strong international authority.
—"Lecture by the Hon. Bertrand Russell", Birth Control News, vol 1, no. 8 (December 1922), p.2
Another passage from early editions of his book Marriage and Morals (1929), which Russell later claimed to be referring only to environmental conditioning, and which he significantly modified in later editions, reads:
In extreme cases there can be little doubt of the superiority of one race to another[...] It seems on the whole fair to regard Negroes as on the average inferior to white men, although for work in the tropics they are indispensable, so that their extermination (apart from the question of humanity) would be highly undesirable.
—Bertrand Russell, Marriage and Morals, pg. 266 (1929)
....
Responding in 1964 to a correspondent's inquiry, "Do you still consider the Negroes an inferior race, as you did when you wrote Marriage and Morals?", Russell replied:
I never held Negroes to be inherently inferior. The statement in Marriage and Morals refers to environmental conditioning. I have had it withdrawn from subsequent editions because it is clearly ambiguous.
—Bertrand Russell, letter dated 17 March 1964 in Dear Bertrand Russell... a selection of his correspondence with the general public, 1950–1968. edited by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils.(London: Allen & Unwin, 1969, p. 146)
Are there any wars which achieve so much for the good of mankind as to outweigh all the evils...?
By a 'war of colonization' I mean a war whose purpose is to drive out the whole population of some territory and replace it by an invading population of a different race. Ancient wars were very largely of this kind, of which we have a good example in the Book of Joshua. In modern times the conflicts of Europeans with American-Indians, Maories, and other aborigines in temperate regions, have been of this kind. Such wars are totally devoid of technical justification, and are apt to be mor ruthless than any other war. Nevertheless, if we are to judge by results, we cannot regret that such wars have taken place. They have the merit, often quite fallaciously claimed for all wars, of leading in the main to the survival of the fittest, and it is chiefly through such wars that the civilized portion of the world has been extended from the neighborhood of the Mediterranean to the greater part of the earth’s surface. The eighteenth century, which liked to praise the virtues of the savage and contrast them with the gilded corruption of courts, nevertheless had no scruple in thrusting the noble savage out from his North American hunting grounds. And we cannot at this date bring ourselves to condemn the process by which the American continent has been acquired for European civilization. In order that such wars may be justified, it is necessary that there should be a very great and undeniable difference between the civilization of the colonizers and that of the dispossessed natives. It is necessary also that the climate should be one in which the invading race can flourish. When these conditions are satisfied the conquest becomes justified, though the actual fighting against the dispossessed inhabitants ought, of course, to be avoided as far as is compatible with colonizing. Many humane people will object in theory to the justification of this form of robbery, but I do not think that any practical or effective objection is likely to be made.
Such wars, however, belong now to the past. The regions where the white men can live are all allotted, either to white races or to yellow races to whom the white man is not clearly superior, and whom, in any case, he is not strong enough to expel. Apart from small punitive expeditions, wars of colonization, in the true sense, are no longer possible. What are nowadays called colonial wars do not aim at the complete occupation of a country by a conquering race; they aim only at securing certain governmental and trading advantages. They belong, in fact, rather with what I call wars of prestige, than with wars of colonization in the old sense. There are, it is true, a few rare exceptions. The Greeks in the second Balkan war conducted a war of colonization against the Bulgarians; throughout a certain territory which they intended to occupy, they killed all the men, and carried off all the women. But in such cases, the only possible justification fails, since there is no evidence of superior civilization on the side of the conquerors.
Science, argues Russell, cannot pronounce on ethics, but this is for the simple reason that statements in the realm of ethics are not within the purview of objective knowledge in the first place: they can always be paraphrased as expressions of personal desire or preference, and hence are purely subjective. This argument is probably well known to modern philosophers, but I had not seen it before and Russell puts the case nicely.
In the conclusion, Russell suddenly sobers up and tells you what he's really talking about. It's not the Christian Church; it's the new religions of Fascism and Communism, which, as he says, have already killed more intellectual dissidents than the Church did in the last three centuries. You remember that he's writing shortly before World War II. He can see what most people are still trying to pretend isn't there, and he has every reason to be desperately worried. All the clowning around was just to get your attention; you thought you'd avoided being fooled, but he's tricked you at a deeper level than you were expecting. Nice work, Russell.
Tommaso d’aquino sostenne che alcune delle verità fondamentali della religione cristiana si possono dimostrare per mezzo di una ragione spontanea, senza l'aiuto della rivelazione. Fra queste si trovava l'esistenza di un creatore onnipotente e benevolo: dalla sua onnipotenza e benevolenza conseguiva l'affermazione che non avrebbe lasciato le sue creature sprovviste della conoscenza dei suoi decreti, nella misura in cui sarebbe stata necessaria per ubbidire alla sua volontà; vi deve perciò essere una rivelazione divina, è ovviamente contenuta nella Bibbia e nelle decisioni della Chiesa; stabilito questo punto, il resto di quello che abbiamo bisogno di sapere può essere indotto dalla Sacra Scrittura e dalle deliberazioni dei concili ecumenici. Tutta l'argomentazione procede deduttivamente da premesse che una volta erano accettate da quasi tutta la popolazione dei paesi cristiani, e se appare talvolta difettosa al lettore moderno, le sue lacune non erano evidenti alla maggioranza dei contemporanei colti.
Orbene, l'unità logica è al tempo stesso una forza e una debolezza. È una forza perché garantisce che, non appena qualcuno accetti una fase dell'argomentazione, debba accettarne le successive; è una debolezza perché chiunque respinga una qualsiasi delle ultime fasi deve anche respingere almeno alcune delle primissime fasi. La Chiesa, nel suo conflitto con la scienza, ha dimostrato tanto la forza quanto la debolezza risultanti dalla coerenza logica dei suoi dogmi.
Il modo nel quale la scienza giunge alle sue convinzioni è molto diverso da quello della teologia medioevale. L'esperienza ha dimostrato che è pericoloso partire dai principi generali e procedere deduttivamente, tanto perché i principi possono non essere veri, quanto perché il ragionamento fondato su di essi può essere fallace. La scienza parte non da affermazioni di carattere generale, ma da fatti particolari scoperti per mezzo dell'osservazione o dell'esperienza; da un certo numero di questi fatti si giunge a una norma generale, della quale, se la norma è vera, i fatti in proposito non sono che particolari momenti; questa norma non viene affermata positivamente, ma viene accettata, in un primo tempo, come ipotesi di lavoro; se è corretta, alcuni fenomeni rimasti fino a quel momento nell'ombra si verificheranno in determinate circostanze; se si rileva che essi effettivamente si verificano, allora si ha la conferma dell'ipotesi.
Abbiamo visto che nel periodo che comincia con Copernico, ogni qualvolta la scienza e la teologia hanno avuto un disaccordo, la scienza ne è uscita vittoriosa. Abbiamo anche visto che, dove si sono trovati coinvolti interessi pratici, come nella magia e nella medicina, la scienza ha difeso la riduzione del dolore, mentre la teologia ha incoraggiato la brutalità naturale dell'uomo. La diffusione della concezione scientifica, opposta a quella teologica, ha contribuito indiscutibilmente alla felicità.
Il problema sta ormai entrando, tuttavia, in una fase interamente nuova, e ciò accade per due motivi: anzitutto perché la tecnica scientifica sta diventando più importante nei suoi effetti della mentalità scientifica; secondariamente, perché nuove religioni stanno prendendo il posto del cristianesimo e stanno ripetendo gli errori dei quali il cristianesimo si è pentito.
La mentalità scientifica è prudente, sperimentale ed empirica; non pretende né di conoscere l'intera verità né che la sua migliore conoscenza sia interamente vera; sa che ogni dottrina ha bisogno di essere emendata presto o tardi e che il necessario emendamento richiede libertà d'indagine e libertà di discussione. Ma una tecnica scientifica è nata dalla scienza teorica e la tecnica scientifica non ha nulla del carattere sperimentale della teoria.
Se siamo colpiti dal vaiolo, ciò è dovuto al fatto che lo scorso inverno abbiamo avuto un carnevale inneggiante alla carne, che ha offeso il Signore». I padri oblati, la cui chiesa era situata al centro stesso del distretto infetto, continuarono a denunciare la vaccinazione; i fedeli vennero esortati a confidare in esercizi di devozione di diverse specie; con la sanzione della gerarchia religiosa, fu ordinata una grande processione con un solenne appello alla Vergine e fu accuratamente specificato l'uso del rosario.
Un'altra occasione d'intervento teologico per impedire l'attenuazione del dolore umano fu fornita dalla scoperta degli anestetici. Nel 1847 James Young Simpson ne raccomandò l'uso nel parto e gli venne subito ricordato dal clero che Dio aveva detto a Eva: «Partorirai tra i dolori» (Genesi, III, 16). E come poteva soffrire se si trovava sottoposta all'influenza del cloroformio? Simpson riuscì a dimostrare che non vi era alcun male nel dare gli anestetici agli uomini, perché Dio aveva sottoposto Adamo a un profondo sonno quando gli aveva estratto la costola. Ma gli ecclesiastici maschi non si convinsero per quel che riguarda i dolori delle donne, per lo meno nel parto. Si può rilevare che in Giappone, dove l'autorità della Genesi non è riconosciuta, si fanno ancora subire alle donne i dolori del parto senza nessuna attenuazione artificiale. È difficile resistere alla conclusione che, per molti uomini, vi sia qualche godimento nel far soffrire le donne e quindi una propensione a aderire a qualsiasi codice teologico o etico che imponga loro il dovere di soffrire pazientemente,