This book is remarkable historiography with relevance to the present day, a compelling biography of a Turkish imperial revolutionary politician and architect of genocide, and a work of history quoting primary sources in multiple locations and languages. It is a tour de force.
It makes obvious why developments before, during and after the Great War attracted segments of Germany's right wing elite, including Hitler and the Nazis, seeking to emulate Mehmet Talaat Pasha and his successor Mustapha Kemal Attaturk as political men of action.
The book adds to what is already known about the connecting threads between late Ottoman Empire events (from the 1890s to 1923 in Asia Minor, the Balkans and the Levant) and European events in the 1930s to 1945 and then to the UN resolution of 1948 and its consequences, through finally to the ongoing calamity of Turkish polity.
In this first scholarly biography of Talaat Pasha, he emerges as the central, instrumental figure for what took place within the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. He was married to his cause. His legacy is that the empire was lost, and a mythologised Sunni Turkish homeland (reimagined in a redefined "Anatolia") emerging from regions, cities and villages from which Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians were eradicated.
A central argument of Kieser is that Talaat from his own records and those of others was the string puller. He pulled for the 1908 Young Turk revolution removing Sultan Abdul Hamid II from power and involving Turks, Armenians, Greeks and others in a hopeful movement for change. He pulled too in the January 1913 coup by the political force he co-founded, the Committee of Union and Progress, which made government in the empire constitutional in name only and eradicated or restrained any Ottoman tendency towards multiculturalism with Christian and other non-Sunni Turk subjects.
From January 1913 he reached a position of greater command, the Committee's lead action man in charge, sending directives in 1915 to operatives he marshaled and instructed to conduct arrests, deportations and mass murder if necessary, until his gambles under the cloak of war began to fail and doubts set in by 1919 with military setbacks and internal corruption. So on 1 November 1919 he and his cohort left secretly on a German torpedo boat becoming fugitives from court trials which sentenced them to death in absentia. He went to Berlin, others to Rome, Baku or Moscow. In Europe Talaat continued conspiratorial work moving between cities, supported by German allies and others, now with no mustache to avoid being recognised.
Then in Berlin on 15 March 1921 with one bullet he was assassinated by Soghomon Tehlirian as part of Operation Nemesis organised by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation from mainly Boston.
Tehlirian was tried in Germany and found not guilty for psychological reasons and freed. The legal argument about Talaat as mass murderer of millions was not aired. However for a moment newspaper readers worldwide understood that justice had been served through assassination. Then it was back to business as international treaty negotiators (with politicians, oil, banking and other lobbyists guiding them) settled the borders of Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, and in other documents. It was by then expedient to not mention genocide and forced relocation of people, and to instead bury horrific recent history under a new crime, of silence.
How did it get to this end game of 1921 and 1923?
Keiser begins with the last decades of the 19th century as the Committee inherited Ottoman imperial ideology mixing it into a lethal cauldron. They cooked to respond to self-determination demands of subjects across the once vast empire, to respond to the loss of face with the empire's declining wealth and military power (relative to Russia, Britain and France, among others), to respond to corruption among the Turkish Ottoman elite and their susceptibility to Western grabs for colonies or concessions.
In Talaat's case, ideas for a Turkish homeland in a redefined geography of Anatolia emerged from around 1900 onwards, brewed with chauvinist nationalism, Turanianism or Panturkism (though this was mostly cut back from about the last years of the Great War to Anatolian Turkism), Islamism including jihad when that was expedient for war aims, and Social Darwinism to rationalise policies against non-Turks. This brew was the Committee's definition of modernism.
Social Darwinism was not expressed as a theory of the Turks being the "master race", but how it was expressed was comparable to that Nazi expression of "herrenvolk" and showed admiring Germans of the time and from the early 1920s what could be achieved by a dictatorial regime for a nation-state stewing in self-perceptions of being victims who had been or were being stabbed in the back. Not all German, Turkish, Kurdish or other operatives were devotees of the theory, but those working in active opposition from 1914 to 1919 were few and in the case of the Committee's finance minister, Mehmet Cavit Bey, writing private thoughts in his diary about his disgust at events manipulated by his colleagues. Many who were not devotees were discovered and demoted, or co-opted or lied to. The press of the day was largely sponsored propaganda, highly censored or self-censoring. Part of the ruin of the empire during the Great War and subsequently was that corruption and lawlessness grew, and to such an extent that even Talaat was depressed by it.
Armenians note the massacres of about 20,000 Armenians in Adana in 1909. Kieser provides a valuable insight in covering the January 2014 removal through terror of no less than 100,000 Greeks (perhaps up to 200,000) from the Aegean coastline which at the time was heavily populated by Greeks. This was done with Talaat's scheming. In parliament he pretended otherwise. This was the work of cunning. He'd tested his demographic engineering powers.
So on and from April 24, 1915 for Armenians Talaat and his operatives provided two options under the Ottoman Empire's new laws and directives. With the men typically already taken away and shot, the women, children and elderly could either accept deportation leaving behind their farms, factories, trades, villages, cities, homelands and possessions. Otherwise they could accept death now through suicide or death later through forced marches with no provision made for food, water or shelter. Where clemency was possible - conversion to Islam together with abandonment of Armenian heritage culture as schools, cultural institutions and church property were nationalised or came under government control. Under Kemal Attaturk in 1934 that extended to compulsory adoption of Turkish surnames under the Surname Law. Throughout some reprieve was available to Armenians living in large urban areas such as Constantinople and Aleppo and only then because of the presence of foreign press and diplomats.
A very original contribution by Kieser is his use of primary sources evidencing why and how Talaat rooted for war in 1914. We learn that he, Enver and others were passionate about the possibility of war, unlike allies, in particular Germany. Their Committee's messianic fantasy sought to use war as a furnace for demographic engineering and demolition (concepts used by Kieser), to replace the Ottoman ethno-religious millet system with a Turkish monocultural state with its homeland in a redefined Anatolia, and - as opportunity appeared or reappeared during the war - a territory contiguously extending across the Caucasus to join with the Panturkic mythologised region of Turan in Central Asia.
Talaat stringed all that into motion, though not completely, as Alevis, Kurds and others remained, treated not equally but differently to Turks. For Christian citizens and subject peoples the distortions in his war furnace were so profound and so successful that to the present day Turkey and its victims, now including Kurds and others, are haunted by the ghost of Talaat, a ghost perpetuated by creation myths, denialism and leveraging geopolitical geography.
Kieser sketches a portrait in fine detail. We read of Talaat's career as a postal clerk teaching him how to use a telegraph machine in the 1890s; and having one installed in his home in Constantinople as the Minister of the Interior, and virtual foreign minister and war strategist. Using telegraphs he gave instructions for the arrests on Saturday April 24, 1915 of Constantinople's Armenian political, cultural and business elite, thus decapitating Armenian leadership of what until then had been described by Ottomans as "millet-i sadıka" ("loyal people or nation"). From April to July Talaat issued telegraphs and directives to Special Organisations, rogue bands and governors on an industrial scale co-ordinating and monitoring operations in the killing fields of the eastern Armenian populated provinces, then across into refugee fields and camps nearby in Syria, and by 2016 driving those banished people to yet more barren concentration camps and death traps for Armenians banished to Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa.
Having done to the Armenian Question effectively in three months what, as Talaat said, Sultan Abdul Hamid II had tried to do in thirty seven years, Talaat turned from 1916 to treat similarly other subject peoples including the Pontic Greeks, Assyrians and others. They too did not conform to the messiantic monocultural vision of Panturkism as an ideology to replace Ottomanism. From their displacement too revenge could be extracted for the Ottoman Empire's loss of territory, something felt closely by many in the Committee who like Talaat originated from Muslims displaced from regions of the Balkans and educated in the port city of Salonica.
There is in this book a wealth of insights for students of many aspects of the history of those times.
- The Great War encompassing "larger Europe" (a term used by Kieser), seeing the Committee of Union and Progress led wily by Talaat Pasha.
- The daily operations of the Committee of Union and Progress and the varying skills, inclinations and attitudes of its members and ideological leaders.
- German modern history as a response of seeking equal standing to then existing colonial empires, in particular those of Britain and France.
- Denial of massacres of Armenians in 1894-96 and associated robbery of land in the eastern provinces creating a foundation for subsequent genocide denialism as a national, government-funded, backed and led cause to the present day.
- Zionist relationships with and anti-Armenian work for the late Ottoman Empire in the decades of the 1890s, 1900s and 1910s, sowing seeds unintentionally for the destruction of European Jewery in World War II, and intentionally for Zionist political and historical distortions to the present day.
- The liaison between Talaat and Kemal Attaturk, who says Kieser adopted Attaturk's distortions and extended them.
As a historian Kieser has two stand-out approaches in this work which this review ends with.
First he uncovers an extraordinarily long list of astonishingly revelatory sources, in archives and diaries in particular, and lets them show their insight and perspectives, with direct quotes and footnoted sources. Kieser thereby shows rather than tells history.
Secondly, there is Kieser's historiography. His deep understanding of the languages and the polity of several nations and empires permits him to make telling high level observations clarifying how it was that decision makers in war, politics and myth making both faced and squandered opportunities. This informs the reader of how politics can work towards life-engendering visions, not cycles of violence and crimes against humanity.