What do you think?
Rate this book
Battlegrounds
New York Times Bestseller Now with new text from McMaster addressing the January 2021 assault on the U.S. Capitol and recommending how citizens across the free world can work together to restore confidence in democratic institutions and processes From Lt. General H.R. McMaster, U.S. Army, ret., the former National Security Advisor and author of the bestselling classic Dereliction of Duty , comes a bold and provocative re-examination of the most critical foreign policy and national security challenges that face the United States, and an urgent call to compete to preserve America’s standing and security. Across multiple administrations since the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy has been misconceived, inconsistent, and poorly implemented. As a result, America and the free world have fallen behind rivals in power and influence. Meanwhile threats to security, freedom, and prosperity, such as nuclear proliferation and jihadist terrorism have grown. In BATTLEGROUNDS, H.R. McMaster describes efforts to reassess and fundamentally shift policies while he was National Security Advisor. And he provides a clear pathway forward to improve strategic competence and prevail in complex competitions against our adversaries. Battlegrounds is a groundbreaking reassessment of America’s place in the world, drawing from McMaster’s long engagement with these issues, including 34 years of service in the U.S. Army with multiple tours of duty in battlegrounds overseas and his 13 months as National Security Advisor in the Trump White House. It is also a powerful call for Americans and citizens of the free world to transcend the vitriol of partisan political discourse, better educate themselves about the most significant challenges to national and international security and work together to secure peace and prosperity for future generations.
559 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 22, 2020
1254 people are currently reading
2783 people want to read
About the author
H.R. McMaster
24 books208 followersHerbert Raymond McMaster (born July 24, 1962) is a retired United States Army lieutenant general who served as the 25th United States National Security Advisor from 2017 to 2018. He is also known for his roles in the Gulf War, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
In February 2017, McMaster succeeded Michael Flynn as President Donald Trump's National Security Advisor. He remained on active duty as a lieutenant general while serving as National Security Advisor, and retired in May 2018. McMaster resigned as National Security Advisor on March 22, 2018, effective April 9,and accepted an academic appointment to Stanford University in 2018.
McMaster is the Fouad and Michelle Ajami Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a lecturer in management at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
In February 2017, McMaster succeeded Michael Flynn as President Donald Trump's National Security Advisor. He remained on active duty as a lieutenant general while serving as National Security Advisor, and retired in May 2018. McMaster resigned as National Security Advisor on March 22, 2018, effective April 9,and accepted an academic appointment to Stanford University in 2018.
McMaster is the Fouad and Michelle Ajami Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a lecturer in management at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 210 reviews
April 19, 2023
Alas, a victim of misfortune.
Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster served in the Army for thirty-four years. He was stationed in Iraq and taught history at West Point, yet he is probably best remembered for his brief stint as national security advisor to President Donald Trump. After thirteen months and a quiet departure, many advised him to write about his experience with that mercurial figure. He declined, foregoing this rather crowded bandwagon to choose, instead, to pen a study of the current battlegrounds his country faced.
This work examines six adversarial relationships America struggles to refine - in specific: those with Russia, China, South Asia, the Middle East, Iran, and North Korea. Sections are devoted to the recent history of each, followed by his suggested course of action. Part Seven addresses additional areas of concern, among them cyber-warfare, technology theft, climate change, and education. It is a supremely straightforward presentation, meeting the military standard of organization with spit-and-polish precision. The content, however, is crushed by an unfortunate structural conceit.
McMaster quotes a strategist named Hans Morgenthau who wrote a famous essay titled, The Roots of Narcissism. In this essay, Morgenthau "...lamented preoccupation with self in foreign policy because it led to alienation from other nations and aspirations that exceeded the limits of ability...". McMaster agrees and proceeds to lay the woes of these United States at the feet of Strategic Narcissism. We are too convinced, he claims, that other nations share our aims and perspectives - or would if given a nudge in that direction. It's a fair argument, as far as it goes. Where it doesn't go, however, is to the unnatural conclusion that the treatment for Strategic Narcissism might, by any stretch of the imagination, be Strategic Empathy. Empathy is an emotional component of connection and is the wrong word for what he's after - which appears to be better educated in another country's aims and cultural perspective. Now, I can twist myself into the right kind of pretzel to understand what my Lieutenant General intends by this, but it is uncomfortable and, to my mind, unnecessary.
Equally unnecessary is the armchair quarterbacking of the history of America's foreign policy. Yes, mistakes were made. Yes, you would have done things differently. But hindsight is (still) twenty-twenty and just as tone-deaf here as it is by the watercooler come Monday morning. Tone is important, especially in history. And lack of reverence has a tendency to grate.
Finally, and no fault of his at all, is the fact that this book was published prior to the events in Ukraine. The best analysts our country has to offer have yet to come down on the scope of the game-change occurring in that region as we speak. It's like we took all the nations on the planet and threw them into a dice cup. How many rolls do you imagine this twenty-first century conflict is going to take? Keep your eye on the felt, 'cuz hell if I know.
Again, the work held good intent and was very well organized. Those are its selling points.
Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster served in the Army for thirty-four years. He was stationed in Iraq and taught history at West Point, yet he is probably best remembered for his brief stint as national security advisor to President Donald Trump. After thirteen months and a quiet departure, many advised him to write about his experience with that mercurial figure. He declined, foregoing this rather crowded bandwagon to choose, instead, to pen a study of the current battlegrounds his country faced.
This work examines six adversarial relationships America struggles to refine - in specific: those with Russia, China, South Asia, the Middle East, Iran, and North Korea. Sections are devoted to the recent history of each, followed by his suggested course of action. Part Seven addresses additional areas of concern, among them cyber-warfare, technology theft, climate change, and education. It is a supremely straightforward presentation, meeting the military standard of organization with spit-and-polish precision. The content, however, is crushed by an unfortunate structural conceit.
McMaster quotes a strategist named Hans Morgenthau who wrote a famous essay titled, The Roots of Narcissism. In this essay, Morgenthau "...lamented preoccupation with self in foreign policy because it led to alienation from other nations and aspirations that exceeded the limits of ability...". McMaster agrees and proceeds to lay the woes of these United States at the feet of Strategic Narcissism. We are too convinced, he claims, that other nations share our aims and perspectives - or would if given a nudge in that direction. It's a fair argument, as far as it goes. Where it doesn't go, however, is to the unnatural conclusion that the treatment for Strategic Narcissism might, by any stretch of the imagination, be Strategic Empathy. Empathy is an emotional component of connection and is the wrong word for what he's after - which appears to be better educated in another country's aims and cultural perspective. Now, I can twist myself into the right kind of pretzel to understand what my Lieutenant General intends by this, but it is uncomfortable and, to my mind, unnecessary.
Equally unnecessary is the armchair quarterbacking of the history of America's foreign policy. Yes, mistakes were made. Yes, you would have done things differently. But hindsight is (still) twenty-twenty and just as tone-deaf here as it is by the watercooler come Monday morning. Tone is important, especially in history. And lack of reverence has a tendency to grate.
Finally, and no fault of his at all, is the fact that this book was published prior to the events in Ukraine. The best analysts our country has to offer have yet to come down on the scope of the game-change occurring in that region as we speak. It's like we took all the nations on the planet and threw them into a dice cup. How many rolls do you imagine this twenty-first century conflict is going to take? Keep your eye on the felt, 'cuz hell if I know.
Again, the work held good intent and was very well organized. Those are its selling points.
November 17, 2020
This book is a glaring representation that to a hammer every problem is a nail, and implies the military is key to solving global conflicts.
A myopic view written by a man steeped in an insular military culture poisoned by hubris, partisanship, and risk aversion. His prose reads like a compilation of lists of PowerPoint bullet points with lots of unnecessary verbiage that seems intended to increase word count.
Global challenges require leadership that uses diplomacy to encourage international cooperation and long-term commitments, and provides for accountability. H. R. McMaster calls for such but offers primarily military pressure as a solution. He repeats the tired trope that military success is thwarted by inept civilian leaders (if only we had more time, troops and support we would have succeeded) without acknowledging the risks or past military failures. His purported nonpartisanship is belied by harsh, direct criticism of President Obama and the Obama administration failures, while he describes the failures of the Bush and Trump administrations as largely a result of external pressures.
Military failures and refusal to take responsibility are documented in “Fiasco” by Thomas Ricks, “A Bright Shining Lie” by Neil Sheehan, and “Vietnam” by Stanley Karnow. For examples of the deterioration of the military culture “The Generals” by Thomas Ricks describes how the military became risk averse and unaccountable, and Tim Bakken in “The Cost of Loyalty” describes how military academies perpetuate an anti-intellectual, hidebound culture more interested in protecting senior officers from accountability, preserving their perks, and promoting the military’s reputation as honorable and infallible, than in meeting the challenges of today’s world.
A myopic view written by a man steeped in an insular military culture poisoned by hubris, partisanship, and risk aversion. His prose reads like a compilation of lists of PowerPoint bullet points with lots of unnecessary verbiage that seems intended to increase word count.
Global challenges require leadership that uses diplomacy to encourage international cooperation and long-term commitments, and provides for accountability. H. R. McMaster calls for such but offers primarily military pressure as a solution. He repeats the tired trope that military success is thwarted by inept civilian leaders (if only we had more time, troops and support we would have succeeded) without acknowledging the risks or past military failures. His purported nonpartisanship is belied by harsh, direct criticism of President Obama and the Obama administration failures, while he describes the failures of the Bush and Trump administrations as largely a result of external pressures.
Military failures and refusal to take responsibility are documented in “Fiasco” by Thomas Ricks, “A Bright Shining Lie” by Neil Sheehan, and “Vietnam” by Stanley Karnow. For examples of the deterioration of the military culture “The Generals” by Thomas Ricks describes how the military became risk averse and unaccountable, and Tim Bakken in “The Cost of Loyalty” describes how military academies perpetuate an anti-intellectual, hidebound culture more interested in protecting senior officers from accountability, preserving their perks, and promoting the military’s reputation as honorable and infallible, than in meeting the challenges of today’s world.
September 25, 2020
EYE-OPENING AND MIND-BOGGLING -- THE FREE WORLD AND AMERICA'S CHALLENGE IN IT
The former national security advisor brings home, in compelling and stark terms, what our greatest challenges are going forward for national security and foreign policy in the continuation of a free world. The playing field has changed, but the players remain the same: Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. I really felt just how seriously America has dropped the ball at just the wrong time in history. McMaster's brilliant assessment enlightened and chilled me with a deep dive into the history of our foreign policy, and where it’s headed. The world has been changing around us, in spite of us, and it’s very clear that America has taken its eye off the ball -- especially in pursuit of "Strategic Narcissism" (pursuing policies based on wishful thinking). Never more than today, in a Trumpian, pandemic world, our place of power and influence is at stake and in jeopardy. I got lost in all the dangerous fronts threatening a continued free world, and the necessary steps to get this right and retain our place at the table, free of partisan politics. This should be required reading for all Americans.
The former national security advisor brings home, in compelling and stark terms, what our greatest challenges are going forward for national security and foreign policy in the continuation of a free world. The playing field has changed, but the players remain the same: Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. I really felt just how seriously America has dropped the ball at just the wrong time in history. McMaster's brilliant assessment enlightened and chilled me with a deep dive into the history of our foreign policy, and where it’s headed. The world has been changing around us, in spite of us, and it’s very clear that America has taken its eye off the ball -- especially in pursuit of "Strategic Narcissism" (pursuing policies based on wishful thinking). Never more than today, in a Trumpian, pandemic world, our place of power and influence is at stake and in jeopardy. I got lost in all the dangerous fronts threatening a continued free world, and the necessary steps to get this right and retain our place at the table, free of partisan politics. This should be required reading for all Americans.
October 2, 2020
Excellent, detailed overview of the international challenges the next President of the United States inherits by retired LTG and previous National Security Adviser (for one year) to President Trump--in addition to the domestic challenges that lie ahead for him. It's not small task, that's for sure. I respect his objectiveness in describing working with Trump, though I am shocked at how, in the book, he resisted saying that Trump was chummy with Putin. Recent reports in the NYTimes say otherwise--and McMaster seem to be becoming less objective each week. I also wish that McMaster had mentioned the economic and societal costs of fracking, rather than simply toting as a great alternative to energy from coal.
Still, I learned a lot and was reminded how much I like international affairs--so complicated, so fascinating, and McMaster (and historian Zachery Shore) is right: because the greatest source of national strength is an educated populace there needs to be another National Defense Education Act (1958) to motivate students to learn about history--and specifically, the history of war--in order to prevent war and learn from the past in order to have sounder policy and a more peaceful future.
Still, I learned a lot and was reminded how much I like international affairs--so complicated, so fascinating, and McMaster (and historian Zachery Shore) is right: because the greatest source of national strength is an educated populace there needs to be another National Defense Education Act (1958) to motivate students to learn about history--and specifically, the history of war--in order to prevent war and learn from the past in order to have sounder policy and a more peaceful future.
May 15, 2022
This took me over a year to read because it is so troubling. Each successive chapter would send me down a rabbit hole of additional research into another possible threat: Russia, North Korea, Iran, terrorism, global warming, cyber and bio warfare. The world presented through the sober lens of this book is very scary, but it also makes you value the peace and social harmony we have been able to establish and maintain in certain small ways. This is very apropos after the the invasion of Ukraine, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the Covid-19 pandemic. This book is refreshingly light on politics. It focuses less on simplistic policy theory and strategy and more on just laying out the threats and potential threats that free societies need to be thinking about as we move deeper into the 21st century. We all need to appreciate democracy, cultural liberalism (i.e. tolerance and equality before the law, not the political buzzward), and the value of civic integrity, and one of the main steps to doing this is to be on our guard.
October 24, 2024
Interesting perspective from a partisan.
December 8, 2020
It is disappointing that McMaster's book does not live up to its potential in providing the level of insight into America's current national security challenges as his previous book shows he is capable of. McMaster's introduction starts off with several fundamental flaws. First, he has largely adopted the conventional wisdom of a group of centrist, security-oriented commentators and officials regarding national security threats. For example, McMaster repeats the conventional wisdom that the Obama Administration should have attacked Syria in 2013 in response to Assad's use of chemical weapons in suggesting that the US had stepped back from doing enough to assert its national interests abroad. Like other writers, McMaster ignores that the US public, the international community, and Congress all did not support the strikes and that the US was ultimately successful at eliminating the vast majority of Assad's chemical weapons. The notion that the US should only care about civilians who are killed by chemical weapons, and not respond when they are shot, bombed, burned, tortured, etc, has always been absurd and McMaster fails to take the opportunity to examine why the political climate in the US failed to lend Obama the backing to engage in acts of war in Syria. This shortsightedness and repetition of conventional wisdom is a common theme throughout McMaster's book.
McMaster's criticism of Obama, echoing the conventional wisdom of others, also falls short on the withdrawal from Iraq and the Iran nuclear deal. Obama ended the combat mission in 2010 and withdrew all US forces in 2011 in accordance with the Bush Administration's withdrawal plan, not in accordance with Obama's stated campaign pledge, and Obama ran into the same problems that Bush had. These included a lack of domestic support in the US, with Bush officials still in denial about their ineptitude in starting and waging the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in Iraq, which refused to support a Status of Forces Agreement that would give American soldiers immunity from local law for official actions that resulted in the death of Iraqis and destruction of Iraqi property. That Iraq would adopt this stance is unsurprising given the events at Abu Ghraib and high-profile issues with military contractors, like Blackwater. How could Obama have convinced Iraq to concede on the SOFA issue? McMaster does not say, much less mention this fundamental problem. Also, in a problem that occurs throughout the book, McMaster fails to reconcile the degree to which the US should remain committed to international problems when our partners, the Iraqis, remain uncommitted to fixing issues related to sectarianism, for example. On the Iran Nuclear Deal, McMaster does not consider what the alternative to a flawed deal would have been. Should the US have made sent credible signals of a commitment to military action, risking civilian casualties and reaffirming false views of American militarism? McMaster also fails to consider Iran's point of view, a major shortfall in a book recommending strategic empathy, and the country's desire to remain sovereign, if authoritarian, in the face of a US committed to overthrowing world leaders, like Qaddafi, and facing an Israel and US publicly committed to attacking Iran's nuclear capabilities.
This incident, and many other parts of McMaster's book, betray a failure to understand how domestic politics influences international relations. It should not be controversial that a US president did not commit acts of war, risking civilian casualties and greater involvement, without the support of the public, Congress, or allies. McMaster also selectively ignores how domestic politics regarding trade and finance complicate the US's ability to respond to Chinese human rights abuses and assertiveness and how Russia's economic weakness and distance from the US make complicate broad-based and more assertive actions against Putin.
A second fundamental flaw of McMaster's book is that he decides not to directly criticize the failures of action and inaction of the Trump Administration. McMaster rightly calls out Russia's election interference and points out that Trump Administration responded to Russian actions with meaningful measures, but does not as carefully examine Trump's own attitudes towards Russia and how those views negatively affected US national security policy. McMaster ultimately chooses to ignore the views of Trump and instead pretends that the actions damaging to US national security did not happen by attributing the hard work of level-headed bureaucrats and political appointees, including McMaster, to control Trump's worst impulses.
The most insightful parts are those about Iraq and, to a less degree, Afghanistan, where McMaster spent substantial amounts of time. A more conventional memoir would have focused on McMaster's own career before eventually describing how the hard-won lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan influenced his thinking on China, Russia, and other issues when he oversaw them on the National Security Council.
Lastly, the paradoxes of this book cannot go unexamined. McMaster criticizes the Obama Administration for not being strong enough on national security and alludes to the idea that Obama was more interested in apologizing for America's past mistakes, but his core premise is that the US needs to shift from strategic narcissism to strategic empathy. He suggests the US needs to credibly reassure allies, but fails to critically examine the Trump Administration's withdrawal from TPP, Paris, and the Iran Nuclear Deal, agreements supported by every country in the region, every country on the planet, and every major ally, respectively. McMaster also fails to critically examine Trump's disparagement of NATO, Korea, and Japan and Trump's fondness for dictators like Putin. Notably, McMaster wears his historian hat proudly in examining the past and context of US foreign policy throughout the world, but he fails as an academic in providing evidence in the form of contemporary speeches, documents, or even memoirs to back up his view of US strategic narcissism from the 90s to very recently. Past presidential administrations were surely optimistic following the Cold War, but McMaster's is a very bold claim that Administration after Administration put optimism over reality. In one weird segment, McMaster describes how the US withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal unsurprisingly led to Iran increasing its military activity in the region while suggesting that the US should be prepared to enact even tougher sanctions and threaten military action. In doing so, McMaster describes his own self-fulfilling prophecy, begging the question as to why he did not pursue a different policy in the first place.
McMaster also fails to appreciate the difficulty of making and implementing successful foreign policy, and how to judge success. George W. Bush hired some of the most experienced policy-makers in Republican circles, yet got the US bogged down in two unsuccessful wars. It is also worthwhile to point out that Bush's tough stance on North Korea did not deter Kim from detonating a nuclear device in 2006 or from successive rounds of escalation. While Obama may not have had policies that worked perfectly, a politician like Obama appreciates the fact that the problems that the National Security Council is asked to deal with are the ones that could not be solved at lower levels in the bureaucracy or by assistant and deputy assistant secretaries in the political hierarchy. The problems of national security involve investments and probability in an attempt to solve challenging dilemmas. The US could make a heavy investment in missile defense and military deployments to deter Iran and North Korea, but would be spending money to prevent wars that may never have happened anyway while giving up the cost to buy down risk in other conflicts or invest in domestic political priorities. Additionally, military deployments, and other complementary policies, do not ensure that Iran or North Korea will not continue provocative actions, but merely attempt to deter such actions while being postured to defend against them. At the same time, the classic security dilemma (military spending on one side increases military spending on the other side, and offensive capabilities are often indistinguishable from defensive ones), teaches us that states like Iran and North Korea may increase their desire for nuclear weapons or advanced military equipment. Indeed, North Korea made its biggest gains towards nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles after being labeled part of Bush's "Axis of Evil." Iran bought Russia's S-300 missile defense system following threats from the US and Israel to bomb Iranian facilities. The US may see the purchase of the S-300 as a provocative act meant to provide cover for an illicit nuclear program, but ignoring that the purchase would have made sense to Iran in the face of direct threats from foreign countries to bomb its sovereign territory is shortsighted.
Ultimately McMaster trades one form of strategic narcissism for another while ignoring his own advice to pursue a national strategy backed by fundamental American values and strategic empathy. McMaster assumes that US allies can be forced to adhere to American national interests, that the US government can pursue tough and militaristic foreign policies without domestic and foreign political audience costs, and, most importantly, that a strategy of sanctions and military threat will work, rather than reinforce adversary's resolve to protect their interests by pursuing nuclear weapons or engaging in provocative action. It is tragic that McMaster chose to write a flawed book rather than reflect on his deep experience and let his lessons arise from his own interactions with history.
McMaster's criticism of Obama, echoing the conventional wisdom of others, also falls short on the withdrawal from Iraq and the Iran nuclear deal. Obama ended the combat mission in 2010 and withdrew all US forces in 2011 in accordance with the Bush Administration's withdrawal plan, not in accordance with Obama's stated campaign pledge, and Obama ran into the same problems that Bush had. These included a lack of domestic support in the US, with Bush officials still in denial about their ineptitude in starting and waging the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in Iraq, which refused to support a Status of Forces Agreement that would give American soldiers immunity from local law for official actions that resulted in the death of Iraqis and destruction of Iraqi property. That Iraq would adopt this stance is unsurprising given the events at Abu Ghraib and high-profile issues with military contractors, like Blackwater. How could Obama have convinced Iraq to concede on the SOFA issue? McMaster does not say, much less mention this fundamental problem. Also, in a problem that occurs throughout the book, McMaster fails to reconcile the degree to which the US should remain committed to international problems when our partners, the Iraqis, remain uncommitted to fixing issues related to sectarianism, for example. On the Iran Nuclear Deal, McMaster does not consider what the alternative to a flawed deal would have been. Should the US have made sent credible signals of a commitment to military action, risking civilian casualties and reaffirming false views of American militarism? McMaster also fails to consider Iran's point of view, a major shortfall in a book recommending strategic empathy, and the country's desire to remain sovereign, if authoritarian, in the face of a US committed to overthrowing world leaders, like Qaddafi, and facing an Israel and US publicly committed to attacking Iran's nuclear capabilities.
This incident, and many other parts of McMaster's book, betray a failure to understand how domestic politics influences international relations. It should not be controversial that a US president did not commit acts of war, risking civilian casualties and greater involvement, without the support of the public, Congress, or allies. McMaster also selectively ignores how domestic politics regarding trade and finance complicate the US's ability to respond to Chinese human rights abuses and assertiveness and how Russia's economic weakness and distance from the US make complicate broad-based and more assertive actions against Putin.
A second fundamental flaw of McMaster's book is that he decides not to directly criticize the failures of action and inaction of the Trump Administration. McMaster rightly calls out Russia's election interference and points out that Trump Administration responded to Russian actions with meaningful measures, but does not as carefully examine Trump's own attitudes towards Russia and how those views negatively affected US national security policy. McMaster ultimately chooses to ignore the views of Trump and instead pretends that the actions damaging to US national security did not happen by attributing the hard work of level-headed bureaucrats and political appointees, including McMaster, to control Trump's worst impulses.
The most insightful parts are those about Iraq and, to a less degree, Afghanistan, where McMaster spent substantial amounts of time. A more conventional memoir would have focused on McMaster's own career before eventually describing how the hard-won lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan influenced his thinking on China, Russia, and other issues when he oversaw them on the National Security Council.
Lastly, the paradoxes of this book cannot go unexamined. McMaster criticizes the Obama Administration for not being strong enough on national security and alludes to the idea that Obama was more interested in apologizing for America's past mistakes, but his core premise is that the US needs to shift from strategic narcissism to strategic empathy. He suggests the US needs to credibly reassure allies, but fails to critically examine the Trump Administration's withdrawal from TPP, Paris, and the Iran Nuclear Deal, agreements supported by every country in the region, every country on the planet, and every major ally, respectively. McMaster also fails to critically examine Trump's disparagement of NATO, Korea, and Japan and Trump's fondness for dictators like Putin. Notably, McMaster wears his historian hat proudly in examining the past and context of US foreign policy throughout the world, but he fails as an academic in providing evidence in the form of contemporary speeches, documents, or even memoirs to back up his view of US strategic narcissism from the 90s to very recently. Past presidential administrations were surely optimistic following the Cold War, but McMaster's is a very bold claim that Administration after Administration put optimism over reality. In one weird segment, McMaster describes how the US withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal unsurprisingly led to Iran increasing its military activity in the region while suggesting that the US should be prepared to enact even tougher sanctions and threaten military action. In doing so, McMaster describes his own self-fulfilling prophecy, begging the question as to why he did not pursue a different policy in the first place.
McMaster also fails to appreciate the difficulty of making and implementing successful foreign policy, and how to judge success. George W. Bush hired some of the most experienced policy-makers in Republican circles, yet got the US bogged down in two unsuccessful wars. It is also worthwhile to point out that Bush's tough stance on North Korea did not deter Kim from detonating a nuclear device in 2006 or from successive rounds of escalation. While Obama may not have had policies that worked perfectly, a politician like Obama appreciates the fact that the problems that the National Security Council is asked to deal with are the ones that could not be solved at lower levels in the bureaucracy or by assistant and deputy assistant secretaries in the political hierarchy. The problems of national security involve investments and probability in an attempt to solve challenging dilemmas. The US could make a heavy investment in missile defense and military deployments to deter Iran and North Korea, but would be spending money to prevent wars that may never have happened anyway while giving up the cost to buy down risk in other conflicts or invest in domestic political priorities. Additionally, military deployments, and other complementary policies, do not ensure that Iran or North Korea will not continue provocative actions, but merely attempt to deter such actions while being postured to defend against them. At the same time, the classic security dilemma (military spending on one side increases military spending on the other side, and offensive capabilities are often indistinguishable from defensive ones), teaches us that states like Iran and North Korea may increase their desire for nuclear weapons or advanced military equipment. Indeed, North Korea made its biggest gains towards nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles after being labeled part of Bush's "Axis of Evil." Iran bought Russia's S-300 missile defense system following threats from the US and Israel to bomb Iranian facilities. The US may see the purchase of the S-300 as a provocative act meant to provide cover for an illicit nuclear program, but ignoring that the purchase would have made sense to Iran in the face of direct threats from foreign countries to bomb its sovereign territory is shortsighted.
Ultimately McMaster trades one form of strategic narcissism for another while ignoring his own advice to pursue a national strategy backed by fundamental American values and strategic empathy. McMaster assumes that US allies can be forced to adhere to American national interests, that the US government can pursue tough and militaristic foreign policies without domestic and foreign political audience costs, and, most importantly, that a strategy of sanctions and military threat will work, rather than reinforce adversary's resolve to protect their interests by pursuing nuclear weapons or engaging in provocative action. It is tragic that McMaster chose to write a flawed book rather than reflect on his deep experience and let his lessons arise from his own interactions with history.
October 6, 2020
outstanding overview and history of the biggest foreign policy challenges facing the US, by someone who has been involved extensively with all of them. Impressive military career, phd in history, Trump's national security advisor.
Russia, China, Mideast, North Korea, ....
Russia, China, Mideast, North Korea, ....
October 25, 2020
After only serving in the position of President Trump's National Security Advisor for only 13 months after being asked to leave, many told Lt Gen H.R. McMaster to write a damaging account of his time with the President. Being an accomplished warfighter and academic, he dismissed this approach and instead took the high moral ground and wrote a fantastic account of his experiences at the White House and his travels. Yet more than that, McMaster delivers in clear prose the very readable context and short history underpinning these experiences, which makes for a very worthwhile contribution to the historical record.
McMaster’s work lays out, typically as these kinds of work do, the adversaries and threats to US security—Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, etc., as well as other topics of interest such as the environment and others.
His overarching argument begins with a discussion underpinning US policies leading US decision makers into a mindset of over-optimism, complacency and hubris, while stating three flawed assumptions about the new, post–Cold War era. “First, many accepted the thesis that the West’s victory in the Cold War meant “the end of history,” what political philosopher Francis Fukuyama described as “the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” “Second, many assumed that old rules of international relations and competition were no longer relevant in what President George H. W. Bush hoped would be “a new world order—a world where the rule of law, not the rule of the jungle governs the conduct of nations.” “Third, many asserted that American military prowess demonstrated during the 1991 Persian Gulf war manifested a revolution in military affairs (dubbed RMA) that would allow the U.S. military to achieve “full-spectrum dominance” over any potential enemy.”
Furthermore, McMaster grounds these assumptions with solid, fact-based observations. “First, autocracy was making a comeback. Second, a new great power competition was emerging. China had paid close attention to the 1991 Gulf War and was deeply embarrassed by the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, during which the United States responded to Chinese missile threats meant to intimidate Taiwan with a massive show of force. Third, as China began to challenge so-called American military dominance, increasingly potent jihadist and Iranian state-sponsored terrorist organizations attacked asymmetrically, avoiding military strength and exploiting weakness.”
In addition, McMaster states that these observations have derived an attitude driving US foreign policy over multiple Administrations: “U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy has suffered from what we might derive from Morgenthau’s essay “Strategic Narcissism”: the tendency to view the world only in relation to the United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily on U.S. decisions or plans. The two mind-sets that result from strategic narcissism, overconfidence and resignation, share the conceit of attributing outcomes almost exclusively to U.S. developed integrated strategies for the president. First, great power competition was back with a vengeance, highlighted by Russia’s annexation of Crimea, invasion of Ukraine, intervention in Syria, and the sustained campaign of political subversion against the United States and the West.” “Second, the threat from transnational terrorist organizations was greater than it was on September 10, 2001. Terrorist groups were increasing their technological sophistication and lethality.” “Third, hostile states in Iran and North Korea were becoming more dangerous.” “Fourth, new challenges to security were emerging in complex arenas of competition from space to cyberspace to cyber-enabled information warfare to emerging disruptive technologies.
McMaster concludes that, “none of the competitions discussed in this book will be resolved quickly; strategies, while remaining flexible and adaptable to changing conditions, must be sustained over time”, [and that] a theme in this book, strategic narcissism, and the corresponding tendency to artificially separate interconnected problem sets, encourages short-term, simplistic solutions to complex problems.”
His final thought is that “support for democracy and the rule of law is the best means of promoting peace and competing with those who promote authoritarian, closed systems.” This is a must read for any national security scholar!
McMaster’s work lays out, typically as these kinds of work do, the adversaries and threats to US security—Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, etc., as well as other topics of interest such as the environment and others.
His overarching argument begins with a discussion underpinning US policies leading US decision makers into a mindset of over-optimism, complacency and hubris, while stating three flawed assumptions about the new, post–Cold War era. “First, many accepted the thesis that the West’s victory in the Cold War meant “the end of history,” what political philosopher Francis Fukuyama described as “the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” “Second, many assumed that old rules of international relations and competition were no longer relevant in what President George H. W. Bush hoped would be “a new world order—a world where the rule of law, not the rule of the jungle governs the conduct of nations.” “Third, many asserted that American military prowess demonstrated during the 1991 Persian Gulf war manifested a revolution in military affairs (dubbed RMA) that would allow the U.S. military to achieve “full-spectrum dominance” over any potential enemy.”
Furthermore, McMaster grounds these assumptions with solid, fact-based observations. “First, autocracy was making a comeback. Second, a new great power competition was emerging. China had paid close attention to the 1991 Gulf War and was deeply embarrassed by the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, during which the United States responded to Chinese missile threats meant to intimidate Taiwan with a massive show of force. Third, as China began to challenge so-called American military dominance, increasingly potent jihadist and Iranian state-sponsored terrorist organizations attacked asymmetrically, avoiding military strength and exploiting weakness.”
In addition, McMaster states that these observations have derived an attitude driving US foreign policy over multiple Administrations: “U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy has suffered from what we might derive from Morgenthau’s essay “Strategic Narcissism”: the tendency to view the world only in relation to the United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily on U.S. decisions or plans. The two mind-sets that result from strategic narcissism, overconfidence and resignation, share the conceit of attributing outcomes almost exclusively to U.S. developed integrated strategies for the president. First, great power competition was back with a vengeance, highlighted by Russia’s annexation of Crimea, invasion of Ukraine, intervention in Syria, and the sustained campaign of political subversion against the United States and the West.” “Second, the threat from transnational terrorist organizations was greater than it was on September 10, 2001. Terrorist groups were increasing their technological sophistication and lethality.” “Third, hostile states in Iran and North Korea were becoming more dangerous.” “Fourth, new challenges to security were emerging in complex arenas of competition from space to cyberspace to cyber-enabled information warfare to emerging disruptive technologies.
McMaster concludes that, “none of the competitions discussed in this book will be resolved quickly; strategies, while remaining flexible and adaptable to changing conditions, must be sustained over time”, [and that] a theme in this book, strategic narcissism, and the corresponding tendency to artificially separate interconnected problem sets, encourages short-term, simplistic solutions to complex problems.”
His final thought is that “support for democracy and the rule of law is the best means of promoting peace and competing with those who promote authoritarian, closed systems.” This is a must read for any national security scholar!
July 2, 2021
H.R. McMaster is a historian, military man, national security expert with personal experience in China, Afghanistan, Iraq and with Soviet Union and North Korea. The combination of his personal experience, historical knowledge and detailed research and excellent storytelling make this lengthy book a compelling listening experience. I listened to the audiobook version of this book cover to cover. I was interested in the introduction he described himself as apolitical and has never voted in an election.
The depth of his personal experience and knowledge of history shines in the page of BATTLEGROUNDS: THE FIGHT TO DEFEND THE FREE WORLD. In the final pages of this book, he talks about writing it on the 11th floor of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University. I recommend this book as worthwhile listening
W. Terry Whalin is an editor and the author of more than 60 books including his latest 10 Publishing Myths, Insights Every Author Needs to Succeed .
The depth of his personal experience and knowledge of history shines in the page of BATTLEGROUNDS: THE FIGHT TO DEFEND THE FREE WORLD. In the final pages of this book, he talks about writing it on the 11th floor of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University. I recommend this book as worthwhile listening
W. Terry Whalin is an editor and the author of more than 60 books including his latest 10 Publishing Myths, Insights Every Author Needs to Succeed .
January 2, 2021
I had earlier read Mcmaster's articles but this was my first read of his books. McMaster is a respected military strategist with a thoughtful consideration of the complex challenges faced by America in the world. Battlegrounds starts off well with an objective of presenting a national security perspective of America's current and future challenges, colored as he describes by the lessons of the past. He makes it clear that his objective is not to dwell on the reasons of his short tenure in Trump's cabinet but present his thoughts on key national security policies and issues.
His first few chapters covers the Russia and China strategic issues in considerable depth. McMaster is scholarly in his assessment and very structured in the way he approaches the multiple levels of strategic engagement required to deter the aggressive nature of the two countries approach to countering the West, especially America. He describes the dialogues and the interlocutors with considerable detail and details in a very structured fashion, in his view, the flawed approaches of the past and their negative consequences. His concept of 'strategic narcissism' in explaining the rosy view of past administrations in being able to encourage liberal thinking in both countries through engagement, permeates his thesis across all chapters. Strategic deterrence is what he pines for in America's national security stance.
When describing the challenges of South Asia he is highly critical of Pakistan and America's naivete about both Pakistan and the Taliban. He documents the range of failures in Afghanistan and decries America's ambivalence about staying the course. Its not a 20 year war in Afghanistan he says, its a 1 year war fought 20 times over. His loyalty hews strongly towards India and its future as a strategic partner of the US and the Quad. But he doesn't hesitate to point out some of the inconsistencies in India's approach.
Its when he comes to Iran and Iraq, countries to whom as would be expected he devotes considerable attention, that the belligerence in his doctrine surfaces. He vehemently supports the bankrupt policies towards Iran that have conditioned Americas approach (similar to Cuba). In his recounting, the assassination of Mossadegh had nothing to do with the CIA and the mullahs are the mortal enemy who need to be dispatched. His advocacy of aggressive action, both military and financial, which he supported during his tenure as NSA chief and does so now as well, risks dragging America into another, even larger, quagmire in the Middle East. In this at least he does not follow his own consideration of the lessons of history. He excoriates Obama's approach and the JCPOA as ineffective and supports policies that have not resulted in material change in the theater since the '79 revolution.
The final chapter dwells on the increasing risk of North Korea and the potential of a significant escalation in the peninsula given the capriciousness of the Great Successor. But as with Iran, his plans revolve around regime change which as we have seen is a dangerous path to go down.
Overall I felt Mcmaster is a very erudite, cerebral and thinking general with a strong view on issues but always supported by his interpretation of facts. Its a testament to the American Military that it is led by able generals like him. But as a set of policies that he recommends it is dangerously close to driving America down a path, at least in the middle east, which can only lead to further loss of blood and treasure. Generals need to appreciate more the limits of America's power and the need to allow optionality and some degree of give and take to pragmatically address some of the huge challenges ahead of us.
His first few chapters covers the Russia and China strategic issues in considerable depth. McMaster is scholarly in his assessment and very structured in the way he approaches the multiple levels of strategic engagement required to deter the aggressive nature of the two countries approach to countering the West, especially America. He describes the dialogues and the interlocutors with considerable detail and details in a very structured fashion, in his view, the flawed approaches of the past and their negative consequences. His concept of 'strategic narcissism' in explaining the rosy view of past administrations in being able to encourage liberal thinking in both countries through engagement, permeates his thesis across all chapters. Strategic deterrence is what he pines for in America's national security stance.
When describing the challenges of South Asia he is highly critical of Pakistan and America's naivete about both Pakistan and the Taliban. He documents the range of failures in Afghanistan and decries America's ambivalence about staying the course. Its not a 20 year war in Afghanistan he says, its a 1 year war fought 20 times over. His loyalty hews strongly towards India and its future as a strategic partner of the US and the Quad. But he doesn't hesitate to point out some of the inconsistencies in India's approach.
Its when he comes to Iran and Iraq, countries to whom as would be expected he devotes considerable attention, that the belligerence in his doctrine surfaces. He vehemently supports the bankrupt policies towards Iran that have conditioned Americas approach (similar to Cuba). In his recounting, the assassination of Mossadegh had nothing to do with the CIA and the mullahs are the mortal enemy who need to be dispatched. His advocacy of aggressive action, both military and financial, which he supported during his tenure as NSA chief and does so now as well, risks dragging America into another, even larger, quagmire in the Middle East. In this at least he does not follow his own consideration of the lessons of history. He excoriates Obama's approach and the JCPOA as ineffective and supports policies that have not resulted in material change in the theater since the '79 revolution.
The final chapter dwells on the increasing risk of North Korea and the potential of a significant escalation in the peninsula given the capriciousness of the Great Successor. But as with Iran, his plans revolve around regime change which as we have seen is a dangerous path to go down.
Overall I felt Mcmaster is a very erudite, cerebral and thinking general with a strong view on issues but always supported by his interpretation of facts. Its a testament to the American Military that it is led by able generals like him. But as a set of policies that he recommends it is dangerously close to driving America down a path, at least in the middle east, which can only lead to further loss of blood and treasure. Generals need to appreciate more the limits of America's power and the need to allow optionality and some degree of give and take to pragmatically address some of the huge challenges ahead of us.
October 9, 2021
McMaster was the national security advisor for Trump and one of the three high quality generals who were the core military and political advisors for the administration from the start. He did not last, of course, since most (if not all) of the initial cabinet members have gone. His new book about his tenure as the National Security Advisor for Trump was just published, within a month of the election. It is a very good book, but it is not a tell-all critical dump on the Trump Administration, as one might have expected. While there are criticisms of Trump in the arguments, the point of the book is more to express General McMaster’s approach to his job and a richly detailed example of his work on the National Security Council.
I have always liked McMaster. He represents an admirable example of the strategic/political policy advisor. He has a finely developed and critical scholarly mind. He has also “done his homework” and knows the details of what he is talking about. He is also a solid practitioner and craftsman. He knows the nitty gritty detail of the systems he discusses and he is thoroughly familiar with how policy gets made and implemented in military systems. He knows how the people and the systems work and how practical matters get accomplished. No ivory tower wonk here! Finally, he is principled and expects that National Security work will help to pursue US values (and his values).
But what about Trump? This is not a scathing critique of the current President. It is not an advocacy piece either. McMaster is trying not to be political about this. (I will take him at his word about this, but it does stretch credibility how this could happen, given the events he is recounting.). After I read his earlier book about Vietnam - “Dereliction of Duty” I wondered how he could have been even selected by Trump and why he would have worked for him, since McMaster was highly critical of those who subordinated US war aims to the demands of domestic politics in the run up to the huge US escalation in Vietnam. So if I analyze Vietnam that way, I will now go to work for Trump - the oh so political President who want to close off US wars?? This is a difficult idea to get one’s hands around.
McMaster’s relationship to Trump becomes clearer in this book. Trump is a President who is pushing a more activist foreign policy and view of the US role in the world that is consistent in its content (somewhat) with the view of the military-political scene that McMaster provides. He is consistent with Trump on the substance of US policy (at least some of it). There is only one US President at a time, however, and McMaster had a position supporting the National Security positions of the Trump Administration. Perhaps there were disconnects between them and he ended up leaving his position early, but solid partnerships have been forged on much less of a basis in US Security advising.
“Battlgrounds” is a series of case studies/briefings in which a fairly well developed approach to national security policy is presented on a set of significant geographically based areas of policy and activity. It is sort of a policy text and case book by McMaster. For each area, McMaster provides a detailed background and then a chapter with significant policy suggestions and recommendations for what to do going forward. This is an imposing set of briefings/lectures, the case areas are the ones you might expect (Middle East, China, Russia, Japan, both Koreas, and I can already imagine the issues in full briefings like these for a President who notoriously does not like to read very much. McMaster, on the contrary, provides a shotgun burst of information and analysis in each chapter. Just to work through these pieces and even modest background reading is formidable.
So what kind of analysis is it? To start with, McMaster seems to be a national security realist in the mode of Hans Morgenthau. This involves arguing how nations can pursue their vital national goals and objectives in a world of competing state actors by crafting a strategy that matches a government’s resources and capabilities to the requirements of a given situation. Given the importance of information and uncertainty in the world, impressions matter in communicating a nation’s posture to other nations. Strategic success has to do with whether and to what extent national goals and objectives are pursued successfully and at what cost.
Analysis like this is frightfully complicated and involves lots of events and actors. McMaster does not leave matters as complex and chaotic. He is focused on how to craft and implement strategies effectively. To do that, nations need to reduce or eliminate their strategic narcissism and overly optimistic thinking. Huh? As best as I can tell, this means planning and anticipating what others will do based on what one wants them to do.
A major mistake in national security policy is to presume that all of the important actors in the world act in similar ways in pursuit of similar goals and values. Country A will/should act the way I think they should act, even though the culture, history, and political situation of Country A is very different from my situation. To counter this, it is necessary to develop what McMaster calls strategic empathy, which means crafting strategies from the actual perspectives of others and not what you wish their perspectives to be. This is a common approach to among some foreign policy “experts” and McMaster is good at it.
Even with his skill, there are issues with this approach. To start with, it seems biased towards finding a unitary state actor. I expect that country A will consistently perform in a given way no matter how large and complex it is. Do all of the participants in any government act together according to a unified strategy and while pursuing clear and valuable goals? Not really or at least very infrequently. There are often numerous actors contending for influence as a country crafts its strategy. These actors seldom agree on what the national strategy is (or should be).
A second issue with this line of analysis concerns what is sometimes called a “level of analysis”. I want to draw conclusions about some large and complex country and its policies - for example is Iran hostile to the US? To draw such a conclusion, however, I have to look at lots of smaller actions and statements by individuals, while the overall true orientation of the country remains unseen by me. How do I determine a fundamental orientation from such actions and statements? How do I know when a country has changed its orientation? How do I identify fundamental positions and changes on the basis of lots of little details?
McMaster criticizes others for misjudging fundamental national positions our of wishful thinking. There are lots of examples of such wishful thinking but such positions stem from mistaken assumptions that analysts make - for example, if I interact with country X sufficiently, it will grow to be friendly with me. This is a variant of what is called “the contact hypothesis”. McMaster’s positions can be subject to a similar criticism, however, in the other direction. For example, if I assume that country X is permanently hostile to the US, then I will always interpret potentially conciliatory gestures from country X as being hostile. If I assume hostility then how can I ever see change. Now in national security situations, the stakes are often high and so a cautious position is understandable and even justifiable. McMaster is well aware of the potential for misjudgment as well and marshals lots of history to support his conclusions. That should make him more accurate over time. But the analytic problem is still there. Your analysis may only be as good as the assumptions you bring to the table to work with. The facts do not speak for themselves.
What about the particular case areas? Go read the book! I can take issue with aspects of his analysis, but in general McMaster does a fine job. Perhaps he is either unsure that the current administration will leave office or perhaps he wants to signal his openness to advising work after the election. However he decides, I hope McMaster produces more work. He seems to have a current adjunct teaching position at the Stanford Business school. I hope his course is popular. At least it should be.
I have always liked McMaster. He represents an admirable example of the strategic/political policy advisor. He has a finely developed and critical scholarly mind. He has also “done his homework” and knows the details of what he is talking about. He is also a solid practitioner and craftsman. He knows the nitty gritty detail of the systems he discusses and he is thoroughly familiar with how policy gets made and implemented in military systems. He knows how the people and the systems work and how practical matters get accomplished. No ivory tower wonk here! Finally, he is principled and expects that National Security work will help to pursue US values (and his values).
But what about Trump? This is not a scathing critique of the current President. It is not an advocacy piece either. McMaster is trying not to be political about this. (I will take him at his word about this, but it does stretch credibility how this could happen, given the events he is recounting.). After I read his earlier book about Vietnam - “Dereliction of Duty” I wondered how he could have been even selected by Trump and why he would have worked for him, since McMaster was highly critical of those who subordinated US war aims to the demands of domestic politics in the run up to the huge US escalation in Vietnam. So if I analyze Vietnam that way, I will now go to work for Trump - the oh so political President who want to close off US wars?? This is a difficult idea to get one’s hands around.
McMaster’s relationship to Trump becomes clearer in this book. Trump is a President who is pushing a more activist foreign policy and view of the US role in the world that is consistent in its content (somewhat) with the view of the military-political scene that McMaster provides. He is consistent with Trump on the substance of US policy (at least some of it). There is only one US President at a time, however, and McMaster had a position supporting the National Security positions of the Trump Administration. Perhaps there were disconnects between them and he ended up leaving his position early, but solid partnerships have been forged on much less of a basis in US Security advising.
“Battlgrounds” is a series of case studies/briefings in which a fairly well developed approach to national security policy is presented on a set of significant geographically based areas of policy and activity. It is sort of a policy text and case book by McMaster. For each area, McMaster provides a detailed background and then a chapter with significant policy suggestions and recommendations for what to do going forward. This is an imposing set of briefings/lectures, the case areas are the ones you might expect (Middle East, China, Russia, Japan, both Koreas, and I can already imagine the issues in full briefings like these for a President who notoriously does not like to read very much. McMaster, on the contrary, provides a shotgun burst of information and analysis in each chapter. Just to work through these pieces and even modest background reading is formidable.
So what kind of analysis is it? To start with, McMaster seems to be a national security realist in the mode of Hans Morgenthau. This involves arguing how nations can pursue their vital national goals and objectives in a world of competing state actors by crafting a strategy that matches a government’s resources and capabilities to the requirements of a given situation. Given the importance of information and uncertainty in the world, impressions matter in communicating a nation’s posture to other nations. Strategic success has to do with whether and to what extent national goals and objectives are pursued successfully and at what cost.
Analysis like this is frightfully complicated and involves lots of events and actors. McMaster does not leave matters as complex and chaotic. He is focused on how to craft and implement strategies effectively. To do that, nations need to reduce or eliminate their strategic narcissism and overly optimistic thinking. Huh? As best as I can tell, this means planning and anticipating what others will do based on what one wants them to do.
A major mistake in national security policy is to presume that all of the important actors in the world act in similar ways in pursuit of similar goals and values. Country A will/should act the way I think they should act, even though the culture, history, and political situation of Country A is very different from my situation. To counter this, it is necessary to develop what McMaster calls strategic empathy, which means crafting strategies from the actual perspectives of others and not what you wish their perspectives to be. This is a common approach to among some foreign policy “experts” and McMaster is good at it.
Even with his skill, there are issues with this approach. To start with, it seems biased towards finding a unitary state actor. I expect that country A will consistently perform in a given way no matter how large and complex it is. Do all of the participants in any government act together according to a unified strategy and while pursuing clear and valuable goals? Not really or at least very infrequently. There are often numerous actors contending for influence as a country crafts its strategy. These actors seldom agree on what the national strategy is (or should be).
A second issue with this line of analysis concerns what is sometimes called a “level of analysis”. I want to draw conclusions about some large and complex country and its policies - for example is Iran hostile to the US? To draw such a conclusion, however, I have to look at lots of smaller actions and statements by individuals, while the overall true orientation of the country remains unseen by me. How do I determine a fundamental orientation from such actions and statements? How do I know when a country has changed its orientation? How do I identify fundamental positions and changes on the basis of lots of little details?
McMaster criticizes others for misjudging fundamental national positions our of wishful thinking. There are lots of examples of such wishful thinking but such positions stem from mistaken assumptions that analysts make - for example, if I interact with country X sufficiently, it will grow to be friendly with me. This is a variant of what is called “the contact hypothesis”. McMaster’s positions can be subject to a similar criticism, however, in the other direction. For example, if I assume that country X is permanently hostile to the US, then I will always interpret potentially conciliatory gestures from country X as being hostile. If I assume hostility then how can I ever see change. Now in national security situations, the stakes are often high and so a cautious position is understandable and even justifiable. McMaster is well aware of the potential for misjudgment as well and marshals lots of history to support his conclusions. That should make him more accurate over time. But the analytic problem is still there. Your analysis may only be as good as the assumptions you bring to the table to work with. The facts do not speak for themselves.
What about the particular case areas? Go read the book! I can take issue with aspects of his analysis, but in general McMaster does a fine job. Perhaps he is either unsure that the current administration will leave office or perhaps he wants to signal his openness to advising work after the election. However he decides, I hope McMaster produces more work. He seems to have a current adjunct teaching position at the Stanford Business school. I hope his course is popular. At least it should be.
February 13, 2025
As someone who studied International Relations (i.e. geopolitics) through grad school, this is one of the best modern non-fiction books on this topic that I've read. Certainly the best on this subject. McMaster is a historian and not at all a political partisan, so don't expect a salty memoir about being in the white house or whatever. The title is dramatic but this is a deep dive into geopolitics in the context of the main threats to our national security, with a lot of attention paid to the role of technology. He gives a really respectful analysis of the cultural and historical elements that led to the creation of these threats abroad, and he does not mince words when he discusses the strategic, military and foreign policy errors made by administrations of both parties that created and/or exacerbated some of these issues. I finished this book with an expanded sense of the historical context of many of our more pressing international conflicts, and a deeper understanding of what the future might hold. 12/10 I cannot recommend this enough and I'm keeping it on my kindle because I'm going to read it again at some point.
October 11, 2020
This is a book that makes you think about the role of the United States in a rapidly evolving world. It goes far beyond television pundits and glib newspaper articles fed by self-serving politicians who seem to be more determined to divide than unite. The author presents in detail the challenges facing the United States in the future by illuminating our successes and failures of the past. General McMaster caused me to change my mind about foreign intervention especially since serving both in Iraq and Vietnam I thought I had all the answers.
November 29, 2020
What we can afford least is to define the problems of our future as we would like them to be instead of how they are. Yet self delusion and over simplistic thinking has been the approach taken by several administrations in recent years to global issues. It was really eye opening to hear first hand the complexity of governance and the challenges the world faces. If you are looking for a deeper understanding and analysis of the adversaries and theaters of interaction that the United States will have to confront in 2020 and beyond this is a great book to read.
January 24, 2021
Just couldn’t get into this book. On a positive note there is some good history of events. The General’s assertion that his book is a non-partisan analysis is ludicrous. And his over reliance on citing ancient texts such as Sun Tzu is just annoying for me.
February 4, 2021
Somewhat tedious and repetitive.
All the world is out to get us.
All western governments are naive.
Only the author sees the truth.
But some intereting insights.
All the world is out to get us.
All western governments are naive.
Only the author sees the truth.
But some intereting insights.
October 22, 2021
Quite an interesting take on some of the future theatres of conflict such as cyber warfare, space, advancements in technology like AI and autonomous warfare, and dis and misinformation with some thought provoking ideas of how to engage and combat them going forward as well as the impact climate change will have on global security surrounding issues such as food and water security, mass displacement of peoples, possible future conflicts over resources etc etc. Some really interesting ideas and analysis of these in addition surrounding the more “conventional” theatres of conflict such as malign state actors, countering nuclear proliferation, and global terrorism, where analysis is equally thought provoking as it takes a much more historical perspective than most works in order to explain and explore roots and patterns.
January 18, 2021
McMaster shows himself to be an excellent mind with respect to national security. His take on our past failings in thinking in terms of strategic narcissism vs. strategic empathy provide a good framework for approaching international relations. He does an excellent job explaining the details of current conflicts, and what he believes to be the best path forward. He does not shy away from military solutions, for better or worse, but also does not think force is the only solution.
He touches on cybersecurity and the deleterious effects of social media, but seems somewhat naive in these areas, for example, advocating that people could spend as much time pointing out situations on which we agree as posting points of disagreement. Without some mechanism design to encourage these changes, it seems like a kumbaya solution coming from a realist. He also discusses changes in education and energy that are good ideas, but leaves execution to others, which is likely appropriate given his area of expertise.
All in all, an interesting, although not exciting book, and a good source if looking for more info on current US strategic / national security concerns. McMaster's concept of strategic empathy is distilled in a more interesting form in his many articles, and this deeper delve may help explain the logic to the unconvinced, but makes for dry reading otherwise.
He touches on cybersecurity and the deleterious effects of social media, but seems somewhat naive in these areas, for example, advocating that people could spend as much time pointing out situations on which we agree as posting points of disagreement. Without some mechanism design to encourage these changes, it seems like a kumbaya solution coming from a realist. He also discusses changes in education and energy that are good ideas, but leaves execution to others, which is likely appropriate given his area of expertise.
All in all, an interesting, although not exciting book, and a good source if looking for more info on current US strategic / national security concerns. McMaster's concept of strategic empathy is distilled in a more interesting form in his many articles, and this deeper delve may help explain the logic to the unconvinced, but makes for dry reading otherwise.
February 13, 2021
I wish our political leaders would read this book. McMaster, a lifelong warrior, lays out his National Security vision in this book. McMaster was Donald Trumps’s National Security advisor from 2017 to 2018. As he discusses in the introduction, this book is neither a hit piece on Trump nor an endorsement of all his policies. Instead, as the title suggests, the book covers the major areas of concern in terms of our National Security in 2020.
The book is divided into 7 parts: Russia, China, South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India), Middle East (Iraq and Syria), Iran, North Korea, and Arenas(global threats and opportunities). In each section, McMaster discusses his approach and examines how we’ve dealt with these areas historically.
Two common themes that he emphasizes are empathy (what motivates our adversaries) and narcissism (viewing situations not as they are, but how we wish them to be).
After reading this and Mattis’s book, I find myself wishing that Trump would have retained both of these pragmatic and intelligent men for his entire presidency.
As with McMaster’s first book, highly recommended.
The book is divided into 7 parts: Russia, China, South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India), Middle East (Iraq and Syria), Iran, North Korea, and Arenas(global threats and opportunities). In each section, McMaster discusses his approach and examines how we’ve dealt with these areas historically.
Two common themes that he emphasizes are empathy (what motivates our adversaries) and narcissism (viewing situations not as they are, but how we wish them to be).
After reading this and Mattis’s book, I find myself wishing that Trump would have retained both of these pragmatic and intelligent men for his entire presidency.
As with McMaster’s first book, highly recommended.
April 17, 2022
This book covered so much ground and somehow went decently in depth into the history, current situation, and potential solutions to conflicts all over the world. Through it all, H.R. McMaster talks about our American tendency towards “strategic narcissism” (failing to take into account that there are other actors who have interests of their own and who take unpredictable actions that also influence outcomes; believing that US action is the cause of all global ills) and the need to replace that with “strategic empathy” (understanding an actor’s history, language, and perspective in order to challenge our faulty assumptions and any unfounded optimism). I’d recommend regardless of how clued in someone is to foreign policy or global conflicts; the background McMaster gives in each section is really helpful.
December 13, 2020
This was not much fun to read. At times I wondered if the United States had ever done anything right in its foreign policy and I was surprised at how President Trump was treated in this book, almost with kid gloves. I got distracted by two errors that I noticed and that made me wonder if there were others that I had missed. The one error was that Mick Nicholson was brigade commander when the class of 1985 were plebes, not the class of 1984. I know that is really nitpicking, but to a West Pointer, it was kind of a big deal. I appreciate the amount of research that went into this book. I agree that our country needs more education so that we don't continue to repeat past mistakes.
October 26, 2020
I did note a few passages that seemed to get repeated for no good and apparent reason, but other than that McMaster seems to have an excellent grasp of political life on plantet earth. His experiences span the administrations of both Democrats and Republicans and he finds good and bad in both. I could readily picture him as National Security Advisor of Sec State/Sec Def in a Nikki Hailey administration.
March 28, 2022
Pretty good; workmanlike. I am not sure I would describe this as a book of ideas, which sounds like I’m denigrating any of McMaster’s intellect, sincerity, or soberness. That could not be further from the truth. As a trained historian and soldier, McMaster takes the reader on a round-the-world tour of places where the United States must contest and compete: Russia, China, South Asia, the Middle East (read: non-state terrorism, Israel, Turkey, and the Arab world), Iran, and North Korea. Some of his insights are better than others, mostly because in the short 18 months that have passed since publication, and the longer ones since this book went to the printers, the world has changed. For instance, he spends many pages discussing Afghanistan; his insights and notes from his own experiences, while interesting, carry little actionable value following the collapse of that country. There are examples for each of his subjects, but re-litigating his recommendations would not be fair to him.
The prevailing lesson of this book is McMaster’s description of strategic empathy versus strategic narcissism. Given his historic training, McMaster seeks to be a student of how culture and outside pressure shape events absent the exertions of the United States. In narcissism (some would call it chauvinism), policymakers only view the world though the lens of the United States and our actions. In empathy, we recognize that there are factors outside of the control of the United States that affects how states and leaders respond to us, in hostility or war, wariness or trust, regardless of our actions. These concepts are not his own, but they clearly influence McMaster’s narrative and recommendations, and if accurately described, permeated how he advised President Trump as he sought to steer an empathetic foreign policy.
His overarching recommendations are all solid. Nation-building doesn’t begin at home, but national power certainly does, and it must be driven by the united will of the American people. Faith in democracy and institutions, a historically-inspired patriotism, technological and economic innovation, the protection of American capital and interests. All of these must be protected, nurtured, and harnessed if the United Stated is to compete and win in the Twenty-first Century.
The prevailing lesson of this book is McMaster’s description of strategic empathy versus strategic narcissism. Given his historic training, McMaster seeks to be a student of how culture and outside pressure shape events absent the exertions of the United States. In narcissism (some would call it chauvinism), policymakers only view the world though the lens of the United States and our actions. In empathy, we recognize that there are factors outside of the control of the United States that affects how states and leaders respond to us, in hostility or war, wariness or trust, regardless of our actions. These concepts are not his own, but they clearly influence McMaster’s narrative and recommendations, and if accurately described, permeated how he advised President Trump as he sought to steer an empathetic foreign policy.
His overarching recommendations are all solid. Nation-building doesn’t begin at home, but national power certainly does, and it must be driven by the united will of the American people. Faith in democracy and institutions, a historically-inspired patriotism, technological and economic innovation, the protection of American capital and interests. All of these must be protected, nurtured, and harnessed if the United Stated is to compete and win in the Twenty-first Century.
April 7, 2025
The only “Battlegrounds” you’ll find here are in your eyelids as they struggle to stay open. The 4+1 (or 3+2) structure to the narrative starts out “tired” and quickly accelerates to “completely exhausted.”
Introducing terms like “strategic narcissism” and “strategic empathy” add little, but are his apparent only ideological or intellectual contributions.
If you want the stories of Russia, China, ISIS, Iran, and North Korea retold with some “so, there I was” commentary and pretty much zero new ideas… here’s your book!
One of the most annoying things throughout, aside from the author falling into an almost stereotypical militaristic trope, was his inability to highlight anything good anyone did. It was mistake after mistake, as if he’s somehow (or we’re all somehow) a victim of senior leader decisions over decades… but then no real ideas for what to do other than apparently NOT what anyone so far has done.
Ugh. I’m so disappointed, this book should have been so much better - I don’t know if he got a multi-book deal or just had a completely uneducated and unintellectual audience in mind (seemingly not for the latter, if you read his diction)… it’s just a bummer, but hopefully this saves you my same disappointment.
Introducing terms like “strategic narcissism” and “strategic empathy” add little, but are his apparent only ideological or intellectual contributions.
If you want the stories of Russia, China, ISIS, Iran, and North Korea retold with some “so, there I was” commentary and pretty much zero new ideas… here’s your book!
One of the most annoying things throughout, aside from the author falling into an almost stereotypical militaristic trope, was his inability to highlight anything good anyone did. It was mistake after mistake, as if he’s somehow (or we’re all somehow) a victim of senior leader decisions over decades… but then no real ideas for what to do other than apparently NOT what anyone so far has done.
Ugh. I’m so disappointed, this book should have been so much better - I don’t know if he got a multi-book deal or just had a completely uneducated and unintellectual audience in mind (seemingly not for the latter, if you read his diction)… it’s just a bummer, but hopefully this saves you my same disappointment.
January 12, 2023
I never thought I'd enjoy a book by a member of the Trump administration, but then again, it's unfair to characterize McMaster that way. He served a short term as national security advisor, but that was only part of a long career as a military scholar. In this book, he ignores the orange elephant in the room to talk about issues still relevant today, regardless of the ongoing clown-car sideshow.
This book presents a lot of views that I'd never considered or even understood, a lot of which goes counter to certain left-wing narratives I've taken for granted. I haven't given up my heathen lib'rel ways, to be clear, but McMaster's given me a lot to think over in regards to how the US engages with other countries. A lot of his ideas are not only well-presented, but "slap yourself in the face" obvious when put in proper context. Namely:
The US's view of the rest of the world is inherently narcissistic. (check) What we need is more empathy to understand the points of view of other countries, both our allies and those we compete with. (check) And what's most important for this country? Education, education, education. So say we all.
This book presents a lot of views that I'd never considered or even understood, a lot of which goes counter to certain left-wing narratives I've taken for granted. I haven't given up my heathen lib'rel ways, to be clear, but McMaster's given me a lot to think over in regards to how the US engages with other countries. A lot of his ideas are not only well-presented, but "slap yourself in the face" obvious when put in proper context. Namely:
The US's view of the rest of the world is inherently narcissistic. (check) What we need is more empathy to understand the points of view of other countries, both our allies and those we compete with. (check) And what's most important for this country? Education, education, education. So say we all.
June 29, 2023
Росія. Китай. Південна Азія. Близький Схід. Іран. Північна Корея.
Кожен розділ-регіон інший. Що й логічно, адже й ситуації різні.
Для мене було найцікавіше - про Південну Азію, Близький Схід та Іран.
Так гарно про «труднощі перекладу» в спілкуванні між людьми із західної пів кулі та східної.
✏️
📍 Хоча війна і не є бажаним способом розвʼязання суперечок, вона буває єдиним способом зробити так, щоб хтось інший не розвʼязав їх замість вас.
📍Авторитарні режими мають вигляд сильніших, ніж є насправді.
📍 Розуміння гри важливіше за номінальну вартість карт у гравця.
📍 Війна - продовження політики, якою рухають людські емоції.
📍 Те, що відбувається на Близькому Сході, не обмежується Близьким Сходом.
📍 Стратегія розриву кола насильства має містити багаторівневі зусилля, щоб тиснути на тих, хто затягує війни та ослаблює держави, і має завдавати їм збитків.
Не втомлюся повторювати, що людина - найжорстокіша істота на Землі.
А загалом враження, що саме США керують цим світом 😉
#451deepreading
April 27, 2025
A very detailed and comprehensive account of the battleground on which the free world combats authoritarian regimes as well as extremists based on religion or other differences. A little short on the specifics of how the battle could be won or how to swing it in the favour of the free world.
In this respect it falls a bit short but this is understandable. The conflicts he covers have no clear paths to resolution. So one cannot blame him for a lapse. However, the basic thrust of learning from history and avoiding strategic narcissism is eye opening for any reader.
I would recommend this for reading for sure!
In this respect it falls a bit short but this is understandable. The conflicts he covers have no clear paths to resolution. So one cannot blame him for a lapse. However, the basic thrust of learning from history and avoiding strategic narcissism is eye opening for any reader.
I would recommend this for reading for sure!
March 29, 2021
So much information relating to contemporary history of U.S. relations with other major country players of the world.
April 3, 2021
Educate
Educate yourself on current affairs and real threats to our democracy... read for yourself and help stop foreign threats from dividing our country.
Educate yourself on current affairs and real threats to our democracy... read for yourself and help stop foreign threats from dividing our country.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 210 reviews