'A shooting war is often followed by a second war. This war is not fought with bullets or artillery shells, not with tanks or bombers, but rather with words.' In 1987-1988 the dusty Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale was the backdrop for the final battles of the Border War. Ever since the war ended, the fighting around Cuito has been the subject of a fierce public debate over who actually won the war. While the leadership of the former South African Defence Force (SADF) claims it was never defeated, the supporters of the Angolan MPLA government, Cuba and SWAPO insist that the SADF was vanquished on the battlefield. They contend that the SADF wanted to overrun Cuito Cuanavale and use it as a springboard for an advance on Luanda. But was Cuito Cuanavale ever really an objective of the SADF? Leopold Scholtz tackles this question by examining recently declassified documents in the SANDF archives, exploring the strategic and tactical decisions that shaped the six main battles, from the SADF's stunning tactical success on the Lomba River to the grinding struggle for the Tumpo Triangle. His incisive analysis untangles what happens when war, politics and propaganda become entwined.
The best history of the final stages of the Bushwar to date.
Leopold Scholtz digs deeply into the final phase of the Bushwar in Angola. Well researched and thoughtful this account of the conflict does not make for easy reading. It's conclusions are stark, incompetent general's micromanaging brilliant commanders, brave men betrayed by ill considered strategy, parochial leadership isolated from a global culture of military scholarship and most importantly a failure to observe von Clausewitz dictum about war being an extension of political strategy. The personal bravery and sacrifice of the ordinary fighting men contrasted with the myopic leadership of general's elevated by the cadre deployment policies of the Nationalist Party in the security forces beyond their ability. I was left feeling a huge sense of futility.
A detailed analysis of war, showing how a better trained professional army can achieve astounding success under its operational leadership and then suffer repeated failure when ground operations become dictated and managed by General Staff sitting thousands of km away with no concept of local conditions. A huge feather in the cap for the South African operational combat troops but not for anyone else. Politics and propaganda determined the winners and losers, despite the Angolans/Cubans suffering immense losses of both men and equipment. All kudos to the writer for a balanced perspective that showed the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing forces.
A niche read, but a solid and accessible account of the extended battle for Cuito Cuanavale. Six battles, the first three won decisively by the SADF and inflicting grave casualties on FAPLA forces, the latter three ending in failure. In short, a stalemate because the SADF were never intending on capturing Cuito, though Fidel Castro used it to win the propaganda war. One point to emerge for me: how the old Soviet doctrine of using men as cheap materiél was adopted by the Angolans. Even though they took terrible casualties, both here and throughout the war, especially when compared with the South Africans, the number of men injured or lost barely features in an assessment of how either side fared.
History is argumentative and each participant has their own opinion of what happened. The author rightly points to the contested views on the battle. He however argues for a balanced approach and gives that balance. The interesting part is how leadership fails to deliver the desired results, and this affects how lower levels perform.