I started reading this after auditing a Dr. Perugini's brilliant class on the intertwinement between law, violence and humanity in 'battlescapes,' civil society, the international community, among other spaces. The lectures provided a very rich genealogy of the emergence of the category of the polysemic and political concept of 'human/ity,' by referencing authors like Sylvia Wynter ('Man1 and Man2'), Fanon on colonial domination as a simultaneous humanising and dehumanising force, , Césaire's and Mbembe's postcolonial humanisms- in order to develop a critique of the concept of 'humane violence' that international humanitarian law constantly resorts to and is in fact constitutive of its existence. His lectures brought attention to the dual interpretation of the idea of humanity, which can both delimit violence AND provide legal and moral justifications for it.
I picked up his book as I was listening to the Israeli authorities' mobilisation of the image of 'human shields' to justify their right to wage military action against Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Similarly to Dr. Perguni's classes, I was expecting a kind of genealogical exploration of the category of 'human' and 'human shields' in order to provide a unitary critique of the gendered and racialised regimes of 'humanity' that underwrite the international humanitarian order's simultaneous tolerance AND condemnation of the use of human shields as a military defence tactic.
Instead, I found a much more far-ranging analysis that uses cross-temporal case studies that pertain to human shielding. First, the authors seek to complicate the definition of 'human shields', by pointing to the different ways in which they manifest - voluntary, involuntary and proximate shields, some human, and other 'vital' infrastructures like schools and hospitals. They also discuss the various and often contesting ways in which human shields are conceptually mobilised in humanitarian law, but also (social) media - to dehumanise the enemy because their use of shielding is barbaric and does not conform to universal ethics of war, to assign guilt; to justify, by extension, counterinsurgent measures thus prolonging conflict and human loss (there are many more examples of the political uses of human shields... just listen to AJ's reporting on the IDF attacks on Gaza).
Gordon and Perugini highlight the systematic recourse to historically constructed, racialised notions of what constitutes 'humane' violence, and thus are able to complicate distinctions between civilians and combatants, 'military-aged-men' and 'womenandchildren', human and inhumane violence, armed conflict and civil protest, etc.. that underwrite humanitarian law.
Thinking about human shields is useful in the sense that it offers a really tangible as well as ideal scope through which to approach the intersections between the moral domain of humanitarian law, racial violence emanating from colonial domination, and the realities of armed conflict today.
My criticism would mostly be directed at the absence of a conclusion (it ends with a case study/ reflection on resistance and militarised police, including instances of human barricades in BLM protests and at Standing Rock). While it is symbolically significant to end with 'Protest', I thought that a conclusion would be useful to tie together case studies, and to perhaps summarise the various critiques of international humanitarian law and the agencies/actors enforcing it presented in the book; which would perhaps also make the book a bit more generative.
I was also surprised that the book started with the case of Rachel Corrie, a white American youngster who was crushed by a bulldozer in Palestine as she was standing before the home of a Palestinian family about to be evicted to make way for Israeli settlers. I wonder why they chose that event in particular.