On 31st January, 1944, the United States launched a twin assault on the Kwajalein Atoll.
This was the first time the Americans had penetrated the “outer ring” of the Japanese Pacific sphere.
From now until the end of the war the combined forces of the Navy, Marine Corps and Army would island hop their way to the Japanese mainland.
Yet, the Battle of Kwajalein Atoll, particularly on the island of Roi-Namur where there were only 51 survivors of the original 3,500 garrison left, gave the Americans an insight into the fierce resistance that the Japanese would put up over the remaining months of the war.
Drawn directly from the testimonies of several hundred infantrymen, Island Victory provides insight into what it was like to feel the heat of battle on the beaches of those Pacific islands.
"Written accounts of war simply do not get any closer to the actions and feelings of those [who] were there. Island Victory is a highly recommended, 'must read' book." — The Midwest Book Review
"The real value of Island Victory lies in the unadorned words of these soldiers, recorded so openly and methodically by Marshall after the battle. . . . The Kwajalein victors interviewed so painstakingly by Sam Marshall provide a priceless candor and authenticity, the emotional testimonies of young men still flushed with adrenalin, guilt, and relief." — Joseph H. Alexander, Journal of Military History
S. L. A. Marshall was a chief U.S. Army combat historian during World War II and the Korean War. He had served on the border with Mexico during the Pancho Villa Expedition before serving in France during World War I. He wrote over thirty books about warfare. Island Victory was first published in 1944. Marshall passed away in 1977.
S.L.A. Marshall (full name, Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall) served in World War I and then embarked in a career in journalism. In World War II, he was chief combat historian in the Central Pacific (1943) and chief historian for the European Theater of Operations (1945). He authored some 30 books about warfare, including Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, The River and the Gauntlet and Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War.
Marshall offers a confusing account of the battle based entirely on an interview with the entire invasion force shortly after the battle. There is almost no context. A brief introduction describes the size of the invasion force; but with the introduction of so many characters, the book is a jumble of eye witness narratives loosely compacted into a single-ish story.
The last ten pages of the book describe the methodology. Marshall had a conference with hundreds of people. In what would normally be called a debriefing, the veterans told their story in a huge group format. Marshall provides a limited number of tips and procedures for carrying on such a large interview. At times, he realizes that the stories of the infantrymen contradicted the stories of the higher officers. He merely says that everyone is equal at the interview....so the truth can be found.
What is most obviously missing is the context. Kwajalein is a small island with half of it occupied by the small airfield. Other islands in the atoll had garrisons; but it is not clear why they had garrisons. The strategic value of the islands is the routine vague island-hoping campaign where some islands had to be taken, and others not. Even with regards to the battle itself, Marshall leaves out crucial details such as the size and organization of the defense, and even the numbers of causalities for both sides. I knew going into the book that, compared to Tarawa or Guam, Kwajalein was a relatively easy conquest in terms of duration and casualties.
Readers will quickly get bogged down in the vast cast of characters. The story rightly identifies Major General Charles Corlett as the leader of the invasion force. However, Corlett is otherwise not mentioned in the book. What was the plan? How successful? Below Corlett was a bureaucracy of commanders who rarely appeared in the book. The battle was seemingly led by the captains. Marshall's collection of stories naturally involves every infantryman's story. It becomes impossible to keep track of the men and the units.
Despite the obvious problems, Marshall does relate a good impression of the battle. Readers unfamiliar with the Pacific War probably envision big islands covered in thick jungles, or the moonscape of the Vietnam War. Marshall shows that both of these scenarios are incorrect. The reality of this battle was that the Japanese had made a crude trench system or spider holes (interconnected fox holes), covered by debris. Unlike Tarawa or Peleliu, Kwajalein was actually built up with man-made structures all over the island. The island was covered in debris creating many opportunities for the enemy to hide themselves. Concrete blockhouses were also compartmentalized to allow for a better defense against heavy shells, grenades, and flame throwers.
The battle itself was slow-going with soldiers carefully searching for concealed enemies. Tanks, while only limited in their ability to target areas or break their treads, were useful for covering infantry with their metallic bodies. Marshall documented several instances were communication between the tanks and the infantry led to problems. In one case, the tanks fired consistently at the American infantry. A more obvious problem, Marshall documented was the arbitrary benchmarks for reaching objectives. The battle took place over four days. The heaviest casualties came on the third and fourth days because they soldiers were pressured to move faster.
Marshall offers little in the way of the Japanese perspective. Suicidal charges, suicide by grenade, and nearly 100% casualties, they must have endured worse than the attackers. The Americans had blocked supplies getting to them. Food, water, sanitation, medical care are totally unknown. Also the horror of the being the last defenders in the last 200 yards of occupied island late at night. The Americans normally halt advances in the evening. But on the last day they soldiered on to complete the conquest with heavy casualties to show for it.
Overall, this short book gives an indication of what it was like fighting the battle. It is poorly written. Even with multiple maps outlying the key points of action, it is hard to understand what was happening and where. Marshall also leaves out a holistic approach to the entire battle. It appears the book was written for the family members of the veterans. Otherwise, the first person stories are a tangle of vaguely interconnected narratives of a rather simple battle.
Nothing mentioned in the book at the start prepares you for the fact that these are merely news releases hope the time during the battle and just after. Their relation to historical fact and true outcomes is questionable.
Good reading for unit commanders, leaders, and those who appreciate the grunt
Excellent accounts of small unit tactics overlaid with the fog of war. Includes useful accounts of how one leader, no matter his rank, can influence momentum, good or bad.