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A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order
A sweeping account of the rise and evolution of liberal internationalism in the modern era, selected as a Best Book of 2021 by Foreign Affairs
“A thoughtful and profound defence of liberal internationalism—both as a political philosophy and as a guide to future actions.”—Gideon Rachman, Financial Times
“The crowning achievement of [Ikenberry’s] decades-long work explaining and defending the liberal international order.”—Michael Hirsch, Foreign Policy
For two hundred years, the grand project of liberal internationalism has been to build a world order that is open, loosely rules-based, and oriented toward progressive ideas. Today this project is in crisis, threatened from the outside by illiberal challengers and from the inside by nationalist-populist movements. This timely book offers the first full account of liberal internationalism’s long journey from its nineteenth-century roots to today’s fractured political moment. Creating an international “space” for liberal democracy, preserving rights and protections within and between countries, and balancing conflicting values such as liberty and equality, openness and social solidarity, and sovereignty and interdependence—these are the guiding aims that have propelled liberal internationalism through the upheavals of the past two centuries. G. John Ikenberry argues that in a twenty-first century marked by rising economic and security interdependence, liberal internationalism—reformed and reimagined—remains the most viable project to protect liberal democracy.
“A thoughtful and profound defence of liberal internationalism—both as a political philosophy and as a guide to future actions.”—Gideon Rachman, Financial Times
“The crowning achievement of [Ikenberry’s] decades-long work explaining and defending the liberal international order.”—Michael Hirsch, Foreign Policy
For two hundred years, the grand project of liberal internationalism has been to build a world order that is open, loosely rules-based, and oriented toward progressive ideas. Today this project is in crisis, threatened from the outside by illiberal challengers and from the inside by nationalist-populist movements. This timely book offers the first full account of liberal internationalism’s long journey from its nineteenth-century roots to today’s fractured political moment. Creating an international “space” for liberal democracy, preserving rights and protections within and between countries, and balancing conflicting values such as liberty and equality, openness and social solidarity, and sovereignty and interdependence—these are the guiding aims that have propelled liberal internationalism through the upheavals of the past two centuries. G. John Ikenberry argues that in a twenty-first century marked by rising economic and security interdependence, liberal internationalism—reformed and reimagined—remains the most viable project to protect liberal democracy.
432 pages, Hardcover
First published September 22, 2020
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622 people want to read
About the author
G. John Ikenberry
77 books53 followersGilford John Ikenberry (October 5, 1954) is a theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
May 4, 2022
Same pundit who recommended Waltz's Man, the State, and War as an introduction to 'realist' foreign policy, also recommended Ikenberry's book as an introduction to 'idealist' fhinking. The recommendation is spot on, Ikenberry clearly articulates what he calls "liberal internationalism" (LI). Several major theses are worth summarizing: 1) LI is a response to modernity, as in industrialization and all that has arisen from it (I would go further and say that Liberalism itself, international or not, is bound up with modernity). 2) LI is an extension of Liberalism within states. 3) LI is contingent upon nationalism, and has spread with nationalism (which is itself a response to modernity). 4) the recent American-dominated world order has both 'idealist' and 'realist' parts: a LI order between like-minded liberal states, and a balance-of-power relationship between the LI states and illiberal states partly or completely outside of the LI order. This explains to me quite well the sometimes inconsistent foreign policy choices that America has made since the turn of the 20th century, especially how America waged the Cold War. It also explains well the nature of the crisis America and the world is now experiencing with de-globalization, why it is happening, and how to counter or contain the crisis. On the minus side, Ikenberry repeats himself very frequently, sometimes with identical wording. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the book could be half its length without losing any of its important message.
January 8, 2021
As I see it, the most recent book by John Ikenberry is an attempt to write a history of the 'grand project of liberal internationalism'. Covering the last two hundred years of world politics, it presents a vivid and readable account of how liberal internationalist thinking has evolved over this period.
From my perspective as an economist working in an international organisation, the most insightful sections were those describing the transition in internationalist thinking from an empire-based perspective to one that puts the nation state at the centre - a framework that helps making sense of the last several decades in global politics.
Although the book does include something like an outlook into what happens next, the last chapters are rather light and do not offer much beyond a general call to 'reimagine' liberal internationalism once again.
From my perspective as an economist working in an international organisation, the most insightful sections were those describing the transition in internationalist thinking from an empire-based perspective to one that puts the nation state at the centre - a framework that helps making sense of the last several decades in global politics.
Although the book does include something like an outlook into what happens next, the last chapters are rather light and do not offer much beyond a general call to 'reimagine' liberal internationalism once again.
July 22, 2022
Tragedy of the moderns? — A World Safe for Democracy (G. John Ikenberry)
Liberalism, internationalism, and liberal internationalism are all deeply unfashionable concepts these days. In the context of a potentially unravelling liberal world order, Ikenberry presents a history of, an apology for, and a path forward, in one digestible tome. The defence is compelling, and Ikenberry is no unconditional apologist for liberal internationalism: he recognises the contradictions and hypocrisies evident in the project from the beginning. The history is excellent and helps one put important decades into additional context.
What is liberal internationalism? It is international cooperation, mediated through openness, the rule of law, and formal institutions, between liberal democracies. The goal: to make a world safe for democracy. Instead of the realist view that anarchy is the fundamental problem of world order, the liberal view is that modernity is the core. The forces of science, technology, and industrial revolution lead to ever greater economic and security interconnectedness. Modernity can bring many benefits — the economic and peace gains of trade, for example — but it carries with it severe risks of economic and security contagion.
Liberal internationalism is a set of ideas and a political project that aims to guard liberal democracies against the risks of modernity and let them harness the gains. Generally, for progressive causes, and the fundamental welfare of their citizens. Make no mistake: from the perspective of a liberal democracy, a liberal world order is required. It is not simply a cost/benefit calculation: there is some critical density of illiberal power in the world beyond which liberal democracies may face existential crises. Liberal democracies are vulnerable to the usurpation of state power prompted by foreign threats or states of emergency, to demagoguery and extremism. They need a certain environment to survive and thrive in: the liberal world order.
Ikenberry is right to point out that liberal internationalism is thin and shape-shifting, beset by contradictions and hypocrisies. It’s not an alternative to realist logic — it is a normative project that can coexist with many logics of world order. It has implicated itself with imperial systems of domination, and then given itself to a project of anti-imperialism. With nationalism and market fundamentalism. That is to say, liberal internationalism’s hands are dirty.
Ikenberry spends much of the book sketching a broad history of liberal internationalism, starting in the nineteenth century. Then, it was not even close to a unified political idea or project — more a set of varied internationalisms. The free trade and peace movements, for example. It crystallised into a coherent political project in the early twentieth century, especially with Woodrow Wilson. Unfortunately, he was an incredible racist too, and this liberal internationalism was one between so-called “civilised” western imperial powers, with hierarchical domination for the rest of the world.
Wilsonian liberal internationalism failed. The enforcement hopes were too thin: “public opinion” (audience costs — easily rebutted via propaganda’s existence per FDR) and a sense of morality. States were just expected to get better and evolve into a “community of power”. World War 2 rolled around and prompted liberal internationalists to pick up the pieces and form the postwar order. Modernity was no longer a straightforward force leading to liberal democracy, but it empowered illiberal states too. The Great Depression and world wars tied legitimacy to social security more than ever before. The new liberal order carried “embedded liberalism” — a contract with citizens that in exchange for participation in the liberal order they would receive economic and social security (rendered in the New Deal in America, and welfare states in Europe). It enforced itself in a realist manner, with American hegemony underwriting the project.
This postwar liberal internationalism evolved in the shadow of the Cold War. Instead of just a community of shared social purposes, it had the logic of a geopolitical security pact. When the Cold War ended, the post Cold War order spun itself apart. Illiberalism, populism, protectionism, reactionary movements, xenophobia, and all the rest now characterise much of the current world.
Why? Ikenberry argues this is due to two crises: one of authority and one of community. The authority crisis emerged when the liberal world order expanded far quicker than it could underwrite new bargains and harmonise new interests. The multiplicity of new states, the enlargement of NATO and the EU, for example. Instead of a relatively small and culturally similar club (the trilateral of US, Western Europe, and Japan), the order globalised, and interests diverged beyond the capability of US hegemony to harmonise them. The rise of China — too big to be accommodated in an order with an underlying hegemonic logic, but also too critical for its functioning — also makes governance difficult.
The crisis of community is more familiar to us. Liberal democracies failed to live up to the embedded contract of social security in exchange for openness. The so-called neoliberal reforms of deregulation, privatisation, and shrinking of the government generally culminated in the 2008 financial crisis. Ikenberry sensibly references Milanovic’s “elephant chart” here, showing that the gains from global growth since the end of the Cold War were not shared with core constituencies of the postwar liberal world order. The contract of embedded liberalism was broken, and the liberal world order now looks more like a system for ordering transactions, not global governance. In a sense, liberal internationalism is hypocritical once again — openness, the rule of law, and institutions this time for the wealthy, instead of the imperial powers of Wilson’s age.
Having sketched the history and recent failures of liberal internationalism, Ikenberry then mounts a defence. Echoing the response of FDR to Wilsonian internationalism’s failure, the answer is “more liberalism”. On my reading, Ikenberry comes quite strongly in the “democracy” and “globalisation” (or rather interdependence) corner of Rodrik's trilemma (embedded liberalism — the social contract — needs to return underwritten by a liberal internationalism that democracies credibly commit to). Liberal internationalism needs to become more pragmatic, and reform oriented. There’s much Ikenberry says, but the core is that the social contract of embedded liberalism needs to be re-established and a trial-and-error experimentalist approach to order-building needs to be adopted. I agree with both of these prescriptions. Unfortunately, as is common in works like this, it’s a bit thin on the ground, with a call for “new ideas”. The methodological emphasis is welcome though and neutralises some of my concern. I’m a fan of this approach, also emphasised in Blattman’s book on “Why We Fight”.
This review is already long enough, but Ikenberry speaks on Westphalian internationalism (and how it is the fundamental basis liberal internationalism builds upon), interventionism, imperial internationalism, the hypocrisies in liberal internationalism over the centuries, grand narratives of modernity, and more.
The book is well worth reading. It is a bit repetitive and could do with some more structure to the argument within chapters, but it is clear enough. Ikenberry helpfully summarises and highlights the main points at the start of each chapter. In fact, the redundancy and summaries make it possible to read the chapters in almost any order, so one may treat this as a bit of a reference. I had originally intended to give the book four stars mainly for this, but upon consideration, I think I’ll give it five.
By the way, I’m a big fan of the font the CFR likes to use on many of its books.
Liberalism, internationalism, and liberal internationalism are all deeply unfashionable concepts these days. In the context of a potentially unravelling liberal world order, Ikenberry presents a history of, an apology for, and a path forward, in one digestible tome. The defence is compelling, and Ikenberry is no unconditional apologist for liberal internationalism: he recognises the contradictions and hypocrisies evident in the project from the beginning. The history is excellent and helps one put important decades into additional context.
What is liberal internationalism? It is international cooperation, mediated through openness, the rule of law, and formal institutions, between liberal democracies. The goal: to make a world safe for democracy. Instead of the realist view that anarchy is the fundamental problem of world order, the liberal view is that modernity is the core. The forces of science, technology, and industrial revolution lead to ever greater economic and security interconnectedness. Modernity can bring many benefits — the economic and peace gains of trade, for example — but it carries with it severe risks of economic and security contagion.
Liberal internationalism is a set of ideas and a political project that aims to guard liberal democracies against the risks of modernity and let them harness the gains. Generally, for progressive causes, and the fundamental welfare of their citizens. Make no mistake: from the perspective of a liberal democracy, a liberal world order is required. It is not simply a cost/benefit calculation: there is some critical density of illiberal power in the world beyond which liberal democracies may face existential crises. Liberal democracies are vulnerable to the usurpation of state power prompted by foreign threats or states of emergency, to demagoguery and extremism. They need a certain environment to survive and thrive in: the liberal world order.
Ikenberry is right to point out that liberal internationalism is thin and shape-shifting, beset by contradictions and hypocrisies. It’s not an alternative to realist logic — it is a normative project that can coexist with many logics of world order. It has implicated itself with imperial systems of domination, and then given itself to a project of anti-imperialism. With nationalism and market fundamentalism. That is to say, liberal internationalism’s hands are dirty.
Ikenberry spends much of the book sketching a broad history of liberal internationalism, starting in the nineteenth century. Then, it was not even close to a unified political idea or project — more a set of varied internationalisms. The free trade and peace movements, for example. It crystallised into a coherent political project in the early twentieth century, especially with Woodrow Wilson. Unfortunately, he was an incredible racist too, and this liberal internationalism was one between so-called “civilised” western imperial powers, with hierarchical domination for the rest of the world.
Wilsonian liberal internationalism failed. The enforcement hopes were too thin: “public opinion” (audience costs — easily rebutted via propaganda’s existence per FDR) and a sense of morality. States were just expected to get better and evolve into a “community of power”. World War 2 rolled around and prompted liberal internationalists to pick up the pieces and form the postwar order. Modernity was no longer a straightforward force leading to liberal democracy, but it empowered illiberal states too. The Great Depression and world wars tied legitimacy to social security more than ever before. The new liberal order carried “embedded liberalism” — a contract with citizens that in exchange for participation in the liberal order they would receive economic and social security (rendered in the New Deal in America, and welfare states in Europe). It enforced itself in a realist manner, with American hegemony underwriting the project.
This postwar liberal internationalism evolved in the shadow of the Cold War. Instead of just a community of shared social purposes, it had the logic of a geopolitical security pact. When the Cold War ended, the post Cold War order spun itself apart. Illiberalism, populism, protectionism, reactionary movements, xenophobia, and all the rest now characterise much of the current world.
Why? Ikenberry argues this is due to two crises: one of authority and one of community. The authority crisis emerged when the liberal world order expanded far quicker than it could underwrite new bargains and harmonise new interests. The multiplicity of new states, the enlargement of NATO and the EU, for example. Instead of a relatively small and culturally similar club (the trilateral of US, Western Europe, and Japan), the order globalised, and interests diverged beyond the capability of US hegemony to harmonise them. The rise of China — too big to be accommodated in an order with an underlying hegemonic logic, but also too critical for its functioning — also makes governance difficult.
The crisis of community is more familiar to us. Liberal democracies failed to live up to the embedded contract of social security in exchange for openness. The so-called neoliberal reforms of deregulation, privatisation, and shrinking of the government generally culminated in the 2008 financial crisis. Ikenberry sensibly references Milanovic’s “elephant chart” here, showing that the gains from global growth since the end of the Cold War were not shared with core constituencies of the postwar liberal world order. The contract of embedded liberalism was broken, and the liberal world order now looks more like a system for ordering transactions, not global governance. In a sense, liberal internationalism is hypocritical once again — openness, the rule of law, and institutions this time for the wealthy, instead of the imperial powers of Wilson’s age.
Having sketched the history and recent failures of liberal internationalism, Ikenberry then mounts a defence. Echoing the response of FDR to Wilsonian internationalism’s failure, the answer is “more liberalism”. On my reading, Ikenberry comes quite strongly in the “democracy” and “globalisation” (or rather interdependence) corner of Rodrik's trilemma (embedded liberalism — the social contract — needs to return underwritten by a liberal internationalism that democracies credibly commit to). Liberal internationalism needs to become more pragmatic, and reform oriented. There’s much Ikenberry says, but the core is that the social contract of embedded liberalism needs to be re-established and a trial-and-error experimentalist approach to order-building needs to be adopted. I agree with both of these prescriptions. Unfortunately, as is common in works like this, it’s a bit thin on the ground, with a call for “new ideas”. The methodological emphasis is welcome though and neutralises some of my concern. I’m a fan of this approach, also emphasised in Blattman’s book on “Why We Fight”.
This review is already long enough, but Ikenberry speaks on Westphalian internationalism (and how it is the fundamental basis liberal internationalism builds upon), interventionism, imperial internationalism, the hypocrisies in liberal internationalism over the centuries, grand narratives of modernity, and more.
The book is well worth reading. It is a bit repetitive and could do with some more structure to the argument within chapters, but it is clear enough. Ikenberry helpfully summarises and highlights the main points at the start of each chapter. In fact, the redundancy and summaries make it possible to read the chapters in almost any order, so one may treat this as a bit of a reference. I had originally intended to give the book four stars mainly for this, but upon consideration, I think I’ll give it five.
By the way, I’m a big fan of the font the CFR likes to use on many of its books.
March 15, 2022
If I will, which I'm going to do to make a point, write like Ikenberry does on his worst - meaning that I use excessive amounts of long convoluded centences - the text will become almost unreadable. When you line up these convoluted sentences you'lle get, in the famous words of someone, "an utter word mesh that neither explains nor clarifies anything". A short and clear sentence here and there doesn't do much to change the overall feel of the book.
It's not only the sentences but also the way Ikkenberry approaches the subject more generally. His goal - I guess - is to explain and to contextualize the broad abstract term "liberal internationalism" and its crisis. His way to approach the matter is to kind off ramble on about the subject and throw tons of names, quotes and some historical context at the reader. Not a very pleasent way to recieve information. While Ikkenberry does make intresting points and the book gets better towards the end I still can't say I enjoyed the experience. I found it too elaborate to be a consice introduction on liberal internationalism, but it was also too jumbly to be a good historical account. To me it felt like a mish-mash. I'll reccomend it too someone who has a true interest in the subject matter.
It's not only the sentences but also the way Ikkenberry approaches the subject more generally. His goal - I guess - is to explain and to contextualize the broad abstract term "liberal internationalism" and its crisis. His way to approach the matter is to kind off ramble on about the subject and throw tons of names, quotes and some historical context at the reader. Not a very pleasent way to recieve information. While Ikkenberry does make intresting points and the book gets better towards the end I still can't say I enjoyed the experience. I found it too elaborate to be a consice introduction on liberal internationalism, but it was also too jumbly to be a good historical account. To me it felt like a mish-mash. I'll reccomend it too someone who has a true interest in the subject matter.
March 28, 2021
The author finds liberal internationalism beset from two sides -- from those who don't care if the rulers are good, as long as we are the ones ruling, and from those that despair of the advances of the recent centuries because of their link with cruel empires and contempt for so many peoples. The author gives us hope that we use what we learned and do better, though he never suggests it will be perfect.
The book is written for people who know more than me about the history of twentieth century theoretical political debates, but has footnotes that are often small essays to help me catch up. There is no separate bibliography -- that must be assembled from the footnotes.
The book is written for people who know more than me about the history of twentieth century theoretical political debates, but has footnotes that are often small essays to help me catch up. There is no separate bibliography -- that must be assembled from the footnotes.
November 5, 2023
At a time when the liberal internationalist project is under sustained attack, a rigorous defense of it by a leading scholar is greatly to be welcomed. With deep research and careful analysis, John Ikenberry shows how the liberal world has worked in the past and can be made to work in the current era.
Robert Jervis, author of How Statesmen Think
..........
Foreign Policy
Michael Hirsh
Joe Biden will enter office as America’s 46th president next month in a spirit of confidence for the future—but also with an almost confessional sense of humility about the past. Because Biden and his top advisors seem acutely aware of just how badly they botched things the last time they were in power.
..........
Network Ideas
Walden Bello
October 2, 2022
Talk at the Economics Department of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA
Disconcertingly, however, the book ends with a Fukuyaman leap of faith: that with all its problems, the liberal international order will survive.
“The current political backlash is both inevitable and bound to fail,” Ikenberry writes.
He then continues, “There is no escape. Liberal democracies will find themselves doing what they have always done in moments of crisis searching for ways to reestablish and reinforce the political foundations for liberal capitalist democracy.”
...........
H-Net
It is both a timely and a paradoxical occasion for a book on the liberal international order, and one by its leading academic proponent is to be especially welcomed.
The paradox, or at least puzzle, is that while John Ikenberry’s view is now back in favor, indeed is dominant, in Washington and other Western capitals, it is scorned by large segments of the academic community on both the left and the right.
For Patrick Porter, a member of the 'restraint’ school of Realism that is critical of the American tendency to overreach, Ikenberry has produced a “haunted, conflicted, important book,” a judgment that I would endorse.
Ikenberry knows his history and IR theory too well to portray liberal internationalism as without flaws, and argues that, like democracy, it is better than the alternatives as both an explanation for the last century of the United States’ history and as guide for how the U.S. should behave in the future.
It certainly is true that it is hard to call Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Richard Cheney liberals, but the form of Realism they represent was hardly the mainstream, as illustrated by the fact that the leading academic realists took out an ad in the New York Times opposing the war.
Porter in particular is skeptical of Ikenberry’s move here, and stresses the extent to which "liberal restraints often failed to restrain", raising the question of the independent power of institutions and the international architecture.
Thus, while Ikenberry calls for a “restrained, humble liberalism, [he] reminds us that liberalism is a restless, expansionist force,” echoing Richard Betts criticism of Ikenberry’s earlier Liberal Leviathan on the grounds that those two characteristics simply do not go well together.
It may be trite to say that the reviews and the book raise more questions than they answer, but it is clear we as scholars and citizens need to think hard about them, and that Ikenberry has done us a great service.
Since Ikenberry sets out to both analyze and advocate for liberal internationalism it is not entirely easy to separate the evaluation of his book from one’s judgment of the virtues and defects of this kind of international order.
..........
Institute of Advanced Studies
University of Virginia
Foreign Policy reviewed G. John Ikenberry’s A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order, calling it "the crowning achievement of [Ikenberry’s] decades long work explaining and defending the liberal international order."
In 'Why Liberal Internationalism Is Still Indispensable—and Fixable', Michael Hirsh credits Ikenberry with influencing the incoming Biden Administration:
"Joe Biden will enter office as America’s 46th president next month in a spirit of confidence for the future—but also with an almost confessional sense of humility about the past. Because Biden and his top advisors seem acutely aware of just how badly they botched things the last time they were in power. One of their chief manifestos for change, as some of the incoming Bidenites have already privately conceded, will be G. John Ikenberry’s new book."
According to a senior member of the incoming Biden team…the new administration is paying a great deal of attention to Ikenberry’s ideas.
Robert Jervis, author of How Statesmen Think
..........
Foreign Policy
Michael Hirsh
Joe Biden will enter office as America’s 46th president next month in a spirit of confidence for the future—but also with an almost confessional sense of humility about the past. Because Biden and his top advisors seem acutely aware of just how badly they botched things the last time they were in power.
..........
Network Ideas
Walden Bello
October 2, 2022
Talk at the Economics Department of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA
Disconcertingly, however, the book ends with a Fukuyaman leap of faith: that with all its problems, the liberal international order will survive.
“The current political backlash is both inevitable and bound to fail,” Ikenberry writes.
He then continues, “There is no escape. Liberal democracies will find themselves doing what they have always done in moments of crisis searching for ways to reestablish and reinforce the political foundations for liberal capitalist democracy.”
...........
H-Net
It is both a timely and a paradoxical occasion for a book on the liberal international order, and one by its leading academic proponent is to be especially welcomed.
The paradox, or at least puzzle, is that while John Ikenberry’s view is now back in favor, indeed is dominant, in Washington and other Western capitals, it is scorned by large segments of the academic community on both the left and the right.
For Patrick Porter, a member of the 'restraint’ school of Realism that is critical of the American tendency to overreach, Ikenberry has produced a “haunted, conflicted, important book,” a judgment that I would endorse.
Ikenberry knows his history and IR theory too well to portray liberal internationalism as without flaws, and argues that, like democracy, it is better than the alternatives as both an explanation for the last century of the United States’ history and as guide for how the U.S. should behave in the future.
It certainly is true that it is hard to call Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Richard Cheney liberals, but the form of Realism they represent was hardly the mainstream, as illustrated by the fact that the leading academic realists took out an ad in the New York Times opposing the war.
Porter in particular is skeptical of Ikenberry’s move here, and stresses the extent to which "liberal restraints often failed to restrain", raising the question of the independent power of institutions and the international architecture.
Thus, while Ikenberry calls for a “restrained, humble liberalism, [he] reminds us that liberalism is a restless, expansionist force,” echoing Richard Betts criticism of Ikenberry’s earlier Liberal Leviathan on the grounds that those two characteristics simply do not go well together.
It may be trite to say that the reviews and the book raise more questions than they answer, but it is clear we as scholars and citizens need to think hard about them, and that Ikenberry has done us a great service.
Since Ikenberry sets out to both analyze and advocate for liberal internationalism it is not entirely easy to separate the evaluation of his book from one’s judgment of the virtues and defects of this kind of international order.
..........
Institute of Advanced Studies
University of Virginia
Foreign Policy reviewed G. John Ikenberry’s A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order, calling it "the crowning achievement of [Ikenberry’s] decades long work explaining and defending the liberal international order."
In 'Why Liberal Internationalism Is Still Indispensable—and Fixable', Michael Hirsh credits Ikenberry with influencing the incoming Biden Administration:
"Joe Biden will enter office as America’s 46th president next month in a spirit of confidence for the future—but also with an almost confessional sense of humility about the past. Because Biden and his top advisors seem acutely aware of just how badly they botched things the last time they were in power. One of their chief manifestos for change, as some of the incoming Bidenites have already privately conceded, will be G. John Ikenberry’s new book."
According to a senior member of the incoming Biden team…the new administration is paying a great deal of attention to Ikenberry’s ideas.
September 28, 2023
I have read 3 Ikenberry books right now, and they all overlap a bit, but it's worth it to read at least one of them to get at his core ideas, which are probably the most interesting and developed defenses of liberal internationalism out there. The downside of this book is that it's somewhat dry and repetitive. Ikenberry reviews the theory, history, and future of lib int, developing a few core themes I thought were compelling:
1. Wilson's slogan of making the world safe for democracy, properly understood, is not about crusades to spread democracy by force like Iraq. It's about shaping the international environment in terms of rules, norms, institutions, as well as power and alliances in ways that make it possible for democracies to flourish. This is a key difference and an important response to the crusading neoconservatism of the last few decades. Tony Smith has also shown that this is really what Wilson meant through this famous phrase, and that's what Ikenberry expands on in this book.
2. An interesting theme in this book is the idea of liberalism and lib int as a response to the problems of modernity, particularly that of interdependence and the difficulty of democracy in adapting to modern industrial captialism and, now, revolutions in communications, the service/tech economy, and so on. In short, lib int is a project of constant adjustment to dynamic forces in international politics and a recognition that US interests are inextricably tied to the world economy and to many other nations, both democracies and non-democracies.
3. I found Ikenberry's critiques of lib int to be spot on, although he also pushes back against realist arguments. He acknowledges that lib int has been closely tied to racial hierarchy, empire, and other not-so-great forces in world history. However, he argues that there was really no other way for lib int to rise as an ideology or a movement than by allying with these more powerful forces. Liberalism, for example, has strong imperial and anti-imperial tendencies, and in the age of US hegemony it has worked more to erode empire, creating a system that is both open and hierarchical, unlike most empires in history. This isn't an apology but a contextualization of liberal international as a historical force, not just an abstract theory.
Def worth reading for people interesting in IR theory, USFP, and liberalism, although I'd still say After Victory is his most theoretically and historically interesting work.
1. Wilson's slogan of making the world safe for democracy, properly understood, is not about crusades to spread democracy by force like Iraq. It's about shaping the international environment in terms of rules, norms, institutions, as well as power and alliances in ways that make it possible for democracies to flourish. This is a key difference and an important response to the crusading neoconservatism of the last few decades. Tony Smith has also shown that this is really what Wilson meant through this famous phrase, and that's what Ikenberry expands on in this book.
2. An interesting theme in this book is the idea of liberalism and lib int as a response to the problems of modernity, particularly that of interdependence and the difficulty of democracy in adapting to modern industrial captialism and, now, revolutions in communications, the service/tech economy, and so on. In short, lib int is a project of constant adjustment to dynamic forces in international politics and a recognition that US interests are inextricably tied to the world economy and to many other nations, both democracies and non-democracies.
3. I found Ikenberry's critiques of lib int to be spot on, although he also pushes back against realist arguments. He acknowledges that lib int has been closely tied to racial hierarchy, empire, and other not-so-great forces in world history. However, he argues that there was really no other way for lib int to rise as an ideology or a movement than by allying with these more powerful forces. Liberalism, for example, has strong imperial and anti-imperial tendencies, and in the age of US hegemony it has worked more to erode empire, creating a system that is both open and hierarchical, unlike most empires in history. This isn't an apology but a contextualization of liberal international as a historical force, not just an abstract theory.
Def worth reading for people interesting in IR theory, USFP, and liberalism, although I'd still say After Victory is his most theoretically and historically interesting work.
February 19, 2021
Ikenberry does an excellent job reconciling the history of liberal internationalism with competing strands of international relations theory, incorporating academic thought with contemporary events. Ikenberry shows, without always stating directly, that liberal ideas often fail when the language of liberalism is used to justify realist, or interventionist, ideas or when those implementing liberal ideas fail to live up to liberal values. The question Ikenberry seems to be attempting to answer is whether a liberal world order can ever overcome these challenges to achieve the the potential of a world safe for democracy. Ikenberry may be right that liberal internationalism is the goal, but the challenges facing the international order of revisionist powers (Russia and China), global crises (climate change, pandemics), and with a minority party in the US struggling to withdraw the US from liberal ideas and institutions, it is hard to see Ikenberry's ideas increasing in relevance in the near term.
August 28, 2022
In this book, Ikenberry does a thorough job of explaining and making a case for liberal Internationalism (a term I had no familiarity with prior to hearing about this book on Ezra Klein's podcast). Liberal internationalism is a philosophy that seeks to create global organizations, rules, and norms to foster the safety of liberal democracies. It is a loose term that encompasses a number of different ideas and ways of seeing the world, and can be entangled with other philosophies such as capitalism and imperialism (hard or soft). It has been used in some cases used to justify intervention in other sovereign nations, e.g. US Cold War and War on Terror era exploits. But Ikenberry advocates more for the non-interventionist version of liberal internationalism that includes projects such as the United Nations (and the League of Nations), the World Health Organization, NAFTA, etc. He describes liberal internationalism as a means of tackling the problems of modernity (e.g. technological advancement and globalism), and believes that liberal democracy should not be assumed to be an inevitability that we are progressing towards - it is imperative that we struggle to maintain it.
Ikenberry focuses on several key turning points for liberal internationalism in history:
1) The end of WWI, when Woodrow Wilson fought to create League of Nations, a revolutionary and bold endeavor that was nonetheless flawed in its unwillingness to challenge imperialism and racial/cultural hierarchies.
2) The end of WWII, when FDR and then Truman worked with the allied powers to rebuild the world order, after liberal international projects in the interwar years failed to prevent the rise of fascist states.
3) The end of Cold War, when the world transitioned from the bipolar system of the West vs. the Soviet bloc to a unipolar system of US hegemony
4) Today (or rather, 2020), when threats from illiberal states such as China and Russia, as well as Donald Trump's presidency and other reactionary forces around the world, threaten the liberal international order.
The book can be a bit dense at times, with quite a few academic terms and concepts thrown around that can be difficult to parse for a casual reader (not to mention that they can get repetitive - wish I had a nickel for every time the words "liberal internationalism," and "modernity" are used in the text). Still, this is a very informative work for people such as myself who are looking to become more engaged in political theory, particularly pertaining to international relations.
Ikenberry focuses on several key turning points for liberal internationalism in history:
1) The end of WWI, when Woodrow Wilson fought to create League of Nations, a revolutionary and bold endeavor that was nonetheless flawed in its unwillingness to challenge imperialism and racial/cultural hierarchies.
2) The end of WWII, when FDR and then Truman worked with the allied powers to rebuild the world order, after liberal international projects in the interwar years failed to prevent the rise of fascist states.
3) The end of Cold War, when the world transitioned from the bipolar system of the West vs. the Soviet bloc to a unipolar system of US hegemony
4) Today (or rather, 2020), when threats from illiberal states such as China and Russia, as well as Donald Trump's presidency and other reactionary forces around the world, threaten the liberal international order.
The book can be a bit dense at times, with quite a few academic terms and concepts thrown around that can be difficult to parse for a casual reader (not to mention that they can get repetitive - wish I had a nickel for every time the words "liberal internationalism," and "modernity" are used in the text). Still, this is a very informative work for people such as myself who are looking to become more engaged in political theory, particularly pertaining to international relations.
Read
September 20, 2022Take my criticism with a grain of salt, as IR theory isn't my bread and butter, but I found this book quite hard to read. I found the writing incredibly dry, with convoluted and wordy sentences that mould into confusing paragraphs that don't seem to go anywhere. Whenever it feels like Ikenberry has finished a point and development is approaching, the same point is made again in a different way, with the same words thrown around to the point of becoming annoying. I only got about a third of the way through before I had to put it down. I think I may have also assumed this book was intended for a different audience than it was, as it kind of feels more like an academic article made for a specialist readership... or maybe I'm just dumb. I'll probably try it again at some point but at the moment it's just not clicking.
July 6, 2022
Rooted in history
I appreciated the careful dissection of the connective tissue between liberal hegemony and liberal internationalism. The discussion of the rival impulses for intervention (imposition and restraint) within the recent foreign policy contexts of neoconservatives and isolationists. I consider Ikenberry's modest and pragmatic proposal for rehabilitating some of the liberal order institutions to secure markets and defend selected ideals a great primer for our age of US -China rivalry.
I appreciated the careful dissection of the connective tissue between liberal hegemony and liberal internationalism. The discussion of the rival impulses for intervention (imposition and restraint) within the recent foreign policy contexts of neoconservatives and isolationists. I consider Ikenberry's modest and pragmatic proposal for rehabilitating some of the liberal order institutions to secure markets and defend selected ideals a great primer for our age of US -China rivalry.
December 31, 2021
I found this book extremely valuable in providing a historical insight into the evolution of the Liberal Internationalist project. Both interns of its evolution but also fragility and the importance of egg cartons! There is a great talk by the author on YouTube that it would be worth seeing first. The only fault would be I would have preferred more discussion on today’s challenges.
December 5, 2020
Intellectual comment on the future of a liberal order.
Renamed and compared to The False Promise of a liberal order. It was initially slow and repetitive then slowly I was drawn into the conversation
Renamed and compared to The False Promise of a liberal order. It was initially slow and repetitive then slowly I was drawn into the conversation
February 2, 2021
Democracy as in the individual is too stupid to care for themselves, hence only a few chosen ones have to rule. And this paper pusher is making the world safer for those, no matter how many of the others will die in the process.
January 12, 2021
I quite disagree with parts of the argument presented but would still highly recommend this work
June 25, 2025
This book could have been a pamphlet. It repeats itself endlessly. Relentlessly duplicative. Saying the same things over and over again.
June 28, 2025
dr. bob pls have mercy
March 25, 2021
One of the most repetitive books I think I have ever read - definitely a struggle to finish. Ikenberry gives a cursory history of liberal internationalism (the last roughly 250 years) and how the tradition has evolved in that time, ending with the current crisis of the global liberal order. If you have already read a book about this subject, chances are you will likely find nothing novel or interesting in these 430 pages either.
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