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Vicksburg Campaign #4
The Union Assaults at Vicksburg: Grant Attacks Pemberton, May 17-22, 1863
It was the third week of May 1863, and after seven months and six attempts, Ulysses S. Grant was finally at the doorstep of Vicksburg. What followed was a series of attacks and maneuvers against the last major section of the Mississippi River controlled by the Confederacy--and one of the most important operations of the Civil War. Grant intended to end the campaign quickly by assault, but the stalwart defense of Vicksburg's garrison changed his plans. The Union Assaults at Vicksburg is the first comprehensive account of this quick attempt to capture Vicksburg, which proved critical to the Union's ultimate success and Grant's eventual solidification as one of the most significant military commanders in American history.
Establishing a day-to-day--;and occasionally minute-to-minute--;timeline for this crucial week, military historian Timothy B. Smith invites readers to follow the Vicksburg assaults as they unfold. His finely detailed account reaches from the offices of statesmen and politicians to the field of battle, with exacting analysis and insight that ranges from the highest level of planning and command to the combat experience of the common soldier. As closely observed and vividly described as each assault is, Smith's book also puts the sum of these battles into the larger context of the Vicksburg campaign, as well as the entire war. His deeply informed, in-depth work thus provides the first full view of a key but little-studied turning point in the fortunes of the Union army in the West, Ulysses S. Grant, and the United States of America.
Establishing a day-to-day--;and occasionally minute-to-minute--;timeline for this crucial week, military historian Timothy B. Smith invites readers to follow the Vicksburg assaults as they unfold. His finely detailed account reaches from the offices of statesmen and politicians to the field of battle, with exacting analysis and insight that ranges from the highest level of planning and command to the combat experience of the common soldier. As closely observed and vividly described as each assault is, Smith's book also puts the sum of these battles into the larger context of the Vicksburg campaign, as well as the entire war. His deeply informed, in-depth work thus provides the first full view of a key but little-studied turning point in the fortunes of the Union army in the West, Ulysses S. Grant, and the United States of America.
484 pages, Hardcover
Published January 10, 2020
About the author
Timothy B. Smith
44 books23 followersA former NPS ranger at Shiloh, Timothy B. Smith teaches history at the University of Tennessee at Martin.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
December 5, 2020
This worthy effort offers a highly detailed review of a short period in General Grant’s 1863 campaign against the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg, Mississippi. It starts after the successful battles of Champion Hill and Big Black River Bridge and ends with the second assault against the city’s defenses on May 22nd. As this work mainly concerns two failed attacks by the Union army, the author clearly has the opportunity to criticize the judgments of the various commanders, and he is to be applauded for not exempting Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, or James B. McPherson from negative commentary.
Only a few brigades, mostly in Sherman’s corps, were in position to make the first assault, on May 19th and this premature attempt ended badly. The next two days were consumed with preparations and moving up more troops. The order for a “simultaneous attack” on May 22nd “required the columns to move by every road at 10 a. m.” Left unemphasized is the tactical ineffectiveness of attenuating the strength of these assaulting columns, compared to a more focused approach.
On May 22nd, McClernand commenced his portion of the assault earlier than the other two commanders. For some reason, long delays attended the advance of several of Sherman’s brigades. Achieving very limited gains, McClernand sent his superior the first of several optimistic messages, which went unheeded by Grant. Instead of visiting McClernand’s sector, the Union commander moved away from the only point of attack that promised at least a chance of success and went to Sherman’s front. McClernand had followed the orders to attack all along the line and didn’t have sufficient reserves for reinforcement.
Smith describes one episode of the May 22nd assaults in far more detail than is usually provided in Vicksburg’s battle histories. The day before, Grant gave instructions for William Hall’s brigade of McArthur’s division to embark on boats well below Vicksburg where it had been stationed, disembark on the opposite bank and march past the city (as the stream flowed), re-embark on different boats to go further upriver to the Yazoo and then up that channel to disembark at Hayne’s Bluff. Remaining there only “a few hours,” the brigade then backtracked all the way to the east bank south of Vicksburg and still “marched 4 miles on the road toward Vicksburg, and bivouacked for the night.” In his attack plans, Grant had ordered this one, isolated brigade—the nearest Federal troops were miles away—to “[m]ove cautiously, and be prepared to receive an attack at any moment. Penetrate as far into the city as you can. Should you find the city still in possession of the enemy, hold as advanced a position as you can secure yourself upon.” Smith implies that this represented a viable line of attack. Hall did not, however, even attempt to pierce the enemy defenses, merely skirmishing instead with light casualties. This minor engagement ended after McClernand again requested support and took up Grant’s ill-considered offer of Hall’s brigade as reinforcement.
The worst aspect of an otherwise commendable book is Smith’s literary mistreatment of John McClernand, which matched the prejudices of General Grant, both at the time and in his Memoirs. A search for “glory” in the text shows that McClernand was accused of being a gloryhound, who displayed “duplicity,” “ineptness,” and “selfish motives.” The highly partisan Charles A. Dana falsely contended that McClernand “‘had not the qualities necessary for commander even of a regiment,’” this after the so-called “political general” had put in a series of creditable performances starting as a brigade leader back in the Battle of Belmont. Smith, however, did accurately observe that, “[o]nce Grant made McClernand the scapegoat, it was a done deal and historians have mainly taken Grant’s side.”
The book excels most of all for its detail. Seemingly innumerable quotes from both sides of the campaign’s soldiers and officers pepper the text. Unsurprisingly, the lengthy bibliography includes an impressively long list of manuscript collections. The book contains fifteen maps and appendices for the Union and Confederate orders of battle.
Only a few brigades, mostly in Sherman’s corps, were in position to make the first assault, on May 19th and this premature attempt ended badly. The next two days were consumed with preparations and moving up more troops. The order for a “simultaneous attack” on May 22nd “required the columns to move by every road at 10 a. m.” Left unemphasized is the tactical ineffectiveness of attenuating the strength of these assaulting columns, compared to a more focused approach.
On May 22nd, McClernand commenced his portion of the assault earlier than the other two commanders. For some reason, long delays attended the advance of several of Sherman’s brigades. Achieving very limited gains, McClernand sent his superior the first of several optimistic messages, which went unheeded by Grant. Instead of visiting McClernand’s sector, the Union commander moved away from the only point of attack that promised at least a chance of success and went to Sherman’s front. McClernand had followed the orders to attack all along the line and didn’t have sufficient reserves for reinforcement.
Smith describes one episode of the May 22nd assaults in far more detail than is usually provided in Vicksburg’s battle histories. The day before, Grant gave instructions for William Hall’s brigade of McArthur’s division to embark on boats well below Vicksburg where it had been stationed, disembark on the opposite bank and march past the city (as the stream flowed), re-embark on different boats to go further upriver to the Yazoo and then up that channel to disembark at Hayne’s Bluff. Remaining there only “a few hours,” the brigade then backtracked all the way to the east bank south of Vicksburg and still “marched 4 miles on the road toward Vicksburg, and bivouacked for the night.” In his attack plans, Grant had ordered this one, isolated brigade—the nearest Federal troops were miles away—to “[m]ove cautiously, and be prepared to receive an attack at any moment. Penetrate as far into the city as you can. Should you find the city still in possession of the enemy, hold as advanced a position as you can secure yourself upon.” Smith implies that this represented a viable line of attack. Hall did not, however, even attempt to pierce the enemy defenses, merely skirmishing instead with light casualties. This minor engagement ended after McClernand again requested support and took up Grant’s ill-considered offer of Hall’s brigade as reinforcement.
The worst aspect of an otherwise commendable book is Smith’s literary mistreatment of John McClernand, which matched the prejudices of General Grant, both at the time and in his Memoirs. A search for “glory” in the text shows that McClernand was accused of being a gloryhound, who displayed “duplicity,” “ineptness,” and “selfish motives.” The highly partisan Charles A. Dana falsely contended that McClernand “‘had not the qualities necessary for commander even of a regiment,’” this after the so-called “political general” had put in a series of creditable performances starting as a brigade leader back in the Battle of Belmont. Smith, however, did accurately observe that, “[o]nce Grant made McClernand the scapegoat, it was a done deal and historians have mainly taken Grant’s side.”
The book excels most of all for its detail. Seemingly innumerable quotes from both sides of the campaign’s soldiers and officers pepper the text. Unsurprisingly, the lengthy bibliography includes an impressively long list of manuscript collections. The book contains fifteen maps and appendices for the Union and Confederate orders of battle.
July 13, 2021
If Grant had taken Vicksburg in May, would there have been a Gettysburg? Timothy Smith asks in his book. Smith argues the Vicksburg campaign was far more important to both sides than the battle that happened in a small Pennsylvania town a little over two hours from me, which I agree with him.
This books covers the background of the Vicksburg Campaign, five battles that led to the Confederates being trapped in the city and two Union assaults on the city. The Union attacks failed because of lack of organization in the first attack and Grant underestimated the determination of the Confederates defending the city.
What I like about this book is Smith covers a part of the Vicksburg Campaign that gets little attention. Every Vicksburg I read gives some detail about these assaults and then it just goes to the siege. Smith gives really great detail about those assaults and the carnage both sides witnessed. There are a lot of great sources used for this book. He writes well and makes good arguments. I think he is one of the best Civil War writers around. I started his second Vicksburg Campaign right after I finished this book. If you would like to learn more about the Union assaults on Vicksburg or just want to read good history, look no further.
This books covers the background of the Vicksburg Campaign, five battles that led to the Confederates being trapped in the city and two Union assaults on the city. The Union attacks failed because of lack of organization in the first attack and Grant underestimated the determination of the Confederates defending the city.
What I like about this book is Smith covers a part of the Vicksburg Campaign that gets little attention. Every Vicksburg I read gives some detail about these assaults and then it just goes to the siege. Smith gives really great detail about those assaults and the carnage both sides witnessed. There are a lot of great sources used for this book. He writes well and makes good arguments. I think he is one of the best Civil War writers around. I started his second Vicksburg Campaign right after I finished this book. If you would like to learn more about the Union assaults on Vicksburg or just want to read good history, look no further.
July 8, 2024
The fourth book in Timothy Smith's five-volume history of the Vicksburg Campaign but the first published, The Union Assaults at Vicksburg seems sharper and more considered than the others. By now it's obvious that we don't have classic Civil War histories on our hands, but Smith is in good form here in chronicling the Union's bloody bashing of its head against the brick wall of the Vicksburg outer defenses on May 19 and 22, 1863.
What Smith makes clear is just how monumental was the Federals' task in the two main days of assaults that dominate this narrative. Having won five battles in 17 days in the lead-up to bottling in the Confederates within their Vicksburg defenses, the Union got a sharp dose of reality in front of the redans, redoubts, lunettes and forts, starting with the incredibly rugged, ravine-crossed, obstacle-choked terrain its soldiers needed to traverse to even face the fortifications. When U.S. Grant and his army launched a supposedly coordinated attack, first in a weak pawing on the 19th in which only a small fraction of the line even made an attempt, the three corps under William Sherman, James McPherson and John McClernand showed little coordination and often less stomach to attack. This was understandable, because for the most part it was lambs to the slaughter.
Smith's approach is to examine the attacks by each corps in turn, north to south. This works well, for the most part, though in these overlapping accounts it's sometimes not clear what is happening when in the overall picture; Smith is stingy with telling us what time these events are happening, making it hard to focus on the attacks as a whole.
Smith does a good job at explaining how trust issues and personal animus affected decision-making, including whether Grant should try to exploit the isolated capture of a portion of the Confederate works by part of McClernand's corps. In the end, Grant seemed to have no choice but to renew attacks across the line based on McClernand's exaggeration of his breakthrough. As for that somewhat successful storming of a portion of the Railroad Redoubt, I had a hard time picturing just what sort of hold the Union did have; Confederate soldiers still held a portion of it, but how close were the troops to each other, and what was the layout of the redoubt? Likewise, at one point Smith says there was only Union soldier left in the redoubt, then he goes on to relate how a group of Confederates cleared out the Federals. The ones in the ditches fronting the redoubt? This is unclear.
Smith's handling of the combat is good but not great. But it's in getting us in close to the post-battle carnage and the reactions of frightened Vicksburg citizens to what had happened that he really shines, making for a hard-hitting conclusion to this volume.
As I've noted in reviewing the three books that preceded this one in chronological history, this entire series seems a bit rushed. Fortunately, the writing in this first-published volume in the series doesn't clang as much, with just a couple of incoherent sentences, such as: "Even if McClernand's divisions were making less of the show than they expected of Sherman's and McPherson's troops to their north ..." Um ... huh?
Anyway, The Union Assaults at Vicksburg is a bit of redemption after what seemed a less-than-committed effort in The Inland Campaign for Vicksburg. With this series, Smith hasn't hit the home run that readers of Edwin Bearss' similarly lengthy but dated Vicksburg history might have hoped for. Bearss still feels like the more authoritative historian, but Smith's much more widespread sources help fill in a lot of gaps.
What Smith makes clear is just how monumental was the Federals' task in the two main days of assaults that dominate this narrative. Having won five battles in 17 days in the lead-up to bottling in the Confederates within their Vicksburg defenses, the Union got a sharp dose of reality in front of the redans, redoubts, lunettes and forts, starting with the incredibly rugged, ravine-crossed, obstacle-choked terrain its soldiers needed to traverse to even face the fortifications. When U.S. Grant and his army launched a supposedly coordinated attack, first in a weak pawing on the 19th in which only a small fraction of the line even made an attempt, the three corps under William Sherman, James McPherson and John McClernand showed little coordination and often less stomach to attack. This was understandable, because for the most part it was lambs to the slaughter.
Smith's approach is to examine the attacks by each corps in turn, north to south. This works well, for the most part, though in these overlapping accounts it's sometimes not clear what is happening when in the overall picture; Smith is stingy with telling us what time these events are happening, making it hard to focus on the attacks as a whole.
Smith does a good job at explaining how trust issues and personal animus affected decision-making, including whether Grant should try to exploit the isolated capture of a portion of the Confederate works by part of McClernand's corps. In the end, Grant seemed to have no choice but to renew attacks across the line based on McClernand's exaggeration of his breakthrough. As for that somewhat successful storming of a portion of the Railroad Redoubt, I had a hard time picturing just what sort of hold the Union did have; Confederate soldiers still held a portion of it, but how close were the troops to each other, and what was the layout of the redoubt? Likewise, at one point Smith says there was only Union soldier left in the redoubt, then he goes on to relate how a group of Confederates cleared out the Federals. The ones in the ditches fronting the redoubt? This is unclear.
Smith's handling of the combat is good but not great. But it's in getting us in close to the post-battle carnage and the reactions of frightened Vicksburg citizens to what had happened that he really shines, making for a hard-hitting conclusion to this volume.
As I've noted in reviewing the three books that preceded this one in chronological history, this entire series seems a bit rushed. Fortunately, the writing in this first-published volume in the series doesn't clang as much, with just a couple of incoherent sentences, such as: "Even if McClernand's divisions were making less of the show than they expected of Sherman's and McPherson's troops to their north ..." Um ... huh?
Anyway, The Union Assaults at Vicksburg is a bit of redemption after what seemed a less-than-committed effort in The Inland Campaign for Vicksburg. With this series, Smith hasn't hit the home run that readers of Edwin Bearss' similarly lengthy but dated Vicksburg history might have hoped for. Bearss still feels like the more authoritative historian, but Smith's much more widespread sources help fill in a lot of gaps.
October 8, 2025
In volume four of his Vicksburg series, Timothy Smith covers only the five days in which Grant tried to take the city by storm. This volume is written at the tactical level unlike the previous three volumes. Smith brings the reader into the brutal realities of attacking and defending the fortress of Vicksburg. It is well written, researched and analyzed. It’s an excellent coverage of the fighting for the city.
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