What do you think?
Rate this book
The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order
An eloquent call to draw on the lessons of the past to address current threats to international order
The ancient Greeks hard‑wired a tragic sensibility into their culture. By looking disaster squarely in the face, by understanding just how badly things could spiral out of control, they sought to create a communal sense of responsibility and courage—to spur citizens and their leaders to take the difficult actions necessary to avert such a fate. Today, after more than seventy years of great‑power peace and a quarter‑century of unrivaled global leadership, Americans have lost their sense of tragedy. They have forgotten that the descent into violence and war has been all too common throughout human history. This amnesia has become most pronounced just as Americans and the global order they created are coming under graver threat than at any time in decades.
In a forceful argument that brims with historical sensibility and policy insights, two distinguished historians argue that a tragic sensibility is necessary if America and its allies are to address the dangers that menace the international order today. Tragedy may be commonplace, Brands and Edel argue, but it is not inevitable—so long as we regain an appreciation of the world’s tragic nature before it is too late.
The ancient Greeks hard‑wired a tragic sensibility into their culture. By looking disaster squarely in the face, by understanding just how badly things could spiral out of control, they sought to create a communal sense of responsibility and courage—to spur citizens and their leaders to take the difficult actions necessary to avert such a fate. Today, after more than seventy years of great‑power peace and a quarter‑century of unrivaled global leadership, Americans have lost their sense of tragedy. They have forgotten that the descent into violence and war has been all too common throughout human history. This amnesia has become most pronounced just as Americans and the global order they created are coming under graver threat than at any time in decades.
In a forceful argument that brims with historical sensibility and policy insights, two distinguished historians argue that a tragic sensibility is necessary if America and its allies are to address the dangers that menace the international order today. Tragedy may be commonplace, Brands and Edel argue, but it is not inevitable—so long as we regain an appreciation of the world’s tragic nature before it is too late.
216 pages, Paperback
Published February 18, 2020
89 people are currently reading
636 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 33 reviews
June 26, 2024
In this book, the authors make the case that the lessons of historical tragedy should be a guide to present and future strategy in U.S. foreign policy. The popular stance these days is isolationism (America first!) and to that point, there are plenty of examples of American overreach: To wit, last century’s quagmire in Vietnam, and more recently, the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, looking further back, history backs up their argument. Despite the current American drift into amnesia and complacency, war with all its tragic consequences has always been a part of human culture—World War I and II still loom large in our recent past. Furthermore, no global wars have occurred during the last 80 years—which is arguably a consequence of U.S. policy during that time. And the fact is that authoritarianism is currently on the rise worldwide while democracy is waning. Based on the lessons of history, a dangerous situation is indeed brewing—what should be done?
From the book:
“For in the final analysis, the key geopolitical questions confronting the United States and the international order it created are not simply questions of power. They are equally questions of perception and willpower. Will the countries that have historically defended the international order summon the nerve and unity to defend it again today? Will they realize that it is not historical inevitability, or some triumph of moral progress, but rather incessant and determined effort that holds geopolitical disasters at bay? Will they remember precisely how bad things can get, and how quickly they can get that way, when international orders fall apart? Will they overcome the naïve ahistoricism that risks blinding them to these realities? The United States and its allies once found, in tragedy, the determination necessary to create something imperfect but beautiful. Will they now recover an equivalent determination to keep that good thing going?
The Greeks understood the challenge of maintaining a tragic sensibility over time, which is why they enshrined tragedy as the central, and most visible, part of their culture. They did so to cultivate a political culture that was both sober and optimistic, believing that optimism without sobriety led to hubris and overreach, and that sobriety without optimism led to paralysis in the face of danger. For them, as for older generations of Americans, the past served as a source of both terror and inspiration.” p. 204
If your interest is piqued, give this short book a read. You may find yourself unable to disagree with its thesis. 4 stars.
However, looking further back, history backs up their argument. Despite the current American drift into amnesia and complacency, war with all its tragic consequences has always been a part of human culture—World War I and II still loom large in our recent past. Furthermore, no global wars have occurred during the last 80 years—which is arguably a consequence of U.S. policy during that time. And the fact is that authoritarianism is currently on the rise worldwide while democracy is waning. Based on the lessons of history, a dangerous situation is indeed brewing—what should be done?
From the book:
“For in the final analysis, the key geopolitical questions confronting the United States and the international order it created are not simply questions of power. They are equally questions of perception and willpower. Will the countries that have historically defended the international order summon the nerve and unity to defend it again today? Will they realize that it is not historical inevitability, or some triumph of moral progress, but rather incessant and determined effort that holds geopolitical disasters at bay? Will they remember precisely how bad things can get, and how quickly they can get that way, when international orders fall apart? Will they overcome the naïve ahistoricism that risks blinding them to these realities? The United States and its allies once found, in tragedy, the determination necessary to create something imperfect but beautiful. Will they now recover an equivalent determination to keep that good thing going?
The Greeks understood the challenge of maintaining a tragic sensibility over time, which is why they enshrined tragedy as the central, and most visible, part of their culture. They did so to cultivate a political culture that was both sober and optimistic, believing that optimism without sobriety led to hubris and overreach, and that sobriety without optimism led to paralysis in the face of danger. For them, as for older generations of Americans, the past served as a source of both terror and inspiration.” p. 204
If your interest is piqued, give this short book a read. You may find yourself unable to disagree with its thesis. 4 stars.
May 11, 2019
Because I can't give two different ratings, or a 2.5, I am going to have to explain this one in some detail.
As an argument for the necessity of keeping tragedy and the tragic sensibility always in mind in questions of policy, long term planning, and history this is a timely and necessary book. The argument is persuasive and largely correct and the dangers of hubris are rightly thought to be countered by the art of tragic, whose most popular variant originated in classical and ancient Greece. Furthermore, this book also makes the correct case that the disasters that culminated in World War II created a generation who had no illusions about the depths that humanity could sink to and that any postwar settlement would both have to be equitable *and* dependent on force to uphold it and deter challengers. Even though it was apparent that the author/s are some kind of neoliberal/neoconservative types, my polar opposites on foreign affairs, I was happy to see this case well made and done in a way that could be accessible to people on that side of the spectrum-seeing as those types of people are in need of a heavy dose of the bitter reality.
But once we get past World War II the problems start cropping up, and once they come they come fast. As a recent history/future prognosis of foreign policy I have to invert my reaction to this book and declare it to be missing the forest for the trees. The main point of tragedy, in the Greek polis, was not just to warn how bad things could be but also why they got that way, and unfortunately for the author here its not just a question of eternal empire and slashed defense budgets. Hubris was the key, and the primary mark of hubris in historical states was and is over-expansion. Athens, like America, allied with despotisms and undermined democracies as suited its interests. When the chips are down all states do. Ideological purity can only be held in positions of luxury, never in necessity. Athens also, it should be noted, suffered its most catastrophic defeat at the height of its power and at the hands of another (then) democracy, Syracuse, who it had attacked unprovoked in a mad quest to expand its already fraying hegemony in the Peloponessian War. Athens launched a far away war of choice and found it fatally weakened vis a vis other rivals as a result. Sparta would then take its place, only to replaced shortly thereafter by Thebes and the Kingdom of Macedon shortly after that.
I am merely using the chosen time frame of analogy used in this book itself, but many other examples abound. An America obsessed with maintaining a 1991 level hegemonic power is an America living in the past and risking its future. While the book is certainly correct to warn about the dangers of shrinking US power and the vacuums they create for revisionist powers, the blockheaded hegemony of the post 9/11 policy makers has been not just costly but also counter-productive. Great power competition may be eternal, and therefore must always be prepared for, but wars of choice remain luxuries and no one is more to blame for periods of nativistic inward turning that overreaching foreign policy. The fact that the book basically seems to shrug off the George W Bush administration as just an excess shows a lack of reckoning with this.
The author's analysis of contemporary affairs can also at times be undermined by a moralistic framework that conflates American with world interest. While it is certainly true that big hegemons create a large degree of great power stability, it both benefits some and costs others. Surely Cuba or Iran is not pleased with American unipolarity and thus it is in their rational self interest to stand against it. Numerous countries suffer under de facto economic warfare to keep their markets of raw materials open to developed countries, thwarting or distorting their development. Russia was effectively given a Versailles peace at the end of the Cold War and saw the largest decline in both power projection ability and living standards in peacetime human history. The over-expansion of NATO into basically indefensible territory did more to create present Russian belligerence than any other single factor. Much as the war in Iraq fatally undermined American credibility globally and the fueling of regime change operations in Libya and Syria led directly the refugee crisis which empowered the nativistic far right here at home as well as Jihadists across the planet.
The author may correctly see that postwar stability was built on force but then also still conflates the triumph of this force to American values or exceptionalism. The real tragedy of this book is the inability to see that hubris that leads to catastrophe has been built into that very order since at least the end of the Cold War, and that the United States itself is the unstable hegemon who behaves as if it is a revisionist power against everyone it does not get along with. America's stability (and thus those of its allies) would more likely benefit from a Hadrian style scale back of its bloated empire and a return to more diplomacy than a continuous, unpopular, and unsustainable expansion. This way the benefits of being a power can actually be enjoyed by some for quite some time longer. Especially as these funds for more and more defense seem to come from infrastructure and away from combating the biggest threat of all: climate change. Otherwise the true tragedy will be the construction of a paper tiger that collapses catastrophically once the whole world joins together to balance against it for their own survival. Not to mention that declining living standards in America are likely to make the people vote for more erratic leadership.
Understanding of the tragic is important. But I would say the neoclassical realists, defensive realists, and offshore balancers have a much more robust understanding of both the necessity and the limits of power in an anarchic inter-state world than does the perspective of this book.
Indeed, the historical precedent in American diplomacy alone goes back to the start, with George Washington writing to the King of Morrocco (America's first peacetime bilateral relationship after independence) about how America's republic was not a messianic entity seeking to overthrow all monarchs, but rather work on itself through domestic reform. It was a safer relationship than the European powers, he said, because it did not have a state religion and thus its diplomacy could be divorced from innate hostility to the Muslim rulers of that country. Such was the same logic behind the Cold War era Non-Aligned League, where many of the more successful post-colonial nations sought to create a space free from being too dominated by either the American or Soviet blocs. If there is growing multi-polarity, the real tragedy will be American intransigence changing reality.
As an argument for the necessity of keeping tragedy and the tragic sensibility always in mind in questions of policy, long term planning, and history this is a timely and necessary book. The argument is persuasive and largely correct and the dangers of hubris are rightly thought to be countered by the art of tragic, whose most popular variant originated in classical and ancient Greece. Furthermore, this book also makes the correct case that the disasters that culminated in World War II created a generation who had no illusions about the depths that humanity could sink to and that any postwar settlement would both have to be equitable *and* dependent on force to uphold it and deter challengers. Even though it was apparent that the author/s are some kind of neoliberal/neoconservative types, my polar opposites on foreign affairs, I was happy to see this case well made and done in a way that could be accessible to people on that side of the spectrum-seeing as those types of people are in need of a heavy dose of the bitter reality.
But once we get past World War II the problems start cropping up, and once they come they come fast. As a recent history/future prognosis of foreign policy I have to invert my reaction to this book and declare it to be missing the forest for the trees. The main point of tragedy, in the Greek polis, was not just to warn how bad things could be but also why they got that way, and unfortunately for the author here its not just a question of eternal empire and slashed defense budgets. Hubris was the key, and the primary mark of hubris in historical states was and is over-expansion. Athens, like America, allied with despotisms and undermined democracies as suited its interests. When the chips are down all states do. Ideological purity can only be held in positions of luxury, never in necessity. Athens also, it should be noted, suffered its most catastrophic defeat at the height of its power and at the hands of another (then) democracy, Syracuse, who it had attacked unprovoked in a mad quest to expand its already fraying hegemony in the Peloponessian War. Athens launched a far away war of choice and found it fatally weakened vis a vis other rivals as a result. Sparta would then take its place, only to replaced shortly thereafter by Thebes and the Kingdom of Macedon shortly after that.
I am merely using the chosen time frame of analogy used in this book itself, but many other examples abound. An America obsessed with maintaining a 1991 level hegemonic power is an America living in the past and risking its future. While the book is certainly correct to warn about the dangers of shrinking US power and the vacuums they create for revisionist powers, the blockheaded hegemony of the post 9/11 policy makers has been not just costly but also counter-productive. Great power competition may be eternal, and therefore must always be prepared for, but wars of choice remain luxuries and no one is more to blame for periods of nativistic inward turning that overreaching foreign policy. The fact that the book basically seems to shrug off the George W Bush administration as just an excess shows a lack of reckoning with this.
The author's analysis of contemporary affairs can also at times be undermined by a moralistic framework that conflates American with world interest. While it is certainly true that big hegemons create a large degree of great power stability, it both benefits some and costs others. Surely Cuba or Iran is not pleased with American unipolarity and thus it is in their rational self interest to stand against it. Numerous countries suffer under de facto economic warfare to keep their markets of raw materials open to developed countries, thwarting or distorting their development. Russia was effectively given a Versailles peace at the end of the Cold War and saw the largest decline in both power projection ability and living standards in peacetime human history. The over-expansion of NATO into basically indefensible territory did more to create present Russian belligerence than any other single factor. Much as the war in Iraq fatally undermined American credibility globally and the fueling of regime change operations in Libya and Syria led directly the refugee crisis which empowered the nativistic far right here at home as well as Jihadists across the planet.
The author may correctly see that postwar stability was built on force but then also still conflates the triumph of this force to American values or exceptionalism. The real tragedy of this book is the inability to see that hubris that leads to catastrophe has been built into that very order since at least the end of the Cold War, and that the United States itself is the unstable hegemon who behaves as if it is a revisionist power against everyone it does not get along with. America's stability (and thus those of its allies) would more likely benefit from a Hadrian style scale back of its bloated empire and a return to more diplomacy than a continuous, unpopular, and unsustainable expansion. This way the benefits of being a power can actually be enjoyed by some for quite some time longer. Especially as these funds for more and more defense seem to come from infrastructure and away from combating the biggest threat of all: climate change. Otherwise the true tragedy will be the construction of a paper tiger that collapses catastrophically once the whole world joins together to balance against it for their own survival. Not to mention that declining living standards in America are likely to make the people vote for more erratic leadership.
Understanding of the tragic is important. But I would say the neoclassical realists, defensive realists, and offshore balancers have a much more robust understanding of both the necessity and the limits of power in an anarchic inter-state world than does the perspective of this book.
Indeed, the historical precedent in American diplomacy alone goes back to the start, with George Washington writing to the King of Morrocco (America's first peacetime bilateral relationship after independence) about how America's republic was not a messianic entity seeking to overthrow all monarchs, but rather work on itself through domestic reform. It was a safer relationship than the European powers, he said, because it did not have a state religion and thus its diplomacy could be divorced from innate hostility to the Muslim rulers of that country. Such was the same logic behind the Cold War era Non-Aligned League, where many of the more successful post-colonial nations sought to create a space free from being too dominated by either the American or Soviet blocs. If there is growing multi-polarity, the real tragedy will be American intransigence changing reality.
October 29, 2019
Hal Brands and Charles Edel are concerned that the liberal order created by the United States following World War II is breaking down. Sometimes called Pax Americana, the system of alliances and financial props was designed to perpetuate and promote liberal governance while providing a strong deterrence to the expansion of authoritarianism. Geopolitical partnerships coupled with a general worldwide prosperity would, it was widely thought, prevent such dictatorial challenges as arose in the 1930s and would lessen the tensions leading to big power conflict. The system with such familiar features as the United Nations, the World Bank, and NATO has been largely successful. One measure of that success is that the number of democratic governments rose to 120 by the end of the century. The result has been a period of 74 years without a major war, a period rivaling the Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years' War, a peace lasting from 1648 to 1789, and the Concert of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, 1815 to 1914.
The problem is democracy is receding. The number of democracies is now only about 75. At the same time Russia and China consider themselves geopolitical competitors of the U. S. and are using coercive means if not outright force to reduce the influence of the American order. Freedom of navigation in the oceans is being restricted, groups such as radical jihadists are actively disruptive. Countries considered rogues or predators, like North Korea, are intruding into international relations.
The great analogy Brands and Edel use is Greek theater. The Greeks used tragedy as a means of public instruction in moral and political matters. Tragedies warned of institutional fallibilities and overreach, hubris and complacency. Tragedies were wake-up calls prompting awareness and constructive action. Realization of a tragic vision helped the Greeks avert disorder, chaos, and war.
The message of Brands and Edel is that long periods of peaceful norms and political order without big power conflict--such as the Pax Americana--cause us to forget the horrors of past tragedies, like those of the 20th century. They fear the liberal order is breaking down because of our short historical memory. More, America's tragic sensibility has eroded, partly because the collapse of Soviet communism ending the Cold War allowed the U. S. to assume a role of hegemon while encouraging that peace could be maintained through prosperity and cooperation. The current shift in the balance of power is underway partly because America's position as gatekeeper of the liberal order is being abraded by fiscal restraints, a general ambivalence felt in the West about the value of traditional international norms, and geopolitical pressure by Russia and China through direct military intimidation and undermining of the liberal system through a variety of compulsive means. At the same time core democratic values are being chipped away, trade and military alliances are being abandoned, and the geopolitical world, always a rough neighborhood, is becoming meaner and more dangerous under leaders who're more openly autocratic. Brands and Edel caution that only through a careful consideration of the 20th century's tragedies can we avoid those in our future.
The problem is democracy is receding. The number of democracies is now only about 75. At the same time Russia and China consider themselves geopolitical competitors of the U. S. and are using coercive means if not outright force to reduce the influence of the American order. Freedom of navigation in the oceans is being restricted, groups such as radical jihadists are actively disruptive. Countries considered rogues or predators, like North Korea, are intruding into international relations.
The great analogy Brands and Edel use is Greek theater. The Greeks used tragedy as a means of public instruction in moral and political matters. Tragedies warned of institutional fallibilities and overreach, hubris and complacency. Tragedies were wake-up calls prompting awareness and constructive action. Realization of a tragic vision helped the Greeks avert disorder, chaos, and war.
The message of Brands and Edel is that long periods of peaceful norms and political order without big power conflict--such as the Pax Americana--cause us to forget the horrors of past tragedies, like those of the 20th century. They fear the liberal order is breaking down because of our short historical memory. More, America's tragic sensibility has eroded, partly because the collapse of Soviet communism ending the Cold War allowed the U. S. to assume a role of hegemon while encouraging that peace could be maintained through prosperity and cooperation. The current shift in the balance of power is underway partly because America's position as gatekeeper of the liberal order is being abraded by fiscal restraints, a general ambivalence felt in the West about the value of traditional international norms, and geopolitical pressure by Russia and China through direct military intimidation and undermining of the liberal system through a variety of compulsive means. At the same time core democratic values are being chipped away, trade and military alliances are being abandoned, and the geopolitical world, always a rough neighborhood, is becoming meaner and more dangerous under leaders who're more openly autocratic. Brands and Edel caution that only through a careful consideration of the 20th century's tragedies can we avoid those in our future.
August 30, 2021
In the wake of the catastrophe of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, there will be a tremendous amount of review and reflection. But will it be the right sort? Will we honestly look at what happened and what led us there? In their slim little volume, Hal Brands and Charles Edel offer a unique perspective on foreign policy. Specifically, they look, as the title plainly says, the lessons of tragedy. Going back to ancient Greece, the authors reflect on how the Greeks used tragic plays to better understand what worked and what did not work in statecraft. I'm not sure this is something we in the United States do very well but would do well to practice. Not figure points and playing the blame game - but honestly examining what went wrong so we can become better people and a better government. It is a fascinating approach to statecraft and foreign policy.
November 28, 2020
The purpose of this book is to use history to help Americans and other supporters of the U.S.-led international order rediscover their sense of tragedy before they have to experience it themselves. The starting point for that endeavor is an exploration of what tragedy meant to the people who invented it, more than two thousand years ago.
September 5, 2021
A rather hamfisted account of the tragic sensibility of the Greeks and its application to modern American statecraft, as well as an imploration for continued American engagement in upholding the rules-based international system that the United States has been instrumental in maintaining since 1945. It may be of some interest to those without a background in international relations, but others will recognize this as a book that has been written many times before.
January 15, 2020
This book is a defense of American exceptionalism and the liberal international order. The authors argue that Americans and the current generation have become exceptionally complacent because they have forgotten about the suffering and tragedy which have shaped the current world order which has contributed to economic security, prosperity, created public goods such as universal freedom of the seas and the multilateral institutions such as IMF, world bank and the WTO. The combination of economic prosperity, collective security and the promotion of democratic liberal values has then made the world a safer place and made their lives better and more comfortable. Complacency eventually leads to ruin. The authors then refer to the Greeks who have drawn inspiration from tragedy to not only do great things but also keep themselves grounded to reality
It is a short readable and convincing read as the prose and language used is clear, concise, inspiring and lined with heaps of metaphors.
The authors seem like neocons who are high priests of US exceptionalism. But any student of history and geopolitics can smell the bullshit about the concept. It is based on flawed fundamentals which have not only contributed to regional and global instability, widened religious schism in the Middle East, commited repressive war crimes in pursuit of profits and promoted values which are not universally applicable. Most importantly American foreign policy utilize the issues of democracy and human rights as a projection of soft power to justify their intervention in the sovereign affairs of foreign countries.
If you are a proponent of US exceptionalism and the liberal international order, this is the book for you. If you aren’t, take the book with a pinch of salt, learn from the earlier parts about the lessons of tragedy and making sure we do not forget the past so we do not fall into ruin. As 2 big figures have widely emphasized, historical amnesia (Plato) or historical nihilism (XJP) must be avoided at all costs.
It is a short readable and convincing read as the prose and language used is clear, concise, inspiring and lined with heaps of metaphors.
The authors seem like neocons who are high priests of US exceptionalism. But any student of history and geopolitics can smell the bullshit about the concept. It is based on flawed fundamentals which have not only contributed to regional and global instability, widened religious schism in the Middle East, commited repressive war crimes in pursuit of profits and promoted values which are not universally applicable. Most importantly American foreign policy utilize the issues of democracy and human rights as a projection of soft power to justify their intervention in the sovereign affairs of foreign countries.
If you are a proponent of US exceptionalism and the liberal international order, this is the book for you. If you aren’t, take the book with a pinch of salt, learn from the earlier parts about the lessons of tragedy and making sure we do not forget the past so we do not fall into ruin. As 2 big figures have widely emphasized, historical amnesia (Plato) or historical nihilism (XJP) must be avoided at all costs.
Read
March 31, 2025#Read for class
A strange argument, but I came around to the idea in the end. The United States has preserved a relatively peaceful liberal order over the years, and it's up to us to recognize the pitfalls and danger looming ahead to avoid tragedy occurring in the future. The authors majorly gloss over counter-points (no proxy war discussion in the Cold War? Modern wars? I'm sure people from those countries would disagree) and it takes such a hard-line pro-U.S., pro-West, pro-Europe stance that there's no semblance of this being a non-partisan account of international relations. I expected this book to be more academic in that regard. The conclusion is quite depressing because Trump is doing exactly the opposite of what the authors think is necessary to preserve peace and world order, especially with Russia invading Ukraine and Trump turning his back to international organizations. It's fine!!!!!!!
A strange argument, but I came around to the idea in the end. The United States has preserved a relatively peaceful liberal order over the years, and it's up to us to recognize the pitfalls and danger looming ahead to avoid tragedy occurring in the future. The authors majorly gloss over counter-points (no proxy war discussion in the Cold War? Modern wars? I'm sure people from those countries would disagree) and it takes such a hard-line pro-U.S., pro-West, pro-Europe stance that there's no semblance of this being a non-partisan account of international relations. I expected this book to be more academic in that regard. The conclusion is quite depressing because Trump is doing exactly the opposite of what the authors think is necessary to preserve peace and world order, especially with Russia invading Ukraine and Trump turning his back to international organizations. It's fine!!!!!!!
November 21, 2019
الكتاب موجه إلى القارئ الأمريكي، ويحاول الكتاب إقناع القارئ أن المناداة بعزلة الولايات المتحدة عن العالم هي ضد مصالح المواطن الأمريكي لأن الإيجابيات التي نعم بها منذ الحرب الثانية ستزول، وتعود الفوضى وتصارع القوى. وهو في هذا كله يوظف كثيرا من الشواهد التاريخية. والكتاب يباهي وبوضوح أن الولايات المتحدة يجب أن تصدر أيدلوجيتها للعالم، وفي الوقت نفسه ينتقد مسلك الثورة الفرنسية لأنها أرادت فرض أيدلوجيتها. وستجد فيه بعض من مثل هذه التناقضات. إلا أن الكتاب لا يخاطب العالم، بل يخاطب الأمريكي حصرا، لذلك لا يرى أن هذه التناقضات تنطبق عليه.
May 5, 2019
Probably one of the more interesting defenses of the maintenance available order I have read. Edel and Brand do a good job of making their case, but they don’t necessarily interact with cultural and social factors that might lead some Americans to question the validity of the liberal order. If one is a liberal without worrying too much about religion, their case is a slamdunk. But all too often that has not been the case in the United States.
December 8, 2023
An excellent book on the creation of international orders following gruesome wars. The authors skip over a lot of the historical details when giving their account, but tie it all into a consistent narrative of tragedy resulting in stability, only to have that stability crumble again once the tragedy has been forgotten.
April 9, 2024
there are some good points in this book, but it’s rlly not connected to greek tragedy and their solution to healing the current international order is flawed
September 11, 2022
The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order by Hal Brands and Charlie Edel is a pretty straight forward book. With clear, mission driven texts sometimes you could easily have the book doubled in length, and other times you could have some chapters or content cut to drive home the point. In this case, I think either could have been done. The writing style makes me wanting more, but the primary mission of the text could have lost at least one of the middle chapters without losing any of its meaning.
This book leans into Peloponnesian Greece, as all good foreign policy books must, to illustrate the inherent tragedy of human existence, particularly in the realm of states and war. At its heart, if this book were to have a close parallel, it would be a Liberal Internationalist argument that is much in line with Robert Kagan's The Jungle Grows Back. And its done very well. Modern geopolitics creep in mostly at the end, but it is meant to build a case for broad support for America's support for international institutions and to meet the challenges threatening it posed by other states.
Its worth a read, even if - perhaps - you've heard something similar before.
This book leans into Peloponnesian Greece, as all good foreign policy books must, to illustrate the inherent tragedy of human existence, particularly in the realm of states and war. At its heart, if this book were to have a close parallel, it would be a Liberal Internationalist argument that is much in line with Robert Kagan's The Jungle Grows Back. And its done very well. Modern geopolitics creep in mostly at the end, but it is meant to build a case for broad support for America's support for international institutions and to meet the challenges threatening it posed by other states.
Its worth a read, even if - perhaps - you've heard something similar before.
May 26, 2020
For the general public, this provides a beautiful and easy-to-read overview of a very complex topic. If that is what you are looking for, this is a great commentary to read.
However, for PoliSci/IR folks, this glosses over some topics superficially, plus, it only engages with one strand of IR literature (Realism), without paying any notice to the numerous critiques of this viewpoint.
My second critique is that the argument sets out to discuss a normative/ideational concept, but then only very briefly discusses normative aspects of the international order. There is next to no discussion of norms and multilateralism. There is an assumption that America must lead the order (fair, if that's the argument), but without a consideration of the fact that US norms are embedded in structures of the order. The only reason this is an issue for me is that the authors that these counterarguments are made by are cited in this book repeatedly- therefore I expected their ideas to be discussed.
However, for PoliSci/IR folks, this glosses over some topics superficially, plus, it only engages with one strand of IR literature (Realism), without paying any notice to the numerous critiques of this viewpoint.
My second critique is that the argument sets out to discuss a normative/ideational concept, but then only very briefly discusses normative aspects of the international order. There is next to no discussion of norms and multilateralism. There is an assumption that America must lead the order (fair, if that's the argument), but without a consideration of the fact that US norms are embedded in structures of the order. The only reason this is an issue for me is that the authors that these counterarguments are made by are cited in this book repeatedly- therefore I expected their ideas to be discussed.
Read
August 17, 2021"For the Greeks, hubris was no less a sin than complacency; excessive ambition was as dangerous as insufficient courage."
"By understanding the frequency with which prosperous and seemingly stable worlds have plunged into darkness, we can better appreciate the inherent fallibility of our own creations."
"The Greeks understood the challenge of maintaining a tragic sensibility over time, which is why they enshrined tragedy as the central, and most visible, part of their culture. They did so to cultivate a political culture that was both sober and optimistic, believing that optimism without sobriety led to hubris and overreach, and that sobriety without optimism led to paralysis in the face of danger. For them, as for older generations of Americans, the past served as a source of both terror and inspiration."
"By understanding the frequency with which prosperous and seemingly stable worlds have plunged into darkness, we can better appreciate the inherent fallibility of our own creations."
"The Greeks understood the challenge of maintaining a tragic sensibility over time, which is why they enshrined tragedy as the central, and most visible, part of their culture. They did so to cultivate a political culture that was both sober and optimistic, believing that optimism without sobriety led to hubris and overreach, and that sobriety without optimism led to paralysis in the face of danger. For them, as for older generations of Americans, the past served as a source of both terror and inspiration."
August 23, 2020
Under a rather dramatic title authors basically want to convey idea as old as time itself - learn from history otherwise you are destined to repeat mistakes from the times past.
That being said it is interesting that they chose the title and perspective of tragedy plays from ancient Greeks. But I guess that at times when people do not read anything longer that a paragraph and where news outlets place timing information on their articles dramatic title like this has its uses. And history is suffocating because no 60-minutes show can give you proper perspective, reading and investigation is what is required and even then wrong conclusions happen.
In regard to the book itself while it does give a clear picture of the ways world powers worked on creating stability from 1700's to 1918 and then from 1947 to current times it quickly steps into the narrative of messianic destiny of United States.
I agree that United States played very important role post-WW2 and immensely helped the creation of free-market society as we know it today but what started as alliance of equals with United States as primus inter pares deteriorated after fall of Soviet Union into alliance where everyone else is subdued (very like Athens and Delian League or Roman Empire with their allies that then became client states).
Repeating the mistake of 1918 and humiliating the former Soviet Union by supporting corrupt politicians (this is time when oligarchs of Russia became rich btw during the shady period where national resources where "privatized") United States basically paved the way for the Russian revanchism today. All the so called dictators across the Europe were instated by the US and their allies because these were the forces used in the Cold War period against Soviet Union. And now question is why are these dictators raising back to power - they never left but were conveniently left alone until they decided to change sides or to question their allegiances. It is interesting how industrial espionage scandals that caused discord with France are not mentioned - and this was something going on between the allies.
Even when one looks at events of September 2011 ti is weird that (considering the parties included int he assault) Saudi Arabia remained untouched while god forsaken (but strategically important) areas of Afghanistan were target of a massive invasion. Not even trying to hide the reasons for the military actions taken (following old maxim that past is past) just shows how powers to be are sure nobody will ever question them.
Basically what happened is that US in their pursuit of world dominant role forced everyone to obey by a strict set of rules while themselves act by no restriction whatsoever. Even UN is pushed aside and accounts for nothing (unless it is suitable depending on the situation). All of this and rather unilateral decisions on some actions (like Iraq invasion) only helped to deepen the wedge between US and its allies and also rest of the world. When one checks the way conflict areas are treated it is hard not to expect resistance - for all those people only changed a dictatorship for utter chaos of various transitional governments that prove to be either completely ineffectual or corrupt to the core. On economic end situation is no better as poor countries are left even poorer without any perspectives except to be used as resources to be harvested.
By the logic of the authors US needs to increase military spending and that is the only way forward. I agree that they need to counter China, Russia and other states in that way. But to build military only without providing economical growth option (both abroad and local) is basically turning Athena to Sparta. And rule by the sword will only bring forth more and more opposition.
US is not doing nothing new on the world scene. They are great country with lots of power - economical and military that tries to build its supremacy and lead role and make it lasting for centuries. Initially aim was to help other countries and raise the standard of world society but from 1990's they remained the only only one super-power and everyone who objected was slowly declared as authoritarian country. In order to grow the values one must invest into them and not force them, otherwise all effort will backfire. Same is with economic aspect - while free international market works wonders mechanisms needs to exist that will enable local populace to prosper. Otherwise only resentment will rise as people see their jobs go away to far-away countries because various corporations want to slash the tax fees and pay their workers miserable sums. What authors seem to have forgotten is that in situation when one is constantly on the lookout for the job in order to eat one cannot think about how his sacrifice is for the greater good. This is why 1930's happened and were "overlooked". Economic situation throughout the world was so bad that thinking about fighting war half a world away was something nobody wanted to hear.
All in all interesting book that gives good insight into the reasoning of US external politics. Authors did not elaborate on some of the key things (like supporting repressive regimes and economical issues) - these were shyly mentioned in a sentence or two - and instead put their focus on military power and prowess as only means of keeping the control. According to the authors everything else is price to be paid by common people in the areas affected.
And if history taught us anything is that societies relying on military might and continuous warfare always have great problems. Hopefully this is something that will not take place and more cooler and reasonable heads will prevail.
That being said it is interesting that they chose the title and perspective of tragedy plays from ancient Greeks. But I guess that at times when people do not read anything longer that a paragraph and where news outlets place timing information on their articles dramatic title like this has its uses. And history is suffocating because no 60-minutes show can give you proper perspective, reading and investigation is what is required and even then wrong conclusions happen.
In regard to the book itself while it does give a clear picture of the ways world powers worked on creating stability from 1700's to 1918 and then from 1947 to current times it quickly steps into the narrative of messianic destiny of United States.
I agree that United States played very important role post-WW2 and immensely helped the creation of free-market society as we know it today but what started as alliance of equals with United States as primus inter pares deteriorated after fall of Soviet Union into alliance where everyone else is subdued (very like Athens and Delian League or Roman Empire with their allies that then became client states).
Repeating the mistake of 1918 and humiliating the former Soviet Union by supporting corrupt politicians (this is time when oligarchs of Russia became rich btw during the shady period where national resources where "privatized") United States basically paved the way for the Russian revanchism today. All the so called dictators across the Europe were instated by the US and their allies because these were the forces used in the Cold War period against Soviet Union. And now question is why are these dictators raising back to power - they never left but were conveniently left alone until they decided to change sides or to question their allegiances. It is interesting how industrial espionage scandals that caused discord with France are not mentioned - and this was something going on between the allies.
Even when one looks at events of September 2011 ti is weird that (considering the parties included int he assault) Saudi Arabia remained untouched while god forsaken (but strategically important) areas of Afghanistan were target of a massive invasion. Not even trying to hide the reasons for the military actions taken (following old maxim that past is past) just shows how powers to be are sure nobody will ever question them.
Basically what happened is that US in their pursuit of world dominant role forced everyone to obey by a strict set of rules while themselves act by no restriction whatsoever. Even UN is pushed aside and accounts for nothing (unless it is suitable depending on the situation). All of this and rather unilateral decisions on some actions (like Iraq invasion) only helped to deepen the wedge between US and its allies and also rest of the world. When one checks the way conflict areas are treated it is hard not to expect resistance - for all those people only changed a dictatorship for utter chaos of various transitional governments that prove to be either completely ineffectual or corrupt to the core. On economic end situation is no better as poor countries are left even poorer without any perspectives except to be used as resources to be harvested.
By the logic of the authors US needs to increase military spending and that is the only way forward. I agree that they need to counter China, Russia and other states in that way. But to build military only without providing economical growth option (both abroad and local) is basically turning Athena to Sparta. And rule by the sword will only bring forth more and more opposition.
US is not doing nothing new on the world scene. They are great country with lots of power - economical and military that tries to build its supremacy and lead role and make it lasting for centuries. Initially aim was to help other countries and raise the standard of world society but from 1990's they remained the only only one super-power and everyone who objected was slowly declared as authoritarian country. In order to grow the values one must invest into them and not force them, otherwise all effort will backfire. Same is with economic aspect - while free international market works wonders mechanisms needs to exist that will enable local populace to prosper. Otherwise only resentment will rise as people see their jobs go away to far-away countries because various corporations want to slash the tax fees and pay their workers miserable sums. What authors seem to have forgotten is that in situation when one is constantly on the lookout for the job in order to eat one cannot think about how his sacrifice is for the greater good. This is why 1930's happened and were "overlooked". Economic situation throughout the world was so bad that thinking about fighting war half a world away was something nobody wanted to hear.
All in all interesting book that gives good insight into the reasoning of US external politics. Authors did not elaborate on some of the key things (like supporting repressive regimes and economical issues) - these were shyly mentioned in a sentence or two - and instead put their focus on military power and prowess as only means of keeping the control. According to the authors everything else is price to be paid by common people in the areas affected.
And if history taught us anything is that societies relying on military might and continuous warfare always have great problems. Hopefully this is something that will not take place and more cooler and reasonable heads will prevail.
January 9, 2020
This is less about tragedy or world affairs, than a thinly disguised attempt to argue for the US retaining a globally engaged approach to policy. I have no problem with that argument, but it relies on a distorted sense of what tragedy is, and completely fails to recognise or think seriously about how the very engagement the book champions has directly contributed to the perilous situation the West now finds itself in.
There are better justifications of US policy out there, and ones which do more to engage the nature of the problems we face today, or the risk of it all collapsing tomorrow. I might write a full review of this book later, as it was a frustrating read, especially given I have high regards for both of the authors.
There are better justifications of US policy out there, and ones which do more to engage the nature of the problems we face today, or the risk of it all collapsing tomorrow. I might write a full review of this book later, as it was a frustrating read, especially given I have high regards for both of the authors.
January 21, 2023
Interesting but not Starting
This book says what needs to be repeatedly reinforced again and again. The interesting twist here is the use of Greek tragedy t reinforce the point. It has been clear that it has not normally found in human nature to join with others to take on the struggle until one minute before miy. The tougher question is why must we continue to learn this lesson rather than say have evolution move us towards a more permanent solution. Because when you look at history our ability to naturally live together has not moved much since the Greeks
This book says what needs to be repeatedly reinforced again and again. The interesting twist here is the use of Greek tragedy t reinforce the point. It has been clear that it has not normally found in human nature to join with others to take on the struggle until one minute before miy. The tougher question is why must we continue to learn this lesson rather than say have evolution move us towards a more permanent solution. Because when you look at history our ability to naturally live together has not moved much since the Greeks
May 1, 2019
Interview with the authors on one of the talk shows sounded interesting. Sadly, nope. It's a reflection on what Greek Tragedies said about their culture and how those who forget the morals of the stories mess up in politics. The tragedy of this book is that it makes the topic a good tool for curing insomnia.
November 11, 2025
✅ Shared some good historical examples of how military failure served as a forcing function to adapt. Articulates the risk of complacency due to a lack of ‘tragedy’. Essentially expressing the tale of “who is more hungry, the wolf on top the mountain with the kill, or the ones climbing to challenge”.
❌ Filled with a political dryness which became quite unstimulating.
❌ Filled with a political dryness which became quite unstimulating.
February 15, 2021
I went into this book not knowing what to expect but I greatly enjoyed it. I do not normally read non fiction novels so when I do it is normally on topics I find interesting such as in this case Greek tragedies and how it relates to world history.
June 27, 2025
This is one of the best books I have ever read. It illuminates concepts that EVERYONE should be aware of in a digestible and captivating way. Should be required reading for Americans and non-Americans. If you don’t know history you are doomed to repeat it.
October 29, 2019
Tragedy and history
The link between tragedy and American obligations in the world is not well carried. Apart from this, it is a good history of the US in the post war period.
The link between tragedy and American obligations in the world is not well carried. Apart from this, it is a good history of the US in the post war period.
April 14, 2020
On virtues of tragedy. Good book to read👍
July 20, 2020
If you want to understand the current world order and US foreign policy / how the US has shaped the world, this is an interesting quick read.
July 26, 2020
This was a sobering, interesting read.
September 17, 2022
An excellent book explaining the Greek purpose of tragedy and how it was to remind them about the need for sacrifice. Worth a read.
February 4, 2024
A good and interesting book - not too dense, and goes down quickly. The core of the book’s thesis is encapsulated in the first 60 pages, if you’re short on time.
December 10, 2020
One of the most non-partisan books I’ve ever read. Critical of the foreign policy of both Republicans and Democrats.
January 23, 2023
Authors Hal Brands and Charles Edel select the recognition and appreciation of tragedy as one of the outstanding cultural contributions of ancient Greece. Through annual festivals the Greeks ritualized that culture's many tragic plays to both celebrate their artistic merit and to continually refresh the citizens' memory of the role tragedy played in their history. The authors write, "Through the experience of tragedy on the stage, the Greeks believed they could summon the strength of mind and character to avoid suffering tragedies in real life." They note that Thucydides, in his History of the Peloponnesian War, showed that tragedy is not that easily banished from national life. Rather, he "makes the point that it was when the Athenians became insufficiently attentive to tragedy that tragedy befell them."
The authors then start a high-speed trip through twenty-five hundred years of history in which they show that, after truly tragic episodes of warfare, the combatants attempted to construct a new international order among nations. Following the Thirty Years War, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia set the basic parameters for nation states and for conflicts among them. "Westphalia also established other diplomatic customs--permanently stationing diplomatic representatives in foreign capitals, convening international summits and consultations--in hope of regulating relations and settling disputes." Establishing coalitions that represented a balance of powers among nations was another outcome of the Treaty. It remained effective for over a hundred years until the French Revolution and subsequent continent-wide Napoleonic Wars began.
"In the wake of the ensuing quarter-century of conflict, however, there emerged the Concert of Europe" as the settlement agreement. This international order proved even more effective than the Westphalian arrangement in reducing conflict until World War I. That ending was comprised of the Versailles Treaty, and the organization of the League of Nations. The harshness of the Treaty terms was later used as justification by Germany for starting World War II.
The conclusion of WWII brings Brands and Edel to their principle concern: the international order established by American political leaders and continued on a strong bipartisan basis through the end of the Cold War. "Washington funded the rebuilding of devastated societies through...the Marshall Plan... created and led the International Monetary fund (IMF), the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)...and slashed its own average tariff...from 33 percent in 1944 to 13 percent in 1950. NATO was established to provide military security to a rebuilding Western Europe. Numerous mutual security agreements were established throughout the world. The Bretton Woods Agreement provided both economic trade benefits and American protection of the world's sea lanes. All that, and more, worked. The free world recovered, prospered, moved on.
That factor of moving on is the central concern of the authors. Since the end of the Cold War they find the international order, nursed into being by the United States, is threatened by "contemporary amnesia." They state that, "America's commitment to the international order it built over generations is becoming more tenuous." This, they say is because the process "has proven so effective." The order has been so successful that the threats that required it seem to have gone away. They write, "the intensity of historical memory is related to its proximity...at present, most Americans have no recollections of the tragedies that spurred creation of the U. S.-led order." The costs of maintaining the order, economic and administrative, strike many as unnecessary now.
The closing chapter presents an articulate, rhetorical case in behalf of rebuilding the tragic sensibility that provides the reason for creating that international order. Some will obviously differ, citing other concerns that now require our attention and dollars. The authors response is that things are going so well only because of what we are doing. The costs, and consequences, would be much higher, they contend, if we have to deal with the tragedy the programs are protecting us against. The current "special military operation" in Ukraine is a pertinent example of why the threat can't be assumed to have vanished.
Highly recommended for those interested in the matter of war and peace.
The authors then start a high-speed trip through twenty-five hundred years of history in which they show that, after truly tragic episodes of warfare, the combatants attempted to construct a new international order among nations. Following the Thirty Years War, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia set the basic parameters for nation states and for conflicts among them. "Westphalia also established other diplomatic customs--permanently stationing diplomatic representatives in foreign capitals, convening international summits and consultations--in hope of regulating relations and settling disputes." Establishing coalitions that represented a balance of powers among nations was another outcome of the Treaty. It remained effective for over a hundred years until the French Revolution and subsequent continent-wide Napoleonic Wars began.
"In the wake of the ensuing quarter-century of conflict, however, there emerged the Concert of Europe" as the settlement agreement. This international order proved even more effective than the Westphalian arrangement in reducing conflict until World War I. That ending was comprised of the Versailles Treaty, and the organization of the League of Nations. The harshness of the Treaty terms was later used as justification by Germany for starting World War II.
The conclusion of WWII brings Brands and Edel to their principle concern: the international order established by American political leaders and continued on a strong bipartisan basis through the end of the Cold War. "Washington funded the rebuilding of devastated societies through...the Marshall Plan... created and led the International Monetary fund (IMF), the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)...and slashed its own average tariff...from 33 percent in 1944 to 13 percent in 1950. NATO was established to provide military security to a rebuilding Western Europe. Numerous mutual security agreements were established throughout the world. The Bretton Woods Agreement provided both economic trade benefits and American protection of the world's sea lanes. All that, and more, worked. The free world recovered, prospered, moved on.
That factor of moving on is the central concern of the authors. Since the end of the Cold War they find the international order, nursed into being by the United States, is threatened by "contemporary amnesia." They state that, "America's commitment to the international order it built over generations is becoming more tenuous." This, they say is because the process "has proven so effective." The order has been so successful that the threats that required it seem to have gone away. They write, "the intensity of historical memory is related to its proximity...at present, most Americans have no recollections of the tragedies that spurred creation of the U. S.-led order." The costs of maintaining the order, economic and administrative, strike many as unnecessary now.
The closing chapter presents an articulate, rhetorical case in behalf of rebuilding the tragic sensibility that provides the reason for creating that international order. Some will obviously differ, citing other concerns that now require our attention and dollars. The authors response is that things are going so well only because of what we are doing. The costs, and consequences, would be much higher, they contend, if we have to deal with the tragedy the programs are protecting us against. The current "special military operation" in Ukraine is a pertinent example of why the threat can't be assumed to have vanished.
Highly recommended for those interested in the matter of war and peace.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 33 reviews