Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime

by David Barno, Nora Bensahel

Every military must prepare for future wars despite not really knowing the shape such wars will ultimately take. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once noted: "We have a perfect record in predicting the next war. We have never once gotten it right." In the face of such great uncertainty, militaries must be able to adapt rapidly in order to win. Adaptation under Fire identifies the characteristics that make militaries more adaptable, illustrated through historical examples and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Authors David Barno and Nora Bensahel argue that militaries facing unknown future conflicts must nevertheless make choices about the type of doctrine that their units will use, the weapons and equipment they will purchase, and the kind of leaders they will select and develop to guide the force to victory. Yet after a war begins, many of these choices will prove flawed in the unpredictable crucible of the battlefield. For a U.S. military facing diverse global threats, its ability to adapt quickly and effectively to those unforeseen circumstances may spell the difference between victory and defeat.

Barno and Bensahel start by providing a framework for understanding adaptation and include historical cases of success and failure. Next, they examine U.S. military adaptation during the nation's recent wars, and explain why certain forms of adaptation have proven problematic. In the final section, Barno and Bensahel conclude that the U.S. military must become much more adaptable in order to address the fast-changing security challenges of the future, and they offer recommendations on how to do so before it is too late.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Military History, Nonfiction, War

424 pages, Hardcover

First published August 17, 2020

About the author

David W. Barno is a retired Lieutenant General in the U.S. Army.

Reviews

[Wilson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Outstanding book by these two authors. Being on both sides of the net (operational and supporting establishment), the authors laid out a great overview of how well-intended policies end up having unintended consequences of hurting capability development, fielding, and testing.

I’ve long believed that it’s not a shortage of capabilities we have, but rather a risk aversion by leaders who either wish not to “rock the boat” with the unknown, or see the problem as too hard to tackle. The result is the same though: pursue marginal goals that somewhat contribute to mission accomplishment, while hoping someone else is placing their focus on these big problems.

These authors also hit on talent management, awards, and fitness report (FITREP) processes that also unintentionally reward short-sighted executions (get those numbers up!) instead of long-term efforts.

Overall it’s a good analysis, yet lamentable that many wish not to take the time to understand emerging capabilities and concepts, and instead look for “easy wins” for the sake of showing they are making progress on something.

Finally, understanding that there is a rift between Combatant Commands (focus on “the now”) and services (the future) at times has cost hundreds of lives in the past. If we (currently I’m on the service side) cannot put aside our idolized processes and work to break barriers to supporting CCMD efforts, we will almost certainly have another “MRAP moment”, or even a Palantir/DCGS embarrassment.

[Dale · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really good with case studies through the modern era of warfare. I very honest drill down on the lack of adaptation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although I did not agree with all of the innovators highlighted the book does cause one to think. Best part is they recommend changes in the Army system to become more innovative.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well written with a lot of solid theoretical underpinnings to its application to recent conflicts. Nonetheless, I found myself wishing for more time spent on case studies beyond OIF and OEF. I also wished for a better exploration of military acquisitions beyond the over-simplified trope of “the FAR is bad.”

[Jacqueline Leeker]

What capability gaps and skillsets should the U.S. military be focusing on to win future wars? The authors of Adaptation Under Fire suggest adaption is the key skillset the military needs to face multiple challenges and an ambiguous future.

The authors Lt. General (Ret.) David Barno and Dr. Nora Bensahel are both visiting professors at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. In the book they discuss the importance of adaptation in three sections. The first section examines adaptation through previous operations. The second section examines adaption through more recent conflicts in the Middle East.

The third part of the book looks toward the future of what war could be, focusing on the new domains of space, cyber, and new technology. The final section also highlights current barriers to success including long acquisition timelines, training concerns, lack of doctrine, and bureaucratic culture, with suggestions on how to address each concern.

The Department of Defense must be focused on how to win future wars by first developing adaptive leaders by updating Professional Military Education (PME), second by addressing the long timelines of procurement and acquisition, and third by encouraging a culture of reassessment and reflection.

[Phillip Murrell · Rating 3 out of 5]

As a US army officer with over 21 years of service, I found this book interesting. I nodded along with it at many points. I didn't agree with all of them, but I understood the authors' position. Specifically, I agreed with the position on decentralized versus centralized decision making. I think it's a good book for military personnel or people interested in seeing behind the curtain. Something to close the knowledge gap between military and civilians.

[Edwin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Barno and Bensahel's book provides a well-organized and thoroughly researched discussion of the topic of military wartime adaptation. Their approach to dividing the discussion into areas of doctrine, technology, and leadership provided a very readable treatment of the material. Some of their conclusions were contradictory (such as poo-pooing the first Trump administration's decision to move a GWOT-era rapid acquisitions office under DARPA, but then recommending the exact same thing just a few pages later), and the focus on adaptation solely within the Army felt myopic.

[Dan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well researched (almost 100 pages of references) and well organized. The book is both descriptive and proscriptive, and should be on every defense professional’s DESK.

Knowing what to do and how to do it is important, but the question to the authors is: how do we get rid of that which is no longer needed?

[Karlen Morris · Rating 5 out of 5]

So many takeaways from this book. A book that should be used as we look back over the War on Terror and as we look for lesson learned and how we move forward. A no holds bar look at what we did well and what failed to do.

[Jer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good introduction if you’re unfamiliar, helpful reminders / reference for those who already are in the know, this book is a valuable contribution (even if a bit long and academic).

If you’ve got an interest, check it out.

[Brian Thorson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Doctrine = Useful
Adaptive culture and processes = Decisive

Useful read

[Brenden Siekman · Rating 3 out of 5]

Chapter 1: The Nature of Adaptation

In this chapter, Barno and Bensahel define adaptation as "the ability to change in response to new information, new challenges, or new opportunities." They argue that adaptation is essential for militaries, as they must be able to adapt to the ever-changing nature of warfare.

Chapter 2: The Sources of Adaptation

Barno and Bensahel identify three sources of adaptation:

Doctrine: Doctrine is the "body of thought" that guides military operations. It provides a framework for understanding and responding to the challenges of warfare.
Technology: Technology can provide militaries with new capabilities that can be used to adapt to the challenges of warfare.
Leadership: Leaders play a critical role in adaptation. They must be able to create an environment where adaptation is encouraged and supported.
Chapter 3: The Challenges of Adaptation

Barno and Bensahel identify three challenges to adaptation:

Culture: Military cultures can be resistant to change. This can make it difficult to adapt to new challenges.
Bureaucracy: Military bureaucracies can be slow and inefficient. This can make it difficult to implement changes quickly.
Resources: Adaptation can be expensive. This can limit the ability of militaries to adapt to new challenges.
Chapter 4: The Future of Adaptation

Barno and Bensahel argue that the future of warfare will be characterized by uncertainty and complexity. This will make it even more important for militaries to be adaptable. They offer the following recommendations for how militaries can improve their ability to adapt:

Develop a culture of adaptation.
Invest in technology.
Train leaders to be adaptable.
Create a system for rapid decision-making.
How an Operations Research Systems Analyst for the Army Could Use / Apply Those Lessons

Operations Research Systems Analysts (ORSAs) for the Army can use the lessons from Adaptation Under Fire to improve their ability to support adaptation in the military. Specifically, ORSAs can use the following tools and techniques to support adaptation:

Systems analysis: Systems analysis can be used to identify the challenges and opportunities facing the military.
Modeling and simulation: Modeling and simulation can be used to test new ideas and concepts before they are implemented.
Data analytics: Data analytics can be used to identify patterns and trends that can help the military adapt to new challenges.
Operations research: Operations research can be used to develop solutions to complex problems.
By using these tools and techniques, ORSAs can help the military adapt to the ever-changing nature of warfare.

In addition to the above, ORSAs can also play a role in supporting adaptation by:

Educating military leaders about the importance of adaptation.
Developing training programs that teach military personnel how to adapt to new challenges.
Conducting research on new technologies and concepts that can help the military adapt.
Advocating for changes to military policies and procedures that will make it easier for the military to adapt.
By taking these steps, ORSAs can help the military become more adaptable and better prepared to meet the challenges of the future.