November 1918: The German Revolution

by Robert Gerwarth

The German Revolution of November 1918 is nowadays largely forgotten outside Germany. It is generally regarded as a failure even by those who have heard of it, a missed opportunity which paved the way for the rise of the Nazis and the catastrophe to come.

Robert Gerwarth argues here that to view the German Revolution in this way is a serious misjudgement. Not only did it bring down the authoritarian monarchy of the Hohenzollern, it also brought into being the first ever German democracy in an amazingly bloodless way.

Focusing on the dramatic events between the last months of the First World War in 1918 and Hitler's Munich Putsch of 1923, Robert Gerwarth illuminates the fundamental and deep-seated ways in which the November Revolution changed Germany. In doing so, he reminds us that, while it is easy with the benefit of hindsight to write off the 1918 Revolution as a 'failure', this failure was not somehow pre-ordained. In 1918, the fate of the German Revolution remained very much an open book.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Germany, Politics, European History, World War I, German Literature

352 pages, Hardcover

First published September 1, 2020

About the author

Robert Gerwarth is a Professor of European history, with an emphasis on German history. Since finishing a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship at Oxford, he has held fellowships at Princeton, Harvard, the NIOD (Amsterdam) and the Institute for Advanced Studies at the University of Western Australia.

Reviews

[Anthony · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mixed Emotions

The 1918 German Revolution and the Weimar Republic that followed suffered greatly from the start. Wanted by neither the left nor the right for differing reasons it suffered from a lack of political legitimacy throughout its existence. It was born only through a humiliating defeat and came to an end by allowing the Nazi regime to take over. Not a good CV. Robert Gerwarth believes that the long standing narrative on the 1918 German Revolution is unfair and too harsh. For me he puts some compelling points across, but in other ways this is a flawed argument.

In the Spring of 1918 OHL (German High Command) still believed they could win the war. Germany by this time was essentially a military dictatorship with Paul von Hindenburg and Eric Ludendorff running things and the Kaiser slipping into the background. Having wrapped up the Eastern Front with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, they believed they needed to complete one final push before too many American soldiers came to France, which would overwhelm them. They nearly pulled it off. However, when the Spring Offensive failed, there would be no victory, nor any negotiated peace. Too little too late was done, to compromise or meet with Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points. Modern changes in the government in the spring of 1918 were not enough to settle an armistice. German morale by this time had reached an all time low, even in the relatively stable army. But the Kaiser also made mistakes in not taking a grip of the civil responsibilities and by sitting back, allowed the floodgates of revolution to occur. It began in Kiel where a naval mutiny occurred, then spread to the cities. Lack of food and huge casualties on the battlefield were the German people’s breaking point.

What is still key about the German Revolution is that in reality Germany was not allowed to surrender until revolution occurred. This was practically imposed by Wilson and allies. But what is clear is that most just wanted the war to end. They did not necessarily invite a new republic. Any other time this would not have happened. Gerwarth argues that this was the only one of two non violent revolutions in industrial societies. The other being the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. However, he tries to draw a line between the days leading up to the armistice, when war was still waging in France and the political violence which followed in the 1920s. For me they are an extension of this revolution. Gerwarth states that there were many good things about the Weimar Republic, he feels a moral, representative and free society was created, one much more liberal than Bismarck’s 1870 creation. This is true, but one key component was still missing, the soft power of the monarch at the top. Had this been in place there certainly would have been no Führer cult.

I also agree with Gerwarth that Weimar Germany was not on its way to Nazism from the start. The two aren’t intrinsically linked. But German national pride and self confidence was torn apart. Anger at an unfair treaty and the development of the stab in the back myth had already began to take shape. The book is very readable and Gerwarth has a great understanding of Germany and Realpolitik. But he almost protests too much that Weimar was not the republic no one wanted. There is no great commemoration for this system that was in place in between two devastating wars. What Gerwarth has done however is allowed me to appreciate some of its positives which I may have overlooked before.

[Sean · Rating 5 out of 5]

Covers German history from 1914 to 1923, with an emphasis on politics in the immediate aftermath of the First World War and the abrupt collapse of the Wilhelmine state. Gewarth argues that the Weimar republic showed remarkable resilience given its troubled (though relatively bloodless) birth, and believes that historians don't give the republic its due thanks to our knowledge of what was to come. Recommended to anyone interested in 20th c. European history.

A few fun bits:

* My favorite politician is now Franz Lipp, who served as the Commissar for Foreign Affairs for the Munich Soviet Republic. Gewarth writes that Lipp "... telegraphed to Moscow to complain the the 'fugitive Hoffman [his non-communist predecessor] has taken with him the keys to my ministry toilet,' and declared war on the neighboring state of Württemberg and on Switzerland because 'these docs have not at once loaned me sixty locomotives. I am certain,' he added, 'that we will be victorious.' " His attention to detail and confidence are admirable.

* The notion of Anschluss, which is usually associated with the Nazi regime, was in the wake of WWI a left-coded idea. That it failed is no surprise - the French more or less wanted to break up the German nation into smaller pieces to render it harmless. The idea that the Allies would permit Germany and Austria to merge seems ludicrous in retrospect. At the time, however, it appealed to Germans across the ideological spectrum but particularly on the left as in tune with Woodrow Wilson's concept of national self-determination. That Anschluss didn't happen ultimately added to the grievances of the right.

* The Weimar state improved the lives of women in a number of respects, but one stood out: it abolished the celibacy requirement for female civil servants. Imagine working for the DMV and having to take a vow of celibacy! Weird stuff.

* David Lloyd George on Turks: "...a human cancer, a creeping agony in the flesh of the lands which they misgovern, rotting away every fiber of life."

* Gewarth's verdict on rutabagas: appalling flavor. Seems unfair to me, as I rather like them.

[Steve]

Professor Gerwarth argues that the German revolution produced a republic that is deserving of much greater credit than history has allowed. Because the Great Depression fed a chain of dark events in Europe, the Weimar Republic is most often considered a failed state, a conclusion deserving of reexamination. I find Professor Gerwarth’s logic compelling. Germany sustained far greater social and political advancement following the First World War with less loss of life than many Central and Eastern European countries. Assessing the republic as of late 1923, Professor Gerwarth writes:

Germany had a democratic government, a liberal constitution that granted its citizens wide-ranging basic political and economic rights, and a noticeably improving economy. The government crisis of autumn 1923 had been overcome. Extremist minorities on the political Left and Right had been marginalized, and their attempts to violently topple the republic had failed. Despite its territorial losses, the Reich had been preserved as a unified nation-state—counter to French ambitions and the efforts of small separatist movements inside Germany. In view of the great number of challenges that the young republic had been exposed to between 1918 and 1923, German democrats could have looked back on their achievements with a certain degree of pride.

Then, in conclusion:

Historians have repeatedly and justifiably pointed to the many weaknesses of Weimar—weaknesses which, however, have only proven to be such in retrospect. Yet they are being continuously referred to when historians assess the nature and success (or lack thereof) of the revolution. This has led to a very one-sided image of Weimar as a stillborn republic—a perception that is certainly not reflected in the views of most people in 1918 or even in 1923. In fact, in late 1923, the failure of democracy would have seemed far less probable than its consolidation. At that point, the future of the Weimar Republic was wide open.

I still wonder, why Petrograd in 1917 and not Berlin in 1918? One contributing factor was the German Freikorps, a potent reactionary force without analogue at that critical fulcrum of Russian history. The Russian reactionaries gathered in arms too late; the Germans were there at a time and place that mattered to history. Why so many felt compelled to assert the status quo, or at least brake revolutionary momentum, is a matter for further study.

[Oleksandr Zholud · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a non-fic historic overview of German revolution of 1918 and its outcomes. The big new idea is to stop viewing it as an ‘unfinished revolution’ that by its partial nature led to Nazi coming to power. In view of the enormous challenges that the emerging Weimar Republic faced, the German Revolution was the ‘greatest’ of all revolutions, the only one happening in line with original Marxist idea of a socialist revolution in an industrial state (not in growing but largely agricultural Russia and China, where Lenin and Mao had to develop their ‘amendments’ to Marxism to justify own bloody putsches).

The book starts with the situation in 1915-18, with such major items as unrestricted naval warfare, Zimmerman telegram, entering of the US into war, Russian revolution, Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, attempt of the final push on the western front – Operation Michael and hunger within the Reich. German empire was quite unlike others – they had a parliament with largest political party, the Majority Social Democrats (MSPD), the first highly industrialized country in the world to introduce universal suffrage for women in 1918, with a split from MSPD that hasn’t supported war loans, etc. In the last years parliament’s decisions met the factual military dictatorship of Hindenburg,-Ludendorff, who didn’t follow them, e.g. despite parliament’s protest decided on extensive use of submarines to break the naval blockade.

The revolution was quite civil and bloodless. The Kaiser was in OHL’s military field headquarters in the Belgian town of Spa since 29 October 1918, shortly after the constitutional reforms—‘the revolution from above’—had stripped him of much of his power. He flatly refused even to contemplate abdication (required by Woodrow Wilson as a precondition of peace) and even thought about storming Berlin with an army, but the poll of field commanders showed to his surprise that only 1 of 39 polled believed that his men would follow their Supreme Warlord against the revolutionaries. Fifteen recorded that their loyalty was doubtful; twenty-one rejected the idea outright. To get the ceasefire as fast as their can, politicians in Berlin declared the abdication before it happened.

The peace terms were a great surprise to Germans, who viewed own new government as the force that won against the Kaiser and his politics, but who were forced to pay for their predecessors’ actions. In line with Wilson’s idea on self-determination the Anschluss of Austria was debated at the opening of the
German National Assembly. Germans hoped that the German Reich would soon compensate for its military defeat and the anticipated loss of Alsace-Lorraine by incorporating German-Austria, the truncated, German-speaking state left over after the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire. On 12 November 1918, the Provisional Government in Vienna declared German-Austria to be ‘part of the German Republic. So, the Anschluss was not a Nazi or even right-wing idea.

There is a lot more information about Spartacists rising, its bloody reversal by Freikorps soldiers who among others had murdered Spartacists’ leaders Liebknecht and Luxemburg; the Second Munich Soviet Republic that established a Bolshevik regime in Munich and opened communications with Lenin. Under Lenin’s instructions, they began arresting members of the aristocracy and the upper middle classes as hostages. When the army stormed Munich several hostages (incl. women) were shot. It is possible that the profound sense of living in a world in which established social orders and hierarchies had been violently overturned prompted a right-wing backlash in Bavaria. Munich in particular was to become the most staunchly nationalist and anti-Bolshevik city in Weimar Germany and it was not a coincidence that it was the Bavarian capital that became the birthplace of Nazism.

A very informative book on the subject.

[Birko · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ein phantastisches Buch. Beginnend in den letzten Kriegsjahren und endend mit der Überwindung der Hyperinflation im Jahre 1923, gibt das Buch eine strukturierte Übersicht über die Anfangsphase der Weimarer Republik. Dem in Dublin lebenden Autor ist es zu verdanken, dass auch die Situation in den anderen Ländern der Mittelmächte und in Russland erwähnt werden.

Ein hoch interessantes Buch, welches ich nicht mehr aus der Hand legen wollte. Besser kann man Geschichte nicht lebendig werden lassen.

[Bongobongo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mi s-a părut o lucrare mai mult decât adecvată, deși admit că nu am cu ce s-o compar. Sunt de acord cu teza autorului: Republica de la Weimar a fost multă vreme interpretată drept sortită pieirii, o interpretare teleologică și, în mod evident, lacunară. Însă afirmația lui cum că această percepție nu s-a schimbat în istoriografia recentă nu mi se pare tocmai veridică. De fapt, am senzația că această reinterpretare a Republicii de la Weimar nu e atât de nouă. În plus, oricât de mult ar susține autorul, îmi vine greu să cred că în 1923, după puciuri și răscoale, turbulențe economice și altele, Republica de la Weimar ar fi fost o democrație cu adevărat stabilă și prosperă.

[Mickey Mantle · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fascinating history on a topic most know very little about. The German attempt at a Republican form of government was quite noble and actually succeeded considering the numerous obstacles placed in its path. The history is not a study in retrospect. This is not begin with the Nazis and go backwards. It is begin with the defeated German Military State headed by the Kaiser and go forward. Very interesting. The post WWI conditions in Europe were seemingly up for grabs. The French, it would seem, have avoided scrutiny for their obvious role in dooming German Democracy after WWI. Karma always bites France in the posterior.

[Hans · Rating 4 out of 5]

Gives a very clear and comprehensive picture of one of the most forgotten yet important European revolutions. Does the Weimar republic justice by illustrating the firm footings on which it was born and the challenges it had to overcome.

[Leonard Janke · Rating 5 out of 5]

Overall Rating: 4.75/5.0

A sentiment often expressed today is that the political situation in present-day America strongly resembles Weimar Germany. This sentiment comes mainly from the left, where many fear that the rise of populism under Donald Trump is setting America on a course where it "could lose its democracy" and become a fascist state. The depth of this belief strengthens the further one goes out on the left.

On the right, fears of similarities to Weimar are expressed less frequently but still exist, albeit cast differently. For those on the right who see similarities, there is growing moral and intellectual decadence, including a rise in sympathy for extreme leftist ideologies. For some, such as Christian Nationalists, they also see a political system not up to the task of saving itself from these existential threats.

Robert Gerwarth's study of early Weimar is, thus, very timely. Gerwarth's central thesis is that Weimar was more resilient to existential threats than many now believe and that its ultimate fall to National Socialism was only foreseeable retrospectively. Indeed, Gerwarth suggests that without the singular event of the Great Depression, Weimar's demise would likely not have happened at all, despite all the other extraordinary challenges the Weimar Republic faced.

WWI and Weimar

November 1918 focuses on the period from about 1916 until the end of 1923. The coverage of WWI is particularly fascinating. Gerwarth discusses how, although Germany understood it was likely to draw America into the war, it felt it had to escalate submarine warfare; otherwise, it would slowly suffocate under the Allies' naval blockade.

Critical to later Weimar attitudes, Gerwarth discusses the sudden swing of military fortunes in favor of Germany in late 1917. This began with Ludendorff's stunning victories in the east, Russia's withdrawal from the war and vast concessions of land in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the emergence of stormtroopers with tactics capable of breaking the years-long stalemate of trench warfare on the Western Front. From such near giddy heights, it is easy to see how Germans were shocked, and many later fell into denial about the complete reversal of fortunes on the Western Front.

Gerwarth makes it clear, however, that there was no "stab in the back." At the time of the military mutinies and the November Revolution, Germany was indeed understood, including by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, to be beaten, even if its front had not completely collapsed. Indeed, Gerwarth argues that the mutinies and Revolution were due to the fact that, in Germany, it was widely recognized that Germany was beaten and, hence, needed to get out of the war before total annihilation. Gerwarth shows that the Weimar Republic was quite popular and that its most important leaders, though on the left, were utterly determined to prevent Bolshevism from spreading into Germany.

Betrayal at Versailles

Today, it is well understood that a primary reason for the rise of Hitler and the world's descent into a Second World War was the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles. Gerwarth discusses this in detail, emphasizing not only the treaty's harshness but the sense of betrayal Germans felt. They had believed Wilson would, at least to some extent, deliver on his promises of "peace without victory" if they changed their government from a rather militaristic monarchy to a liberal, constitutional Republic. Germany had fulfilled its end of this implicit understanding, but it seemed to scarcely matter. Unlike the Congress of Vienna, which dealt with the defeat of Napoleon and France and included France's input in the final decision, Germany had no input in drafting the Treaty of Versailles and, essentially, no option but to accept all of it.

The Left's Sense of Betrayal

Although it is well known that the German right felt that the country had been betrayed by the Revolution of November 1918, Gerwarth tells the less well-known story of how many on the left, even to this day, also felt the Revolution was a betrayal. They thought the Revolution presented a missed opportunity to create a government that was even more "of people," meaning especially labor, than what emerged.

Although, from all the feelings of betrayal, left and right, it would seem that nobody liked Weimar, Gerwarth shows that the Revolution, in the direction of Social Democracy as opposed to Bolshevism, was very popular at the time and would remain so until the Great Depression.

Weimar Culture

In addition to his coverage of political and military events, Gerwarth spends some time discussing the culture of Weimar. This includes the emerging political power of women, early optimism regarding tolerance of gay people, and the backlash that these generated. Gerwarth vividly describes German soldiers' alienation after returning home as losers in a war they sacrificed so much to win. He discusses the rift between those on the front who often wanted to continue the fight and what they regarded as weak military elements in the rear who favored withdrawal. Gerwarth discusses how many found the way to deny losing the war was to fail to move on and continue "fighting the war" by joining extreme right-wing paramilitaries and other organizations. Most interestingly, Gerwarth discusses how the regions that initially saw the greatest success for the radical left experienced the strongest backlash from the right, with cities like Munich, for instance, later becoming their greatest strongholds.

The Book's Strengths and Weaknesses

Gerwarth's book provides a highly engaging, often vivid recount of the earliest days of Weimar. The reader can feel the sense of shock at the reversals in the fortunes of war; they can understand the sense of betrayal by the Treaty of Versailles and can easily see how these led many into a sense of denial. Gerwarth is quite masterful in tying this all together in what is relatively short for a history book: just a hair under 10 hours of listening time on Audible. In addition, Gerwarth has an uncommon take that Weimar's Democracy was quite resilient, as demonstrated by the fact that it survived severe challenges from the extreme left and extreme right early on and was able to bounce back from hyperinflation.

The book's only real weakness is that, in being so short, most readers will likely feel some areas were not covered adequately. I would have liked to see more detail, for instance, on how the situation on the Western Front fell apart in 1918, and more specifics on why the right felt Weimar was morally decadent.

Comparing Weimar and Present-Day America

The great contemporary relevance of a book like this is that it allows us to see how many things in Weimar were quite different from what we see in contemporary America. This, in my view, if it does not shatter, at least dramatically undermines those who see powerful parallels between present-day America and Weimar. Yes, with a superficial look, there are some vague semblances. For instance, Hitler was a nationalist, and Trump is a nationalist. A similarity it is true. But what are the key differences?

Although it has lost wars recently, America has suffered nothing comparable to German causalities in WWI. No Treaty of Versailles has been imposed upon us. We do not have a millstone of reparations around our necks. Although there was some extreme leftist violence in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the scale was much less than leftist violence in Weimar. There have been no comparable coup attempts. Some may argue Jan 6 was a coup attempt, but compare the death tolls and ask how many genuinely seem willing to die for the cause of a "stolen election" versus how many died in the name of extreme left and right-wing ideologies in Weimar.

Additionally, no powerful foreign adversary is openly aligned with domestic extremists to the extent that the Bolshevists were aligned with German Communists. Compare America's military tradition, which has entailed strong domestic opposition to nearly all foreign wars resulting in significant American causalities and long engagements, to that of Germany pre-Weimar. Consider also that although there was street violence in and around 2020, it is orders of magnitude less than what was seen in Weimar.

Although it was not an explicit intent of Gerwarth's book, a great strength is providing readers with the opportunity to see the differences between now and Weimar. Additionally, contrary to the beliefs of some on the right, the book clarifies that in extreme situations, where there is a mix of moderate and radical leftists, the more ruthless extreme left is not guaranteed to crush the weak Kerenskyist moderates. Weimar's Social Democrats were deeply determined to keep Germany from turning Bolshevist and were successful. Sometimes, emergency powers were used by the moderate left, but, in contrast to another common belief on the right, that such powers are never temporary and only ratcheted up over time, things did return to normal after the crises had passed.

Conclusion

Overall, I highly recommend November 1918 for providing a highly engaging and concise discussion of Weimar with an uncommon take that Weimar was a more resilient and popular Republic than many today imagine.

[Liam Ostermann · Rating 4 out of 5]

(I have corrected a number of spelling, grammar and examples of poor or confusing phrasing of this review which I first posted two years ago. The substance of the review is unaltered).

Marvelous book on a period in history (the end of Wilhelmine Germany and the birth of the Weimar republic) and the specific revolution that brought in about that even those of us who have read anything about post WWI Germany will probably know nothing, or at very least, very little about. It may reflect my own ignorance rather than a general ignorance but I never knew that Germany continued in the Weimar period to be officially called a 'Reich' not a Republic, that the term Weimar Republic was a term, if not invented by, was certainly used extensively by Hitler to define what he was against. There is a great deal here that is not simply eye opening but will cause you to rethink what you may think you know; and if you have enjoyed or found enlightening any of Mr. Gerwarth's other books then I doubt you will be disappointed in this one.

One thing this book helped me to understand better was why, in contrast to WWII, there were no members of the German army signing the armistice; the answer is not hard to find but is an wonderful example of 'unintended consequence'. The US president launched his '14 points' and made other statements (all without consulting his other allies) which seemed to suggest that peace without annexations or indemnities would be open to any warring party that was not militarist/monarchical, so the German politicians happily excluded any participation by the generals who had run almost everything in Germany post 1914 and certainly had the final say in all policy matters because they expected the allies to deal with civilian, democratic, politicians in a more liberal/understanding/sympathetic way. The German generals were delighted to dump this poisoned chalice on the politicians so they could of course absolve themselves all responsibility if things didn't go well, as of course they didn't, for the politicians and thus the generals avoided taking responsibility for the mess they had made. Jumping ahead it was because of the disastrous lack of coordination amongst the allies in WWI, and in particular the way Wilson raised false expectations amongst the defeated countries, that in WWII, the allies set 'unconditional surrender' out as the terms for armistice and also any negotiations/armistice/surrender would always involve all the allies; thus avoiding the cock ups and confusions that Wilson's independent interventions caused. That is why in WWII any counterfactual readings of a separate peace between The UK & USA and the Nazis so as to avoid the communist takeover of Eastern Europe are just impossible - the allied leaders in WWII could only look back, not forward.

Having said that, and duly allowing for Wilson's disastrous interventions (I'll admit I dislike Wilson intently - although a liberal hero in the USA I find him totally unsympathetic - his was a prig whose ignorance of the European situation was only matched by his arrogant surety that he knew best. The result was that he sold out all his promises and ideals so he could get his European allies to accept the League of Nations and the his own country rendered the League still born by rejecting it. He was a failure, not of good intentions but of stupidity, blindness to reality and overweening vanity) the German politicians having, in many cases, accepted the Kaiser's expansionist and crippling peace treaties against Russia and Romania, all of a sudden expected to be treated in a different way - refusing even to accept 'in theory' that France and Belgium might have cause to resent the way the German armies had invaded and ravaged their countries.

I could go on, but the best thing is for anyone interested in this period is to read the - it is not a 'popular' history in the 'vulgar' sense but it is well written and readable - as should come as no surprise to anyone who has read his other excellent books such as 'The Vanquished'.

[Henry · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is terrible. I'm not getting paid to write reviews, but a short capsule to follow. Needless to say, even if your book covers the basic chronological story decently, if it is repetitive in its telling, weak in its characterization, shoddy in its editing, and lacking in any analytical heft, it should not be considered a quality work of history. Gerwarth is not a bad writer, his The Vanquished is a good book! But its clear that his November 1918 should have cooked a bit longer, had a better editor, and been thought out a bit more. Reading it is like reading three different books at once, by different authors, all who seem to be interested in different things. A patched together feel, with weak, weird transitions, odd word choice, over reliance on acronyms and ill defined terms, and the picking up and dropping out of historical characters and events with no explanation whatsoever, man, is this book disappointing. I'm rating it two starts, because I did learn quite a bit, but the quality of writing really is a drag.

One final note: quite the opposite of Gerwarth's intention I bet, he gives the impression that the big "stabbed in the back at home" myth explaining German defeat in the First World War has some validity to it. That's bad.

[Carwyn. · Rating 3 out of 5]

In the preface to 'November 1918', Gerwarth comments that he signed the contract for this book almost a decade previously and has since been sidetracked by publishing two books, including his impressive 'The Vanquished...'. Whereas 'the Vanquished...' feels like a passionate account of the interwar period, November 1918 seems more like an obligation with its short length and lack of new information (in the context of the interwar period).

I enjoy all that I have read from Gerwarth but in this case, I believe Mark Jones’ 'Founding Weimar...' to be a better , enthralling book on the German Revolution because it successfully communicates the mood of the revolutionary crowds, the actions of the masses in the streets and gives a greater understanding of who the Spartacus League were and their actions in the new Republic.

Finally, a better proof reader is required; the scuttling of the High Seas Fleet and the political purpose behind it is mentioned twice, almost word for word, in three pages; there are several spacing issues between words and punctuation, and in one instance, what I presume is meant to be ‘Telegraph to Switzerland’ is instead published as Switzerlandtelegraph.

[Melle · Rating 4 out of 5]

Much-appreciated review of this crucial period in German history. The remarkable history of the German empire imploding and the endless possibilities this created for a different history is tantalizing. The storytelling could have been a bit livelier, but hey, that's a german historian for you.

[Matt Beaty · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great introuduction to a revolution I had never heard of.

[Degenerate Chemist · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm giving this 3 stars because I honestly don't know what else to give it.

"November 1918" is about the German Revolution of 1918- the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of the Weimar Republic. The thesis of this book is that it is a mistake to look at the fall of the Weimar as foreordained and that to do so is evaluating the era with the benefit of hindsight.

The book spends the first 4 chapters establishing the backdrop for the revolution before it gets to the Kiel mutiny and its fallout. From there it is a walkthrough of establishing the republic, dealing with far left radicals, and the treaty of Versailles. It wraps up with the events of the Kapp Putsch and the Ruhr uprising.

I have a few issues with this book. One being that it felt rushed and disjointed. The author tried to cram so much minutia into this book that at times it felt he was reading off a list of random dates and names. There were times when I wanted more information on a topic and the author would just jump to another, marginally related subject. I wanted less of the minutiae and more meaningful analysis.

The author kept repeating throughout his work that the idea that the German government abandoned its soldiers was a myth, but everything he wrote indicated otherwise. The Kiel mutiny was begun by the Navy that barely saw any action during the war. The uprising was generally a left wing affair. Citizens spent their time destroying soldiers uniforms and going out of their way to humiliate them. The men on the front found out about the revolution after it had mostly been settled. These men had been fighting bolshevicks in the war only to turn around and find bolshevicks were restructuring the government. It isn't hard to understand why these men would have held a grudge against the new government and the political left. It was just bizarre how the author kept harping on about this topic when all the evidence he presented indicated otherwise.

I found the section on the treaty of Versailles interesting. It is the first time I realized that the allies treated the central powers like defeated colonies. And I had to remember this war came towards the end of the age of imperialism.

Gerwanth really boils down the weakness in the Weimar as conflicts between the far left and the far right destabilizing government authority. I don't know if that is his intention but that is what this book boils down to- the majority like the republic they just wish the far left and the far right would stop fighting in the streets.

I read this without having a very deep knowledge of German politics during this time so I learned a lot from it. I feel like I could find this same information in a source that is better written or edited. I am not thrilled with whatever was going on when the author claimed the government didn't abandon the soldiers.

I listened to the audio book version narrated by Michael Page.

[Riley Roche · Rating 2 out of 5]

A book structured around, as I see it, two main ideas: 1) that the November Revolution was faced with a choice, either Wilson or Lenin; 2) that Weimar has not be properly appreciated outside of Hitler’s shadow.

Despite these very, very interesting arguments—and the excellent quality of the research notwithstanding—the book falls rather flat. The ‘Wilson’ side of things is given too much emphasis relative to the ‘Lenin’ side. The author, in great detail, recounts the march towards liberalism taken by the MSPD in hopes of a 14-points-inspired peace deal. However, essentially no pages are dedicated to the other half of the dual power situation, the workers’ and soldiers’ councils. References are made to the spectre of Bolshevism and the possibility of civil war, but the political vehicle for this possible transformation is neglected. This is strange considering that Scheidemann and Liebknecht set the terms of the struggle by each declaring a German Republic on the same day—one parliamentarian and the other councilist.

Perhaps this neglect can be found in the author’s generally flippant (to say the least) attitude towards Marx and his especial disinclination towards Lenin. Whatever one might think of the Marxists, their spectre loomed incredibly large over Germany, and not just in the form of energetic intellectuals like Luxemburg and Zetkin. The Russian *soviet* was the thing, and the author of this work neglects, as I said, the dual power regime between the councils and parliament almost entirely.

The work is a serviceable introduction to an incredibly neglected, “lost” (as Chris Harman says) revolution, but it fails to deliver on its tantalizing central arguments, ultimately rendering the work a well-researched but incomplete political history of Germany’s struggle with its post-armistice conditions.

[Evan Þ. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Gerwarth views the overthrow of the German Empire from a contemporary perspective, arguing that it was a significant revolution and that the Weimar Republic (outside hindsight) wasn't an abortion or betrayal of the revolution's promise. I think he's technically proven his case, but little more.

Gerwarth deservedly shows the decay of the Imperial government and its regressive nature, and how huge a change it was when it was overthrown. He also shows the huge chaos of the revolution, how conservatives had been discredited, and how a whole spectrum from liberal republicans to multiple types of Communists were jockeying for power. And then, a liberal-republican alliance got the upper hand, allied with the army to put down the Communists, and declared the Weimar Republic.

Yes, there was a huge change. Yes, a liberal democrat would say this was the promise of the revolution (though a Communist would disagree) - at least, inasmuch as it was possible given the Treaty of Versailles. But the steelman of the anti-Weimar case is that the Treaty, and the alliance with the army, were flaws at the heart of Weimar that would eventually betray the Revolution's promise. (Inasmuch as it had a specific promise in the first place - Gerwarth shows how that was unclear!) Gerwarth observes that Weimar's democracy outlasted most Eastern European countries - to which I would merely say they had flaws too.

So I still deem Weimar fundamentally flawed.

[Piker7977 · Rating 4 out of 5]

The birth of the German republic in 1918 is overshadowed by the Russian Revolution and the democratic breakdown of the 1930s. While those events were true paradigm shifts, the birth of Weimar needs more attention as it shows how a revolution can happen in an imperial nation. In the German Reich, state by state embraced political and economic alternatives after the collapse of the western offensive in 1918 as majority socialists created a middle of the road, liberal governance system. This was not done without violence or resentment. However, as Gerwarth points on in his narrative and epilogue, by 1923 the Weimar Republic was a fairly stable and progressive system with potential for growth due to the reforms during the Interwar years.

We know that the Great Depression would squeeze the global economy and burst forth political extremists who were sitting on their resentment since the end of the war. But, few predicted that future in 1923 and the German democratic parliamentary republic forged in last year of the Great War deserves more respect and credit than what it gets from being under the shadow of Hitler and Nazism that shrouds its popular legacy.

[Reko Wenell · Rating 3 out of 5]

The idea of the book is to look at the 1918 revolution and the creation of the Weimar Republic without the inevitable shadow of its fall and the rise of the Third Reich. This change of perspective allows us to see it as the (fairly) nonviolent democratic triumph it was, where lots of reasonable and serious people made responsible if suboptimal choices to avert worst case scenarios. One cannot but applaud their success as for all their failings one must recall the dangerous tides they navigated. The perspective change is additionally justified by the fact that it helps us see how complex and contingent the world is: it’s clear that there was no inherent reason Weimar had to fail even given the far right winds of the time. If by nothing else, one can surmise it from the fact that the Republic had managed to stabilize before the Great Depression hit. Imagining a future of democratic solidification, however slow and uneasy, is not difficult. Viewing history this way instead of the perspective of inevitablity has big implications for our understanding of history and therefore the whole world.

[Troy S · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very informative book about the end of World War 1 and beginning of the Weimar Republic. I find Dr. Gerwarth's argument against what other modern historians claim -- that the Republic was doomed to fail and the birth of Nazism was inevitable due to the hardships stemming from the Treaty of Versailles -- is very compelling and that indeed much of history is written with the benefit of hindsight.

This book had the right level of detail and spanned an appropriate amount of time in history (from 1916-1923). I learned the most about the immediate aftermath of the war, I had no idea that more civilian lives were lost in Central and Eastern Europe than all the Entente military deaths during the war itself. It's quite eye opening just how unstable the whole first half of the 20th century actually was, even outside the war years themselves.

I would recommend this book to others that enjoy history who aren't familiar with the inter-war years.

[Timothy Liu · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a fairly short, but very enjoyable to read book. The author makes a strong argument that the 1918 revolution was not an "incomplete" revolution, but instead a true, complete revolution. The book includes a good mix of primary sources and quotes. Especially interesting was how fears of Bolshevism shaped and moderated the revolution. The book was shorter than I expected and I would have liked it to go on in more detail, especially about the Spartacist uprising and the early challenges to the Weimar Republic.

[Max · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read the review by Anthony posted on September 5th, 2025. He sums up my thoughts well in a more elegant manner than I care to muster. The book is good but is slow and at times I felt he was repeating himself or retelling us the same information mentioned in a previous chapter.

This history is a bit revisionist and attempts to put the Weimar Republic in the best light possible but at times I’m not sure he understood why it failed. Maybe he does and this simply was not the goal of his book! Regardless it’s good I recommend a read.

[Simon Dobson · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Weimar Republic is a period often forgotten and often treated merely as a failed precursor that led to dictatorship. This book deals with its formative period. It's extremely focused, dealing with only the period between the Kaiser's abdication and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, and the focus gives it momentum. The interpretation is balanced and not overly distorted by what the author (and reader) knows comes next.

[Derek · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book is well-researched and well-written but I was somewhat disappointed that book doesn’t really focus on November, 2018, as the book’s title promises, but rather sweepingly describes the end of the war and its concluding treaties and aftermath. Of course, many readers may appreciate the broad military, political, economic, and diplomatic context of the end of the German’s defeat and political realignment.

[Guillaume Dohmen · Rating 5 out of 5]

The first German Republic

The German Republic created after the First World War was not such a failure as it is usually described. It certainly had its great crisis nevertheless it managed these to a great extend. The post war peace negotiations were a far greater failure. Those negotiations laid the groundwork for chaos in most of Eastern Europe and certainly for the troubles in the Middle East.

[John Hinckley · Rating 4 out of 5]

solid book it gave a pharaoh view of the entire Revolution and its consequences.

to get the full effect of the book you will need to have some prior knowledge of the timeline which I didn't but I cannot blame the book for my lack of knowledge

the only problem I had with the book was that he mentioned a lot of German names and you don't know if these people and he didn't disclose if they were important or not for the future. which kind of made it hard to understand and follow along.

[Jarno Mehtiö · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tämänkin luin keväällä. Muistaakseni avasi hyvin sitä, miten monimutkainen prosessi itse asiassa oli ensimmäisen maailmansodan loppuminen, miten pitkiä kapinoita siitä seurasi ja toisaalta miten Saksa kuitenkin tietyssä mielessä näytti olevan matkalla menestykseen Weimarin aikana, jos sitä ei tarkastella 1933 aukosta käsin.

[Tim Snedeker · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good read. Puts things in perspective.

The book is relatively short but loaded at the end with plenty of sources. Not overdone with a lot of philosophical or technical jargon. Helped to put things in perspective for me from a contemporary viewpoint and not hindsight or skewed left or right.

[Eric · Rating 5 out of 5]

I thought this was a tremendous book about Germany at the end of WWI and the collapse that followed leading to the German Revolution. Well written book that is not too long and easily digestible.

Enjoyed so much want to read his other book on this time, Vanquished.

[Andrew Daniels · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good, but not great book
This revolution is largely overlooked, so its probably going to be illuminating for most

Suitable for those with very little knowledge of WWI or those with a lot
I think its a good read, and I may reread it again sometime