Kremlin Winter: Russia and the Second Coming of Vladimir Putin

by Robert Service

Vladimir Putin has dominated Russian politics since Boris Yeltsin relinquished the presidency in his favour in May 2000. He served two terms as president, before himself relinquishing the post to his prime minister, Dimitri Medvedev, only to return to presidential power for a third time in 2012.

Putin’s rule, whether as president or prime minister, has been marked by a steady increase in domestic repression and international assertiveness. Despite this, there have been signs of liberal growth and Putin – and Russia – now faces a far from certain future.

In Kremlin Winter, Robert Service, acclaimed biographer of Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky and one of our finest historians of modern Russia, brings his deep understanding of that country to bear on the man who leads it. He reveals a premier who cannot take his supremacy for granted, yet is determined to impose his will not only on his closest associates but on society at large. It is a riveting insight into power politics as Russia faces a blizzard of difficulties both at home and abroad.

Genres: Politics, Russia, Nonfiction, History, Biography, Political Science, Contemporary

571 pages, Kindle Edition

First published October 9, 2019

About the author

This author is the British historian of modern Russia. For the British-Canadian writer of Yukon poetry, see Robert W. Service.

Robert Service is a British academic and historian of modern Russia and the Soviet Union. He is a professor of Russian history at the University of Oxford and a Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford.

He is the author of the highly acclaimed Lenin: A Biography, A History of Twentieth - Century Russia, Russia: Experiment with a People and Stalin: A Biography, as well as many other books on Russia's past and present. He wrote a marvelous book on communism titled Comrades Communism A World History (International Bestseller). He is married with four children.

Reviews

[Anthony · Rating 5 out of 5]

Who is He?

Robert Service is undoubtedly the master of modern Russian history. I have found all of his books are first class and Kremlin Winter is no exception. Vladimir Putin is a modern titan, whether you think he is good or bad, it cannot be denied that he will be remembered in history. Such, a dominant figure cannot be ignored. A man who has controlled nearly one sixth of the earth’s surface for a quarter of a century must be studied. Since being announced as Boris Yeltsin’s successor in 1999 and taking the presidency in 2000, he served two terms before becoming prime minister under the puppet Dimitri Medvedev. Then in 2012 he became president once more.

As Service points out all of the signs of where he wanted to take Russia have been outlined from the start. So nothing should be a surprise to the sharpe eye and keen ear. He has taken Russia on a path of steady internal repression and outwardly international strength. Some may argue that he is a strong leader who supports traditional values, the family and working people. Infrastructure is in place and public services are adequate. Russians can travel freely, watch TV and own property. However, this all comes with a caveat. TV is regulated and enterprise must not get in the way of the corporate magnets who pillaged the country. He has also invaded the Ukraine twice, causing countless deaths. Putin is a challenge to the West, but from Putin’s point of view the West has double standards. Being let down by this he has pivoted to the East. Showing that he is strong enough to call the shots in his sphere of influence. Service shows a strongman, who wants to push Russia forward, but is in fact more of the same of what Russia has produced over the last two hundred years.

Russia’s economy under Putin is still small, similar to that of the Netherlands. Heavily reliant on oil and gas, with little investment outside of Moscow and St Petersburg. You could be in Tsarist Russia in the countryside. Life expectancy is also in decline and the population is steadily dropping. This could have huge consequences. But for Service, Putin’s success is how he maintains power. He remains popular inside Russia, but there are signs of cracks. His second war isn’t going well and since the mid 2010s there has been a steady rise in demonstrations, arrests and murders of political opponents. Do we believe all is as it seems and the general populace is happy? Want to understand Putin? This is an amazing analysis of the man and his regime. The question is how long do we have left with him? Will he step down by his own volition or will Russia plunge into another bloody revolution following a disastrous war?

[Το Άθχημο γατί του θενιόρ Γκουαναμίρου · Rating 5 out of 5]

Russia, however, is not the only country where national feelings run high. Ukraine’s people, in their vast majority, hate the Kremlin for what it has done to their country. Putin’s actions since 2014 have had the unplanned effect of making it all but impossible for anyone to win the Ukrainian presidency without attacking Russian quasi-imperial pretensions [...] Zelensky won a landslide electoral victory despite refusing to sketch out a programme of practical policies. On assuming power, he taunted that Ukraine, unlike Russia, was a free country with free elections, media and internet. Whereas the task of cleansing the Augean stables of Ukrainian public life may prove beyond Zelensky’s strength, Ukraine’s example of open politics fills Kremlin leaders with dread that it might be transferred to Russia.

If you read this book you get a glimpse of what's going on inside Batyushka Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin's mind, Robert John Service is a British historian, professor of Russian history at the University of Oxford and does a great job explaining everything, but even he, with all his knowledge and insight, couldn't predict the magnitude of the recent developments. This is no longer just a Kremlin Winter. It's the Winter of our Discontent and I can only hope won't turn into a Nuclear winter...

What is Russia? A Nation? An Empire in distress?

Putin’s attitude can be seen as an echo of the kind of mindset that prevailed in many European countries undergoing ‘nation-building’ in the nineteenth century when poets, musicians and folklorists joined efforts with political activists to unify their own people by eulogizing their national virtues. But those were countries that, to a greater or lesser extent, would turn into nation states. ‘Russia’ before 1917 was not a nation state but an empire whose government had to take account of the experiences and sentiments of many subject nations. This obligation remained after October 1917, when the communists, with their internationalist creed, seized power [...] Such a formulation camouflages the fact that Putin and his administration, while displaying a pronounced favour for ethnic Russians, do not refer to themselves as nationalists. They walk the walk without talking the talk.

The USSR lost the Cold War. Though Gorbachëv and Yeltsin asserted that there was no victor, they failed to dispel the national feeling of humiliation among countless Russians. It was a sentiment that Putin and his contemporaries shared at the turn of the millennium. In Britain and France this state of mind is called a post-imperial syndrome. What Russia has been experiencing is not just a post-imperial but also a post-superpower syndrome. Nobody should underestimate the intensity of these feelings.

Who are the Russians that support and empower Putin?

Like Putin, many Russians regret the post-1991 reality that, when they cross from the outermost Russian provinces, they find themselves in foreign countries such as Ukraine or Kazakhstan. For centuries they have been told to delight in the achievements of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Nowadays they have a special term for the states that were formed when the USSR fell apart: ‘the near abroad’ – a sign that they do not think of Ukraine or even Uzbekistan and Estonia as being quite as foreign as Greece and France.

When Britain, France and other European powers relinquished their empires, their colonies were overseas. The Russians had an empire made up of neighbouring countries, a fact of geography that makes it difficult for them to forget about the imperial loss. In the 1990s the Russian Federation went through a prolonged economic recession. Most Russians, except for the tiny minority that benefited from the privatizations, were floored by poverty and were indignant that Moscow, the capital of a motherland that had been one of the world’s superpowers, became a waiter at the tables of global diplomacy.

Is Russia a Democracy?

[Putin] was determined to transform and dominate the way that Russia was ruled. Generally he kept quiet about his thinking on the subject, although in summer 2008 he let slip to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: "Russians have always been at their best when they have been ruled by great men. Peter the Great, Alexander II. Russia needs a strong hand". Putin has governed in the same spirit. He had little democratic experience. Until he first stood for the presidency he had never – not once – offered himself as a candidate at an election at any political level. Not even in his time in St Petersburg politics in the early 1990s. It was to Yeltsin that he owed his ascent of the slippery ladder of public office in Moscow as he became first director of the FSB, then prime minister and finally the acting president. He was accustomed to working inside a political machine that insulates itself from public pressure. His career has been an authoritarian ruler’s dream.

What is the political establishment that supports and backs up Putin's decisions?

Putin’s supremacy is consolidated by the fact that successive elections for over a decade have given United Russia, the political party he founded, a majority in the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament [...] The secret services have a huge importance, as does the Ministry of Finances. Russia has a sprawling edifice of institutions held together by an understanding of the general line that has been laid down by Putin in consultation with the rest of the ruling cabal. It also coheres because all the team’s members understand that the potential consequences of disunity are dire.

They did not come to power by a free and fair electoral process and are on permanent alert for signs of public discontent. The Kremlin elite has to present itself as a disciplined vanguard. Like Brezhnev in the 1970s, Putin assigns the box seats of power to proven loyalists. A remarkable number of holders of high office are friends from his Leningrad youth or former colleagues in the city’s KGB or the mayor’s office. Inside the ruling group they are known as the Piterskie (for St Petersburg, the name the city reverted to in 1991).

Does the Russian government have ties with organised crime?

Russia has sometimes been called a mafia state and a kleptocracy. The evidence is compelling that high-ranking politicians from the 1990s onwards have had links to big criminal groups. But it’s doubtful that the bosses of organized crime can issue orders to Putin and his ministers: more likely, the mafias carry out profitable errands for the Kremlin. The FSB has found that criminals are able to get their dirty business done more expeditiously than the intelligence operatives. This symbiosis of state and organized crime makes Russia a dangerous place for the administration’s enemies at home and abroad. But Putin refuses to see much wrong with Russian politics.

What are the origins of Russian kleptocracy?

Kremlin leaders have trampled the rule of law in Russia, protecting their dominance with a regime of fear. But they are not the sole culprits. Lower down the ladder of power stand elected officials and businessmen who have fought to ensure the retention of ill-gotten gains. It was a state of affairs predating Putin’s first presidential term, but by introducing greater order to the national patchwork of malpractice he has made a bad situation worse.

The national and regional rulers would not so easily have imposed their kleptocracy had popular attitudes offered a stronger defence. For centuries there was widespread distrust of those in authority among Russian people: from tsarism through to the communist period it was the norm for families to assume that the government in the capital was a parasite on society, and that the courts were skewed in favour of the powerful and well-off. The response was for Russians to put their confidence mainly in relatives and proven friends.

What is Zapad and Vneshegoria? How big is the probability for other countries to suffer the same fate as Ukraine?

Zapad-2017, as it was called, was a joint exercise with the Belarusian armed forces, and aimed against an imagined enemy known as Vneshegoria. The chosen terrain, commentators noted, bore a distinct resemblance to parts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

In Poland there was concern that the Russian plan envisaged a nuclear attack on Warsaw. In advance of the exercise, Ukraine’s President Poroshenko told his parliament the Kremlin was preparing for ‘an offensive war of continental proportions’. There was speculation that the Kremlin was planning, not too discreetly, for a potential international crisis when it might move Russian air and ground forces into the Baltic countries.

Nor did the Ukrainians discount the possibility that the Russians might deliberately foment such a crisis. Unsurprisingly, Poroshenko continued to plead for the delivery of advanced lethal weaponry from the West. Putin was accompanied by his Chief of General Staff for the operations, which were held near St Petersburg. Defence Minister Shoigu pronounced the whole exercise a success and spoke out against the ‘lies’ in the Western media about Russia’s aggressive intentions [...]

Estonians bitterly remembered the chaos and privation of the 2007 cyber-attack, widely blamed on the Russian leadership [...] Absolute proof was lacking that Russian official agencies had conducted the cyber-attack – the source was traced back to private hackers in Russia – but circumstantial evidence pointed strongly that way.

It was assumed the Kremlin’s purpose was not only to knock out the Estonian network of communications but also to show the world what it could do – as well as to allow its disruptive specialists to conduct a real-life test of what became known as hybrid warfare. Without setting foot outside the Russian capital they could do enormous harm abroad.

The Baltic countries felt particularly vulnerable: the Crimean annexation had shown that Kremlin rulers did not regard as sacrosanct the borders bequeathed by the USSR. The Russo-Estonian frontier near Narva was disputed, and there were other cities west of the long Russian frontier from the Baltic Sea down to the Black Sea where Russians lived in large numbers and, in several instances, complained about their treatment at the hands of their governments.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania didn’t help matters by each legislating for their native tongue to be recognized as the state language. Putin frequently spoke of his fears for his co-nationals outside the Russian Federation – and people remembered how zealously he had upheld the rights of Russians in Crimea even before 2014.

What about whataboutism?

If Russia wants to be a regional economic power within a formal institutional structure, it cannot afford to humiliate its partners. Yeltsin understood this, but not all Putin’s ministers and officials do. Nationalist opinion ascribed Russia’s difficulties with its neighbours not to any recent fault of its own, or even to centuries of suspicion, but – for Putin’s economics adviser Sergei Glazev, for example – to American machinations. Glazev saw the planet’s widespread Russophobia as a ‘mystification’ sponsored by America.

He looked back fondly to the Eurasian school of intellectual thought that arose in the 1920s and saw in the past a seamless record of inter-ethnic harmony under the Golden Horde, the Russian Empire and the USSR. It is self-deception of staggering proportions when a public figure such as Glazev can so casually dismiss the historical reality and lasting effects of national and religious persecution. Ukrainians or Kazakhs whose parents or grandparents starved in the 1930s did not need American propaganda to make them feel suspicious of Moscow. [...]

Whenever Russian spokesmen fossick in historical annals for evidence of the sins of America, NATO and the West, they omit to consider why their neighbours continue to be fearful of and have suspicions about the motherland.

The post-1945 suppression of national freedoms in all Europe to the east of the Elbe is lodged in the regional memory. Whereas Putin can fairly say that Russians suffered alongside other Soviet peoples under the USSR, the fact remains that it is primarily Russia that the societies in eastern and east-central Europe blame for imposing a brutal communist order. But the Russian government still holds to the idea that it has seigneurial rights over the region.

Countries in eastern and east-central Europe formed an impatient queue of petitioners for entry into NATO and the European Union: they were not cudgelled into it by the United States. Their concerns appeared justified when, under Putin, Ukraine’s gas supplies were cut off and Estonia fell victim to a nationwide cyber-attack.

The more I try to process everything that is happening the bigger my dispair. I feel exhausted. Sometimes I wish I could enter a magic cave and sleep for a hundred years. But that's not an option. Because, unlike the Russians, we, the Europeans still have an option. To get our shit together and stand our ground and stay united in solidarity. In solidarity with ourselves and everyone who fights for their freedom and democratic values. In solidarity with the People who lay down their souls and bodies to attain their freedom. We must cut ties with the tyrants and let them isolate themselves into oblivion.

I don't know what else to say, so I'll quote a Suomalainen whose father fought against the Russian invasion, source :

"We fought 105 days against them and never surrendered. But we were alone. I remember the words of my father who was a war veteran, a fighter pilot, he died ten years ago, he said that if we have the change NEVER MORE ALONE!

[Jeremy Noble · Rating 5 out of 5]

This substantial tome was a gift from dear daughter at Christmas who knew of my interest in Russia that has only grown during these last half dozen confronting years. Several hours of documentary watching the PBS Frontline background interviews for the 'Putin's Revenge' special stirred the fascination. The Salisbury poisoning scandal and the Navalny Novichok event add to the puzzle - or is it?

On the back of my recent read of the classic Russia At War by Alexander Werth this contemporary work by Robert Service begins with an amusing acknowledgement: "On a windy day at Lingfield Park races in 2015 our son Owain suggested backing an unfancied Irish bay gelding by name of Putin. He was putting up the idea, I discovered, for no other reason than he wanted to hear me should 'C'mon, Putin!" in the final stretch. The gallant houre disappointed its backers that day, finishing fifth in a field of nine". So whilst it might be said that our gallant writer has shown his hand at the first I found myself impressed by his even handed description of an ambitious, surprising, patriotic and no doubt substantial leader.

However, as the evidence steadily reveals during the book the legacy of victimhood, not helped by the unfolding of events we look at a Russia that has - despite the appealing rhetoric of autocracy - not made the most of its opportunities these last thirty plus years. In the language of today once we dig beneath the surface then we see in the brutal technical language of modern business a country that has not optimised its approach to modernity.

Much has improved in Russia - and the early resignation of Mr Putin from the Communist Party and what I believe to be a sincere and consistent rebuttal of the key moments of the past: "Yes, but why did they kill the priests!" shows a clear distance between the past and today. The need for active complaining about real problems if only for commercial purposes, the retention of some kind of opposition is perhaps of value. However, the gut level suspicion of the counter-terrorist professional that he trained to be, the trauma of his final months in Germany where past order could not hold, the abuse of the oligarchs that he so despised have fed an instinct in which the opportunity for real substantial and yet painful learning for the country does seem to have passed.

This book details how Mr Putin has done his country no good and a lot of harm by placing himself alongside autocrats rather than democray and putting off the painful transition to a noisy full democracy. History may be skewing the way of the autocrats today - and perhaps this precedes a new dark age - we shall see. Whatever, peace and quiet in civic life is a large price to pay where the
contribution of our most thoughful citizens - often the cornerstone of collaboration and innovation in our modern era - can be so easily suffocated -and worse.

I found the scholarship and insight of this excellent book helped give me more understanding and appreciation of where this significant figure is coming from whilst clarifying the risks he might pose to our future wellbeing. It also opened just a glimmer of hope that he might - with just a slight change of heart - be of help to a better future for this long suffering country.

[Adrian · Rating 5 out of 5]

Despite being one of the most high profile people on the world stage, Putin remains an enigma. Service attempts to shed some light on Putin, revealing the man to be a mass of contradictions, and certainly not the unreconstructed Stalinist many believe him to be.
Although the book primarily focuses on the second Presidency of Putin (2012-onward), Service provides some remarkable insight into Putin's personal history and a scope into what the man himself actually believes.
Although many would believe otherwise, today's Russia is not the sole work of Vladimir Putin, and his rise to the top was far from guaranteed. Putin could very well have been one of the various Prime Ministers hired and fired under Yeltsin, however, coming late in under the capricious Yeltsin's tenure, and having the personal qualities desired by Yeltsin for sturdy leadership, enabled him to eventually succeed to the paramount status of power he now occupies.
Service focuses upon most domestic and foreign policy issues concerning Russia, making this book a very good companion to understanding not just Putin himself, but the dynamics of today's Russia. Additionally, the book is a very good read for those wishing to understand Machiavellian politics, the politics of networks, and psychological manipulation.
In short, an excellent overview of current affairs highly recommended to anyone interested in either Putin, Russia, Geopolitics or Machiavellian wielding of power.

[Manon Joris · Rating 5 out of 5]

I rarely write reviews but this one really is worth one.

I had so much fun reading this book and that wasn't something I expected going into a political read. Robert Service brings a new light to current Russia and I loved the historian's approach to politics. I overall really enjoyed the structure of the book, and it made it easy to get into. I did not expect to laugh while reading it but some moments were surprisingly funny. It quite quick, enjoyable read.

I highly recommend it!

[Annie Oosterwyk · Rating 4 out of 5]

I love learning about history! This added to what I’ve been reading about Russia and Putin to try to understand the rationale behind recent world events. Still feels very foreign to me as a woman who cares about others and has a strong sense of justice and fair play.

[Socrate · Rating 3 out of 5]

Sondarea deschisă a opiniei cetăţenilor a fost făcută sporadic până în 1987, când Gorbaciov a permis înfiinţarea Centrului pentru studierea opiniei publice din întreaga Rusie de către reputaţii sociologi Tatiana Zaslavskaia şi Boris Gruşin. În 1992 a fost redenumit Centrul pentru cercetarea opiniei publice ruse, fiind cunoscut după acronimul său rusesc, VŢIOM; activitatea sa zilnică era condusă de Iuri Levada, care a stabilit standarde înalte şi a introdus tehnici de investigaţie şi analiză din alte ţări, urmarea fiind că politicienii erau uneori nevoiţi să citească ştiri neplăcute despre ceea ce credeau oamenii despre ei. VŢIOM a fost lăsat în pace până în 2003, când guvernul i‑a schimbat baza de finanţare. Levada, frustrat, crezând că aceasta era reacţia miniştrilor la rapoartele îngrijorătoare despre atitudinile faţă de luptele din Cecenia, a plecat şi a înfiinţat propriul său Centru Levada. A murit în 2006. Centrul Levada şi‑a păstrat independenţa, dar a avut probleme, deoarece o mică parte din finanţarea sa provenea din afara Rusiei, ceea ce îl făcea pasibil de a fi pus pe lista „agenţilor străini”. Faptul că a ales să‑şi continue activitatea fără fonduri din străinătate nu l‑a scutit de reaua‑voinţă a Ministerului Justiţiei: în 2016, cu puţin timp înainte de alegerile pentru Dumă, a fost clasificat ca având „funcţiile unui agent străin”, dovadă că Kremlinul continua să fie sensibil la sondajele de opinie.

[Dmitry · Rating 2 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Совершенно типичная книга о путинском периоде правления в том смысле, что подобных книг было издано очень и очень много. Более того, все эти книги практически ничем друг от друга не отличаются. Примерно подобная ситуация сегодня складывается и по отношению к теме российско-украинского конфликта 2014 и 2022 гг., когда из книги в книгу описываются одни и те же темы зачастую одними и теми же словами: развал СССР и обретение Украиной независимости, период правления Кучмы, Оранжевая революция и период правления Ющенко, газовая война Украины и России, период правления Януковича и Майдан 2014, аннексия Крыма и начало боевых действий на востоке Украины, вторжение России в Украину в феврале 2022 года. В России период правления Путина даётся похожим способом, только темы, разумеется, разные: отставка Ельцина и символическое окончание эпохи 90-ых, катастрофа с подводной лодкой Курск, теракты в Москве и Беслане, дело ЮКОСа, война с Грузией в 2008 году и правление Медведева с последующей "рокировкой", Навальный и массовые демонстрации в 2011-2012 гг., первый военный конфликт с Украиной в 2014 году, отравление Литвиненко и так далее. В этой книге описание даётся в типичном для таких книги стиле - коротко и поверхностно, напоминая политические колонки крупных международных СМИ.

He has always appreciated the importance of public image. When working in the St Petersburg administration in the early 1990s, he took the unusual step of commissioning a TV documentary about his work. Years later he told media editors, ‘It’s better not to be chewing in front of the cameras.’ He explained that broadcasters would exploit the slightest visual faux pas. On rising to the presidency, he worked at grooming himself in public relations. When in November 2000 he met Prime Minister Blair in Moscow, he asked about how to improve his image. Blair’s team included some of the world’s doyens in media manipulation, and Blair was famous for his ease with audiences and his actorly flair. Putin listened avidly to how the British did it. His zeal to learn from Western experience stretched to asking Blair to send over a team of consultants to Russia to advise on how to reform the Russian civil service.

Совершенно верно, хороший PR создающий нужный образ лидера, это именно то, что лучше всего усвоил Путин, и чем он будет заниматься на протяжении всего своего правления. Именно поэтому бессмысленно рассматривать, что сказал Путин, и каких лидеров прошлого он принимает за образец. Вся политика Путина заключается в том, чтобы говорить людям то, что они хотят услышать, что им приятнее всего слышать (примерно такой подход использует Алексей Арестович, приходя на эфиры с Юлией Латыниной). В этом деле Путин достиг мастерства.

This is a typical book about Putin's reign, in the sense that there have been a lot of similar books published. Moreover, all these books are practically indistinguishable from each other. An approximately similar situation is today about the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2014 and 2022, when from book to book the same topics are described with the same words: the collapse of the USSR and Ukraine's independence, the period of Kuchma's rule, the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko's rule, the gas war between Ukraine and Russia, the period of Yanukovych's rule and Maidan 2014, the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of hostilities in the east of Ukraine, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In Russia, the period of Putin's rule is given in a similar way, only the themes are, of course, different: Yeltsin's resignation and the symbolic end of the 90s era, the Kursk submarine disaster, the terrorist attacks in Moscow and Beslan, the Yukos affair, the war with Georgia in 2008 and Medvedev's rule with the subsequent “castling”, Navalny and the mass demonstrations in 2011-2012, the first military conflict with Ukraine in 2014, the Litvinenko poisoning, and so on. This book is described in the typical style of such books - short and superficial, reminiscent of the political columns of major international media.

He has always appreciated the importance of public image. When working in the St Petersburg administration in the early 1990s, he took the unusual step of commissioning a TV documentary about his work. Years later he told media editors, ‘It’s better not to be chewing in front of the cameras.’ He explained that broadcasters would exploit the slightest visual faux pas. On rising to the presidency, he worked at grooming himself in public relations. When in November 2000 he met Prime Minister Blair in Moscow, he asked about how to improve his image. Blair’s team included some of the world’s doyens in media manipulation, and Blair was famous for his ease with audiences and his actorly flair. Putin listened avidly to how the British did it. His zeal to learn from Western experience stretched to asking Blair to send over a team of consultants to Russia to advise on how to reform the Russian civil service.

Quite right, good PR that creates the right image of a leader is exactly what Putin has learned best and what he will be doing throughout his reign. That is why it is pointless to consider what Putin said and what past leaders he takes as a model. Putin's entire policy is to tell people what they want to hear, what they are most pleased to hear (this is roughly the approach Alexei Arestovich takes when he comes on the airwaves with Yulia Latynina). In this endeavor, Putin has achieved mastery.

[Ana-Maria · Rating 4 out of 5]

Iarnă la Kremlin: Rusia și a doua venire a lui Vladmir Putin de Robert Service (2019)

Robert Service este un istoric care are darul de a scrie simpu și clar, aproape jurnalistic, despre subiecte dense. Această carte, deși are chipul lui Putin pe copertă, nu este o biografie a acestuia, ci mai degrabă o analiză atentă a istoriei Rusiei de la Elțîn până aproape de prezent. Desigur că Service îl caracterizează pe Putin- admirator al Romanovilor se dezice de Lenin și de acțiunile lui și arată sentimente mixte față de stalinism. Și-a creat imaginea unui lider care nu și-a dorit cu orice preț puterea, dar care totuși și-a luat acestă sarcină pentru a repune Rusia pe harta lumii, mai ales după decăderea post comunistă. Încheierea războiului rece fără un acord clar l-a iritat, la fel ca și intrarea multor state europene în NATO. Putin este prezentat prin prisma interviurilor și declarațiilor pe care le-a dat de-a lungul timpului și astfel istoricul nu are nevoie să facă ample analize psihologice, ci creează un portret cuprinzător din colaje.
Al doilea portret pe care Service are grijă să îl contureze în toată complexitatea sa este regimul politic rus, contorsionările acestuia, drumul prin diferite etape, mai ales din ultimii 20 de ani, iar toate aceste analize se fac, desigur, în context global, iar povestea curge foarte bine, în ciuda densității de evenimente pe care istoria le-a înregistrat în această perioadă. La final, verdictul lui Service este unul clar:
”Rusia este o democrație subdezvoltată. Malformată în pântece și maltratată după naștere. Poporul are o influență neglijabilă asupra cui va ocupa președinția, funcția de prim-ministru sau funcțiile din guvern. Agențiile de securitate își numesc propriul personal în posturi oficiale prin intermediul ordinii politice și economice. Statul rus elimină oponenții serioși ai grupului aflat la conducere cu metode care variază de la excluderea electorală la crimă. Instituțiile parlamentare au fost reduse la tăcere și își exercită autoritatea doar atunci când diviziunile interne ale conducerii se transformă în lupte între facții în Duma de stat. Instanțele sunt subordonate conducătorilor. Mașinăria verticală de comandă a fost reconstruită din ruinele URSS. Este adevărat că ordinele Kremlinului sunt frecvent ignorate, așa cum se întâmpla în perioada sovietică, dar atunci când administrația Putin își concentrează atenția asupra unor obiective specifice, aceasta poate călca în picioare opoziția. Mândria națională este trâmbițată, sportul și divertismentul, precum și puterea militară evidentă desfășurată dincolo de granițele Rusiei, sunt folosite ca distrageri. Patriotismul, religia și valorile sociale tradiționale sunt promovate. Vladimir Putin este prezentat ca întruchiparea a tot ceea ce este bun la Rusia. ... cei puternici își asigură puterea prin mijloace nemiloase. Serviciile secrete acționează cu impunitate și fără supraveghere guvernamentală sau parlamentară. Bandele criminale sunt angajate pentru afaceri murdare. Clasa politică își transmite privilegiile familiilor și prietenilor, conturile bancare supradimensionate sunt deschise în străinătate, inclusiv în offshore și în Insulele Cayman. Elveția și Riviera Franceză au devenit locuri de joacă pentru bogații ruși, iar Londra a devenit locul convenabil pentru spălarea banilor - unde avocații, contabilii și unii politicieni britanici au câștigat bani buni ca facilitatori de afaceri din Est.
Puterea economică a Rusiei a crescut odată cu creșterea veniturilor din hidrocarburi, iar recâștigarea încrederii Moscovei s-a imprimat asupra comportamentului Rusiei în străinătate. Serviciile secrete rusești au fost învinuite pentru asasinarea lui Aleksandr Litvinenko și pentru atacul cibernetic din 2007 care a deviat Estonia și alte țări spre Occident. În 2008, armata și forțele aeriene ruse au invadat Georgia. În 2014, Crimeea a fost ocupată și anexată. Aceasta a fost urmată de o intervenție armată în estul Ucrainei, o intervenție care continuă până în ziua de azi, deoarece trupele și echipamentele Rusiei sunt desfășurate pe ascuns pentru a confrunta forțele armate ucrainene. Forțele armate rusești au intrat în războiul civil sirian pentru a salva administrația Assad, iar Rusia s-a plasat de partea opusă Statelor Unite. Kremlinul s-a amestecat în politica din Uniunea Europeană, finanțând constant partide care căutau să slăbească unitatea acesteia și să-i împiedice expansiunea. Hackerii ruși și companiile IT au perturbat alegerile prezidențiale americane din 2016. În timp ce puterile occidentale au ripostat cu sancțiuni economice, Putin a consolidat parteneriatul Rusiei cu Republica Populară Chineză. Apelând la multipolaritate în politica mondială, și-a bazat politica externă pe o provocare la adresa puterii globale americane.
Activitatea sa a indicat o singură direcție generală, incluzând în același timp o serie de mișcări improvizate.”
Cartea aceasta este o bună trecere în revistă a istoriei din 2012 până în 2019, mai ales pentru cei ca mine care nu au urmărit cu mare atentie mișcările politice internaționale. Poate că un aspect pe care are mi l-aș fi dorit mai mult ca element de interes în carte ar fi fost cel legat de ceva informații de culise, mai puțin cunoscute publicului larg. Mi s-a părut că totusi Service a ramas tot timpul în zona sigură, a faptelor și declarațiilor publice, a documentelor și interviurilor publicate, iar asta a făcut ca uneori cartea să mi se pară plictisitoare. Totuși, cred că e o chestiune de gust, până la urmă Service este istoric, nu romancier.

[Dave · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book for understanding the challenging relationship between Russia and the West. History is never a straight line! This book is well worth the read!

[Martin Tolton · Rating 5 out of 5]

Robert Service (not the Canadian poet) has delivered a comprehensive history of Russia post gllasnost up to near near present day 2019 and the election of Zelensky to the presidency of the Ukraine. Service examines the foreign policies of not only Russia but Europe's, the EU, and China's. In short the author made predictions that were very accurate even though there were other options for different outcomes. I recommend this book to anyone interested in present geopolitics and it is a must read for anyone surprised by events thus far in 2022.

[Kat Mot · Rating 2 out of 5]

If you know the topic, it is nothing new. The book is only good for people that start getting to know Putin's Russia. Moreover, the book is very badly edited and full of mistakes, that especially from someone coming from Central Europe are appalling; i.e. referring to Nord Stream 2 as a pipeline on the Black Sea....

[Beata Horała · Rating 2 out of 5]

Spore rozczarowanie. Po paru książkach o Putinie ta zdecydowanie najsłabsza. Rzekłabym nawet prorosyjska. Niezrozumiałe wręcz pominięcie okrucieństw i potworności Putina oraz innych ważnych faktów historycznych. Nie polecam.

[James Thompson · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this to be an excellent book. Service goes into depth on a lot of aspects of the Putin regime that you just don't get by reading the paper, for example the relationships between Russia and the former states of the USSR under Putin.

[Emily · Rating 3 out of 5]

Read this fairly rapidly and uncritically, but good for an overview of Russian politics over the last decade or so. Clear and not too dense, and not shy in offering judgments as well as narrative.

[Colin Maclennan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A little slow to start with, but an interesting and textured picture of Russia under Putin builds up. Although the book was written before the attempt on Navalny's life by poisoning, it gives an interesting account of his background and prospects.

I was rather taken by the author's summary description of the Russian state; "Russia is a stunted democracy, malformed in the womb and maltreated after birth. It's people have negligible influence over who will occupy the presidency, premiership or cabinet. The security agencies assign their own personnel to official posts throughout the political and economic order. The Russian state eliminates serious opponents of the ruling group with methods ranging from electoral exclusion to murder."

Despite that, ordinary Russians have more freedom than ever before. "Personal property is respected in the Courts so long as high politics and big business do not have a dog in the fight. Capitalism flourishes. In every town entrepreneurs are running businesses." Although authoritarian controls have been tightened to prevent "colour revolutions" such as happened in Ukraine and Georgia, freedoms remain that would be unimaginable in China, North Korea or Saudi Arabia.

For a short read, the last chapter "Choices: Russia and The West" is worth reading on its own.

[Sophia Rigby · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best books I've read on Putin's Russia. Comprehensive and clearly written.

[David Highton · Rating 4 out of 5]

Published in 2019 before the Russian attack on Ukraine but this book contains all the elements of Putin’s thought processes and approach to his buffer states.

[Flob · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book to read if you don't want to sleepwalk into hell.