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Impossible Knowledge: Conspiracy Theories, Power, and Truth
Conspiracy theorists claim impossible knowledge, such as knowledge of the doings of a secret world government. Yet they accept this impossible knowledge as truth. In effect, conspiracy theories detach truth from knowledge.
Knowledge without power is powerless. And the impossible knowledge claimed by conspiracy theorists is rigorously excluded from the regimes of truth and power – that is not even wrong. Yet conspiratorial knowledge is potent enough to be studied by researchers and recognized as a risk by experts and authorities.
Therefore, in order to understand conspiracy theories, we need to think of truth beyond knowledge and power. That is impossible for any scientific discipline because it takes for granted that truth comes from knowledge and that truth is powerful enough to destroy the legitimacy of any authority that would dare to conceal or manipulate it. Since science is unable to make sense of conspiracy theories, it treats conspiracy theorists as individuals who fail to make sense, and it explains their persistent nonsense by some cognitive, behavioral, or social dysfunction.
Fortunately, critical theory has developed tools able to conceive of truth beyond knowledge and power, and hence to make sense of conspiracy theories. This book organizes them into a toolbox which will enable students and researchers to analyze conspiracy theories as practices of the self geared at self-empowerment, a sort of political self-help.
106 pages, Kindle Edition
Published January 15, 2019
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November 8, 2023
Impossible Knowledge is arguably one of the most original books on conspiracy theories published in the last years. It is stringently coherent, exacting in its encompassing brevity – and – as it delves into the last chapter – perhaps even more speculative than the authors misleadingly straight style might concede. Hristovs command of the specialized literature on conspiracy theories, as much as his knowledge of critical theory in general, combined with the constant strewing of real-life examples to illustrate and test the given critical theories of conspiracy theories make this without doubt one of the most rewarding readings on the subject one can find.
In this sense I would like to especially praise the structure of the book, which one might call dialectical. Not only because the text aspires to constantly test the theories it introduces by putting them in dialogue with concrete examples. Which makes for a very vivid reading. But more specifically because of the way the book develops its argument – and an intricate argument it is. For the theories discussed (from among others Jamesons “cognitive mapping” passing trough Boltanski’s sociology of critique, Adorno, Lacan, Foucault, culminating perhaps in Badiou, and so on) are introduced not in a random succession, but, in a way reminiscent of Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit, they are always in some sense responding to some of the shortcomings of the previous one. This makes for a very complex, convoluted argument, full of lively (critical) figures, whose merits and flaws Hristov introduces and whose critical potentials, even while in some sense “sublated” (aufgehoben) by the following figures, aren’t exhausted or annulled by the “last” explaining one of parrhesia – even if the book might give this impression.
It is interesting and telling, in this sense, that we are constantly left with questions which I don’t take to be merely rhetorically posed (at least not always). This aspect of Hristovs book is very much worth praising as well: it is more interested in asking questions and offering approaches than in trying to get rid of these uncomfortable objects (and subjects!) of study which are conspiracy theories.
I take the book in this sense to provide a sort of almost impossibly compressed “totality” – a sort of “absolute knowing” in the Hegelian sense – of critical theories of conspiracy theories. In that sense, it isn’t merely the last explanation that matters, but the whole way, the whole path, each station retaining its kernel of truth.
Nonetheless, as a sort of form of absolute knowing on impossible knowledge, Impossible Knowledge doesn’t indeed fail in approaching – as the end of the book draws near – what I at least perceived as a very sublime speculative position, which one might render as follows: there is a tendency of absolute critical-theoretical knowing of the impossible knowledge aspired to by conspiracy theories to become identical with the impossible conspirational-theoretical knowledge conspiracy theories aspire to. What is the difference? This indeed is the burning question, for which I would risk – hopefully not misreading Hristov too badly – the answer: praxis.
In a sense, this touches upon an important question, which silently subtends the whole book, namely what the relationship between conspiracy theories and critical theories might be. Hristovs book appears to me to have the merit of sustaining this tension for as long as possible, and I’m not sure if we get one definite answer in the end, having already got a multiplicity of them on the way, all of which nonetheless can’t quite completely square the circle.
One might perhaps venture that the difference between both lies in the fact that conspiracy theories must in the end remain speculative, inasmuch as they constitute failed parrhesiastic speech-acts which would seem, by their failure, to regress to mere speech. The problem then being that, since their truth isn’t actually of a propositional, but of a performative kind, they can’t – at least not all of them, at least not in what regards their form (though maybe less so their content) – necessarily be dismissed in advance, that is, in theory, but must be judged by their practice, by their effects. Critical theory – with its ingrained practical vocation – would then be more akin to a successful parrhesiastic speech act: practical hypotheses, articulations of impossible knowledge which have found, in the end, the practical means to verify their claims – perhaps as if saying: if the present world won't accept the critique, so much the worst for the world! for we shall invent the means of verifying the truth of our critical claim that the order of world can be subverted...
But I would be interested be very much interested in reading how others have read this. Perhaps there’s something I’m missing…
On a slightly critical note, perhaps some of the “flaws” of the discussed critical theories are overstated – or seemed to me at least a bit hasty. For example some of the ways Hristov deals with the shortcomings of “cognitive mapping”, which, being at the beginning of the exposition, has a tendency to keep on popping up every now and then, as if resisting to have been done with. But those might be my own shortcomings, biased as I might be, having more “benevolent” readings of, for example, Jameson (although I wouldn’t want to accuse Hristov of the contrary either).
And this being such a short book (only 96 pages long), but covering so much theoretical ground, some aspects (and at times perhaps whole sections, as for example the discussion of the shortcomings of “repression” and “ressentiment” in chapter two) can remain a little bit difficult to grasp. And I say this as someone who has had some (more or less intense) contact for some years with some chunks of the literature Hristov is referring to. So I’m not quite sure how people who haven’t for example read some Freud or Adorno or on ressentiment, might grapple with such parts. Which could be a problem inasmuch as the book also aims to be a sort of introduction to critical theory by way of conspiracy theories. But I’m not sure if it could serve, say, as an introductory text even for a seminar on critical theory or conspiracy theories: the arguments might be too compressed to be actually understood by people not already familiar with them.
On the other hand, I wouldn’t want to give the impression that Hristov isn’t good at breaking down really complicated stuff. In this sense for example I think Hristovs explanations of some of the most central and difficult aspects of Lacanian Psychoanalysis is outstanding. Although I’m not quite sure how accessible they might be for half-“lay” academic public, for I’ve also spent some years untangling Lacan and at some point it gets difficult to know if anyone understands you when you're talking about it... But nonetheless: the way Hristov manages to chunk it in around 10 pages is formidable.
Perhaps this all might be condensed in the following judgement: although this book is short and seems to try at times to give itself a light-analytical air or tone, it is actually quite dense and demanding. But it is rewarding. And I certainly hope it will find more readers, which it deserves.
In this sense I would like to especially praise the structure of the book, which one might call dialectical. Not only because the text aspires to constantly test the theories it introduces by putting them in dialogue with concrete examples. Which makes for a very vivid reading. But more specifically because of the way the book develops its argument – and an intricate argument it is. For the theories discussed (from among others Jamesons “cognitive mapping” passing trough Boltanski’s sociology of critique, Adorno, Lacan, Foucault, culminating perhaps in Badiou, and so on) are introduced not in a random succession, but, in a way reminiscent of Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit, they are always in some sense responding to some of the shortcomings of the previous one. This makes for a very complex, convoluted argument, full of lively (critical) figures, whose merits and flaws Hristov introduces and whose critical potentials, even while in some sense “sublated” (aufgehoben) by the following figures, aren’t exhausted or annulled by the “last” explaining one of parrhesia – even if the book might give this impression.
It is interesting and telling, in this sense, that we are constantly left with questions which I don’t take to be merely rhetorically posed (at least not always). This aspect of Hristovs book is very much worth praising as well: it is more interested in asking questions and offering approaches than in trying to get rid of these uncomfortable objects (and subjects!) of study which are conspiracy theories.
I take the book in this sense to provide a sort of almost impossibly compressed “totality” – a sort of “absolute knowing” in the Hegelian sense – of critical theories of conspiracy theories. In that sense, it isn’t merely the last explanation that matters, but the whole way, the whole path, each station retaining its kernel of truth.
Nonetheless, as a sort of form of absolute knowing on impossible knowledge, Impossible Knowledge doesn’t indeed fail in approaching – as the end of the book draws near – what I at least perceived as a very sublime speculative position, which one might render as follows: there is a tendency of absolute critical-theoretical knowing of the impossible knowledge aspired to by conspiracy theories to become identical with the impossible conspirational-theoretical knowledge conspiracy theories aspire to. What is the difference? This indeed is the burning question, for which I would risk – hopefully not misreading Hristov too badly – the answer: praxis.
In a sense, this touches upon an important question, which silently subtends the whole book, namely what the relationship between conspiracy theories and critical theories might be. Hristovs book appears to me to have the merit of sustaining this tension for as long as possible, and I’m not sure if we get one definite answer in the end, having already got a multiplicity of them on the way, all of which nonetheless can’t quite completely square the circle.
One might perhaps venture that the difference between both lies in the fact that conspiracy theories must in the end remain speculative, inasmuch as they constitute failed parrhesiastic speech-acts which would seem, by their failure, to regress to mere speech. The problem then being that, since their truth isn’t actually of a propositional, but of a performative kind, they can’t – at least not all of them, at least not in what regards their form (though maybe less so their content) – necessarily be dismissed in advance, that is, in theory, but must be judged by their practice, by their effects. Critical theory – with its ingrained practical vocation – would then be more akin to a successful parrhesiastic speech act: practical hypotheses, articulations of impossible knowledge which have found, in the end, the practical means to verify their claims – perhaps as if saying: if the present world won't accept the critique, so much the worst for the world! for we shall invent the means of verifying the truth of our critical claim that the order of world can be subverted...
But I would be interested be very much interested in reading how others have read this. Perhaps there’s something I’m missing…
On a slightly critical note, perhaps some of the “flaws” of the discussed critical theories are overstated – or seemed to me at least a bit hasty. For example some of the ways Hristov deals with the shortcomings of “cognitive mapping”, which, being at the beginning of the exposition, has a tendency to keep on popping up every now and then, as if resisting to have been done with. But those might be my own shortcomings, biased as I might be, having more “benevolent” readings of, for example, Jameson (although I wouldn’t want to accuse Hristov of the contrary either).
And this being such a short book (only 96 pages long), but covering so much theoretical ground, some aspects (and at times perhaps whole sections, as for example the discussion of the shortcomings of “repression” and “ressentiment” in chapter two) can remain a little bit difficult to grasp. And I say this as someone who has had some (more or less intense) contact for some years with some chunks of the literature Hristov is referring to. So I’m not quite sure how people who haven’t for example read some Freud or Adorno or on ressentiment, might grapple with such parts. Which could be a problem inasmuch as the book also aims to be a sort of introduction to critical theory by way of conspiracy theories. But I’m not sure if it could serve, say, as an introductory text even for a seminar on critical theory or conspiracy theories: the arguments might be too compressed to be actually understood by people not already familiar with them.
On the other hand, I wouldn’t want to give the impression that Hristov isn’t good at breaking down really complicated stuff. In this sense for example I think Hristovs explanations of some of the most central and difficult aspects of Lacanian Psychoanalysis is outstanding. Although I’m not quite sure how accessible they might be for half-“lay” academic public, for I’ve also spent some years untangling Lacan and at some point it gets difficult to know if anyone understands you when you're talking about it... But nonetheless: the way Hristov manages to chunk it in around 10 pages is formidable.
Perhaps this all might be condensed in the following judgement: although this book is short and seems to try at times to give itself a light-analytical air or tone, it is actually quite dense and demanding. But it is rewarding. And I certainly hope it will find more readers, which it deserves.
Displaying 1 of 1 review