Kevin Ohi begins this energetic book with the proposition that to read Henry James—particularly the late texts—is to confront the queer potential of style and the traces it leaves on the literary life. In contrast to other recent critics, Ohi asserts that James’s queerness is to be found neither in the homoerotic thematics of the texts, however startlingly explicit, nor in the suggestions of same-sex desire in the author’s biography, however undeniable, but in his style. For Ohi, there are many elements in the style that make James’s writing queer. But if there is a thematic marker, Ohi shows through his careful engagements with these texts, it is belatedness. The recurrent concern with belatedness, Ohi explains, should be understood not psychologically but stylistically, not as confessing the sad predicament of being out of sync with one’s life but as revealing the consequences of style’s refashioning of experience. Belatedness marks life’s encounter with style, and it describes an experience not of deprivation but of the rich potentiality of the literary work that James calls “freedom.” In Ohi’s reading, belatedness is the indicator not of sublimation or repression, nor of authorial self-sacrifice, but of the potentiality of the literary—and hence of the queerness of style. Presenting original readings of a series of late Jamesian texts, the book also represents an exciting possibility for queer theory and literary studies in the a renewed attention to literary form and a new sounding—energized by literary questions of style and form—of the theoretical implications of queerness.
Unlike most books published on conspiracy theories, Fenster doesn't set out to debunk every conspiracist argument in fine-grained detail so much as to produce a cultural analysis. (Many really need no refutation -- I'm looking at you, David Icke!) He sets up the book as a critique of Richard Hofstadter's classic The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays and largely succeeds. Fenster sees conspiracy theories as a misguided form of populist politics rather than just mere paranoia. As he writes, "Just because overarching conspiracy theories are wrong does not mean they are not on to something." Fenster does not just go after conspiracy theorists while leaving dominant ideologies unscathed. His analysis of power includes issues of class, race, and gender, making it much richer than many other books in this genre. Is it any wonder that conspiracy theories involving medical or government plots spread among communities after COINTELPRO and Tuskegee?
The main limitation of Fenster's approach to conspiracy theories as populism is apparent when it comes to powerful interests using conspiracy theories to advance their own agenda. For example, Fenster draws on theories that proliferated about Bill Clinton during the 1990s, but these were in some cases co-opted by various members of the "vast right-wing conspiracy," i.e. wealthy and powerful figures such as Richard Mellon Scaife. (Fenster does note this, but leaves it under-theorized, in my opinion.) In this way, conspiracy theories become a form of pseudo-populism. I would list climate denial-related conspiracy theorizing (e.g. "Climate-gate") as one of today's more widespread pseudo-populist theories.
However, Fenster's contribution is unorthodox in its approach and far more nuanced than any other treatment I've read. If you think the only thing being published on conspiracy theories is yet another deconstruction of the "grassy knoll," think again and read Fenster.
What is most intriguing about this book is that it is pre-Trump, pre-Steele Dossier, pre-Russia hoax, pre-Epstein, pre Jan 6, pre-Covid, pre-Biden’s dementia cover up, pre- all of it. I found this especially exciting as a book of *recent* history, a retelling of conspiracy theory history from the 90s through around 2007-2008 with this revised edition. I really enjoyed his discussion of the modern folklore (media-rituals-symbols) of conspiracy theories up until he seems to suggest Hofstadter’s idea about “paranoid style” somehow “seeks a violent confrontation” such as evidenced by Ruby Ridge and Waco. (p. 83) Could it be that this is merely a common security system (legal + political) response to perceived threats that has nothing specifically to do with Hofstadter’s book? Police I think are known to be a little paranoid according to the MMPI studies I’ve heard about. Thus we have an effect as Niklas Luhmann describes in that Fenster suggests somehow that Hofstadter’s ideas have penetrated all the way to law enforcement in a gunfight atop Ruby Ridge. Did those cops need to read Hofstadter? Or is all of society leaving this trail of breadcrumbs?! (On a side but related note some of Fenster’s descriptions of Arlen Specter’s militia hearings sparks a similar idea in me given that I lived through that history and barely noticed the hearings- perhaps some ‘current events’ are mostly important to historians?) Fenster says that Hofstadter is to blame in a subdued, dispassionate (i.e. academic) way and I’m sure he would likely respond that he’s not arguing direct causation. Yet could it not be the other way around as well, that such ideas as Randy Weaver’s or David Koresh’s also “seek confrontation” and “have consequences”? There is the effort that Weaver went through to remove himself from society, yes. And Koresh had his own separate compound for his group as well. But still it seems a bit silly that Fenster suggests community policing might work with regards to such extreme views that edge towards violence. He also mentions MOVE in comparison with the Branch Davidians. I’ve previously lived in West Philly and heard a few stories about MOVE. I doubt most of us would have liked having them as neighbors. I also wouldn’t call that group ‘non-confrontational’ even if in the same breath I might be sympathetic to the idea that dropping a bomb on the MOVE building was excessive. Fenster’s analysis is mostly reasonable but yet I’m not so sure the idea that we all can just talk about things and it will work out is necessarily true when it comes to extremism. We hope in our relatively free society that is the case. Yet Fenster does eventually get around to this counterargument when he discusses The Turner Diaries, the racist tract that likely inspired the OK City bomber Timothy McVeigh. Fenster is willing to admit that some extremism is too extreme for dialogue. He fails to articulate a separate definition for this program of the social system, and I suggest terrorism is what he missed here. Which brings me back to the idea that I wonder how he sees it now with Trump in office. A lot of intellectuals have become in favor of suppressing speech and ideas considered ‘misinformation’ in these current dangerous times. Did the 9/11 truth era end as we entered first the ‘birther’ conspiracy against Obama, then the Russiagate hoax about Trump’s first win in 2016, Trump’s famous counter allegations that his campaign was spied on, and the Steele Dossier shenanigans of the Clinton campaign? Then of course COVID which is the biggest conspiracy of them all. Not to mention the most extreme conspiracy wing of the MAGA movement which is QAnon. There are so many ideas here and do they all have “consequences”? Is history now moving in conspiratorial time, where we will continue to proceed from one conspiracy to the next ad infinitum? Could it be that the internet news cycle that feeds off clicks actually feeds off conspiracy theory?! What happens when a famous conspiracy theorist becomes President? Judging by the unusual separation between Trump’s two terms and the terrible response of his most zealous supporters I’d say this is unprecedented. I’ll have to see if Fenster has written more on this topic post-Obama. Fenster does a great job of showing that conspiracy theory is nothing new and has a rich history in the U.S. He also does a great job connecting conspiracy theory to play (i.e. non-consummation) such as tabletop roleplaying games or groups like the Discordian Society. I would say something seems to have changed recently that appears hard to deny however. Has conspiracy theory grown up? Or has the internet regressed us all to childhood? I do like the way Fenster distinguishes between populism and conspiracy. As I already mentioned I think some of his questions in the end piece might be helped if he distinguished further between populism, conspiracy and terrorism. Just like all populist movements are not conspiracy theories, it seems all conspiracy theories are not terrorist schemes. Still this has me thinking that like the infamous ‘freedom fighter / terrorist’ distinction, it could also be said that one man’s ideology is another man’s conspiracy theory. I find this particularly relevant where Fenster flirts with Marxist analysis. The bits from Fredric Jameson are certainly ironic. If conspiracy theory is “the poor person’s mapping” as Jameson claims (p. 128), then Marxism belongs in the same way to the ‘comfortable intellectual’. Fenster clearly does a lot to avoid leftwing intellectual bias but it still creeps into his analysis, particularly in discussing Jameson and also how conspiracy theory is somehow “different . . . from Marxism’s call for a mass revolutionary movement”. (p. 124) Whenever Fenster felt compelled to mention “capitalism” or “patriarchy” as a cause I found myself thinking one could apply the same type of ‘conspiracy’ analysis to those intellectual canards. The ivory tower is perhaps just as much a removal from society (but in the opposite direction in terms of status) as Randy Weaver’s cabin. Certainly one might make the claim that all terrorist groups are linked to certain conspiracy theorists or extremist views we could say, as well as being actual conspirators in the legal sense. It seems clear that not all conspiracy theorists are actually committed to violent action against the state. I wonder what the data looks like, if you mapped various conspiracy theories and attempted to trace any back that resulted in violent confrontation with the state. Perhaps there might be certain commonalities between the violent ones. Perhaps you could model it and make predictions. As with most social data this complexity would be difficult to measure. Accurate predictions would be a long shot. Predicting a conspiracy theorist in the White House though is perhaps the longest. I’m reminded of the song ‘Lunatic Fringe’. Does a conspiracy theorist in the White House change the analysis here at all?
As someone who is fascinated with conspiracy theory, a sometimes traveler, and loves to participate in what Fenster calls "conspiracy play", it provides a good basis for self reflection and helps to analyze my own interest in conspiracies. Fenster uses many examples to demonstrate his thesis but also offers counterpoints, which speaks to his reliability as an author. Not to mention, I enjoyed his thorough tear down of Hofstadter's "paranoid" pathological explanation of conspiracy theory. It simultaneously normalizes populist movements and conspiracy theory as products of a well constructed political system and seeks to find the cause of conspiracy theory with an analysis that goes deeper than mere "pathology".
EDIT: The second edition of this book DOES include an entire chapter on 9/11 and the truth movement.
Mark Fenster's cultural analysis on conspiracy theories in U.S. culture is an illuminating analysis on the social significance that conspiracy discourse has played out in popular and marginal spaces. The book originally came out in the late 90s. This is an updated 2008 edition that does seem substantial in that 911 and post 911 discourse is examined at fairly great length. However, this updated version has very minimal coverage of the role that the internet has played in the wider dissemination and acceptance of these alternative (oftentimes outlandish) narratives.
Although there is still many useful socio-anthropological insights to be found in this book, in an age where the internet and social media has so much influence, this book will probably feel lacking for anyone that is just looking for one book on the subject.
Conspiracy theories by Mark Fenster Is an amazing book if you are into reading/learning about how politics might manipulate themselves against the news and normal people. The language in the book would be very hard to understand and if you were younger or did not know a lot presidency. For example, JFK’s assignation is very deeply in this story and it goes through every part about how it might have been set up and how it could have been an inside job very easily. As I was reading this book, it hits hard on the power of the popular and unpopular American culture and politics. Fenster ignores the popular party and puts into play what all the possibilities of something happening again and how else it could have happened with others while objects are being put into play. Part One of the book begins with Richard Hofstadter’s essay called “The Paranoid Style” which Fenster explains how this was based on lies and false statements put into the public to try to brainwash people into voting for a candidate based behind cold lies. Part Two is about uncovering the plot of conspiracy, which is about the signs that demand over Interpretation. Part Three is about Conspiracy theories in everyday life. Fenster looks at theorizing populism in liberalist ways. Although he analysis several complex features, all the reasons that he puts behind his theories’ make complete since because he goes out of his way to describe each event to his fullest. I would highly recommend this book
This is a fairly wide ranging book on conspiracy theory that admirably attempts to prove its thesis: that conspiracy theory is a generative method of political engagement for people who have been left out of traditional American consensus building. I think that this part of the book’s thesis is undoubtedly true. Fenster touches on conspiracy theory as play, it’s fun, it really feels like you’re doing something when you engage in it. Fenster’s overtures to harnessing conspiracy theorists' energy but for constructive politics, is maybe a little optimistic, but there’s certainly something there.
I bought this book at a used bookstore and unknowingly got an edition published in 1999, a few years before, well, an explosion in various conspiracy theories. Make sure to get a more recent edition with Fenster’s thoughts post 9-11.
This book would be most interesting to those who study State Crimes Against Democracy, Narrative Theory, and the manufacturing of History.
This book has perhaps the obvious disadvantage of being published before 9/11, but it still seemed worth consulting. I think that one of the problems with this book is that it still seems to deal with conspiracy theories as though they were “merely” cultural phenomena. While Fenster does qualify it more than that (to be fair), there is still a sense that we are not watching anything that has much to do with the truth, and I think that many readers can then decide that the mainstream media is still a reliable source of reality and that anything outside that is safe to assume is suspect.
Fenster seems most concerned about the links between Narrative Theory and Conspiracy Theory, Political Ideology and Conspiracy Theory, and Conspiracy Theory and Cultural Studies. While some of his analyses make sense, for example, his observation that in “The X-Files,” all of the smaller episodes only point at the huge conspiracy in the background that can never be fully understood. The entire nature of the conspiracy can never be fully grasped, and so Scully, but particularly Mulder, can never find anything that is fully provable or demonstrable.
Introduction, pp. xi and xii: Fenster discusses the coverage of the San Jose Mercury News in 1996 about the introduction of crack cocaine into inner cities and the disparaging coverage that it got [later this is portrayed in the 2014 film "The Messenger"], and mentions a book by Daniel Pipes that discusses the “ ‘overtly conspiracy minded’ nature of ‘the black community’ who refused to believe the media investigations that claimed to uncover no evidence of direct CIA involvement in cocaine trafficking. The book’s author, Daniel Pipes, blamed black journalists and leaders, all of whom apparently ‘dislike the existing the existing order and offer radical ideas about changing it’” (xi to xii).
(xIv): “Above all, conspiracy theory is a theory of power.” [I would change this slightly to say that it is a theory of society, but OK]. “Conspiracy theories seek to explain the power of ethnic, social, or even supernatural elites over ‘the people’ rather than focus on the systematic exploitation of the oppressed through control of the relations of production and ideological structures of domination. (new paragraph, p. xv) Conspiracy theory thus seems a rather disabling theory of power. If the conspiracy is in complete control, and if those who are controlled are utterly unaware of the conspiracy’s existence, then effective resistance is unlikely, or it least requires the most desperate of measures. Indeed, conspiracy theorists spend most of their time collecting and interpreting information rather than in the traditional politics of movement building and forging alliances with other groups. At particular conjunctures, however, such as the tenuous association between the John Birch Society and parts of the Christian Coalition on behalf of Republicans in the 1990s, conspiracy theories can have important effects on major political parties” (footnote 13 cites a book and an article by Sara Diamond about these relationships).
However, Fenster says: “Let me declare my own position clearly: There are elements of secret treachery in the contemporary political and economic order. Foreign covert actions that employ economic exploitation of native populations, political assassinations, and subversion of democratic and revolutionary movements, as well as domestic policies of covert surveillance and ‘countersubversion’ such as the FBI’s COINTELPRO program, have played important roles in twentieth-century history. Secretive alliances between private individuals and groups with shared class interests do enjoy power of seats of public and private power that is greater than their numbers would allow them in a participatory democratic state. Yet, totalizing conspiracy theories suffer from a lack of substantive proof, dizzying leaps of logic, and oversimplification of the political and economic structures of power. Structural, institutionally based inequities in the destribution of power, capital, and resources do not constitute conspiracy; rather, they help to define capitalism. [!!!] Thus, the existence of governmental secrecy neither proves the existence of all-encompassing conspiracies nor provides a rationale for them. Although conspiracy theories are certainly resistant to dominant political discourses, they rarely enable effective political engagement and often are related directly or indirectly to virulent forms of scapegoating, racism, and fascism.” [This basically seems to be saying; yeah, there’s a conspiracy, go read Marx and then we’ll talk.]
Mark Fenster’s book talks about the link between the book The Turner Diaries and the Oklahoma City bombing, and its popularity among fascist groups in the U.S. He also cites John Fiske’s Media Matters: Everyday Culture and Political Change (U of MN Press, 1994) as insinuating that “counterknowledge,” like theories of domination or plotting by whites and Jews against blacks is a kind practice of resistance to the oppression they face; Fenster says he finds this problematic and also says that, while one could weigh the followers of The Turner Diaries against the followers of “counterknowledge” by blacks and conclude that the former is unacceptable and the latter is acceptable, given that the latter is less likely to lead to violence and more likely to lead to a lessening of oppression, neither of these strains of thought leads to cooperation and or emancipation for non-elites, despite their populist natures (224-225).
A dense and increasingly dated book, but nevertheless important in how seriously it takes conspiracy theories and how thoroughly it debunks the notion that we can dismiss conspiracy theorists as purveyors of a "paranoid style" in American politics. Rather, Fenster argues that conspiracy theories are essential to the fabric of American democracy, representing as they do a populist pushback against elite control. Fair enough, but Fenster's argument is harder to sustain as such theories become easier to spread, and as those theories take aim at the very structure of democracy itself. I'd be very curious to see a third edition of this book bring its conclusions into the 21st century, instead of essentially ending in the 1990s, when the modern internet-fueled conspiracy theory began.
An interesting scholarly work. Fenster's main thesis is that conspiracy theories are often manifestations of populism among groups of people who feel politically alienated.
He begins with a critique of Richard Hofstadter's "The Paranoid style in American Politics", then develops his own thesis. Fenster credits Hofstadter for "style", but not for "paranoid" Which he claims is a misdiagnosis as pathology; he develops his position that the paranoid label oversimplifies and misunderstands the populist function of conspiracy theories.
This work is not an encyclopedia of conspiracy theories, and doesn't really take a position on any of them, but merely explores their function in pluralistic democracies.
I'm teaching this book in a cultural studies class and I was a bit disappointed in it. I had hoped for a more detailed discussion of actual conspiracy-theorists, but I found the book over-reliant on formal texts as sources for the argument. I had hoped for a greater historical or sociological perspective. I did like the final (new) chapter on 9/11 conspiracy theory and found the afterward's discussion of populism and American studies quite insightful. I wish that he had foregrounded more of that discussion.