In 1970, two cabinet ministers and their alleged accomplices were accused of smuggling arms to self-defence groups in Northern Ireland and were put on trial. Many of these groups were associated with the then-nascent Provisional IRA. It was also suggested that these ministers favoured the invasion of Catholic areas along the border in order to protect the northern minority and provoke an international incident that might draw in the United Nations.
All this took place against a background of sectarian violence and chaos: during and after August 1969, Catholic families were being driven out of Belfast and other towns and fleeing south, and whole streets were burned out. This was the situation that led to the first introduction of British troops in an attempt to halt the rioting and expulsions.
The trial was seen as a major test of Irish democracy: this was an attempt at a kind of coup, a conspiracy to provide guns to nationalist paramilitaries, and a secret plot to end partition by force. The two politicians were eventually acquitted, a verdict that was never accepted by many of their opponents, but their reputations were forever tainted. The prime minister at the time, Jack Lynch, was hailed as a courageous democrat who defended the integrity of the state and reined in the wild men of his own party. Lynch drew back from any talk of intervention. But politicians hostile to irredentism in the south, and Unionists in Ulster, accused Haughey and Blaney of helping to give birth to the Provos, who launched a murderous campaign that took 30 years to end.
This book arrives at 50th anniversary of the event, the author Michael Heney argues that our traditional understanding of this event has been poor. As authors have had a tendency to view the event though the modern day prism of Charles Haughey latter ambitions and militant violence which the Troubles facilitated. Heney disputes the traditional approach, that the event arose out due to the militant wing of Fianna Fáil led by two ministers Neil Blaney and Charles Haughey alone. To support this approach the author uses primary research with some of the actors involved. Alongside new evidence released from the British and Irish government state archives and the 2001 Attorney General report about the event. Heney argues that Lynch and his defense minister Jim Gibbons actually were not only aware but help facilitated the plan to import arms. This is seen through the perjury of Gibbons, redacted evidence from the arms trials and Lynch's timid response when he first became aware of the plot, according to Secretary General from the Department of Justice Peter Berry.
While it's an interesting argument, when reading it Heney feels is overplaying certain aspects of the evidence presented. The heavily reliance on the Peter berry 'Diaries'. While Lynch definitely was aware since October 1969 about the plot to import arms, The author takes Berry actions of having to consult not only President de Valera but also Fianna Fail veteran Frank Aiken to force Lynch's hand. Lynch ultimately acted when Liam Cosgrave leader of Fine Gael and opposition consulted with Lynch about Garda evidence of such a plot. This demonstrates Lynch's personality at times which is timid nature, unsure of himself at times in how to act and doesn't support the author's argument.
Ultimately my view is this, Jack Lynch allowed the setting up of the Cabinet sub-committee which under Charles Haughey and Neil Blaney took upon themselves alongside elements of military intelligence to seek means to import weaponry. There actions were not only taking a political opportunity to assert their dominance on the 'caretaker Taoiseach' and leader of Fianna Fáil Jack Lynch, but also an opportunity to unify the country militarily.
Overall one has to take that 'Arms crisis of 1970' as a battle for the mindset within Fianna Fáil towards its approach to the North. It's a product of the failure within Fianna Fáil party to effectively articulate a clear policy to unify the country. This began with its founder Eamon de Valera and his approach that Britain would capitulated the North, taken under a new approach slightly under Sean Lemass of economic integration but ultimately the Civil Rights marches in the North escalated forcing Fianna Fáil to be split between hawkish and dove approaches.
While this book is a welcome additional to the historical debate and the Lynch's government impact on state relations toward Northern Ireland, I disagree with the author's conclusion that Jack Lynch had the intention to import arms for the purpose of arming civilians in the North. From reading personal biographies on Lynch, which the author cites in particular Frank Dunlop book 'Yes Taoiseach' who states that Lynch was cute at times while also paradoxically "quite innocent and naive in some ways". Therefore the argument that Lynch actively coordinated a plot from most of his cabinet and through only a select choice of ministers can be largely seen as farcical.
An interesting guided tour through the foggy field that is the arms crisis. The book analyses existing writings and reports on the topic combined with recently released state papers, along with misfiled documents exclusively discovered by the author, to lay out the facts, identify & categorise the key players, provide commentary, and allow the reader to draw their own conclusions about the political machinations, contributions from individuals involved, and societal impacts of the events of the arms crisis from 1969/70 onwards. Proof of how insightful historical investigative journalism can be.
For more than half a century the events surrounding the "arms plot" has intrigued historians, was Lynch the victim of an elaborate plot to unseat him as premier, was he involved in a clandestine attempt to assist nationalists in NI who came under extreme pressure from reactionary unionist forces, or was he a serial political survivor. This work has added immensely to the body of knowledge surrounding the "plot" and interrogates the evidence that has been either hidden or ignored for 20 years. This work has changed my view of some of the main players in the events of early 1970 and is a very welcome and detailed analysis of one of the most significant events of 20th century Irish history.
Did the author consider that the Government might want the case against Charles Haughey to fail, hence the rush to press charges before all statements were made? A guilty Charles Haughey could have caused major problems as he had a lot of party support. The prosecution barrister was kept out of some of the loop on issues with statements. Bringing the prosecution would have satisfied (at least partly) those baying for blood and, as the author admits, made Jack Lynch appear to be a man of decision. Isn't that what all leaders want.
I picked this book to increase my understanding of a moment in Irish history but ended with an even murkier perspective. It is written with an open agenda to change the popularly understood past which it fails to do.
While understanding that the full set of facts are unknown, the book is written in a style that confuses rather than clarifies by filling in gaps with speculation and conjecture.
An intriguing book about an event I had never heard of previously! I found the start tough, likely due to unfamiliarity of the general conclusions, but definitely started to enjoy it more as it went along and I started to understand the author's theory of events.
Interesting. I ended up giving it four stars instead of five because I skipped the timeline at the start, which turns out is necessary, and also only ever reading this after work, before I went to bed, and on my lunch break so I was tired and confused throughout the book