Lessons In Disaster: McGeorge Bundy And The Path To War In Vietnam

by Gordon M. Goldstein

A revelatory look at the decisions that led to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, drawing on the insights and reassessments of one of the war’s architects

"I had a part in a great failure. I made mistakes of perception, recommendation and execution. If I have learned anything I should share it."

These are not words that Americans ever expected to hear from McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. But in the last years of his life, Bundy—the only principal architect of Vietnam strategy to have maintained his public silence—decided to revisit the decisions that had led to war and to look anew at the role he played. He enlisted the collaboration of the political scientist Gordon M. Goldstein, and together they explored what happened and what might have been. With Bundy’s death in 1996, that manuscript could not be completed, but Goldstein has built on their collaboration in an original and provocative work of presidential history that distills the essential lessons of America’s involvement in Vietnam.

Drawing on Goldstein’s prodigious research as well as the interviews and analysis he conducted with Bundy, Lessons in Disaster is a historical tour de force on the uses and misuses of American power. And in our own era, in the wake of presidential decisions that propelled the United States into another war under dubious pretexts, these lessons offer instructive guidance that we must heed if we are not to repeat the mistakes of the past.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, War, American History, Biography, Historical

320 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 2008

Reviews

[Jeffrey Keeten · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interview with Joe Biden in the Rolling Stone.

Considering how busy you are, do you have time to read books? If so, which ones would you recommend?
I make the time because it's important. Let's see. There is a good book titled The River of Doubt, by Candice Millard, about Teddy Roosevelt's exploration of the Amazon in Brazil. I knew nothing about this. My goodness, let's see. There's Mr. Putin, by Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy. Insightful. He's an interesting man. Anyone who's traveled with me to Afghanistan knows why I love this book: War, by Sebastian Junger. And that reminds me of another book, Lessons in Disaster, by Gordon Goldstein. There's a great line in there where LBJ turns to [National Security Adviser] McGeorge Bundy and says, "How can we win this war in Vietnam?" And Bundy says something like, "Sir, we don't know how to win the war, but we know how not to lose it."


Vice President Joe Biden

I have to say isn’t it nice to have people back in the White House that READ? I can’t tell you how tired I became of the previous administration almost bragging about the fact that they didn’t read. It is hard enough to get kids to give reading a chance without the President of the United States implying that reading is not necessary to be successful. Not all of us are born with a silver spoon. My life without reading...well...I shudder to think where I would be today.

Anyway I just finished The River of Doubt My The River of Doubt Review last week and now Lessons in Disaster this week. The books that are influencing our Vice President interest me. I might even dip a toe into the Mr. Putin book.


President John F. Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy was a member of the Kennedy team that David Halberstam so famously called The Best and the Brightest in the book of the same title. It also defined Bundy for a generation as the very personification of the hubris and arrogance of America’s tragic encounter in Vietnam.” I don’t disagree with the arrogance and the hubris, Bundy was an overachiever, a successful academician and an adviser to two presidents who were as different as two people can possibly be. Their view of Vietnam were shaped by different characteristics. ”Kennedy didn’t want to be dumb. Johnson didn’t want to be a coward.”

I’ll take the guy who doesn’t want to be dumb every day of the week and twice on Sunday.

Gordon Goldstein was working with Bundy to put together his recollections about Vietnam, unfortunately the book was never completed because Bundy died from a massive heart attack before the work advanced very far. This book is the result of the research the author did in preparation for the Bundy book. He also added some of Bundy's views of events and stories that were shared with him during several meetings. The sweaty fingerprints of an academic who fears being challenged on his conclusions is evident throughout the text. It is heavy on carefully worded facts, but there is gold in them thar mounds of information.

One of the most heavily debated points for me with my more astute political friends is whether Kennedy would have escalated and “Americanized” (I really loathe that word.) Vietnam. Bundy says: ”Had Kennedy lived, there would have been no Vietnam War as we know it; and with Johnson in the White House, it was(in combination with Hanoi’s total intransigence) destined to unfold like the tragedy it became.” Bundy supports this further with a conversation that he had with Kennedy where he pushed the resolve of the president. ”Within five years we’ll have three hundred thousand men in the paddies and jungles and never find them again. That was the French experience...To my surprise, the President seemed quite unwilling to discuss the matter, responding with an overtone of asperity: ‘George you’re crazier than hell. That just isn’t going to happen.’”

We can’t know for sure as the events unfolded in Vietnam what Kennedy would have done about the situation. He did not believe in the Domino Theory that was circulating among his more Hawkish advisers. They tried to scare him with the theory that Vietnam was the first domino and when it fell so would all the other Asian countries. They would all embrace communism one by one. Kennedy listened to advice, but we have a few incidents that happened in his short presidency that may give us an idea that at least whatever he decided it would be his decision.

He inherited the Bay of Pigs concept from his predecessor Dwight D. Eisenhower. The CIA were determined to pull off this coup attempt to oust Fidel Castro. They weren’t getting the answers they wanted from Kennedy. They thought the prospect of the battering he would take in the press would bring the President into line with their plan. They were basically blackmailing him into providing them with the air support they knew they needed to even have a chance of success. Kennedy explicitly said that he would not provide U.S. air support. When the frantic calls came that air support was needed Kennedy held firm. Bay of Pigs was a debacle, but it was a CIA debacle. They assured the President that the population would join up with the invading force and take back their country. We know how that turned out.



The Cuban Missile Crisis, without a doubt, was Kennedy’s finest hour. Bundy’s advice was to bomb the Nuclear Missile site which would have, of course, launched World War Three. The Russians installed the missiles as a deterrent to future invasions of Cuba. Not unreasonable given the recent Bay of Pigs invasion, and the rhetoric that the US and Cuba had been exchanging with each other. Kennedy decided to bluff, an audacious decision, by installing a blockade referred to as a quarantine. Thus began 13 days of HELL. My father remembers that time vividly and said to me that in the whole time he has been alive this was the moment when he thought the world was going to end. Nikita Khrushchev, thinking this young untested leader would fold, was surprised that beneath that handsome face was an unexpected resolve.

Khrushchev blinked.

To allow Khrushchev to save face, Kennedy did make a secret deal to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey if Khrushchev removed the missiles from Cuba.


Put ‘er there you old so and so. Notice Khrushchev can’t even bear to look at all that hair.

The world became a slightly safer place.

Given the way Kennedy handled those two critical incidences one thing we can be sure of he wouldn’t be pushed into anything he didn’t want to do.

Lyndon Johnson on the other hand was more worried about being seen as weak than he was about being able to win a war. Bundy issued what is referred to as the “Fork in the Road” memo in 1964 which was designed to lay out American strategic options. Johnson’s response: “I don’t know what to do. If I take them out, there’s going to be more killin’. Anything I do, there’s going to more killin’. And he never put a ‘g’ on the ‘killin’’, it was Texas ‘killin’’. Then he got up and walked out of the room, leaving us in a somewhat shattered state.” Johnson decided to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam. This decision left a generation disillusioned with political leaders, and a group of veterans unsure why they sacrificed so much for so little.


McGeorge Bundy with President Lyndon Johnson

I came away from reading this book with more respect for Kennedy and more sympathy for Johnson. Lyndon Johnson believed in his “Great Society” and was willing to make deals, even war deals, to achieve those ideals. The Vietnam war was a disastrous conflict that should have reminded us of the inherent hazards that exist for becoming mired down in future struggles, especially those we know before going in that we can’t win. We need to quit enacting regime changes which in the past has always made things worse. We also must insure that when we do decide to help settle a conflict, with the use of our military, that we have a fully realized exit strategy. Maybe the Iraq war could have been avoided if only a President had READ a little history.

”We must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent or omniscient,” Kennedy declared, “that we are only six percent of the world’s population, that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent, that we cannot fight every wrong or reverse each adversity, and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.”

If you would like to read more of the Joe Biden interview in Rolling Stone. Here is a link: http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/...

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[Michael Perkins · Rating 3 out of 5]

Didn't find this book very convincing.

“Among those dazzled by the Administration team was Vice-President Lyndon Johnson. After attending his first Cabinet meeting he went back to his mentor Sam Rayburn and told him with great enthusiasm how extraordinary they were, each brighter than the next, and that the smartest of them all was that fellow with the Stacomb on his hair from the Ford Motor Company, McNamara. “Well, Lyndon,” Mister Sam answered, “you may be right and they may be every bit as intelligent as you say, but I’d feel a whole lot better about them if just one of them had run for sheriff once.” It is my favorite story in the book, for it underlines the weakness of the Kennedy team, the difference between intelligence and wisdom, between the abstract quickness and verbal fluency which the team exuded, and the true wisdom, which is the product of hard-won, often bitter experience. Wisdom for a few of them came after Vietnam.” ( David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest)

And we still haven't learned. Look at Afghanistan. Alexander the Great could not defeat them. The British Empire tried and failed twice. The Soviets were thwarted. What made us think we could prevail? Now we are engaged in a hasty exit (Vietnamization redux) and it's already an obvious failure.

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 3 out of 5]

Drawing upon the knowledge of the Kennedy administration I have accumulated from other works, I divide the Vietnam War during the Kennedy administration into four phases. The first one lasted from his inauguration to May 1961. Overshadowed by the "failure" in Laos and the debacle in Cuba, Vietnam policy languished as the bureaucracy in Washington charged with developing it paid little attention to the battles waged by the Viet Cong. The produced program – the Counterinsurgency Plan – made the much needed American aid dependent on reforms by President Diem, a man whose record demonstrated he would never put reforms into effect. The attempt to force him to do so turned into ugly intrigue in Saigon, wasting precious time in the process. By the time the link between aid and reform was abandoned and Vice President Lyndon Johnson sent out to patch things up, the Viet Cong had expanded their operations in Vietnam and captured most of the key terrain in Laos that would later become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The options that the American government ended up facing in the summer of 1963 were already apparent: get out of Vietnam, overthrow Diem, or pray for the best with him. These choices were not clearly posed to the president, Since President Kennedy did not make a definitive choice in favor of any one of them, the policy that emerged by default was the praying option. It was a sluggish American slide into deeper commitment, more aid, and acquiescence to the corrupt Diem regime.

What Washington policy-makers tragically lacked was a joint effort to understand the nature of Vietnamese society, the nature of the insurgency raging there, and the nature of Diem’s policies to deal with it. If made, such an effort would have revealed a predominantly rural Buddhist society driven by the simple goal of freedom from foreign occupation and government interference, a fierce insurgency that had long since gathered the power of the villagers for a unified Communist country, and a repressive authoritarian regime in Saigon that stood in the path not only of the Communist insurgency in the countryside, but also of the educated non-Communist urban dissenters seeking a more democratic alternative for the country. 

Yet, even if known in Washington, it is doubtful that these sobering facts would have been accepted by policy-makers because the United States was already deeply embroiled in the conflict. The situation was already well out of hand by the time Kennedy was elected, and his hope, enthusiasm, and energy only helped to postpone serious consideration of the problem America faced in Vietnam. The President began to understand, in those first three months, that the intrigues that had preoccupied both Saigon and Washington had not served U.S. policy well. In addition, he found out that his advisers – including Vice President Johnson – wanted to intervene in Southeast Asia while he did not.

The second phase of the Kennedy-era Vietnam began with NSAM-52 in early May 1961 and continued through the initial execution of NSAM-111 at the end of the same year. The period between those two presidential directives was marked by the increasing success of the Communist effort in the South, the growing American commitment to halt it, and the resulting dissonance in Washington over how to proceed. 

NSAM-52 committed American policy to preventing Communist domination in the South and sent 400 Special Forces advisers. In October, NSAM-80 dispatched the first Air Force Jungle Jim unit to participate in the war. In making these decisions, President Kennedy resisted the pressure to send ground forces put on him mainly by the military, but also by the civilian advisers.

Kennedy’s final decision, NSAM-111, issued on November 22, 1961, ruled out American intervention. The president made this decision after all the arguments for it that could be made had been collected – when the intelligence unequivocally showed that the battlefield situation was tragic, when all of his advisers agreed that the fate of Vietnam was obscure, and when most of them believed that crucial American interests in the region and the world were jeopardized. He drew a line he refused to cross. But he did, nevertheless, make a commitment, giving in to urgency from his advisers. NSAM-111 unleashed advisers, helicopters and other aircraft and military equipment into Vietnam, in the hope that advanced American technology might somehow win in a jungle warfare. To complicate matters, Kennedy, while not accepting intervention with combat troops, refused to accept defeat too. 

The third phase of the Vietnam War, comprised of 1962 and the winter of 1963, witnessed an impressive increase in the ranks of the Viet Cong and an unexplainable American optimism. In his book JFK & Vietnam, John M. Newman describes this optimism as "inside deception," for Kennedy was its target. "The explosive growth of the Viet Cong by the spring of 1962, beyond the ability of the South Vietnamese Army to cope with it, meant that the U.S. advisory effort in Vietnam was stillborn. The reason this was hidden from Kennedy and his point man, McNamara, was because it meant there were only two options left—intervention or withdrawal. With intervention out of the question, the truth about the scale of Viet Cong forces left Kennedy with only one realistic option—withdrawal," explains Newman.

Encouraged by his ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, John F. Kennedy suggested a neutralist solution in Vietnam, but was – of course – immediately and unanimously rebuffed by his Cold Warriors of advisers. As the President and his Secretary of Defense were overwhelmed by the Cuban Missile Crisis, they had to let Vietnam policy run its course for several months. Too little attention was paid to the fact that to sustain the illusion of success, America needed more men, more planes, more helicopters and other equipment, and soon Kennedy and McNamara found themselves trapped in a military escalation without victory in sight. 

As McNamara points out in his book on Vietnam, it was not that the military had done a bad job. The advisors had counseled the South Vietnamese Army, and the intelligence specialists had been precise and honest in their reporting. The South Vietnamese Army was far too small, though, because of that, Diem did not let it fight guerrillas. He used the army to protect his power and wanted Americans to fight the Communists instead.

The final phase of Kennedy’s growing problem in Vietnam began with the Buddhist crisis and subsequent complete collapse of the Saigon regime in the second half of 1963. The President made a decision to withdraw from the Vietnam conflict even though it meant sacrificing his popularity. His withdrawal plan became increasingly hastened as the situation deteriorate further, and Diem and his brother Nhu were assassinated. 

The first aspect of his plan included his belief that the bulk of the withdrawal could not take place before the 1963 elections, so unfortunately, Kennedy had to keep giving the impression that he was all for the deepening American commitment in Vietnam. The second aspect of his plan was to pull some of the American personnel out during the 1964 election campaign yet to begin such a limited withdrawal without provoking an indignant reaction from the hawks was difficult to do.

Nevertheless, it was obvious that John F. Kennedy was headed toward total withdrawal – come what may – from Vietnam before he left was assassinated in Dallas, Texas in November 1963. Whether he was thinking of accelerating his withdrawal plan after Diem met his horrible death cannot be known for sure. However, I believe that the cruel and shocking act in Dallas brought about precisely the outcome that Kennedy had opposed throughout his presidency: full-scale American intervention in Vietnam.

LESSONS IN DISASTER was the idea of McGeorge Bundy, John F. Kennedy's National Security Adviser. A brilliant man and a prodigy, Bundy became the dean of Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences in 1953, at the age of just thirty-four. He was a systematic thinker who could get to the crux of the matter – a quality much prized by Kennedy. If anyone was smarter and more analytical than the gifted Secretary of Defense McNamara, it was McGeorge Bundy. After his death, the manuscript remained unfinished, so his co-author, Gordon M. Goldstein, developed it into a book of his own, a book with which I disagree because of its portrayal of John F. Kennedy's dealing with Vietnam. I wonder: is it because his life ended not only abruptly but much earlier than the lives of his contemporary policy-makers, did they decide to dump so much undeserved blame on him?

The actions of John F. Kennedy speak in his defense after his premature death: while he was guilty of endorsing a potential overthrow of South Vietnamese President Diem, he was not the one who escalated American intervention into the Southeast Asian country. On the contrary, he waged a lone battle against virtually his whole administration to prevent Americans from trapping themselves in the quagmire of Vietnam.

[Kathleen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Who in their right mind names their child McGeorge? Turns out that the incredibly wealthy Boston elite do, you know, like the Lowells who talk only to Cabots, or the Cabots who talk only to God. The point is, he was bred to arrogance and to certitude. The lessons that Goldstein learns from Bundy's mistakes are simple and elegant, yet far too easily ignored. The way a high level public servant can help push a nation into an unmitigated disaster of a war?
1.) Always pass the buck higher up. Claim that since your only job is to serve the President and you can only find facts that agree with his intent.
2.) Rely on bureaucracy. Decide things in committee.
3.) Decide policy based on popularity.
4.) Believe firmly that you are in the right, but don't be too concerned with the details.
5.) Deploy the military before deciding firm objectives.
6.) Believe in the inevitability of an action without choice.

Yet in spite of the failings of his choices, Goldstein treats Bundy very compassionately. It is an interesting, informative story.

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 3 out of 5]

Lessons in Disaster is a post-mortem look at the pivotal moments of the Vietnam War as viewed through the eyes of National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy. "Mac" was one of the hawks, who publicly argued for escalating the Vietnam War, but he held private doubts about the possibility of success. This book originated in a collaboration between the author and Bundy on his memoirs, which was cut short by Bundy's death in 1996. Based on the historical record, scribbled 'fragments' for that book, and conversations with Bundy, Goldstein wrote a different book about the key decisions to intervene in Vietnam, and the relationship between Bundy and the presidents he served.

The primary argument that Goldstein advances is one that defends the reputation of Kennedy at the expense of Johnson. The picture of Kennedy that emerges is one of skepticism towards the military bureaucracy, a man who learned hard lessons in the Bay of Bigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis, who knew that starting a war was easier than finishing it, and that there was little of strategic interest in Vietnam. Kennedy was willing to deploy special forces and adviser/training forces, but not to commit ground combat troops.

By contrast, Johnson was desperate to save political face, and unable to make the hard choice to abandon Vietnam. A dyed-in-the-wool creature of the legislature, Johnson treated his staff like Senators he was whipping for a key vote, not a source of ideas, options, and plans. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution shored up Johnson's right flank during the 1964 election, rather than acting towards a strategic end. The decision to escalate was based on a desire to get General Westmoreland onboard, and then to negotiate the lowest number of troops that would keep Westmoreland's support, not any clear strategic goals. This is a solid story, but better told in H.R. McMaster's Dereliction of Duty.

The problem is that where we might get some unique insight into Bundy's character and role in the great drama of the Vietnam War, the book becomes maddeningly vague. American Rasputin draws a clear line between Rostow's modernization theory and faith in the efficacy of airpower. McNamara's memoirs describe a flawed process of analysis and roads not taken. The Best and The Brightest has a compelling argument about the fatal arrogance and political cowardice of the Washington establishment. All of those books are superior to Lessons in Disaster.

National Security Adviser is a strange role, with little formal power but a great deal of potential access to the President, and power through that channel. Bundy was one of the brightest of Kennedy's advisers, an academic wunderkind who became the youngest Dean of Harvard (fascinatingly, as Dean he was continually interviewed by David Halberstam for the Harvard Crimson, who would go on to cover the Vietnam War and excoriate Bundy for his role in it.) But relatively little of that man comes through. In fact, Bundy was on vacation for key moments, like the Vance telegram that set in motion the coup against Diem. The post-facto disapproval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the introduction of ground troops are weakly contrasted against active approval for escalating the war at all decision points. And I wish we had more about the SIGMA II-64 wargame that correctly predicted how the war would go in 1964, and at which Bundy was present. Not a bad book, per se, but one almost entirely redundant.

[perry · Rating 3 out of 5]

I mean I only read this for epq so ...

[Ann · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book focuses on the role that McGeorge Bundy played in the escalation of the War in Vietnam, in the period roughly between 1961, when he joined JFK's cabinet, until 1965, when he resigned from LBJ's White House. The author had started to work with Bundy in 1995, when he (Bundy) was finally ready to grapple with the questions of his competence, diligence and regrets about his involvement in the Vietnam War. Bundy had started to review government documents and memos, and had even begun drafting "fragments" of explanation. The project was halted after Bundy's sudden death, and the final product is probably not the book that Bundy and the author had originally planned. Still, it is an interesting and surprisingly readable book about one of the most debated questions of American history. Since the author is a trained historian/political scientist, he relies heavily on the written record (as he should), and so there are many citations from official memos, cables and other documents that are typically not written in a very clear, direct style. That can get boring - there's a lot of "we'll do anything to combat communism - but the South Vietnamese are going to fight the North Vietnamese on their own" type of internal contradictions.

Still, the book is interesting because it focuses on a couple of pivot points that ended up with the massive escalation of the war under LBJ. For instance, the cable instructing the ambassador in Saigon to support, or at least not counteract, a coup being prepared by the South Vietnamese military against Diem and his brother Nhu, had been written over the weekend by an anti-Diem fraction that happened to be in DC that weekend while Bundy and McNamara were spending the weekend elsewhere. JFK seems to have gone along, possibly believing that his senior advisors had signed off on this. The coup led to the assassination of Diem and Nhu and might have been a case of going from the fire into the frying pan - it certainly does not seem to have led to increased governmental and political stability in South Vietnam. Three weeks later JFK was assassinated and no one knows how he would have dealt with Vietnam.

Another interesting example is the Tonkin Bay incident, which led to the Tonkin Bay resolution and opened the way to a "real" war. The book explains how LBJ used that incident (a destroyer being shot at by the North Vietnamese) to get Congress where he wanted. The book also describes how the war escalated by bombing raids, even though hardly anyone believed that bombing raids would break the North Vietnamese fighting spirit (history tends to show that bombing raids stiffen, not weaken the resolve of the targeted population). And since one can't have a bombing raids without ground personnel to service and protect the planes, that meant that "regular" military personnel needed to come along... and before you know it, you have 100,000 to 200,000 combat troups in Vietnam.

One of the things I had not appreciated before was that the year 1964 was essentially a lost year in terms of dealing with the Vietnam issue. That was because LBJ was focused on getting elected and could therefore not afford to withdraw troops (and risk being perceived as soft on communism) nor expand the war (and lose votes because of that).

In terms of McGeorge Bundy himself, the author quotes from interviews and writtten "fragments" that he had come to question his passivity and reluctance to challenge LBJ or the "hawks". For someone who was considered as one of the most brilliant brains in the White House, Bundy seems to have been very uncritical of received notions (the domino theory, the idea that American prestige must be preserved at all costs, the idea that numerical dominance must inevitably lead to victory). It is fascinating to read how many misgivings there were about the war, and how early on... and how yet, time after time, the decision was made to continue down the path of military escalation. More than one expert pointed out that the US were at risk of duplicating the French experience in Indochina- but such considerations were summarily dismissed with the thought that the US were simply better warriors and/or strategists than the French. General Westmoreland asked for about 40 batallions to fight the war in Vietnam, but also seems to have stated that he didn't think that that would win the war - did no one pick up on the contradiction in that? And I almost feel sorry for LBJ, who clearly just wanted to get on with his legislative agenda and wished that Vietnam would just go away....

Now I need to find a book that will cover the decision-making in the Vietnam War between 1965 and 1974 !

[Kerry · Rating 4 out of 5]

For history junkies like myself, how is this one possible to resist?! Bundy's immediate admitting to having part in a great failure in American history with it's involvement in the Vietnam war while also making statements like: Kennedy didn't want to be dumb" and Johnson didn't want to be a coward" within the first few pages?! Tantalizing. Pow! Bam! Boom! (cue Adam west)

Then of course the story of Bundy presenting a paper to the class where his classmates snickered through it. When asked why? Bc he gave a superb delivery from a blank piece of paper. You sir, are what the kids call, a baller. Most delectably so when Yale asked you to write an essay on what you did on your summer vacation and you upbraided them for their banal question. I knew you were something special already.

Bundy was one of those who's intelligence stymies others while tiptoing on the edge of blantant arrogance. Sigh there are so few of us out there. The quote "the US is the locomotive at the head of mankind & the rest of the world the caboose" is not going to make you any friends in the world's playground sir...but I'd share my snack pack w him any day. Now now not bc I believe that of the US but bc it takes a sort of...panache to pull off a comment like that without blinking. Tell me more!

But then as well all know nothing good lasts forever and right out of the gates we learn of Bundy's role in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. You can assuredly tell that Bundy is an educated man, but it seems he never asks all of the questions about what the fallout of it all may be. This does not bode well... It means well, it just doesn't bode well.

Now personally I'm torn with Kennedy's response. Though I think personally I respect that he stuck to his guns on this. He told his advisors he was not going to allow US military involvement and he damn well didn't. It is always hard to see people fighting for their freedom have the rest of the world turn their back on them. I know there are many reasons for such a thing, political and otherwise, but it's still painful to see in humanity. (see, I DO have a heart...occasionally). Still thou, extra props to Kennedy for facing up to the failed mission. He didn't try to save face by sending in the troops to bomb Cuba to hell...but then again more than a few people still wish he had.

It is a fascinating read thou to see how Kennedy stuck to his decision to stay out of Vietnam as long as possible, even as the rest of his advisors pushed for it, Bundy included. What makes this one hit home though, is right in the second chapter where it explains how often Bundy went to the DC Vietnam memorial and ran his hands over the names etched in stone, constantly re-evaluating his role in such a costly mass of human life. While the history is fascinating to read about in hopes to wrap your mind around the reasoning, far too little is spoken about the weight these men (and now women) carry with these decisions about the lives of soldiers and American citizens. Well played Goldstein. Well played.

It is a facinating study of contrasts thou to see the steps and arguments that take place when debating whether to enter the arena in a war. It comes down to what's in it for us of course. And while bundy at the time thou not easily, justified his support of Americanizing the Vietnam war, in hindsight he saw how wrong he was. But then as we all know hindsight is 20/20 for us all. What piques my curiosity the most is what would have happened if Kennedy had not been assassinated. He fought tooth & nail to stay out of military action, most ESP after the Bay of Pigs. Which leads to if that was one of the reasons for his assassination.

But then we all know history repeats itself. (cough::desert storm::) but it will still always depend on how big the bait is for us in the decision at hand...

[Tony]

According to WSJ, "Lessons in Disaster" traces the hawkish war stance and eventual disavowal of it by Vietnam-era national-security adviser McGeorge Bundy.



In 2009, in the context of the Vietghanistan quagmire, the book: "entered West Wing circulation after Deputy National Security Adviser Tom Donilon, one of the top foreign-policy voices in the White House, gave it to White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel after reading it himself. Mr. Emanuel read the book in a weekend, then showed it to the president, who was already working on his own copy. Instead, Mr. Emanuel gave his copy to senior White House adviser David Axelrod, according to an administration official familiar with the book's path. Once in Mr. Obama's hands, the book drew attention throughout the administration's foreign-policy ranks.

There are striking similarities between the debates of today and yesteryear. Now, as in the 1960s, the discussion in the administration is how to best defeat a perceived national-security threat. In both periods, the U.S. had partnered with corrupt governments with tainted leaders. For opponents of a major troop increase, led by Mr. Biden and Mr. Emanuel, "Lessons in Disaster" encapsulates their concerns about accepting military advice unchallenged. 'Bundy said we debated a number and not a use,' said Gordon M. Goldstein, the book's author, referring to troop deployments. 'That's a really critical observation which goes to the heart of what's going on right now in the White House.' Administration officials in the Biden camp fear they too could close off the path to a more peaceful resolution of the conflict if 40,000 more troops are sent. They believe most of the Taliban fighters, and some of their leaders, are neither hard-core, violent Islamists nor sympathetic to al Qaeda. Some are nationalists trying to rid their country of foreigners. Some leaders are willing to flip sides depending on the deals on offer or the momentum on the ground. Many more are simply doing it for the money paid by Taliban leaders."



http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12548...



Sounds like an important book. On the other hand, this is only a book "about a White House adviser who, like so many of “the best and the brightest,” was decades behind the curve in discovering that he had made a mistake pushing for war."



There are other relevant books, for sure, as detailed in this review article:

"Apocalypse Then, Afghanistan Now"

by William J. Astore and Tom Engelhardt, October 12, 2009

http://original.antiwar.com/engelhard...



Either way, for President Obama, what he's reading may have a decisive influence on the outcome of his presidency and his career as a politician, if he turns out to be just another Lyndon Johnson escalating another pointless war:



"By failing his first big test as commander in chief, Obama will likely ensure himself a one-term presidency, and someday be seen as a man like LBJ whose biggest dreams broke upon the shoals of an unwinnable war."

~Lt. Col. William Astore (retired)

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Lessons in Disaster: written from long interviews with McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to Kennedy and Johnson, about the lead-up to the Vietnam war. History is told primarily from the perspective of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, with Bundy's personal lens often affecting what gets told and how it gets told. That's not necessarily a bad thing, but it's worth keeping in mind while reading.

I don't know the history of that time period (1960 to 1967, roughly) well enough to comment on the accuracy and thoroughness of what was covered, but as a reader I felt like I got a fairly thorough timeline of important events. Some bits seemed to need more explanation (Cable 243 being sent is described as an event that just happened, without any discussion of trying to undo it within the next six months) but cross-referencing Wikipedia as needed tended to fill in the gaps.

As expected, the book is incredibly harsh on Bundy, McNamara, Johnson, and how the administrations handled things in general. The harshest criticisms of Bundy and the Johnson administration, however, are only implied by the author rather than asked outright. Why was Bundy in a position as national security advisor, when he was clearly not qualified? (Bundy recalls first being offered several unrelated positions in Kennedy's staff, in a wonderful demonstration of nepotism.) Why did no one consider that the other world powers didn't support us (related: how petty was our dismissal of France's advice against combat as thinking they didn't want to look bad if we won in Vietnam)? Why did they not listen to the analysis they had? (Bundy asks himself why they didn't try analytical approaches several times in hindsight, though the answer is scattered throughout the book---the analysis was there, the dissidents didn't hesitate to speak up, but the Sigma wargames were ignored and the vocal opposition was eventually excluded from relevant discussions).

Aside: I found the writing style a bit off-putting. It's written like a long-form journalistic piece, with the writer regularly injecting himself into the book as an active participant. I expect this when reading a piece from the Atlantic, not in a book like this. It didn't affect my experience too negatively, but was noticeable enough to be a distraction.

The last chapter seems a little excessive in defending a big "what-if" (arguing that things would have been better had Kennedy not died), but I'm told that that is (unsurprisingly) a traditional topic for debate in Vietnam literature.

If you're interested in the subject, the book is great; otherwise, it's not enough of a book to warrant reading entirely on its own merit.

[Bill · Rating 4 out of 5]

McGeorge Bundy was Dean of Harvard University and National Security Advisor for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Henry Kissinger and Condeela Rice followed Bundy as national security advisors before becoming secretaries of state. Goldstein has a PhD in international relations and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Bundy and Goldstein had been collaborating for 18 months to write a book covering Bundy's national security advisor experiences and the Vietnam War prior to the Bundy's unexpected death on April 16, 1996. That date was 34 years after the beginning of the War and Bundy's national security advisor role in the Kennedy Administration.
Goldstein and Bundy were at the beginning stages of the book when Bundy died. Bundy left a disorganized collection of memos and many note fragments. Goldstein reorganized these materials and interviewed many of the survivors in both administrations to provide information for this lessons learned book.

Among the lessons learned by Kennedy was never trust the bureaucracy to take effective action. The bureaucracy's less than effective action caused the hugely embarrassing loss at the Bay of Pigs.

In spite of Kennedy's involvement in the Diem coup, he strongly ordered that U. S. military personnel in Vietnam were to only act as advisors and trainers. Kennedy, according to Bundy, believed that if U. S. combat forces were sent to Vietnam the war would become Americanized. On November 22, 1963, the date of Kennedy's murder, 108 American military personnel had been killed in Vietnam. Fifty eight thousand more would die before the end of the war.

Bundy believed that LBJ exaggerated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August, 1964 in a successful effort to persuade Congress to give him almost unlimited powers to conduct the Vietnamese War. Bundy in a letter written in 1994 described Johnson as being

"…kind and mean, open and closed, brave and timid, sensitive and unfeeling, careful and rash, trusting and suspicious, self-centered and generous."

The huge and fundamental lesson learned is the question of what resources would be required to force North Vietnam to meaningfully negotiate. LBJ and Bundy paid little attention to this question. Bundy, thirty years later, castigated himself for paying so little attention to such an important matter that affected the lives of so many. As a result of lack of strategic thought the U. S. engaged in a war of attrition. North Vietnamese losses were at least an order of magnitude greater than those of the U. S. Yet, they outlasted the U. S. and won the war.

Afghanistan??

[Max · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent treatment of the Kennedy Administration's involvement in Vietnam. Drawing on numerous interviews with McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and numerous documents from the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Goldstein's thorough research provides strong support to his arguments. Goldstein tells the reader that Kennedy did not favor intervention in Southeast Asia, evidenced by the fact that he chose not to intervene after Laos fell to Communism. Furthermore, while Kennedy did increase the number of military advisors in Vietnam, Goldstein argues that Kennedy did not intend to escalate the war the way McGeorge Bundy wanted and Lyndon Johnson eventually did.
Each chapter analyzes historical events and key decisions and extrapolates a particular lesson. One of the most poignant is that politics is the enemy of strategy. In fact, Goldstein argues that one of Johnson's principal considerations for escalating the conflict were to avoid looking weak on Communism. Another key lesson is that conviction without rigor is a strategy for disaster. Goldstein illuminates the debates held by Cabinet members and other key players with President Johnson over whether to escalate the war. It was shocking to learn that arguments in favor of intervening never moved past ideological reasons because statistical data, intelligence gathering, and analysis suggested that the United States could not successfully execute a war against native guerrillas. This could is why clear objectives were never determined and were postponed by McGeorge Bundy (National Security Advisor). There are of course other important lessons to be learned by reading this book.
Lessons in Disaster is an important book in understanding the blunders that led not just to America escalating the war in Vietnam, but doing so in an incredibly irresponsible fashion. It also offers key lessons to the deciders of tomorrow: should America choose to enter a war, it should have clear objectives to accomplish and know why it is doing so. War, while sometimes necessary, is not to be entered into lightly. Whether or not our intervention in Vietnam was necessary has been a highly contested issue by historians over the years, and Goldstein definitely argues the negative. It is a highly readable book and necessary reading for anyone interested in the history of the Vietnam War.

[Peter Jana · Rating 4 out of 5]

Similar to Robert McNamara - but in a more restrained way - McGeorge Bundy critically looked back at his decisions during the Vietnam years, took stock of his mistakes, and concluded that the war never should have happened. Lessons in Disaster is not Bundy's memoir. It was written by Gordon M. Goldstein, the co-author of a history of the war started by Bundy but left incomplete due to Bundy's death. Using his access to Bundy's personal notes, Goldstein makes a strong case that if John Kennedy were not assassinated, the Vietnam war never would have escalated into the ground war quagmire that it became. [LBJ reversed JKK's no ground troops policy with the advice and consent of Bundy and others.:]

Interesting tidbits:

1) The CIA tried to manipulate Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy told them that he would not, under any circumstances, directly use American military power to assist the exile forces. The CIA expected the mission would fail without direct American military support but conducted it anyway. The CIA undertook the operation without sharing this conclusion and assumed that JFK would reverse his policy in the midst of the operation. After this incident the president would never completely trust his senior military advisers. Note how the military wanted to bomb Cuba during the missile crisis, which would have led to a much larger war, perhaps a nuclear exchange (38-40). The best thing to come out of the Bay of Pigs was a president skeptical of military leadership.

2) Bundy thought that we should fight in Vietnam even if we lose. We have to show the rest of the world American resolve to fight Communism. The gains from demonstrating the resolve are much greater than the consequences of losing a war.

3) Critics of the war: George Ball (Undersecretary of State) was one of the very few members of LBJs cabinet who opposed escalating the war. Also see the Morganthau/Bundy debate p. 194. Other anti-war voices in government include Robert Kennedy. Check out Walter Lipmann's anti-war writing.

Review from NYRB: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archi...

[Garrett Burnett · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lessons in Disaster provides a wonderful behind-the-scenes look at the political machinations and gamesmanship roiling in the White House. McGeorge Bundy was the national security advisor for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. The author, Gordon Goldstein, had worked extensively with Bundy in his later years for a biography that eventually fell through. Goldstein wrote this book instead. He examines the choices that led to the expansion of the Vietnam War. Kennedy comes out looking much better than Johnson in Goldstein's treatment--less hawkish and more restrained. Goldstein separates the chapters into six lessons, including "Conviction without rigor is a strategy for disaster" and "Never deploy military means in pursuit of indeterminate ends." While lessons with titles like these don't exactly beg to be read, they are well-thought-out, insightful, and detailed. No one can accuse Goldstein of "conviction without rigor."

[Olivia · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book has made me quite skeptical about the leaders in our government. Of course, I hope all the current leaders have all read this and learned from it.
Through 6 lessons, Goldstein writes about the many mistakes of the American administration during Kennedy's and LBJ's presidencies. We all know that the Vietnam War ended badly, but I did not realize it was jumped into so blindly. Even when they were presented with research that the chances of winning were slim to nothing, they still proceeded with the war. I do realize that it was a very tough situation, but the unorganization of the administration still appalls me. I'm sure people would still criticize Johnson if he had withdrawn early and lost, but at least not as many lives would have been lost.

There are a lot of names mentioned so it can get a bit confusng. Just have to pay close attention. I thought I would be bored by this (which at times I was), but overall, very interesting content.

[Hj Reichen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Compelling to see how the administration had produced all the warning signs for failure in Vietnam and that key leaders, most of all Bundy, intellectually disregarded these signs. The refusal to define a precise end and link to proper means demonstrates the challenge of proper strategic reasoning in the democratic environment. Politics is the enemy of strategy.

[Clem · Rating 5 out of 5]

In many ways, this is yet another Vietnam War book. This one is a tad different in that former National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, is sort of the main focus of the book. My guess is that author Gordon M. Goldstein set out to write a biography of the man, yet Bundy died shortly after the two of them met sometime around the mid-1990s, so the author had to change course a bit.

Bundy served as National Security Advisor to both Kennedy and Johnson, and this fact alone makes this book an interesting read. Much of the book is devoted to the differences in leadership styles of the two presidents, and there is a lot of speculation as to how and why the U.S. Government managed to get embroiled in such a mess in a place like Vietnam. McGeorge Bundy serves as the perfect focus for such a narrative since he was front and center during the earlier years of the conflict.

Now, it needs to be pointed out that since McGeorge Bundy resigned as National Security Advisor in 1965, this is where the narrative of this book essentially stops. There really is a lot more to tell about Vietnam, and most would agree that 1965 is just about the time when things escalated from so-so, to bad, and then to catastrophe. So again, don’t expect a complete narrative of the conflict.

The book doesn’t suffer because of this, however. In fact, most of the controversy surrounding Vietnam is focused on how and why the U.S. got involved, and all of this did, in fact, occur prior to Bundy’s resignation. Hindsight is 20/20, and other than Undersecretary George Ball, most of the cabinet and key political figures were in agreement that our military presence was needed in Southeast Asia in order to keep the proverbial dominoes from falling. For the most part, Bundy was part of this group as well.

What makes this book stand out as opposed to the oodles of other books on Vietnam is watching and observing the behaviors of the two presidents. The conclusions that the author gives us is that, even though we never could know what direction Kennedy would have gone had he lived, his experience and behavior surrounding similar issues would have caused him to eventually take a radically different path that wouldn’t have been nearly as calamitous. In fact, we also get to read about the Bay of Pigs fiasco; mostly because the event hardened JFK’s resolve when it came to dealing with military “experts” and he vowed to never let them do his thinking for him again. This helps set his tone for Vietnam.

So once Lyndon Johnson is at the helm, we get the impression that he never really wanted to even be bothered much about the situation. Johnson’s big focus was always his “Great Society” initiative, and that was where he wanted to devote his attention and resources. When news from Saigon unexpectedly arrived from time to time, you get the feeling that LBJ would just push the issue off his desk and tell his staff to “handle it and just don’t make me look bad”. Johnson never comes across as “presidential” as he should. Yes, a president needs to consult their advisors, but ultimately, great presidents know how and when to lead. Johnson seemed to be lacking in this when it came to Vietnam.

This book was a very good, clear read. Sometimes “war” books or “government” books can get buried too deep in the weeds with too much meticulous detail. The author, though, manages to keep this book at a high level and it was always easy to keep the personalities and the events straight in one’s head. He did tend to divert from his narrative time-to-time and “revisit” his meetings with Bundy thirty years after the fact around some issues, but as I’ve mentioned, Bundy seems to be the intended focus of the book, so such diversions aren’t too unwelcome. In fact, one might argue that rather than a “history book” this book might be better served as a “doctoral thesis”.

For someone who knows very little about the Vietnam War and the personalities of early 1960s U.S. politics, it might be best to start with a broader, more encompassing volume. If, however, you’ve read several books about events, this book serves as an excellent companion piece and does focus on areas (JFK vs. LBJ) that might not be readily available elsewhere. Yes, McGeorge Bundy is the focus, and I came away thinking that the ground that was covered so well here really benefited from the fact that we witnessed so much of these high-level meetings through his eyes.

[Greg Brown · Rating 4 out of 5]

Surprisingly good book about the decision-making process around Vietnam from 1961-65, with special attention paid to the role of MacGeorge Bundy. The book itself is a strange shadow of an unpublished book on Vietnam, one Bundy started co-authoring with Goldstein before his death. Despite Goldstein's efforts to make it publishable after his death, the estate spiked its release—so we get Goldstein writing a history book about the research they did, along with Bundy's scraps of recollections in interviews and marginalia.

It sounds like a lesson in disaster itself, especially with Bundy's early insistence that he's uninterested in considering Hanoi's decision-making in all of this, or the facts on the ground in Vietnam at any point; by limiting his study to administration memos, he seems to be reproducing the same biases and ideological assumptions that led to escalating the war. Yet there was enough real dissent in the administration that it is worth asking why it wasn't considered more carefully.

Some of the interesting stuff here I haven't seen in other books was the extent to which Eisenhower was being consulted by LBJ before Vietnam decisions, and his consistent advocacy for more military involvement. Likewise, Bundy concludes that some meetings before a significant troop increase were largely staged, with LBJ's decision made days earlier when McNamara sounded out Westmoreland for his minimum acceptable increase.

In the book's epilogue, Goldstein tackles Bundy's conclusion later in life that JFK would not have allowed ground troops in Vietnam. While it's the strongest case I've seen for the premise, I'm still unconvinced: the domestic political incentives seem too strong pushing for more involvement in Vietnam. He places so much faith in JFK's private pledge to disentangle from Vietnam after the election, even in the face of all his advisors pushing otherwise. Given the statements were made in 1963, it's hard not to read the pledges as a way of justifying continued inaction to himself and others, and it's not clear that by 1965 he wouldn't have found another justification.

And as LBJ found out, it's very easy to slowly escalate beyond your own guardrails: once you have bombers stationed there, the airbases can be shelled; once you have soldiers guarding the airbases, they can be attacked; once you have soldiers actively patrolling near the airbases, they can be ambushed.

[Tamara aka SoMysteriousLee · Rating 4 out of 5]

My dad was a Vietnam vet. He endured so much, including being a POW for a time, and was part of the team that set up the Hamburger Hill nightmare. His health was never the same thanks to Agent Orange, and the shrapnel he had to live with in one kidney, among other 'leftovers'. I read this and it just pisses me all the more off actually. Mundane azzhatz making decisions they had no clue about. Trying to explain so that you can justify your decisions while making more money thanks to book sales in order to feel better about your life isn't going to cut it with me. To me the war was more like a bunch of good ole'boys playing Risk or Stratego after dinner with brandy and cigars aplenty while they laid bets on who would do what next.

I give it 4 stars because of the emotion it brought up, but I give the people involved in the government decision making a 1/2 a star. That much because I'm sure somewhere there were parents who did love them and thought they raised them right. Or maybe not, snobs don't seem to have a moral compass...And I sincerely hope that all those who weren't actually involved in the war other than making and taking orders from a desk don't ever sleep at night, either in life or in death, as my dad NEVER did after he came home. He passed away this year, and he's greatly missed.

[D. B. Grace · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book isn't amazing.

It attempts to be a postmortem of the decision-making of the Vietnam War. It succeeds at being a sort of general portrait of three men circling the edges of the war. Despite the title, it spends just as much time on Johnson and Kennedy as it does on Bundy himself.

This book ostensibly distills its thesis into "lessons" learned from Bundy's experience, but the lessons range from painfully obvious to so abstract and general that they're practically useless. They mostly get lost in the meat of the chapter, just parroted once at the beginning and once at the end to give the illusion of structure. Overall, it works as a rough sketch of the dynamics contributing to the war, and an introduction to the major players and events.

McGeorge Bundy, a genius: Look, losing the war is fine, as long as we sacrifice 100,00 lives first.

[Geicodave · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very interesting book on the process by which the US became involved in Vietnam. The focus is on McGeorge Bundy's role in the process and thus covers the period from 1961 through 1965, the years in which Bundy served in the White House. The actions and views of all the key players are also explored, but not in depth. I finished the book with two things in mind. First, nothing like our involvement in Vietnam happens inevitably or accidentally and, second, I wish George Ball's view had prevailed. If it had, 58,000+ men would not have died, much treasure would have been saved, and LBJ may well have been able to realize his dream of the Great Society.

[Jimmacc · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting discussions. Some of the highlights for me were the Bay of Pigs review. The end discussion of how that incident shaped Kennedy’s attitude to the military and intelligence communities was really enlightening. And if the first episode of the PBS Vietnam series didn’t make you realize the tragedy of our escalation in Vietnam, this book will.

The differences between Kennedy and Johnson are highlighted continually. Eisenhower is a recurring background and I would have liked to understand more of his participation/influence in these events. Maybe for another book.

[Duke Gluttony · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this for my Contemporary American History grad course. If you want to learn about U.S. foreign policy in relation to pre-1966 Vietnam War, I would recommend this book. I did not care for its highly Western narratives though.

Other than its main topic, I would like to that McGeorge Bundy was a bad person, at least in my opinion. He makes out foreign policy as only a presidential decision, but this ultimately is self-serving. He does not care about his own involvement nor does he care about the hundreds of thousands of dead Vietnamese.

[Jeffrey Nichols · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great discussion on Vietnam from government perspective

I picked this book up on sale as I am a huge JFK admirer and have read a ton about Vietnam and the 60s. I was familiar with the players in government but this book added alot to that. It was a great discussion of how Vietnam came to be what we know it today with trying to discuss but not limit how we got there. I feel the book did a great job with laying out how things progressed so we can look to avoid those things in the future. I highly recommend it for anyone interested in the 60s wars in Vietnam.

[Jove · Rating 3 out of 5]

Found this to be somewhat more ending than dereliction of duty, but feel prey to the same problem of I'm my opinion overly detailed recounting of fairly trivial internal communications making the same points throughout the book. Emphasizes failures in presidential leadership over failures of advice, and largely focuses on civilian processes. All in all quite information, but repetitive at times.

[nadoo · Rating 4 out of 5]

after nearly a year, i’ve finally finished this book! lol

i came into this without a good understanding of the vietnam war and its significance, and have now left with a better understanding of the american political elites’ perspective on the war. it’s not the full picture, but it certainly is a significant part of the story!

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

As one might expect, a book about the decisions leading us into Viet Nam is depressing. And the excruciating level of detail makes the book boring.

[Sarah Palmer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Interesting insider perspective. Would love to read the book Bundy's wife wouldn't let him release.

[Javvie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book about Bundy and the decisions made on whether or not to send troops into Vietnam. A bit of an odd book considering the author's relationship with Bundy (they were collaborating, Bundy died, then the book had to be about Bundy instead), but still interesting. The book is meant to teach lessons, (hence the title) not just to be a historical record of what happened, and I think it succeeds in those terms. Aside from the titles of each chapter, there are no prescribed lessons, but what you think about when you read it definitely brings those up. The author is both analysing what Bundy thought he should have done (from Bundy's perspective) and what the author identifies as his actual shortcomings as well as when Bundy failed to perceive those shortcomings in action.

Bundy himself, but mostly the author, identify several shortcomings in Bundy's behavior during his stint as essentially the National Security Advisor to both Kennedy and Johnson. First, Bundy was not a very good manager and not a good gatekeeper (even though he'd proven to be pretty good in his academic jobs). Second, he also didn't work on weekends (author loves highlighting this) and didn't quite seem to have what he needed to put into a position of that importance. Third, Bundy was fixated on the US's credibility issues in the world and seemed most worried about whether or not there would be a "paper tiger" - not worried about whether we'd win (and didn't think so) or the lives we'd lose... crazy.

The most interesting part of the book is the end - in which the conclusion seems to be that Kennedy would not have gone to war in Vietnam and would have been able to resist the rising tide of the pressure. The lesson there seems to be that the President, not the advisors, make the decision. Bundy (and others) distinguish Johnson as the great legislator, but not necessarily the kind of independent leader needed for foreign policy decisions to make strategy, stay the convictions, and resist the completely unsupported evidence put before them (it was really shocking how no one ever really analyzed what we wanted out of the war! Or what it would take!).

[Robert · Rating 1 out of 5]

I really got sucker punched on this one. I hoped that it would be a follow-up to the excellent research and analysis by H.R. McMaster on the specifics of decision making that lead to the mismanagement of the American effort in Vietnam. I assumed from the subtitle it would focus largely on the role of McGeorge Bundy and perhaps that of his brother. I couldn't have been more wrong.

This book actually had only one theme and it was very poorly supported, but deceitfully disclosed. As one gets further and further into the book, it becomes less and less about McB and more and more about the wisdom of JFK and how he would never have made the commitment that LBJ did.

The text is loaded with rhetorical sleight of hand. For example, at p. 54 (of the 280 pp. edition I read) Goldstein quotes a reply submitted by the joint chiefs of staff to a query received from the Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, that begins with the following "Assuming that the political decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside the communist sphere, the joint chiefs are of the opinion that U.S. forces should be deployed immediately..." Ignoring the "Assuming," Goldstein then proceeds with his own assumption that the joint chiefs recommended a combat troop commitment.

Moreover, the use of footnotes as authority is unforgivably deceptive. At several points, Goldstein makes a critical assertion of fact with an attached footnote that does not purport to provide authority but simply launches into a digression of collateral information.