Until our most recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military had rarely encountered adversaries that were willing to, according to our culture, commit suicide. The most notable encounter prior to the era of Middle Eastern IED/suicide bombers was the Japanese Kamikaze or Divine Wind attacks against the U.S. Navy during the last year of World War II in the Pacific. This chapter of our military history has receded from view. The World War II generation is nearly gone and our contemporary suicide adversaries now overshadow the remnants of the Japanese Divine Wind. Nevertheless, it is useful to try to understand the root causes of this type of unusual warfare.
The Divine Wind was first published in 1958, when the memories of the American’s who fought the Japanese were fresh. Equally important, especially for this book, is that the memories of the surviving Japanese who were part of the Divine Wind effort were similarly untainted by the passage of time.
Unlike most American published histories of World War II, this book is from the point of view of the enemy. Both authors were senior officers in the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force. They served in high-level staff positions during the formative days of the Divine Wind strategy, and later as the effort was implemented, helped train the personnel and pilots who executed the strategy as well as participating in planning operational Kamikaze strikes. We are thus given their point of view about why such a strategy was developed and by all accounts, successfully executed with minimal material resources and with primarily insufficiently trained pilots.
To the Japanese, the Divine Wind made sense. After the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, the Imperial Japanese Navy, particularly its offensive aircraft carrier arm, was essentially destroyed. Most of the best pilots had been killed. The carrier force was decimated and the naval and military power of the United States was rapidly bearing down on the Japanese home islands. The Divine Wind was a last ditch effort to make the American advance so costly that a peace favorable to Japan might possibly be secured.
The Japanese knew they were going to experience severe losses and felt that the damage inflicted on the Americans in taking those losses should be maximized. The Japanese warrior culture supported such a move, as did loyalty to the Emperor. Particularly early on, an abundance of volunteers provided more than enough Divine Wind pilots. As the possibility of having the attacks affect the outcome of the war diminished, it became harder to recruit pilots, most of whom by this time were very inexperienced. Nevertheless, up until the end of the war, sufficient pilots and planes existed to maintain a steady number of attacks.
Regardless, the Divine Wind failed in its mission. Many brave young men died on both sides, but the outcome of the war was never in doubt. The Divine Wind was driven more by warrior pride than common sense. Off Okinawa, the U.S. Navy suffered its greatest losses ever, but it still brushed aside the Japanese, Divine Wind and all.
The Japanese sacrificed their young men at a time when there was no hope of victory. These men might have played a beneficial role in helping rebuild Japan after the war. Thus, The Divine Wind reinforces the idea that the Kamikaze attacks were and likely are to remain interpreted quite differently by the United States and Japan. For the former, they remain a form of senseless killing. For the latter, they represent the highest form of warrior pride in defense of a divine Emperor and a nation that had not suffered defeat in a thousand years.