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Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974
Kristian Gustafson’s Hostile Intent reexamines one of the most controversial chapters in U.S. intelligence history, the Central Intelligence Agency’s covert operations in Chile from 1964 to 1974. At the request of successive U.S. presidents, the CIA in conjunction with the State Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency first acted to prevent Chilean socialist Salvador Allende from becoming the democratically elected president of his country and then tried to undermine his government once he was in office. Allende’s government eventually fell in a bloody military coup on September 11, 1973. President Richard Nixon’s administration and corporate interests were not sorry to see him go, but did U.S. covert operations actually play a decisive role in Allende’s downfall? The declassification of thousands of U.S. government documents over the last several years demands that historians take a new look.
Since 1973, most observers have maintained that U.S. machinations were responsible for the success of Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s coup that forced Allende’s fall and suicide. This assessment has been based on a thin documentary record of U.S. activity, the myth of an all-powerful CIA, and the CIA’s checkered history of covert action in Latin America. However, Gustafson convincingly shows the conventional wisdom about the impact of U.S. actions is badly flawed. His meticulous research is based upon an intensive examination of previously unavailable U.S. records as well as interviews with key figures. Hostile Intent is the most comprehensive account to date of U.S. involvement in Chile, and its provocative reinterpretation of this involvement will shape all future debates.
Since 1973, most observers have maintained that U.S. machinations were responsible for the success of Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s coup that forced Allende’s fall and suicide. This assessment has been based on a thin documentary record of U.S. activity, the myth of an all-powerful CIA, and the CIA’s checkered history of covert action in Latin America. However, Gustafson convincingly shows the conventional wisdom about the impact of U.S. actions is badly flawed. His meticulous research is based upon an intensive examination of previously unavailable U.S. records as well as interviews with key figures. Hostile Intent is the most comprehensive account to date of U.S. involvement in Chile, and its provocative reinterpretation of this involvement will shape all future debates.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published December 4, 2007
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October 8, 2016
A thorough history of Agency operations in Chile, based on declassified documents and interviews with participants. The book is quite thorough and getting through it is a bit of a slog.
Gustafson puts the operation into its foreign policy context, pointing out that US policy was quite ill-formulated throughout this time and that the various approaches to pressuring Allende were often contradictory. Gustafson also challenges the assumption that, because the US supported Pinochet later on, it must have supported his coup from the start. He argues that the CIA did not actually organize the coup against Allende or orchestrate his death, instead confining its role to supporting Allende's opposition (a conclusion that was also reached by Soviet diplomats in Chile). The CIA did not, in fact, know much about Pinochet and his plans until a few days before the coup began; it didn't even make contact with Pinochet. While it supported Allende's opposition, the CIA did not have much influence over the course of events during and after the coup. Gustafson disputes the simplistic conclusion that because the US was opposed to Allende, his demise must have been the direct result of a deliberate, orchestrated US plot. Gustafson argues that the CIA did not expect the coup, had little to do with it, knew little about the junta that replaced Allende, and did not prepare contingencies for the coup's occurrence. The CIA's posture during the Chile situation tended to be circumspect and cautious rather than hawkish, cruel, or shortsighted. "US intelligence agencies," Gustafson writes, "are neither superhuman or innately evil." He stresses the often overlooked fact that the CIA's traditional role is to execute policy, not make it, a role that it has mostly adhered to throughout its history. While the Nixon administration did support Pinochet in the aftermath of the coup, it eventually began to cut off assistance. He also argues that ITT's influence on US policy was minimal.
Gustafson reveals the extent to which the US, the Soviets, and the Cubans interfered with Chile’s domestic politics, and how ill-informed they all were. Often, the Agency resisted many of the proposals to intervene, and often the White House exercised poor oversight because American interest in Chile was so minimal; State and the CIA thus pursued inconsistent, ill-coordinated policies. Some operations were subtle, with a clear long-term strategy in mind, while others (i.e. October 1970) were "separated from any strategic thinking and uselessly sent charging into the brick wall of immovable Chilean public opinion." The story Gustafson tells often makes you wonder whether Nixon or Kissinger ever actually thought through what they even wanted in Chile. "Absurdly," Gustafson writes, "those who argue that the United States played the decisive role in the Allende regime's collapse are unwitting adherents to the school of American exceptionalism and superpatriotism that they stridently criticize Kissinger and Nixon for."
The writing can get a little turgid. There are also a few factual inaccuracies, like confusing Otis Pike and Frank Church. Curiously, he also writes that "at no point did the US decision to continue the covert action action campaign in Chile go before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee." The only reason it didn't, of course, was because that committee did not even exist at the time. And besides, Congress was informed of CIA activities in at least forty briefings from 1964 to 1973. And Gustafson's treatment of US involvement in the events that led up the coup is rather confusing and sometimes contradictory.
Balanced, well-written, and coherently argued overall.
Gustafson puts the operation into its foreign policy context, pointing out that US policy was quite ill-formulated throughout this time and that the various approaches to pressuring Allende were often contradictory. Gustafson also challenges the assumption that, because the US supported Pinochet later on, it must have supported his coup from the start. He argues that the CIA did not actually organize the coup against Allende or orchestrate his death, instead confining its role to supporting Allende's opposition (a conclusion that was also reached by Soviet diplomats in Chile). The CIA did not, in fact, know much about Pinochet and his plans until a few days before the coup began; it didn't even make contact with Pinochet. While it supported Allende's opposition, the CIA did not have much influence over the course of events during and after the coup. Gustafson disputes the simplistic conclusion that because the US was opposed to Allende, his demise must have been the direct result of a deliberate, orchestrated US plot. Gustafson argues that the CIA did not expect the coup, had little to do with it, knew little about the junta that replaced Allende, and did not prepare contingencies for the coup's occurrence. The CIA's posture during the Chile situation tended to be circumspect and cautious rather than hawkish, cruel, or shortsighted. "US intelligence agencies," Gustafson writes, "are neither superhuman or innately evil." He stresses the often overlooked fact that the CIA's traditional role is to execute policy, not make it, a role that it has mostly adhered to throughout its history. While the Nixon administration did support Pinochet in the aftermath of the coup, it eventually began to cut off assistance. He also argues that ITT's influence on US policy was minimal.
Gustafson reveals the extent to which the US, the Soviets, and the Cubans interfered with Chile’s domestic politics, and how ill-informed they all were. Often, the Agency resisted many of the proposals to intervene, and often the White House exercised poor oversight because American interest in Chile was so minimal; State and the CIA thus pursued inconsistent, ill-coordinated policies. Some operations were subtle, with a clear long-term strategy in mind, while others (i.e. October 1970) were "separated from any strategic thinking and uselessly sent charging into the brick wall of immovable Chilean public opinion." The story Gustafson tells often makes you wonder whether Nixon or Kissinger ever actually thought through what they even wanted in Chile. "Absurdly," Gustafson writes, "those who argue that the United States played the decisive role in the Allende regime's collapse are unwitting adherents to the school of American exceptionalism and superpatriotism that they stridently criticize Kissinger and Nixon for."
The writing can get a little turgid. There are also a few factual inaccuracies, like confusing Otis Pike and Frank Church. Curiously, he also writes that "at no point did the US decision to continue the covert action action campaign in Chile go before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee." The only reason it didn't, of course, was because that committee did not even exist at the time. And besides, Congress was informed of CIA activities in at least forty briefings from 1964 to 1973. And Gustafson's treatment of US involvement in the events that led up the coup is rather confusing and sometimes contradictory.
Balanced, well-written, and coherently argued overall.
February 4, 2009
Much has been written on the topic, and quite a few authors have already made the main argument of the book.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews