By the middle of the second century BCE, after nearly one hundred years of warfare, Rome had exerted its control over the entire Mediterranean world, forcing the other great powers of the region―Carthage, Macedonia, Egypt, and the Seleucid empire―to submit militarily and financially. But how, despite its relative poverty and its frequent numerical disadvantage in decisive battles, did Rome prevail? Michael J. Taylor explains this surprising outcome by examining the role that manpower and finances played, providing a comparative study that quantifies the military mobilizations and tax revenues for all five powers. Though Rome was the poorest state, it enjoyed the largest military mobilization, drawing from a pool of citizens, colonists, and allies, while its wealthiest adversaries failed to translate revenues into large or successful armies. Taylor concludes that state-level extraction strategies were decisive in the warfare of the period, as states with high conscription and low taxation raised larger, more successful armies than those that primarily sought to maximize taxation. Comprehensive and detailed, Soldiers and Silver offers a new and sophisticated perspective on the political dynamics and economies of these ancient Mediterranean empires.
Taylor has presented a fascinating analysis of ancient Roman revenue vs. military costs from 280 - 168 BCE. While it is always prudent to treat any attempt to determine specific financial facts about an ancient society, Taylor uses every resource available. Therefore, his assessment of Roman finances carry significant weight.
He shows quite clearly that Rome's Republican organization and its various methods of incorporating conquered peoples into the Republic elevated it above other major powers of the time. Rather than heavily taxing conquered peoples (as other powers did), Rome lightly taxed them (if at all) and instead required them to provide troops when needed and pay their salaries. As a result, Rome could field tens of thousands of men at a minimal cost. The other powers of the day could not do so; thus, Rome was able to conquer numerous peoples, keep them happy (mostly) with the Republic, and have a resilience that lasted a thousand years in the west. Or, as Michael Mann would say, Rome had "infrastructural power."
Taylor stated in his conclusions: "The Middle Republican State was a sophisticated and subtle engine of resource extraction and deployment with, by contemporary standards, extraordinarily high infrastructural capacity. If it had not been, the course of Mediterranean geopolitical history could have been very different."
Please note that this book is extremely detailed and may not appeal to the casual historian. However, those who are seriously interested in, and familiar with, ancient Roman history will find the information in the book absolutely engrossing.
A very nice overview of the numbers and budgets of the various powers of the Mediterranean in the 2nd and 3rd centuries BC. Taylor does a great job of giving a general overview and then detailing his assumptions. I especially appreciate that the author makes clear where the uncertainties are and that the goals are to get a general idea (order of magnitude) estimate in order to evaluate how atypical Rome, Carthage, and the various Greek (Alexander-successor) states were before Rome became an empire.
Taylor motivates his assumptions and comes out with interesting conclusions: namely Rome was able to mobilize more people at a lower price than other states, enabling Rome to fight "multi-theater" wars and so conquer the Mediterranean. Perhaps surprisingly, during the time period covered, Rome's wars were not especially lucrative (though they proved to become so), and the Greek states probably had higher revenues available to them.
Taylor does an excellent job laying out an argument reliant on highly technical information and analysis in a clear and accessible way. His ultimate conclusion, that conscription and republican governance proved superior as a combination to high taxation and monarchical governance, is convincing. This book easily could have been a painful slog, but Taylor keeps his economic analysis straightforward, and his writing clear enough that it is instead quite readable. His forthright discussion of the merits of various sources, and the degree of uncertainty present in his estimates is also good to see.
Much like Evan Schultheis' Battle of the Catalaunian Fields, this is a very academic read that bombards you with numbers and dates and countless names, backed up by thick volume of works cited. But since I'm a sicko who likes reading about the finances and troop strengths of the middle period Roman Republic and its Mediterranean rivals, I was entertained throughout.