A detailed narrative of the diplomatic, political and military maneuvers that occurred between the Munich Agreement in September 1938, and the invasion of Poland in September 1939.
Acknowledgments 1 Aide-mémoire. Incident at Eger; Prophets of Armageddon; The antipathetic alliance 2 The road to Prague. "How long will this burlesque last?"; "Don't you see?...It's the German insurance companies that will have to pay!"; Hitler over Bohemia 3 Warsaw or Moscow? The Führer is sick; The panic pact; Hitler briefs his generals; The conspirators are worried; "You must think we are nitwits & nincompoops!"; Slow boat to Leningrad 4 Moment of truth. The walrus; Stalin makes up his mind; Hitler takes a hand; Ribbentrop's hour of triumph 5 The sands run out. Mussolini reneges; The indefatigable Swede; Operation "Canned Goods" 6 World War II. Common action or another conference?; At last Epilogue Sources Notes Index Maps
Leonard Oswald Mosley OBE OStJ (11 February 1913 – June 1992) was a British journalist, historian, biographer and novelist. His works include five novels and biographies of General George Marshall, Reich Marshall Hermann Göring, Orde Wingate, Walt Disney, Charles Lindbergh, Du Pont family, Eleanor Dulles, Allen Welsh Dulles, John Foster Dulles and Darryl F. Zanuck. He also worked as chief war correspondent for London's The Sunday Times.
An excellent overview with many fascinating details of the events leading up to the Nazi invasion of Poland on Sep 1, 1939. Written by a journalist who knew many of the characters he wrote about.
A very sad account of the prelude to the outbreak of war in September, 1939.
The author was an English journalist who lived in Germany during that time, so much of this story has a very personal feeling, giving it a lot of resonance. He also came to know some of the personalities involved such as Horace Wilson who was the personal secretary to Prime Minister Chamberlain.
The English leadership in particular is depicted as completely misunderstanding who they were dealing with when dialoguing with the Nazi leadership. It was only in March 1939, after Nazi Germany marched into what was left of Czechoslovakia, that a dim light went on and the reality of what was happening started to dawn on Neville Chamberlain and the other appeasers in government. It should also be pointed out that the appeasers were not intimidated by Hitler; appeasement is what they wanted. The author provides us with an example of a conversation in late August when Dahlerus, the Swedish businessman turned diplomat, is asked by Neville Chamberlain what sort of impression he had of Hitler. Dahlerus replies that he would not “like to have him as a partner in business.” (page 411 my book) This is exactly the point the author makes throughout – the English were in a world of rational business transactions. Hitler was at an entirely different level – he was a fanatic nationalist (among other things). One rule stands out in this book - in politics know the true nature of who you are dealing with. The French, I believe, were more cynical and knew more what the stakes were, but were totally unwilling to commit. Czechoslovakia and Poland knew, but had not the military strength – and both were bluntly betrayed by England and France.
There are two areas in which I disagree with the author.
The author writes that in the negotiations of England and France with the Soviet Union for the defense of Poland that it was the English that were vacillating. I feel it was the Soviet Union (Stalin) obfuscating to determine what they could really get. And they knew what they could get from Hitler – a chunk of Poland and the Baltic States. Seldom has a treaty (with its secret clause) been as jaded and shameful as the Nazi-Soviet pact. For an alternative view see The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939-1941.
Also toward the very end with one million Nazi troops poised on the Polish border for a full-scale invasion, the author states that Hitler finally presented worthwhile terms to the English ambassador to Germany, Nevile Henderson. These terms may have been “rational” but given at this late hour, with masses of the German army poised on the Polish frontier and given how Hitler had treated the leadership of both Austria and Czechoslovakia – Nevile Henderson was quite correct to realize that Hitler was presenting an ultimatum to the Poles.
Despite these two flaws this is a most readable work of the final agonizing year before the most destructive war in history broke out. We are given a view of ineptitude on one side and the utter viciousness and duplicity of the Nazi personalities involved.
Page 21 (my book) William Strang Lumped with other British statesmen “all English country gentlemen, all good public-school men, all good churchmen. They seldom visited Europe, or knew what Europeans were like. None of them could have the slightest conception of the enormity of Hitler. Their whole upbringing conspired against understanding that such people exist...was so bound by tradition that he never wavered in the principles he was taught when young. No new view of the world or violent changes dinted his orthodoxy.”
This is a well written, well researched text which includes a great deal of material drawn from the author's own notes, taken as a reporter inside Germany and a number of Eastern countries just prior to the outbreak of World War II. Like his contemporary, William Shirer, Leonard Mosley brings a professional eye to the major events of the period leading up to the start of the war, and the fact that he was often sur place, gives the book a most authentic ring. The book raises a number of seemingly minor but possibly vital questions such as: would Hitler's attitude to Chamberlain have been different had the British P.M. not turned up in Berchtesgarden with a staff of only four people? Certainly he began to develop a degree of contempt for Chamberlain from that meeting onward, and when it came time for the fateful meeting on the Rhine some months later, Hitler was openly contemptuous of the British P.M.
Would things have also been different had the Czechoslovakian President, Eduard Benes, had more sleep just prior to the events of September 1938? Would he have seen things more clearly and called in the Russians, as he probably should have done (and, it is believed, nearly did do)? And would it not have been much more favourable for the British and French to fight Germany with Czechoslovakia in 1938, than without her in 1939? Mosley is very good at asking these sorts of questions, which, so many years later, may prove to have been very decisive indeed.
How many odd events seemed to influence the mood of the leaders of that time. How many messages failed to get through to the right place. Sometimes they were inexplicably held up en route (Mosley suggests it may have been due, on occasions, to Communist spies in the British Secret Service - like Donald McLean). At other times, well placed people (like Paul Stehlin, the French Air Attaché in Berlin), tried to warn their governments repeatedly that things were hotting up, but were not taken seriously. As for the extraordinary series of errors committed by the Anglo-French military and political delegations to Moscow just prior to the invasion of Poland, Mosley covers them in detail and highlights many points hitherto overlooked.
These and many other forgotten issues probably exerted a far greater influence at the time than has been thought since. Yet in the end, it was the personality of Adolf Hitler himself, although set off and to some extent complemented in exactly the wrong way by the French and British leaders of the period (and one might add, the Italian), which proved decisive. From the very start, it was undoubtedly Hitler's war, and Mosley brings this historical imperative more firmly into the light of day than ever. It nevertheless leaves one quite breathless, to see in detail how it all came about.
I've read a number of books by Leonard Mosley and enjoyed all of them. This was no exception. Unlike many academic writers, someone with the journalism experience held by Mosley has to please both his readership. Thus I've come to favor histories written by non-academicians.
This work is a study of the decisions and actions which led to the German invasion of Poland and the consequent declarations of war by Britain and France. The focus is therefore on 1938-39 and on the governments of those powers as well as of Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy and the Soviet Union. British deliberations, however, are treated most thoroughly.
The author's thesis is that World War Two may have been prevented, or at least substantially delayed, if the Allied Powers had acted more intelligently and expeditiously in their dealings with Germany. Munich, in other words, was only one instance of many failures of Allied foreign policy, failures directly attributable to the Chamberlain government. This is not an 'objective' study, but it is an argument well-documented and researched by its author.
Much of the material in this book was familiar to me, broadly speaking, but I appreciated the detail that over five hundred pages devoted to such a short period of time afforded. I hadn't known, for instance, how exactly Hitler effected his final occupation of Czechoslovakia or where the SS got those fellows they dressed up in Polish uniforms, then shot, in order to 'prove' that Poland had attacked first.
One of my better finds at a library book sale. Published in 1969, Mosely was a journalist who watched the run up to war from Berlin, London and Paris. He had the advantage of having access to many of the second tier and third tier government and military officials who worked under the leaders of the time, to critique and balance the often self-serving memoirs they left. Predictably he's extremely critical of Chamberlain, Daladier and their fellow appeasers. What is truly tragic is how unprepared Germanhy was for war. Hitler was essentially a gambler and a con man who fooled the West. If France and Britain had stood up to Hitler in 1938 in the Seudeten crisis Hitler would likely have backed down. If he had ordered the German army into Czechoslovakia, the German generals were prepared to remove. But the failure of the West undercut the anti-Hitler movement and encouraged Hitler to go for even more. Ultimately, Hitler was convinced that France and Britain would never go to war over Poland. Also surprising were the extent to which Mussolini and Goering were opposed to war. Mussolini, who hadn't expected Germany to go to war until 1942, told Hitler, to Hitler's disgust, Italy wouldn't support him unless given immense amounts of resources. Goering, working through Swedish businessman Birger Dahlerus, tried to negotiate a settlement with the British even into teh first days of the war. An interesting read for students of WWII.
Reading this with view of executive leadership and decision making, my blood boiled with the lack of backbone, lack of froward thinkers, lack of ability and lack of morals. What also got me was the large amount of brown nosers and placaters. We all know about how Chamberlain famously proclaimed that he had "secured peace in our lifetimes." What most do not know is that he was attempting to create an alliance with Germany and even after the invasion of Poland was still trying to organize a conference. This book is filled with many examples that if any of the nations stood up to Hitler, he would have backed down. He bet that they would not. Well researched with direct interviews of many of the people involved. Much more than I knew. Worth the read.
Reading this book requires a lot of attention because it describes the intense machinations of world leaders as World War II begins. After all real life includes a lot of people. The author was a journalist reporting from these countries, and has his own research to draw from , plus interviews with people like Hitler's translator.
Eye-opening, packed with information, but often reading like a thriller (journalists have to entertain the reader more than academics do .)
Riveting narrative of Europe's slide into war in the late 1930s. Mosley's writing is tight, evocative and detailed, bringing to life the personalities and circumstances that determined whether Europe would go to war or not.
I have read this book several times and it's always a treat. And with the crisis in Ukraine looming large and threatening as I write this, it is more pertinent than ever. Highly recommended.
Interesting account of the run-up of events to the start of World War Two. The book is very entertaining, for being historically accurate. This is probably due to the fact that the author is a journalist and not a historian. It tells the events in an engaging and gripping style, but I would go to other secondary source books for more detail.
Great insight to the diplomatic and political lead up to ww2. The amount of in depth knowledge about meetings and conversations between various countries was fascinating. I was shocked at what was actually going on behind the scenes as these large events played out over time.
Enjoyed, author clearly has biases on what should've happened and when, which come through slightly and I'm never a fan of, but a good look at the relations between Germany/France/UK in the lead to WW2.
Devastating critique about the failure of the western democracies to stop Hitler when they had the chance
Most students of history understand the western democracies, fearful of repeating the horrific death toll and devastation of the First World War, struggled mightily to avoid a "small"/local conflict in eastern Europe drag multiple great powers into a catastrophic war. Of course, the British and French leaders (with a few exceptions) did not understand the depth of Hitler's ambitions and utter ruthlessness (and lack of moral limits), meaning appeasing a few of this dictator's demands was more likely to fuel a new war (rather than pull-back from war, which well-timed diplomacy and concessions *might* have prevented the worst horrors of WWI).
This book is a harsh critique of the diplomacy leading to the Second World War, and is especially eye-opening for examining how important it is to stand up to "irrational" or "ideologically extreme" actors like Hitler, whose goals, methods, risk-taking and actions trample on the restrictions and norms expected by traditional diplomatic and government leaders.
As the say goes, a country often prepares for and fights the "current" war based on the lessons of the previous war. This work brings to light both how leaders in the late 1930's were trying to avoid the "mistakes" leading to calamity of the First World War. It also provides an insight into Cold War policies, as western leaders vowed not to make the same mistakes when facing Stalin and the later Soviet leaders as they did when first facing Hitler (and sometimes also apply this logic, for good and bad, when dealing with similar ideological and/or demagogic leaders, even today).
These overarching insights aside, the core of the book is an account of where and how western powers could have stopped Hitler short of leading Europe (and eventually the world) into the most catastrophic man-made event in human history. It examines who strong countries can be manipulated by opponents who do not abide by the moral, ethical, and risk-taking restraints we expect out of most international leaders.
This book completely blows open my perception on how World War 2 began. While I had some understanding of the deficiencies of Chamberlain, the British Government, and the French Government, I had no idea of the back and forth between the major powers, and the lengths to which Chamberlain was willing to go to avoid a war. I have read Churchill's accountant on the beginning of the war, and he has not nearly the same amount of detail to the Continent's events as Mosley does.
As a war correspondent Mosley knew many of the characters in this book personally and it shows, with the great amount of detail into their personalities. This book gives a great account to what really led up to the Second World War.
A masterpiece in research, suspense, intrigue, and storytelling. When I finished the book, I wanted to read more....much more! Frankly, I was sorry to read the last page because Mosley had me hooked! The author captures the year before the war in an enduring tale of conspiracy, manipulation, trickery, and miscalculations. The blunders, and delusions on both sides are ingeniously described with superlative competence from someone who witnessed the events unravel. This book is a TEN on a FIVE scale!
A good, in depth look at the years and months leading up to World War II. It made me question, "what would have happened if...?" Was the war inevitable after the treaty of Versailles and the Washington treaty?